PANORAMA OF GLOBAL SECURITY ENVIRONMENT 2017-2018
THE CENTRAL EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE
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Europe and North Atlantic
EU AND V4 RESPONSE TO TERRORISM AFTER PARIS

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Introduction

There is a long history of cooperation within EU counter-terrorism policy which has been the subject of hundreds of academic books and articles utilizing various approaches. However, with the constant development of the environment and updated measures, the natural disadvantage of all published studies in this area is that they are aging very quickly. In 2013, Raphael Bossong published a comprehensive book analysing the development of the EU counter-terrorism policy by using the three streams approach, focusing on securitization, politics and policy outcomes (Bossong, 2013). It is evident from his book that every significant terrorist attack has created a “window of opportunity” during which the national interests of the EU Member States were transformed into policy outcomes resulting in the strengthening of the EU counter-terrorism policy.

This paper develops and updates the work of Raphael Bossong, focusing on EU level and national level policy development after the 2015 Paris attacks. Nevertheless, due to the limited space, Bossong’s complex approach has been reduced to a short period of time (2015-2017) with a focus on policy changes within V4 countries at the national level. Moreover, policy developments at both the EU and V4 national levels are analyzed in the light of the existing EU counter-terrorism strategy which is related to the principal research question: Which of the four pillars defined within the EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy (EUCTS) was mostly developed by policy changes adopted in 2015-2017? As indicated above, measures will be analyzed at the EU and V4 level.

The main claim verified in this paper is that the Paris attacks provided a new “window of opportunity” which led to the development of counter-terrorism policy measures at the EU and V4 national level mainly strengthening the prevent pillar of the EU Counter-terrorism strategy while the protect, pursue and respond pillars were merely neglected.
EU response to the new wave of terrorism

In November 2013, terrorists killed 130 people in Paris, starting a new wave of terrorism in Europe which also struck other cities including Brussels, Nice, Berlin and London. The new wave of terrorism encouraged EU leaders to move forward within the fight against terrorism at the EU level. Just five days after the attacks in Paris, the European council highlighted the following needs (Council of the European Union, 2015):

1) Improve measures against financing terrorism;
2) Enhance information sharing and greater cooperation between security services;
3) Implement systematic and coordinated checks at external borders;
4) Examine the Commission’s proposals on firearms; and
5) Enhance cooperation with countries, especially in the Middle East and North Africa.

The most visible and most consensual issue was to cut finances to terrorists. In this area, ministers began fulfilling its proclamation quickly, as already in February 2016, the Economic and Financial Affairs Council adopted their first significant measure in the form of conclusions on the fight against the financing of terrorism. This included the use of virtual currencies for financing terrorism, prepaid cards and measures against illicit cash movements as well as improvement in access to information by financial intelligence units (Council of the European Union, 2016a). This measure mainly increased competences in pursuing terrorism but has also had a certain impact on preventing terrorism, as terrorists need money to finance their activities.

The second important measure was negotiated on the eve of the terrorist attack in Brussels, when the Council agreed, in its negotiating position, on the proposal for a directive on combating terrorism which is aimed at preventing terrorist attacks by criminalising preparation, training or travelling abroad for terrorist purposes (Council of the European Union, 2016b). The directive was later adopted in April 2017 and as is evident from the name, it enhanced the prevent pillar and partly the response to terrorism pillar due to the criminalization of terrorism related activities. Moreover, the Council held a debate regarding a new directive on the control of the acquisition and possession of weapons (Council of the European Union, 2016b) which was introduced as a new tool setting limits on the possession of guns and outlawing the possession of certain types of weapons later in
2017. Similarly to the directive on combating terrorism, the nature of the gun control directive is mainly preventive. Critics of the directive claim that it only partially undermines the ability of a terrorist to conduct a terrorist attack while disproportionally complicating the use of weapons by sport associations, collectors, hunters etc.

The terrorist attack in Brussels in March 2016, which cost 35 lives, further intensified efforts leading to the fight against terrorism in the area of checks and external border protection. By the end of 2016, the Council had adopted another important measure in the form of the EU Passenger Name Record (PNR) for the prevention, detection, investigation and prosecution of terrorist offences and serious crime (Council of the European Union, 2016c). The PNR directive obliged air carriers to collect data on reservations and the check-in process and provide this data to security services. In this regard, data related to PNR especially assists the development of the pursue terrorism pillar but also has an impact on the prevent and respond pillars, depending on the nature and purpose for which the data will be used.

Similarly to PNR, the European Commission presented its proposal on the European Travel Information and Authorisation System (ETIAS) to the Council which is aimed at gathering data about visa-exempt travellers (Council of the European Union, 2016d). Like other measures, it is mainly related to pursuing terrorism in relation to EUCTS with a slight overlap with protection and other areas if we consider that data gathering under ETIAS will be used in a similar way as PNR data.

The first half of 2017 was also productive in the subject of adopted measures. In March 2017, the Council adopted a regulation to reinforce checks at external borders and the already mentioned directive on combating terrorism especially aimed at the return of foreign fighters. Later in 2017, the Council updated guidelines to combat radicalisation and terrorism recruitment and several other measures related to the compatibility of information systems were also introduced (without further specification). The Council also passed conclusions on the Commission action plan on travel document fraud (see Council of the European Union, 2017).

Seemingly, right after the Paris attack, less has been done in the fifth large area indicated during the meeting in the autumn of 2015. As in 2016, the Council reviewed the implementation of the regional strategy for Syria and Iraq especially in relation to stopping the financing of terrorism,
counter radicalisation, and increasing its counter-terrorism action (Council of the European Union, 2016c) with implications especially for the preventive part of the EUCTS.

To sum up, policy measures following the Paris attacks were especially aimed at data gathering, prevention and border control, while the development in the last area could be connected with the immigration crisis. In the light of the EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy setting up the strategic commitment to “prevent, protect, pursue and respond” to terrorism (Council of the European Union, 2005: 3), the above-mentioned measures adopted between 2015 and mid 2017 are mainly aimed at the prevention and pursuit of terrorism.

The result is not surprising as in reality almost every measure has its preventive dimension due to creating obstacles for preparing, planning, financing or conducting terrorist attacks. For this reason, we can claim that the proposed measures may benefit various areas under EUCTS or have a multiplier effect. Despite a series of new attacks, the response of the EU was limited to several visible initiatives. There are at least three reasons for that.

Firstly, counter-terrorism policy is by its nature national policy where even decisions agreed at the EU level are implemented and executed at the national level. In this sense the EU acts like an overarching cooperation body but the executive part is predominantly carried out at the Member State level. Secondly, the EU already has limited space to develop new initiatives. After 9/11 and the attacks in Madrid (2004) and London (2005), EU counter-terrorism policy experienced a fast build-up and only limited space remained for new activities. Thirdly, even among the limited initiatives introduced after the Paris attacks, at least two of the most visible ones were criticised as relatively weak as they follow a similar logic. The attacks in Nice or Berlin have proven that terrorists may carry out a destructive attack with very limited financial resources. Similarly, a reduction in the number of guns available to citizens does not significantly limit terrorism as terrorists may use different, more available and even more effective weapons (such as trucks or knives).

In this sense, it is logical that EU measures deal mainly with preventive measures with a link to the Schengen regime. This, however, leads to the expectation that executive measures will be adopted at the level of Member States which are not limited by the burden of consensual decision making and sovereignty issues as they are at the EU level. Similarly, the lesser number of actors involved in the V4 club promises deeper cooperation.
V4 response to the new wave of terrorism

The Paris attacks were also reflected in the V4 platform. In its Joint statement from 3 December 2015, the V4 Prime ministers expressed solidarity and sympathy with the French nations. Moreover, representatives agreed that the December European Council would be a body which would adopt “all relevant means of countering terrorism”, naming especially the PNR Directive, measures combating the financing of terrorism and organized crime and the EU framework for firearms control. In the statement, the V4 also mentioned the need for better border protection by enhancing FRONTEX (Visegrad Group, 2015). These key initiatives were also mentioned in the following statements by V4 leaders, which generally addressed terrorism with a special focus on PNR or information exchange among intelligence agencies.

Visegrad countries have really made significant advancements in their security cooperation. On 19 January 2016, the V4 countries adopted a non-paper in Prague on enhancing cooperation against terrorism which led to joint actions in the following fields (Visegrad Group 2016):

- Initiating EU-level regulations concerning various web-based communication applications, and improving the cooperation between operators of these platforms and national security agencies;
- The unified definition, among V4 and V4+ partners, of key counter-terrorism systems and facilities;
- Elaborating a common definition of civilian targets;
- Defining the parameters of technical equipment and the tools used to detect dangerous substances.

In this sense, V4 cooperation succeeded not only in representing a communication platform which leads to a common position at the EU level, but in some areas enabled more flexible cooperation going beyond the set EU agenda. Moreover, individual V4 states used the Paris attacks as an impetus towards updating existing tools and adopting new legislation which was sometimes considered as controversial.

For example, on 22 June 2016, Poland passed new anti-terrorism measures which were controversial due to their inconsistency with the
Polish Constitution and human rights (Panoptikon, 2016). According to the new law, the Polish state security apparatus is allowed to conduct surveillance of foreign citizens for three months without court approval. Moreover, authorities are allowed to hold suspects for 14 days without charging them, with court approval. The legislation will also enable wiretapping the phones of foreigners without court permission (see Panoptikon, 2016). These measures are potentially very restrictive in terms of freedom, but on the other hand strengthen Polish counter-terrorism policy which is mainly based on the National Counter-Terrorism Programme 2015-2019 (Narodowy Program Antyterrorystyczny na lata 2015–2019).

The adopted measures are in line with the third chapter of the programme which stresses that the main aim is to improve the capacity to prevent terrorist threats, strengthening the preparation of services and institutions for the possibility of terrorist attack, increasing responsiveness in the case of an event, and improving effectiveness in producing the forces, resources and procedures in the fight against terrorism (Monitor Polski, 2014). Similarly to other countries, Poland established an Anti-Terrorist Centre (Centrum Antyterrorystyczne) under the framework of the Internal Security Agency, which has good potential to cooperate with other V4 partners, back in 1998 at the operational level.

Hungary also adopted a controversial new-anti terror law in June 2016, which meant more public surveillance and increased possibilities to use the army. The constitutional amendment (passed by a vote of 153 to 13, with 1 abstention) states that under the threat of terrorism, the government may rule by decree and suspend certain laws at its discretion, expand the force of others and may also adopt extraordinary measures (Fidesz, 2016). These changes were strongly criticized as the legislation provides extensive executive powers in the event of an emergency, including the ban of public assemblies, a severe restriction on the freedom of movement and the freezing of assets (Amnesty International, 2017). On the other hand, the counter-terrorism package allows the use of the army for anti-terrorist operations and gives the government the right to introduce a curfew, to place restrictions on the movement of vehicles, to ban mass events, to reinforce border protection, to initiate stricter control of the internet or read postal communication. The new law also requires telecommunications service providers to cooperate with the Special Service for National Security and

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1 For an overview of the Polish institutional landscape in the fight against terrorism see (Zięba)
the police in decrypting the communication of citizens (Hungary Today, 2016). The Counter-Terrorism and Criminal Analysis Centre (TIBEK) has also been established in order to collect and analyse data (Sadecki, 2016).

An anti-terrorism package has also been passed in Slovakia. The new measures enhance the options or abilities of the police, the special prosecutor’s office, courts and intelligence services. The package consisted of a constitutional act, an update of the Penal code and 13 other Acts. A revision of the constitution allowed the extending of the period of pre-charged detention for people suspected of terrorism from 5 to 10 days. Penal code revision brought higher sanctions for acts related to terrorism, which might in some cases be from 20 to 25 years of imprisonment and suspects may be prosecuted in custody for five years (Smer, 2015). It is also important to note that government passed a law to prevent the spread of Islam in the country by tightening the rules for church registration. Instead of the previously needed 20,000 signatures, the novelization requires 50,000 signatures of Slovak citizens with permanent residence. The law was controversial as just four out of 18 registered churches fulfil the criteria and, according to critics, the law violates one of the basic rights guaranteed by the Slovak constitution (President of the Slovak Republic, 2016). Despite the proposal officially aimed at limiting state contributions to registered churches, there is also a dimension related to the immigration crisis and the spread of Islam which is feared by some citizens in Slovakia and the law served as prevention of this. As with Poland and Hungary, the changes made in Slovakia also mainly had a preventive character.

In the Czech Republic, the government prepared an “Audit of National Security” which was a reaction to the changed environment in Europe, which is facing increasing internal and external threats. Terrorism is addressed as the first out of ten important threats (Vláda, 2016). As of June 2016, the Czech government also passed a partially classified “Counter-terrorism package” improving the asylum system and the use of information during terrorism prosecution. The government also updated the Penal Code which newly includes the crime of financing terrorism and terrorism propagation (Ministry of Interior, 2017). This package has been accompanied by two other initiatives: the so-called “Legislative Proposals in the Area of Internal Security” and the “Proposal for Enhanced Security at International Airports in the Czech Republic” improving measures within civil aviation (Ministry of Interior, 2016:18). The government also established a new Centre against terrorism and hybrid threats under the Ministry of Interior, with mainly an analytical and communication purpose.
After the Paris attacks, the public debate in the Czech Republic was occupied mainly with the new EU proposal on arms regulation (next to topics such as migration and Islam). In this sense, a constitutional amendment which was passed by the Chamber of Deputies in June 2017 attracts attention. The amendment codifies the right to use a gun against a terrorist during an act of terrorism, although it could be understood mainly in terms of populism. Firstly, the Czech legal system already acknowledges the institute of supreme emergency which allows for necessary self-defense in critical situations and thus a special law is not required; and secondly, the amendment was meant as a preventive act to bypass a proposed EU directive tightening gun possession. However, even the second aim does not make any sense as in the case of a clash between EU law and national law, the EU law is applicable.

To sum up, the cooperation in the fight against terrorism at the V4 level became closer and all V4 states updated their law in relation to terrorism and created or enhanced powers for security services. This process was especially criticized in Poland and Hungary. As pointed out by John Dalhuisen from Amnesty International: “In the wake of a series of appalling attacks, from Paris to Berlin, the government has rushed through a raft of disproportionate and discriminatory laws”(Amnesty International, 2017). The fight against terrorism has again raised the question of the right balance between security and freedoms. No wonder that such measures were seen sensitively especially in the light of deteriorating democratic standards where there is a concern that these newly introduced measures might later be misused against a country’s own citizens. Poland, Hungary and, after the 2017 elections, also Czech Republic, are undergoing a departure from liberal democracy.

**Conclusion**

As Bossong (2013) pointed out, every greater terrorist attack created a new “window of opportunity” which resulted in the adoption of new measures to fight against terrorism. The Paris attacks of 2015 were no exception. However, the window of opportunity opened after the attacks was much smaller than after 9/11 or the Madrid and London attacks which might be related to the fact that all major initiatives had already adopted and that counter-terrorism policy is mainly the domain of the states. For this reason, the character of the adopted measures at the EU level and at the level of the Member States is slightly different.
This paper posed the question: Which of the four pillars defined within the EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy (EUCTS) was mostly developed by policy changes adopted in 2015-2017? As analyzed in the first part, the EU developed tools in five important areas: states agreed to adopt (1) terrorism anti-financing legislation, (2) PNR, (3) ETIAS, adopted the (3) directive on combating terrorism and adopted the (4) directive on limiting the possession of guns. States also revised (5) the regional strategy for Syria and Iraq and adopted (6) measures for better border management. These measures have a predominantly preventive dimension and a pursuing terrorism dimension.

These measures are consensual in nature as they are related to the Schengen area and the four freedoms which have inherent security implications. However, behind this enabled consensus, counter-terrorism policy remains bound by national interests which are preventing further cooperation. A typical example is the absence of interest for creating a common EU security intelligence agency dealing with the fight against terrorism. Next to this interest, there is also the matter of trust between the 28 Member States which undermines cooperation in this sensitive area.

For this reason, cooperation between smaller groups of states exists in the area of internal security and the V4 is a good example. At the level of the V4, states especially dealt with information exchange and also focused on agreement on common terms. The V4 states closely cooperated and supported measures taken at the EU level. The domestic response in the individual V4 states resulted in the adoption of anti-terrorism packages which were controversial especially in Hungary and Poland due to a potential violation of freedoms and their restrictive nature. However, contrary to the EU level, we can observe a shift towards more executive measures aimed at improving the dimension of pursuing terrorism. States updated their laws in relation to the act of terrorism and, especially in Poland and Hungary, extended the powers of security services.

Reference list


On the night of Friday, 13 November 2015, a series of coordinated terrorist attacks in Paris claimed by the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) took the life of 130 people, as well as injuring more than 350 (BBC 2015).

A few days later, in a heartfelt speech that will remain part of the history of the EU, François Hollande announced that France was at war, and asked for aid and assistance from the other EU member states through Article 42 (7) TEU, the EU’s so-called mutual defence clause. Many defence counsellors in Brussels and in other EU capitals must have been caught off guard: it was the first activation of the clause since the Lisbon treaty’s entry into force. The article had remained hidden from the spotlight for so long that Hollande even mislabelled it in his speech: he called it the “solidarity clause”, which would correspond to Article 222 TFEU (France Diplomatie 2015).

Article 42 (7) TEU appears to form a legally binding defence union between all the EU MS, should one of them be a victim of armed aggression. Indeed, the wording makes it, at least at first sight, not too dissimilar from NATO Article 5. Therefore, for the six EU countries that are not NATO members (Austria, Cyprus, Finland, Ireland, Malta, Sweden), Article 42 (7) TEU could play a significant role in their defence's considerations.

This work will first explore the significance of EU’s mutual defence clause in the light of the French activation, and then assess the article's usefulness for the two non-NATO EU member states arguably more at risk of military aggression: Finland and Sweden.
Article 42 (7) TEU: an unexplored potential

To start with, it is worth shedding some light on the history and the applicability of Article 42 (7), and then draw a comparison with NATO Article 5 and the EU’s solidarity clause.

As an EU Briefing Paper on the Lisbon Treaty and its consequences for CFSP and CSDP notes, the wording of Article 42 (7) TEU is a compromise between three different groups of states: 1) those seeking a binding commitment on mutual defence; 2) those willing to highlight the role of NATO; and 3) the neutral states (Mills 2015). Concerning the latter group, it is worth noting that the current wording of “aid and assistance” replaced “mutual defence” at their request (Mills 2015). It is perhaps ironic that the neutral countries quickly became the ones most interested in fulfilling the potential of the clause. After all, as highlighted by Tiilikainen (2008, 12-14), the mutual assistance clause was not negotiated foreseeing any security needs, but principally to justify and facilitate the integration of the Western European Union’s (WEU) structures into the EU. In this sense, the Russian invasion of Georgia in 2008, started when the negotiations of the treaty were already over, has certainly contributed to rekindling the debate about common defence arrangements.

The mutual defence clause states that MS “shall have an obligation of aid and assistance by all means in their power” towards the state which is a victim of armed aggression – with some exceptions in the next comma. Still, even taking those exceptions into account, it would remain a strong obligation. It is only with the so-called Irish Protocol of 2012 that the European Council restricted the scope of the article. The Protocol confers a discretionary power to all the MS, when it states that: “It will be for Member States […] to determine the nature of aid or assistance to be provided to a Member State which is the object of a terrorist attack or the victim of armed aggression on its territory” (European Council 2012).

However, the Irish Protocol does not change one element: if the member states agree on the grounds used to invoke Article 42 (7), then they would become automatically bound by it. In effect, it can be argued that a Reasonable Standard Test (RST) should be adopted to determine whether the nature of the intervention is appropriate, taking into account the magnitude of the event and the capabilities of each member state. The RST would have the merit of keeping the Article flexible to interpretation on a case-by-case scenario. On this point, it must be noted that the
minimum threshold to activate the casus foederis is “armed aggression”. Certainly, any member state could disagree on whether such a threshold is met; however, if it accepts the claim of the invoking member state, then it becomes bound to provide adequate aid and assistance. This, in effect, is what de facto happened in November 2015: commenting on the legal basis used by France, Biscop (2016) critically noted that France used the clause after having already conducted military operations against ISIS, thus asking for a legitimation of its self-defence *ex post*. However, since no member state questioned the legal basis, the obligation to provide aid and assistance became applicable to all of them.

Concerning the minimum threshold required to invoke the *casus foederis*, i.e. armed aggression, the majority of scholars believe that the categories “use of force”, “aggression” and “armed attack” are in ascending order of gravity; in other words, not all aggressions are armed attacks (Ruys 2010, 127-130). If we accept this classification, Article 42 (7) can also be invoked, for example, in case of hybrid threats, such as cyber attacks.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>ARTICLE 42 TEU</th>
<th>ARTICLE 222 TFEU</th>
<th>NATO ARTICLE 5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Applicability</strong></td>
<td>Armed Aggression</td>
<td>A terrorist attack or a natural or man-made disaster</td>
<td>Armed Attack</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Territorial Extension</strong></td>
<td>The territory of the EU, as defined by Art. 355 TFEU.</td>
<td>The clause can be invoked regardless of whether the event occurs within the borders of the EU.</td>
<td>Europe or North America</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Involvement of the Institutions</strong></td>
<td>Neither specified, nor required.</td>
<td>Specified in Article 5 of the Council Decision of 24 June 2014 on the arrangements for the implementation by the Union of the solidarity clause.</td>
<td>Not necessary in principle, role of coordination in practice.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Nature of the Intervention</strong></td>
<td>“Aid and assistance by all means in their power” (with caveats)</td>
<td>To be defined through the Integrated Political Crisis Response (IPCR) mechanism.</td>
<td>All actions deemed necessary, including the use of armed force.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Article 42 (7) TEU vis-à-vis Article 222 TFEU and Article 5 NATO: an overview

The table above offers an essential overview of the three articles. Indeed, comparing Article 42 (7) TEU vis-à-vis Article 222 TFEU and NATO Article 5 can remind one of a game of “spot the difference”. The three clauses present striking resemblances, and the lines that distinguish them are blurred: it is already worth pointing out that a choice between them would mostly follow political reasons rather than strictly legal ones.

As for what concerns the differences with Article 222 TFEU, the first, striking difference is that Article 222 TFEU goes into detail to describe how the ‘solidarity clause’ should be implemented. In comparison, Article 42 (7) offers a much more flexible mechanism, which, indeed, can be better suited for situations requiring faster interventions. In this sense, Article 42 (7) does not foresee any role for the Union, leaving it as a purely intergovernmental instrument in the hands of the Member States, while Article 222 dictates a specific procedure for the Member States to follow. Second, the mutual defence clause has an application limited to the territory of the member states, as defined by Article 355 TFEU, while the solidarity clause does not (Cîrlig 2015).

Regarding NATO Article 5, first, the clause has a restricted geographical dimension, only applying to armed attacks “in Europe or North America” – as Spain found out during the Perejil Island crisis (Monar 2002, 251-254). Second, NATO Article 5 refers specifically to “armed attack”, while Article 42 (7) mentions the broader category of “armed aggressions”. Finally, NATO, born as a purely military organization guarantees force planning capabilities, training and exercises, and a well-organized military headquarters for the common defence of its members (Baker et. al. 2016, 24-24). As a concluding remark, nothing prevents hypothesizing on the simultaneous application of both articles: indeed, a coordinated EU-NATO response would work effectively in case of border management, cyber security, strategic communication and, in general, where a broader understanding of collective defence is needed and EU “soft” tools can serve as an effective complement to NATO’s traditional defence tactics (Baker et. al. 2016, 28-30).

France’s activation: a good start

Considering that the attacks happened on the night of November 13, and
that Hollande delivered his “France is at war” speech on November 16, the decision to invoke Article 42 (7) must have been taken urgently over the weekend. Still, taking advantage of an improbable, but convenient, coincidence, France discussed the issue as soon as the next day, in one of the already scheduled four annual meetings of the Foreign Affairs Council (FAC) in a defence format.

In spite of the impromptu decision, the results were quite satisfactory: France’s requests were welcomed in full by the Member States. As Anghel and Cirlig (2015) report, in the months following the activation of the clause, France received aid in various forms for its operations abroad, tailored to the capabilities of different states, in theatres ranging from Iraq, Syria and Central African Republic, to the EU Training Mission in Mali (EUTM), to the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL).

To sum up, France could not have been either legally or politically certain that there would be any significant follow-up to the activation of Article 42 (7), and took a substantial but effective gamble, playing significantly on the emotions that followed the terrorist attacks.

Indeed, after the events, France had four viable options: invoking NATO Article 5, trigger the EU mechanisms of either Article 42 (7) TEU or Article 222 TFEU, or avoid international organizations altogether.

Using NATO Article 5 could have been justified from a formal point of view: indeed, the first and only use of the clause was after the terrorist attacks of 9/11. Nevertheless, the gravitas of the clause would have triggered consequences perhaps even out of France’s control; in addition to that, France has traditionally been a champion of a NATO-independent European defence, and such a choice would have been counterintuitive.

While Article 222 TFEU requires Member States to coordinate and find unanimity in the Council of the EU (not the easiest of features), Article 42 (7) TEU was much more desirable: it formally triggered an EU reaction, but then France was able to keep the discussions at a bilateral level, thus retaining the leadership of the whole process (Pertusot 2017, 66-67). In this sense, invoking Article 42 (7) was almost “emotional blackmail”. Having oftentimes tried to convince the EU and its Member States to commit more to a common European defence, given the tragic circumstances, France saw this as a now or never opportunity.
Still, a question immediately springs to mind. Is the help received by France even close to “all the means” in the power of the EU Member States? As the above mentioned report by Anghel and Cirlig (2015) shows, France did not receive any help exceeding reasonable expectations. In this sense, France’s requests, after a terrorist attack, were commensurate to a RST, and were thus met in full, but what would happen in case of a full-scale aggression? From a mere theoretical exercise, the question gained practical implications due to the increasing tensions at the EU’s eastern border: as mentioned in the introduction, Finland and Sweden are the non-NATO EU members geopolitically exposed to possible Russian aggression. Commenting on the defence posture of the two countries over the years, we shall try to determine how much the existence of the EU’s mutual defence clause impacted their defence policies – before and after Russia’s intervention in Ukraine. In conclusion to this section, it can be argued that France’s biggest merit was to have proved the effectiveness of the clause, to serve as a benchmark for future applications.

Finland and Sweden: from neutrality to security dilemmas

Finland and Sweden shared a common history for centuries: for almost 600 years, Finland was the easternmost part of the Kingdom of Sweden. In the words of the Finnish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2016), the two countries continue to constitute a common strategic space and have compelling reasons to make the same fundamental choices regarding their security and defence. For decades, both had chosen – at least formally – neutrality. However, at the end of the Cold War, the two countries quickly joined the EU in 1995, and are, arguably and officially, not neutral anymore. Still, NATO membership remained a taboo, and, in spite of ever-closer cooperation, the two countries never applied to formally join the Atlantic Alliance (Nyberg 2016). As such, the two countries started to emphasize the role of the EU in their security and defence considerations, especially in the wake of the rediscovered Russian adventurism. As such, Article 42 (7) TEU was repeatedly mentioned in the official defence reports of the two countries, especially in the first few years of the implementation of the Lisbon treaty.

Sweden: relying on the unreliable

Long gone are the times of Viking raids, of the bloody fights with Denmark and Russia and of the Swedish Empire: Sweden has not fought a war since 1814 (Dalsjö 2014, 175). Unlike Finland, Sweden was not forced
into neutrality, but willingly embraced it, and maintained it for the whole
duration of the Cold War (Dalsjö 2014, 180-182).

Yet, a threat to Swedish neutrality always lied in the middle of the
Baltic Sea, where an island roughly the size of Micronesia is coveted by
Russia. The Gotland Island is home to a mere 57,000 people, who are mainly
versed in agriculture and in the tourism business; yet, for geostrategic
reasons, its control is fundamental to the balance of the region, due to its
central position in the Baltic Sea (Elfving 2017).

In 1995, at the end of the Cold War, Sweden, along with Finland,
joined the EU; as a consequence, Sweden started describing itself as post-
neutral (Brommesson 2016). Since 1996, Sweden has drastically reduced
military expenses – and, in spite of its well-known strategic importance,
Gotland received no special treatment (Braw 2015). After years of radical
cuts, Carlqvist (2015) argued that Swedish defence had all but disappeared.
In the meantime, south of Sweden, Russia’s newfound bellicosity started
to worry the Baltic States. Latvia and Estonia have a significant Russian
minority, which could play a role should the tensions with Russia increase;
in addition to that, Russia desires to provide a contiguous land border from
the Kaliningrad oblast to the mainland. While the Baltic States are NATO
members, occupying Gotland would significantly improve Russia’s strategic
position: Moscow would be able to intercept NATO aircrafts providing
aid to the Baltic states, in the logic of Anti-Access/Area-Denial (A2/AD)
(Burton 2016).

Under the Minister of Defence Karin Enström (2012-2014),
Sweden would live a “honeymoon phase” with the mutual defence clause.
Enström was a firm believer of the so-called Swedish “declaration of
solidarity” with the EU, a unilaterally established commitment that, to date
is still reported in Swedish Governmental Defence. The declaration states
that Sweden will provide civilian as well as military support, in case of an
attack or disaster in another EU or Nordic country, and it expects them
to act the same way if Sweden is so affected (Bengtsson 2016, 450-451).
Reportedly, the Estonian President Toomas Hendrik Ilves openly ridiculed
the Swedish stance: “The problem with the declaration of solidarity is that it
doesn’t contain anything concrete. You could send 10,000 bottles of olive oil
and meet the demands of solidarity” (Carlqvist 2015).

In April 2013, Enström, answering a question concerning the
future of her country in NATO, declared that the European Union is obliged
to provide “all necessary means” in case of an attack (Rettman 2013). Combined with a stagnant level of military expenditures, we can infer that, during this “honeymoon phase”, Sweden relied heavily and explicitly on the EU’s mutual defence clause.

However, Sweden had to face a harsh reality: after years of extreme budget reviewing, its military capabilities would not have been able to respond to a Russian invasion. Salonius-Pasternak (2013) argues that Sweden gambled so much on the mutual defence clause, but that the latter is meaningless without concrete acts of preparation from both sides: even if military help was offered to Sweden, the country wouldn’t even have the capabilities to receive it.

Enström’s successor, Peter Hultqvist (2014-present), dramatically transformed the Swedish stance. The “Hultqvist Doctrine”, as defined by Salonius-Pasternak (2016), attempts to address Swedish structural deficiencies through three main policies: 1) reinforcing its own defence capability 2) increasing cooperation with Finland 3) strengthening ties with NATO.

The said “Hultqvist Doctrine” was echoed by the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2016), in a report aptly titled “Security in a new era”. The report is not shy in identifying Russia as the only state in Sweden’s neighbourhood that could conceivably initiate military aggression. The report also excludes an isolated Russian attack against Sweden, but concludes that, “in all likelihood, Sweden would be drawn into a Russian-Baltic military conflict at an early stage through what might be called ‘consequential aggression’” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Sweden 2016, 2).

Commenting on France’s invocation of the mutual defence clause, the report appreciates that “EU solidarity has a concrete security and defence dimension”, but explicitly voices frustration in the EU’s unexpressed potential in foreign and security policy. For this reason, the report concludes that cooperation with the EU will remain of limited relevance for Sweden’s defence capabilities (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Sweden 2016, 3-7).

Further proof of increased Swedish awareness is the defence bill that the Riksdag approved for 2016-2020: the budget for this period was augmented by roughly one billion euros. Furthermore, Gotland is mentioned repeatedly as being of vital strategic importance for Sweden, as well as for the Baltic Sea region as a whole: as such, it is a Swedish strategic
interest to have a permanent military presence on the island, in order to have a stabilising effect for the entire region (Government Offices of Sweden 2015, 2). Finally, in March 2017, the Swedish government reintroduced obligatory military conscription starting from January 2018, citing the conflict in Eastern Ukraine and the annexation of Crimea as some of the reasons behind the decision (BBC, 2017). Clearly, the honeymoon with Article 42 (7) is over.

Finland: a pragmatic approach

“Coming generations: stand here upon your own ground, and never rely on outside help.” – Engraving on the King’s Gate on the Finnish island-fortress of Suomenlinna, dated 1753.

The history of Finland as an independent nation is relatively recent. Part of Sweden until 1809, then ceded to the Russian Empire, Finland unilaterally declared independence in December 1917, exploiting the tumults of the Bolshevik revolution. In 1939, Moscow started the so-called Winter War to re-conquer Finland, but, against all odds, the country retained its independence (Calistri 2010, 6-14).

However, the USSR de facto imposed neutrality on Finland: at the end of the Second World War, Finland “negotiated”, under heavy pressure, the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance (FCMA) with the USSR. The treaty stipulated that 1) in case of war, Finland would maintain its neutrality and 2) Finland would not allow other states to use its territory against the Soviet Union – if that were to happen, the implied consequence would have been annexation (Calistri 2010, 35-44). Therefore, during the Cold War, Finland adopted the Paasikivi-Kekkonen doctrine, named after the two Finnish Presidents during the Cold War, which consisted in maintaining cordial relations with the Soviet Union, rejecting all sorts of Western influence, including the Marshall Plan, and planning carefully for the country’s own defence (Calistri 2010, 57).

After the fall of the Soviet Union, Finland unilaterally abrogated the FCMA in 1992 and joined the EU in 1995: from that point onwards, the word neutrality disappeared from the vocabulary of official foreign policy documents; as the Finnish Ambassador Törnudd (2005) argued, Finland’s accession to the EU makes it no longer possible to call the country’s foreign policy neutral.
Nevertheless, Finland is still very sceptical about NATO, with public opinion remaining lukewarm at best on the perspective of membership. A poll conducted in February, 2017 shows that only 21% of the population is clearly in favour of joining the alliance, while that percentage rises to 38% in the event that Sweden would apply for membership at the same time (Yle 2017).

After the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty, the Finnish government has been one of the most interested in unravelling the potentiality of Article 42 (7) TEU, to the point of changing its internal legislation to operationalize the delivery and the reception of international aid and assistance required by the clause (Iso-Markku 2015). The 2013 Report on Security and Defence from the Finnish government (2013, 10) described EU membership as a fundamental security policy choice. With regards to the mutual assistance clause, Finland maintained that its use requires “the preparedness to provide assistance should one Member State become the victim of an armed attack”. While no role for the Union is foreseen, interestingly, Finland expects that EU and NATO member states would provide assistance within the framework of the Atlantic Treaty (Finland Prime Minister's Office 2013, 89-90).

Furthermore, Finland stressed the importance of the EU for national security not only in official documents, but also to the general public. In his New Year’s speech of 2015, President Sauli Niinistö explicitly said to rely on the EU in case of foreign aggression: “It is inconceivable that the EU would simply look on if the territorial integrity of one of its Member States were violated” (Yle 2015).

In the government White Paper on Foreign and Security Policy of 2016, the Finnish government makes three relevant considerations. First, it notes that “the use of military force, or a threat thereof, against Finland cannot be excluded” (Finland Prime Minister’s Office 2016, 11). Second, it underlines the primary role of the EU in Finnish defence considerations, emphasizing the role of the mutual defence clause, which holds strong security policy significance, both in principle and in practice (Finland Prime Minister’s Office 2016, 20). Finally, it confirms that the Finland-NATO relations are being deepened, but stressing that the current level of cooperation includes neither guarantees nor obligations (Finland Prime Minister’s Office 2016, 24). Commenting on the paper, former Finnish diplomat Pauli Järvenpää (2016) notes that the Finnish government is aware of the mutation of its strategic environment in a way that means “bad news for a small, law-abiding country like Finland”.

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However, unlike Sweden, Finland maintained a respectable level of defence expenditures even after the end of the Cold War, never abolishing compulsory conscription, with almost 900,000 reservists ready to be mobilized on short notice (Salonius-Pasternak 2015). In addition to that, unlike the Gotland scenario, a surprise invasion is far less likely, considering the difficult terrain at the Finno-Russian borders.

In conclusion, the words engraved on the fortress of Suomenlinna are still prophetic of the Finnish attitude towards international alliances and foreign threats. While Article 42 (7) TEU is indeed considered an important tool, the Finnish government kept the tradition of relying primarily on itself as concerns its national defence even after the Cold War.

**Justified suspicions on the article’s effectiveness?**

In theory, Finland and Sweden should be happy by the example set by France: the requests, however small, were still met in full by the MS and were adequate for the case at hand. Still, by analysing their behaviour and their policy papers, both seem rather sceptical that the EU MS would replicate the efforts in case of actual war. Is this scepticism justified?

From a legal point of view, if the MS agree that potential Russian actions amount to armed aggression, then they are legally bound to provide aid and assistance according to the RST. However, from a practical point of view, there are three aspects to take into account.

First, Article 42 (7) TEU lacks operationalization, and the EU does not possess adequate Rapid Response tools for a war-like scenario. After all, the tools available to the EU are primarily meant for crisis management, not for territorial defence (Raik 2017). True, the EU Battlegroups are operating and ready to be deployed on short notice, but, in context, only a regiment of a mere 3,000 men would be ready on short notice.

Second, the role of NATO: could the Atlantic Alliance enter the fray “through the backdoor”? Indeed, it is possible to imagine a domino effect, where a MS helping the Nordic countries under Article 42 (7) would then trigger NATO Article 5. It would be an extreme scenario, legally dubious and requiring a lot of political will, but possible in theory (Brommesson 2015). In this sense, Mäkelä (2016) argues that Finland and Sweden, given their proven record of collaboration with the alliance, could even lobby NATO to obtain a “fast-track membership option”, under which
Article 5 would be available for them even before completing the accession process. Certainly, such a possibility would be brought forward in case of actual aggression.

Third, and perhaps most importantly, the mutual defence clause still retains a deterrence effect. While both Finland and Sweden do not solely trust Article 42 (7) TEU for their defence, its mere existence is enough to discourage Russian aggression. Hence, an operationalization of the clause within the EU bodies should not be pursued, as it could end up in a watered-down compromise that would impair its effectiveness. Given the current circumstances, and in light of the positive French experience, Russia cannot afford to bet on a lack of response from the EU, NATO or both and would achieve, at best, a frozen conflict in the first targeted area, at huge diplomatic and economic costs.

Conclusions

This brief excursus proves that, first of all, Article 42 (7) TEU is alive and well. France took a not-so-calculated risk in activating the dormant EU’s mutual defence clause for the first time, and the gamble paid off. True, France’s requests were not hard to meet; nevertheless, they were tailored to the capabilities of individual MS, they were met in full and there were no reported rejections of help. If anything, the events of November 2015 proved that the EU can be united in solidarity – even, if, ironically, without the help of its institutions. Nevertheless, it is necessary for the EU to improve its Rapid Response tools, if it wants to be able to provide an effective response in case of more threatening scenarios. In addition to that, Article 42 (7) TEU, even with the Irish Protocol exceptions, (or thanks to its purely intergovernmental format) is legally binding: any Member State that recognizes the invocation of the clause as legitimate, is then obliged to provide “aid and assistance” proportionate to the armed aggression suffered by the other Member State; in this sense, Article 42 (7) can be invoked for a wide range of scenarios, ranging from hybrid threats, to terrorist attacks, to conventional warfare.

Indeed, the clause is not precise about its scope, and has margins for improvement: however, uncertainty might even be its greatest strength. Non-NATO EU Member States can rely on its deterrent effect – but should wisely not put all their eggs in one basket. The mutual defence clause is neither a paper tiger nor an equivalent of NATO Article 5. While it is true that Finland and Sweden cannot blindly rely on it, the clause is nevertheless...
binding and effective. True, to what extent it would be operative in case of a full-scale war remains an open question, but this ambiguity is also a deterrent that further discourages Russian actions.

Reference list


The cooperation between the United States and Europe has resulted in many successful projects that have maintained order and unity up until the present. This has spanned from the creation of a winning World War II coalition to the success of the Euro-Atlantic integration of countries that used to wage wars against each other. For some, the election of Donald Trump represented a wedge in the partnership. The presumed candidate formally insulted European leaders on social media, questioned NATO’s Article 5 commitment by indirectly pushing for a two-speed NATO based on defense spending, and called NATO ‘obsolete.’ As president, Trump backtracked a lot of his positions towards NATO and appointed pro-Atlantic members to his cabinet. It seems that the primary fear has evaporated among allies. However, based on the two NATO summits Trump has attended, the unpredictability in U.S. foreign policy keeps raising concerns. This paper will argue that Trump’s words did not bring about a closer cooperation in security among European allies in NATO, nor did they push countries to spend more on defence. What he today perceives as his accomplishment in the shifting and adapting of NATO has been a process of at least the past decade. The election of Donald Trump and the continuation of security threats in and around the transatlantic region require a new way of thinking and a new level of adaptation. This article seeks to assess the first reactions of NATO and its allies since the inauguration of Donald Trump, evaluate the main obstacles and present positive scenarios of U.S. involvement in the alliance for the future.

Introduction

In the immediate aftermath of World War II, the United States emerged as the sole global superpower, displaying its nuclear capability and willingness to use it to other countries. After two failed attempts to prevent World War II, among them the inability to join the League of Nations and the shortcomings of the Brian-Kellogg Pact of 1928, the United States declared
that it would confront any challenge which would again thrust Europe into conflict. Despite many countries falling under communist influence in the late 1940s, America felt the need to preserve and protect security and stability in countries allied to them. General George C. Marshall, then Secretary of State, spoke at Harvard University in June 1947 where he delivered persuading arguments for an urgent recovery programme in Europe. The 1948 Foreign Assistance Act, also known as the Marshall Plan, was the largest financial aid package to Europe in history and it arguably assisted the selected European countries torn apart by the war to ensure their stability and order. Moreover, the economic growth provided a preventive measure to any escalation of conflict between the two former adversaries, France and Germany. Furthermore, in 1947, President Truman announced a doctrine bearing his name requesting the protection of other countries, particularly Greece and Turkey, from becoming vulnerable to the communist regime. For staying “democratic,” the US government used incentives in the form of financial and economic aid, and later political and security aid. Thus, the objective of keeping Europe safe and stable led to the creation of NATO in April 1949 by the 12 founding members with the purpose of creating a security umbrella based on common defence. To assure its goals, the US deployed large numbers of troops to Western Europe. The deterrence provided by US military personnel prevented open conflict with the Soviet Union, while their presence assured allies of the importance of the common defence pledge. Very few presidents during the Cold War or after it questioned the alliance between European and North American nations.

Before 2016, both the Marshall Plan and the establishment of NATO had been described as historical developments which had helped to create a transatlantic partnership and provide assistance to the countries involved to progress peacefully. Republican presidential candidate Donald Trump, whose bid for the presidency ended in success, began questioning the alliance in a manner that created obstacles for European leaders. He was not the first US politician or leader to criticize its European allies for their lack of defence spending, international cooperation, and modernization, nor will he be the last one, but he was the most vocal of them. With his unique style and barely any attempt to tip-toe around the major issues and by the choice of his own words, Trump caused the allies to see the alliance’s coherence in a different light. They all came to the swift realization that NATO does not have a future without US involvement in it.

Estimated USD 130 billion in 2016
The Trump administration kicked off its presidential foreign policy through ambivalent statements about disturbing policies. Donald Trump is the first US president who primarily communicates his policy proposals through Twitter, rarely based on consultations or conversations with advisors in his cabinet or party leadership. However, despite the 24/7 news cycle overshadowing Washington and its focus on domestic issues, most of the foreign policies regarding NATO and Europe remain the same. The United States is still a dependable ally for Europeans and the government continues to deploy more troops on European soil on a rotational basis to provide assurance and deterrence. There are, however, a few topics which need to be looked into and analyzed more deeply. Firstly, it is the alliance after Trump and its impact on the proceedings and culture of NATO. Secondly, it is an issue that has a strong impact on current discourse: Trump’s relationship with the Russian president Vladimir Putin.

NATO in Trump’s Eyes

Early into the 2016 Republican primary campaign, Donald Trump emerged as a frontrunner. A Manhattan billionaire who had flirted with the chance of running in the presidential election more than once before surprised both news pundits and his party opponents. His unconventional and populistic approach to campaigning gained traction during the New Hampshire primary and the inability of the rest of the Republican pack to put forward one candidate who could oppose Mr. Trump helped him become the frontrunner. Consequently, based on his successes, the news media started to demand that the candidate express his opinion on a series of important issues, both domestic and foreign.

Foreign policy is usually not a decisive topic in US presidential debates and the difference between candidates in the public’s eyes is limited to who seems stronger or weaker. The 2016 presidential campaign was no different. Despite numerous ongoing security challenges, from Daesh, North Korea, to expansionist Russia, in May 2016, a mere 61 per cent of responders told the Gallup pollsters that foreign affairs is an extremely/very important issue, only fourth behind the economy (86 per cent), the state of Washington and healthcare (both 77), terrorism (74), and income distribution (61 per cent) (Jones, 2015). Naturally, voters were paying significantly more attention to domestic issues that concerned them the most.
In March, Trump conducted an interview with the Washington Post where he was asked his position on NATO. In his answer, he stated that NATO was established in a different time. “NATO was set up when we were a richer country. We're not a rich country anymore. (...) NATO is costing us a fortune and yes, we're protecting Europe with NATO but we're spending a lot of money. Number one, I think the distribution of costs has to be changed. I think NATO as a concept is good, but it is not as good as it was when it first evolved” (Cilliza, 2016). In this incoherent reply, keeping in mind that domestic topics resonate the most among voters, Trump focused dominantly on the national side of the issue – the budget. First, Donald Trump has proved to have difficulties with understanding how NATO generates its budget and how much each ally contributes to it. While many of the people involved tried to explain the functioning of the budgetary policies, including Secretary General Stoltenberg, Trump's misleading rhetoric has not changed. Drawing from his statements, it seems that Trump perceives the NATO budget as a single sum of money with each country contributing its portion. If said countries are not willing or able, the United States must close the gap. This, of course, is not the case. Trump repeated this claim in an interview with Wolf Blitzer on CNN when he argued that Europeans should spend more on defense (CNN, 2016). He later admitted to the Associated Press in April that he answered Wolf Blitzer “not knowing a lot about NATO” (Associated Press, 2016). However, Europeans already spend more on defense than they used to (NATO, 2018a). At the NATO Summit, which took place in Wales two years before the election, the allies agreed to “reverse the trend of declining defence budgets” (NATO, 2014). Although Donald Trump considers the recent steps NATO nations have taken regarding their defense spending as his success and continues to believe that he was the one who pushed NATO countries to share the burden more properly, the plans had been put in place long before Trump announced his candidacy. In addition to his criticisms of the budget, Trump also called NATO outdated for its lack of involvement in fighting terrorism. Unbeknownst to him, the only time Article 5 of the Washington Treaty was invoked was after the terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001.

What Donald Trump had damaged with his words, he made better with his security and military appointments. When he announced his pick for Secretary of Defense, a former four-star US Marine general James Mattis, the critical comments and dooms day scenarios from representatives of the traditional foreign policy establishment subsided. Arizona Senator John McCain commented that “America will be fortunate to have General
Mattis in its service once again” (Gordon and Schmitt, 2016). Mattis has previous experience with NATO structures as he was the last US general to hold a commander’s seat at the Supreme Allied Command Transformation in Norfolk, Virginia. The US Senate confirmed Mattis in the position with a single opposing vote. The second nomination, a retired three-star general Michael Flynn, was a controversial one. Flynn had been an Obama appointee as the Defense Intelligence Agency Director. However, Flynn later resigned and was replaced by US Army General H.R. McMaster, who defended Trump’s stance on NATO (Roberts, 2017). McMaster resigned as National Security Advisor on March 22, 2018 and President Trump named neo-conservative Republican consultant John Bolton to this position. Bolton is a well-known hawk on foreign policy issues, particularly on North Korea and Iran and he is one of the most outspoken critics of the UN. However, his position on NATO and the US role in the transatlantic alliance is not sufficiently documented. At the time of the presidential election campaign, NATO was not supposed to be on the list of foreign policy priorities. The 2012 summit had taken place in Chicago. Since it followed the groundbreaking 2010 Lisbon Summit where the allies passed the 2010 Strategic Concept, the event in Chicago had looked like a mandatory class trip and PR event for President Obama at best. However, the 2014 Russian invasion of the Ukraine changed the calculus of European NATO members. For the first time since World War II, the European continent witnessed one country violating international law by annexing a part of their neighbor and presumed ally. Thus, the European allies turned their eyes to the Americans. The answer came only partially as the Obama administration responded very carefully and reminded Europeans it will not wage a new Cold War over the Russian invasion in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine (White House, 2014a). The White House continued to cooperate with Russia on North Korea and the Iranian nuclear program and kept signaling that Crimea is a European problem, so people reluctantly looked to the new administration with a hope of bolstering unity among NATO members and properly deterring Russia from its military and disinformation activities in Europe, and solving the crisis in Ukraine (Kupchan, 2017).

The 2018 NATO Summit in Brussels was a significant meeting in several ways. President Trump continued to criticize European allies for not spending enough on their national defense. Moreover, Germany took a serious hit when Trump asserted that Germany is under the influence of the Russian Federation because of the controversial Nord Stream II pipeline build-up (Reuters, 2018). Even before the Summit took place, the Trump administration had scheduled a meeting with Russian president Vladimir

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Putin shortly following the NATO Summit. Before his departure, out of three meetings (UK, NATO, and Russia), Donald Trump called the last one possibly “the easiest of them all” (Stracqualursi, 2018). This statement rose eyebrows among NATO allies. Despite the gaps from the current US president, the Brussels Declaration signed and accepted by all present leaders provides continuing assurance with its policies towards Russia, collective security, and defense spending (NATO, 2018b).

Overlooking the West for the East

One obstacle in the US policy towards Europe and NATO that could not be easily overcome was the unconventional and often too friendly relationship between Trump and Russian president Vladimir Putin. Trump's public statements on Putin are as rich as his comments on NATO and European allies. They include claims that he has a relationship with him to admitting that they directly spoke to each other and Trump saying that he got to know Putin very well (Jacobson, 2016). They, in fact, had their first official meeting at the G20 Summit in Hamburg, Germany in July 2017. At the time of their meeting, Putin's influence in Europe had been well-investigated.

From the beginning of his campaign, Trump made it clear that he wanted to achieve a pragmatic, businesslike relationship with Russia. He brought this position with him to the White House. “If we can make a great deal for our country and get along with Russia that would be a tremendous thing. I would love to try it,” he stated during an interview with Bill O’Reilly (Fox News, 2016). Trump compared the United States to Russia during an interview with the same host in February by saying “You think our country’s so innocent?” (Fox News, 2017). The approach Donald Trump took as a candidate assured many critics of Obama’s failed reset policy with Russia. Georgetown University's Matthew Kroenig (2017, 30) argued that all presidents before Trump had sought better relations with Russia and that there was an opportunity for the US to play a harder deterrence role with Russia. Others thought that by comparing his country to Russia and the American president to Putin, Trump “dismissed 250 years of national ideals and the work of generations of Americans who had strived to reach the moral high ground” (Ikenberry, 2017, 3). Nevertheless, Trump's ambiguous, yet ambitious statement provided some with comfort.

The presidents met at the G20 Summit in Germany. The meeting included Secretary of State Rex Tillerson and his counter-part on the Russian side, Sergey Lavrov. Unlike the previous administrations, no other
representative from Trump’s security cabinet were present at the meeting, therefore he had no advisors on foreign and security policy. Some reporters jokingly claimed that between Trump and Tillerson, it was the American interpreter who had the required foreign policy experience. Despite both presidents describing the meeting as delightful and positive, the reports were critical towards Trump’s approach to Putin (Carpenter, 2017). After the G20 Summit, the media received information that another meeting between Trump and Putin had taken place. Trump and Putin had allegedly agreed on US-Russian cyber security cooperation (Reuters, 2017a). As the investigation of alleged Russian cyber intervention during the 2016 election campaign was still ongoing, including hearings in front of the US Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, this agreement was not only disregarded by the security community, it was denounced by Trump’s former rival, US Senator from Florida Marco Rubio (2017). Trump has thus far declined to acknowledge Russian influence in the US 2016 election and accepted the Russian denial (Owen, 2017). The path of denial continued after their meeting in Helsinki, following the NATO Summit. The president’s advisors, including US ambassador in Moscow, Jon Huntsman, warned the public not to expect anything big. He even declined to call it a summit, but rather a conversation (NBC, 2018). However, Donald Trump delivered something to latch onto. During the question and answer session, President Trump stated on the matter of Russia’s interference in the US political system, “I have President Putin; he just said it’s not Russia. I don’t see any reason why it would be [Russia]” (White House, 2018). The question remains whether Trump’s reluctance to acknowledge the conclusions of the intelligence community lies in his quest for a better relationship or if he fears an informational campaign against him.

The relationship between the two leaders has deeper roots, which became more obvious during the election campaign. Several staffers and appointees had to resign due to their failure to disclose connections with Russian officials or companies, including Michael Flynn from the National Security Council. Attorney General Jeff Sessions, one of Trump’s closest supporters and the first US senator to endorse him, recused himself from the ongoing investigation and Trump’s son Donald Jr. was contacted by employees of the Kremlin with an offer to provide information on Democratic candidate Hillary Clinton to the Trump campaign (Lai and Parlapiano, 2017).

US Senators noticed the special relationship between their President and Vladimir Putin, and decided to put in place a law that would
put the executive branch under more intense scrutiny. In August, Trump reluctantly signed the bill H.R. 3364 - Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act that imposed further sanctions on Russia and placed the White House under the obligation to run any policy changes on Russian sanctions through the Senate (White House, 2017a). The bill won a veto-proof majority in both chambers of Congress and the President had no choice but to sign it. However, he did not do it quietly. Donald Trump made a rare statement during the signing in which he called the bill “significantly flawed” and attacked the provisions which tied his hands in future sanctions which would have to be reviewed by Congress (White House, 2017b). In the face of pressure from the legislative branch, Trump continues to foster the growth of the relationship. Recently, he expressed his appreciation for Vladimir Putin’s plan to cut the number of diplomatic employees in Russia, (Strobel and Landay, 2017) as the Russian response to H.R. 3364. He later retracted his statement by calling it “sarcastic” (Oliphant, 2017).

There are several reasons why Europeans are terrified by Vladimir Putin. The Russian government has already publicly described NATO as a threat (Farchy, 2016) and an ongoing disinformation campaign, particularly in Central and Eastern Europe, continues to support extremist factions, challenge public opinion, and create false narratives about NATO and EU membership (Filipov, 2017). As the strongest and thus most important ally, the United States plays a valid role in security and stability in Europe. The legislative branch of the US government still perceives Vladimir Putin’s Russia to be a challenging threat. The executive branch, however, routinely bases its policy on a combination of affection and lassitude which could possibly lead to Russia having a larger influence over East-Central European countries.

What Do Europeans Really Want?

The crucial question in this debate is for Europeans in NATO to ask themselves what they demand from the United States. During his inaugural speech, Trump said “From this day forward, a new vision will govern our land. From this moment on, it’s going to be America first” (White House, 2017d). This statement was preceded by a prolonged political campaign putting the blame on other countries for the lack of thriving in the US. In May, Trump’s National Security Advisor McMaster and Director of the White House Economic Council Gary Cohen published a text for the Wall Street Journal to clear up the statement and soothe the fears of the allies. In their article, they argued that the American leadership will be maintained
and that “America first is not America alone” (McMaster and Cohn, 2017). Even after McMaster’s and Cohen’s explanation, European allies remained divided post-inauguration.

NATO statements and communiques from NATO summits show the unity of the Alliance. However, the Europeans in NATO are divided on the threat perception and on the relations with the US and the differences between them are not regional. According to a Pew poll from 2016, three times more Poles see Russia as a threat than Hungarians, who reside in the same region. In addition, 42 per cent and 43 percent of responders in Spain and Greece, respectively, both NATO allies, see U.S. power and influence as a major threat to their countries, more than double compared to the Italians and Dutch (Stokes, Wike, and Poushter, 2016). In the same poll, all European countries showed less confidence in President Trump than in his predecessor.

European countries in the East, particularly Poland and the Baltic States, wanted the United States to acknowledge the mere existence of Article 5 and pledge to the collective defense clause. Donald Trump granted their wish in Warsaw six months into his presidency when he pronounced the words “we stand firmly with Article 5, the mutual defense pledge” (White House, 2017d). However, he rightly pointed out following this statement, that it is actions that matter, not words. Thus, amid Trump’s critical remarks towards allies, the US was continuously strengthening their capabilities in Europe, particularly the Eastern border of NATO. The Alliance keeps providing the essential transatlantic link between Europe and the United States and, like good soldiers, NATO leaders carefully congratulated Donald Trump on winning the 2016 presidential election. “A strong NATO is good for the United States, and good for Europe,” said NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg in his congratulatory statement to Trump (NATO, 2016). His predecessor Anders Fogh Rasmussen (2017), currently the chairman of Rasmussen Global, viewed the change in the White House positively when he argued that “Donald Trump has the potential to stabilize American politics and restore reliable American leadership on the global stage in the coming years.” Nevertheless, there were doubts and they were substantial. The first meeting between President Trump and NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg took place in April 2017. NATO manager Stoltenberg called the anticipated meeting “excellent and productive” in his speech, double in length compared to his host during the following press briefing (White House, 2017c). He attempted to sell NATO to Trump by reminding him that the only time the North Atlantic Council invoked the collective
defense pledge was after the 9/11 attacks. Trump had earlier stated that “here’s the problem with NATO: it’s obsolete. Big statement to make when you don’t know that much about it, but I learn quickly,” he said at a rally in Racine, Wisconsin in April (Parker, 2016). Trump backtracked from his previous comments and called NATO “no longer obsolete” (White House, 2017c). He based his decision on NATO expanding its mission to fight terrorism, concretely Daesh in Iraq and Syria. Trump failed to recognize the role NATO played immediately following 9/11, the only time the North Atlantic Council invoked Article 5.

Among the European leaders, Angela Merkel was the first who offered cooperation with a caveat of common values such as “democracy, freedom, and respect for the law and the dignity of man, independent of origin, skin color, religion, gender, sexual orientation or political views” (Barkin, 2017). British Prime Minister Theresa May was the first leader to visit the freshly inaugurated President Trump. In the press conference, she stated that Trump “confirmed [he was] 100% behind NATO” (Government of the United Kingdom, 2017). This acknowledgement from a “special relationship” partner proved that the alliance is not in danger. However, the European leaders remain fractured and Merkel’s statement from May about Europeans “helping themselves” suggests the continent is looking for other options (Reuters, 2017).

To analyze the US posture in Europe, it is important to look beyond the headlines. However, we should not be dismissing them altogether. The pushing of Montenegrin Prime Minister Duško Marković out of Trump’s way so he could get a better position is one of them. Camera attracting moments like these are difficult to forget. Trump’s unwillingness to admit that it was the Russian government behind the cyber hacks, in addition to the collusion of Trump advisors with the Kremlin lawyers remains an undisclosed setback for the European allies as well as the American domestic audience. Thus, the European leaders should more eloquently craft their statements on the transatlantic relationship in the Trump age. However, the mere fact they are thinking about other options suggests there may not be much left of it once this administration leaves the White House.

What’s Next?

Given the simplicity of Trump’s foreign policy towards Europe and NATO, the number of scenarios which may include American involvement in the alliance is larger than we were used to. So far, it seems that domestic topics
occupy President Trump’s mind more than foreign affairs. The inability of the Republican-led Congress to pass the most vocal promises of the 2016 campaigns, including health care, infrastructure, and tax reform, are having a deeper impact on the President’s popularity and the mood in the United States. Therefore, the strengthening and maintaining of the American position in Europe that will survive in spite of the domestic political backlash beyond 2020 seems reasonable.

With the troubles at home, Trump may turn his head towards the global stage to win some political points. The trip Vice President Mike Pence took in July was an example of such a policy. He visited Estonia, Georgia, and Montenegro. Once a Soviet republic, now a full-fledged NATO member, Estonia is under a higher level of threat from Russia than almost any other NATO country given the substantial Russian population (Sternstein, 2017). That was also the reason why Barack Obama visited the country’s capital in 2014 and declared that “the defense of Tallinn and Riga and Vilnius is just as important as the defense of Berlin and Paris and London” (White House, 2014b). The second stop in Georgia included a trip to the most contributing non-NATO partner while it has been waiting for the official declaration of the Membership Action Plan and eventual membership. Pence reinserted the 2008 Bucharest Summit statement by then President George W. Bush about Georgia’s NATO membership (White House, 2017e). Montenegro was also an important country to visit. This most recent NATO member continuously struggles with Russian influence. Sending the vice-president provided a much-needed signal to the people that the United States is standing behind the country’s security.

The concrete steps the US is taking are perceived as more tangible. Under the European Reassurance Initiative funding, 7,000 US troops were re-deployed in Europe (US European Command, 2017), and, under its leadership, the US contributed 1,000 troops to NATO’s Enhanced Forward Presence battle group in Poland (NATO, 2017b). The 2018 budget for the European Reassurance Initiative was larger than in 2017 (US Department of Defense, 2017). Furthermore, in July 2017, the largest NATO exercise since the Cold War took place in Romania. It was also made possible because of the promise from the Defense Department to add 1.4 billion dollars to strengthen US capacities in Europe. US Army in Europe Commander General Ben Hodges considered this a significant step. “[I]t illustrates the continued commitment of the U.S. to security and stability in Europe even with a new administration. I mean, everything that was promised in the last year is happening this year” (Welna, 2017). Based on the Allied
National Exercise factsheet, the US conducted five national exercises in Europe in 2017, including one in Ukraine. The exercises were focused on implementing Article 4 of the Washington treaty, the disconnection of explosive ordinance devices, peace support operations, maritime cooperation, and a NATO Response Force. Two exercises are planned for August and September in Georgia and Iceland (NATO, 2017a). It is difficult to predict if the Trump administration will continue with the policy of large-scale national exercises, in addition to the allied events under the NATO flag. However, it is a very effective way to provide evidence of its persisting commitments to peace and security in Europe.

**Conclusion**

The initial catastrophic scenarios did not play out. The US has yet to depart from NATO and US troops are being deployed to the Eastern border. However, the preliminary worries the analyst had about Trump's incompetence, the use of Twitter, and knee-jerk reaction to world events remain accurate. By appointing military generals and other professionals with NATO experience, Trump comforted some of his critics. However, his inability to listen to them has not proven him to be a good choice for the complexity the current world is faced with. Furthermore, his unknown relationship with Putin continues to give European allies reason to worry. Taking the foreign policy question at large, the situation may not seem to appear so dire. As Hook (2017, 73) noted, “The future of American primacy will depend on its success in balancing its commitments and capabilities, standing up to foreign threats, reconciling domestic divisions, and, most of all, aligning the nation’s power and principles.” Drawing from Trump's White House and concrete steps it has taken, the United States does remain a fully committed NATO member. Europeans must now wish that those commitments remain strong and sound. On the other side, the US administration must comprehend the complexity of America’s role in the world and limit the communication strategy to clear and precise statements. In conclusion, Trump or no Trump, the United States eventually became committed to NATO in 2017, both in words and, more importantly, in deeds. One thing needs to be clear. The test of a true American commitment would come in the form of an attack on one or more of its allies. This is a situation NATO countries have no desire to see, nor do they want to question the legitimacy and preparedness of the US response. They wish to believe that the continuation of US commitments towards its allies will be guaranteed. Thus, the US foreign policy speed train continues to ride on. Trump, no matter how verbal he may be, can only slow it down, but even with all his power and rhetoric he cannot stop it, let alone turn it around.
Reference list


STATUS OF INTERSECTIONS BETWEEN CYBER SECURITY AND SPACE SECURITY IN THE EUROPEAN UNION

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Introduction

Discussing the importance of space and cyberspace capabilities in modern day-to-day military operations represents a topic, which has been to a sufficient level tackled by broader academic research and policy discussions for years if not few decades. Both outer space and cyberspace have been understood as domains suitable or even desirable for conduct of military operations. In fact one could even label them as fourth and fifth domains of modern battlefield, in addition to historically existing three domains of land, sea and air. Space and cyberspace capabilities have so far functioned mainly as a force multipliers (in case of cyber, one could point out to several cases, where cyberspace became already an area, in which adversarial actions have taken place), as Paul Meyer argues, these environments have not yet been ‘weaponised’ or transformed into active battle zones (Meyer 2016, 158). This trend, however, will probably not remain the same in coming years, which could be evidenced by ongoing advances and innovation in both space and cyberspace domains. What is more, and with regards to the topic of this study, even more relevant, is the inclusion of outer space and cyberspace capabilities into wider security-related issues, even those that are not related to traditional defense and military dimension of security policy. As such, space and cyberspace capabilities of a country are becoming parts of its critical infrastructure, they have significant impact on important economic indicators (being inherent part of certain services or industries - telecommunications, navigation, timing...). Space as well cyberspace capabilities are both also dual-use technologies in their essence, opening up opportunities for a spectrum of civil, military
and commercial applications. Two separate terms have thus emerged over time, space security providing “secure access to space and freedom from space based threats” (Space Security Index 2016, 5) and cyber security encompassing “the collection of tools, policies, security concepts, security safeguards, guidelines, risk management approaches, actions, training, best practices, assurance and technologies that can be used to protect the cyber environment and organization and user’s assets” (International Telecommunications Union, 2017). Space security and cyber security are currently being tackled separately on both national level as well as at international forums. What is often missing is a joint strategy providing an approach taking into account growing intersections between space and cyberspace infrastructures and outlining policy goals or specific activities as a result of these linkages. This study further focuses on the European Union and aims to offer policy recommendations related to intersections between space agenda and cyberspace agenda at the EU level. Paper is structured in three chapters. First chapter provides theoretical outlook on intersections and overlaps between operation in space and cyberspace and explores specific security connotations of these intersections. Following chapter provides detailed look into separate European policies on space security and cyber security with a goal to identify the level of perception of space – cyberspace intersections in these policies. Last chapter deals with perspectives of a common space security – cyber security approach on EU level and offers several policy recommendations based on research findings in the topical issue.

Space and cyberspace intersections

The idea of developing an approach tackling connections between issues related to space and cyberspace capabilities builds upon several operational intersections that are inherent to operations in outer space and in cyberspace. Space infrastructures (either the space component, ground component or data link between them) are vulnerable to cyber attacks. Significant part of space operations, even the simplest tasks of communication (radio waves transmission) between ground station and space object itself are performed through cyberspace operations. From inverted perspective, global cyberspace infrastructures use satellites and constellations of satellites on different orbits around the Earth as a foundation for some of routine day-to-day operations. Alongside the fact that space and cyberspace constitute separate agenda with unique characteristics, their technological nature create solid argument for an understanding of space and cyberspace domains as interwoven spheres, where significant development in one area
can impact how trends and developments play out in the other. The starting point when discussing details of potential space and cyberspace security overlaps depart primarily from resilience of space systems against cyber attacks. Pelegrino and Stang state (2016, 23) that “these attacks can often be launched at little cost and require limited technical expertise, making them available to non-state actors”. According to Lewis and Livingstone (2016, 2), “cyber attacks on satellites can include jamming, spoofing and hacking attacks on communication networks; targeting control systems or mission packages; and attacks on the ground infrastructure such as satellite control centres”. Such malicious activity could harm the space system itself, but since space infrastructures are deeply connected to another sectors of economy (through services such as navigation, surveillance and reconnaissance, weather forecast, positioning and timing or even through providing internet coverage to remote areas), any incidents can cause far-reaching consequences. The latter service illustrates one of examples where space meets also cyberspace. Following this train of thought, since space infrastructures are being used also for telecommunications or other kinds of data transmissions, they are vulnerable to cyber attacks aimed at stealing, corrupting these data or stopping transmission from space segment to ground segment or vice-versa. As Babcock notes, in space-cyberspace relation, space operations are cyberspace dependent. Although space operations take place in the physical space domain, those who perform space operations are not physically present in space, and must therefore rely entirely on control of their segment of cyberspace to transmit their commands to space vehicles (Babcock 2015, 61-62)

Livingstone and Lewis (2016, 6) explain that satellite services are potential targets for a range of cyber threats, as space supports a growing and increasingly critical level of functionality within national infrastructure across the world, stimulating economic growth. Furthermore, space and cyber technologies are dual-use. The fact that space and cyber technologies are dual-use and as such have significant military and commercial implications expands the variety of potential targets and diversifies the means and methods of attacking them (Paikowsy 2016). Going into technical details, Del Monte (2013, 2-3) describes some of the specifics of a hypothetical cyber attack against space systems:

3 Space systems comprise of 3 main segments - space segment (e.g. satellite), ground segment (ground stations, antennas) and communication channel. Cyber threats related to space systems can be targeted at any of them.
Access to a satellite's controls or more serious command-and-control infiltration could allow an attacker to damage or destroy the satellite or forge or otherwise manipulate the satellite's transmission.

Partial infiltration could allow the attacker to share data from the compromised satellite.

The issue of cyber attacks against space systems is, however, not just a hypothetical question. In 2007 and 2008, two US satellites experienced 12 minutes of targeted interference making them unable to function properly and possibly opening up security breaches for data theft or unauthorized operational commands (Liebowitz 2011). Well-known is also the case of Iran and its satellite jamming of foreign satellites to prevent satellite transmissions of foreign-based television and radio channels (Bezhan 2014). In addition to these cases, one could point out to another case, which even had deeper cyber security connotations. In 2015, Kaspersky Lab discovered an innovative method of Turla hacking group to disguise cybercrime techniques, one that exploited satellite infrastructures providing Internet connection in order to more effectively disguise tracks leading to illicit cyber activities (Osborne 2015). In addition to this, Livingstone and Lewis (2016, 4) point out also that in the maritime arena, space-based monitoring systems are regularly being jammed or spoofed by vessel operators entering false information in order to disguise their illicit activities. The fact that several different cases of cyber incidents aimed at space infrastructures (or space assets being exploited in and for the purpose of cybercrime) have already taken place further underlines the importance of national and international policy-making that would understand the security implications stemming from intersections of operations in space and cyberspace. As Jana Robison argues in this matter, space-dependent countries are wise to be seeking new ways to engage in international discussions concerning how best to ensure responsible behavior in these two connected domains (Robinson 2016).

**EU’s separate policies on space and cyberspace**

Separate EU strategies for both outer space and cyberspace have already been adopted. EU Space strategy adopted in 2016 is newer out of these two. Although there have already been few high-level policy documents dealing with space published in the years before, the new space strategy represented a milestone in defining comprehensive and dedicated position...
of countries member states of the EU towards exploration and use of outer space. In the view of EU Space Strategy, space is perceived mainly as an enabler and provider of services. The strategy does not focus in detail on the technical and operative architecture of European space capabilities, it is rather incorporating space into other European policies. This has been an approach, which has been inherent to European space policy already for last decade at least. As such, the Strategy deals with existing opportunities where to find and how to utilize potential linkages between space infrastructure and European industry and other sectors of economy. It sets up 5 priority areas (European Commission 2016):

- Maximising the benefits of space for society and the EU economy
- Fostering globally competitive and innovative European space sector
- Reinforcing Europe’s autonomy in accessing and using space in a secure and safe environment
- Strengthening Europe’s role as a global actor and promoting international cooperation
- Ensuring Effective delivery

Looking at the broader picture of EU space agenda, several other issues are to be pointed out in this regard. Space activities in the European environment are conducted on three different levels - national, intergovernmental and supranational. National space programs represent the first level - with Germany and France being the major players in this regard. In terms of defining space policy or space strategy one needs to understand also the other two levels. This is also relevant when discussing cyber dimension of space agenda. The intergovernmental level of European space infrastructure is to be understood through activities of related international organizations, with European Space Agency being the most significant player in this regard. Then, on supranational level, the European Union and its space related activities constitute the final level of this tripartite organizational framework. Setting up proper working relations in this complicated organizational structure, mainly between EU and ESA has been an ongoing debate in fact until present day. When it comes to EU, its main space priorities lie in two flagship programs - satellite navigation system Galileo and global monitoring system Copernicus, and in several
other smaller agendas, such as space situational awareness, space diplomacy on international forums or support of the R&D funding through Horizon 2020 scheme. Approach of the EU lies rather in defining the political and conceptual framework of space activities with actual technical and operational work being conducted mainly through ESA or national space programs. The way, how cyber security dimension relates to space systems at European level, is thus sometimes difficult to grasp. On the operational level, especially at the level of ESA, cyber dimension of space activities has become almost a routinely tackled issue during the development process of a specific space project. Since the EU is dealing prevalently with overall framework of wider policy perspectives of particular projects, there have not been that many cases, where the importance of cyber security in space endeavors would have been publicly tackled.

With regards to cyber agenda, the primary reference document one could point out to is the Cyber Security Strategy of the EU. The strategy was adopted in 2013 and constitutes the first comprehensive high-level policy document dedicated specifically to cyber security. It is focusing on 5 strategic priority areas (European Commission 2013):

- Achieving cyber resilience
- Drastically reducing cybercrime
- Developing cyberdefence policy and capabilities related to the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP)
- Develop the industrial and technological resources for cyber security
- Establish a coherent international cyberspace policy for the European Union and promote core EU values

Besides the cyber security strategy, the overall cyber agenda at the EU level needs to be perceived through a broader organizational framework. In addition to the Cyber Security Strategy, another important document reflecting growing significance of cyberspace activities was adopted in 2016 in a form of a Directive on Network and Information Security. Institutional framework for issues related to cybersecurity has been present in the EU already since 2004, when the European Union Agency for Network and Information Security was established. The 2016
directive further elaborated on principles set in the Strategy from 2013 and focused more in detail on preparedness of individual member states and growing need for cooperation between them in matters of cyber security. With regards to status quo, Fabián and Melková (2016, 93) state that, overall, the majority of EU member states is aware of the necessity of continuous need to strengthen national capabilities in cyber security and resilience of critical infrastructure. However, there still are differences in national policies toward cyber issues and differences in these strategies then create evident gaps.

To sum up the basic focus of space and cyberspace strategies, we can assess that cyber security strategy presents prevalently ‘cyber for cyber’, whereas space strategy outlines a perspective with rather ‘space for other policies’ orientation. If one looks for further information in more generally oriented foreign policy or security related documentation cyber security has a stronger position in both EU Global Strategy from 2016 or in the European Agenda for Security from 2015. This is not to say, that space security or generally importance of space capabilities in wider policy frameworks are not visible, in fact, the EU Global Strategy itself does mention the importance of autonomy and security of European space infrastructure (European Union 2016, 42). The cyber agenda, nevertheless, presents much wider policy platform with deeper linkages to other European sectors and is thus tackled with higher political commitment.

Perspectives for a joint approach?

One can begin exploring the possibilities for a joint space - cyberspace approach at the EU level in already existing policy intersections in these two domains. Existing policy frameworks do provide us several policy overlaps in separate space and cyberspace agendas. These overlaps are mainly to be found in space-related documentation. There are several mentions of cyber attacks and cyber resiliency of space systems in the EU Space Strategy, more detailed view is to be found in the Report on space capabilities for European security and defence presented to the European Parliament in 2016. Article 12 of this report “identifies the dangers of cyber

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4 European perspectives on space activities and cyberspace operations have evolved to a situation, where both the former and the latter became utilized in foreign policy framework - Common Foreign Security Policy (CFSP) or even in Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP). Both space and cyberspace capabilities do have the potential contribute to effective conduct of CFSP or CSDP.
warfare and hybrid threats for European space programmes, taking into account that spoofing or jamming can disturb military missions or have far-reaching implications for daily life on earth” and argues for a need of inclusion of European space capabilities in cyberspace initiatives of the European Commission (European Parliament, 2016). When one looks at documentation focused at cyber security issues, such documents usually do not have any relevant specific mentions of space infrastructure and its linkages to cyber issues. Correia Mendonca (2016, 1)argues that this is, however, not just the case of the EU, but rather a general pattern. “Despite the fact that states are increasingly approving cybersecurity policies and strategies, these policies do not address the security of satellite systems. Even in the EU, the Network and Information System Directive does not mention satellite systems” (Correia Mendonca 2016). This particular trend should not be evaluated with negative assumptions. It confirms, what has already been mentioned - cyberspace security does not necessarily need stronger connections to space systems, but on the other hand, space operations continue to be dependent on cyberspace. This is a fact, which need to be perceived by members of both space and cyberspace community in European environment. Simple capacity building among both technical personnel and bureaucratic staff can have positive impact in enhancing appropriate responsiveness for the space-cyberspace conundrum at the European level. In similar manner, Valeri claims that it is “important to foster the development of strong human resources capable of examining and assessing current and future threats targeted jointly against space and cyberspace” (Valeri 2013, 7).

After exploring the existing and explicit policy overlaps one could shift the perspective to a potential or rather implicitly mentioned connections between space and cyberspace. Are there any? Existing EU policy frameworks suggest several possible areas, which can be pointed out to at the start and then built upon in future steps. One of these examples is the Digital Single Market (DSM) agenda, which is significant topic among European policies on its own. By its nature, DSM agenda has strong connections with any cyber-related policies adopted at the European level. EU space Strategy also portrays space infrastructures as one of instruments relevant in the progress of establishing the Digital Single Market and related digital or cyber goals such as the Internet of Things. Another potentially viable connection between space and cyberspace in existing policy frameworks can be the ‘supporting nature’ of space and cyberspace assets. Both Space Strategy of the EU and EU cyber agenda are creating an approach, through which both of these domains are understood as
providers or enablers of various services and applications, with most of them being primarily inherent to different sectors of European economies. Space and cyberspace are thus connected to effective and efficient economic performance of various economic sectors. Furthermore, with regards to other European policies, space and cyberspace represent instruments with relevance for ambitions of the EU in global arena. Either CFSP or CSDP are able to utilize services and applications related to space and cyberspace capabilities and this potential is also clearly stated in respective strategies. Relevance of space and cyberspace in CFSP related activities increases even further if we focus more narrowly on security related issues in the European environment, more particularly on contemporary ones. Continuing migration influx, complex and blurred security environment on the eastern border of the EU (and related relations with Russian Federation) or rise of relevance? cyber agenda itself present a perspective, in which the EU relies heavily on cyberspace capabilities and their resiliency. As it happens, space infrastructure provides another level of potential solutions in these particular challenges - providing satellite monitoring of maritime borders, land borders or movements in border regions, autonomous navigation system (although not yet in full operational modus), or services related to crisis management, should extraordinary crisis situation emerge. This situation thus creates a solid rationale, why there is a need to have a formal approach tackling connected challenges of space security and cyberspace security and their broader security-related implications.

Large part of the work of the EU in matters related to CFSP is conducted through the European External Action Service (EEAS). Through its representatives, one can find several statements addressing the intersections between space and cyberspace. Frank Asbeck, at that time EEAS’ Principal Adviser for Space and Security Policy argued in 2014, that policy-makers need to see the cross-domain similarities in order to address the growing challenges facing the cyber and space. He also called for understanding of their common features arguing that although cyber and space technologies have stark differences, both domains interact and complement one another and both require similar approaches. Both domains are omnipresent, and their related applications affect people’s everyday lives (Asbeck 2014, 42-43). In 2017, another EEAS representative, Francois Rivasseau, EEAS’ Special Envoy for Space described during an interview with Geneva Centre for Security Policy several technical and policy objectives for the EU in issues of space and cyberspace security. According to him, priority concern should be put on strengthening the cyber protection of ground segment of space systems and encryption of
data transmission, since these two technical issues currently display high-
level of vulnerability. At the same time however, he recognizes the need for a broader policy objectives, where he identifies the need for enhanced protection of whole production chain of space and cyberspace technologies (e.g. homologation and control of components), which could safeguard possible vulnerabilities stemming from rather open market for such technologies (Geneva Centre for Security Policy 2017).

Voices from the broader international affairs and security studies community have identified a prevailing absence of a joint approach for space and cyberspace on both national and international levels. When it comes to EU, we can point out several interesting policy-related recommendations in this matter. Pelegrino and Stang (2016, 8) state that “as the threat landscape evolves, closer engagement between the space and cyber communities will need to become permanent. In the EU, this connection can be enhanced by bringing space actors into the EU cyber dialogue”. We have already mentioned the need for an enhanced and integrated capacity building for both technical and non-technical personnel. Valeri adds to the discussion a broader element, arguing for defining a priority to maintain safe access to these two commons by protecting their capabilities to deliver positive network externalities and, at the same time, avoiding their securitization through restrictive measures (Valeri, 2013, 5). Jana Robinson presented in her paper from 2016 several general policy considerations, out of which we can dedicate several as applicable to the current situation in the European environment (Robinson 2016):

- Building collaborative arrangements between the space and cyberspace operators;
- Building a dossier of possible space vulnerabilities stemming from cyberspace and their possible impacts, including potential for escalation;
- Understanding strategic-level implications of different contingencies;

One final note can be dedicated to the fact, that cyberspace domain of space operations is recognized among relevant European stakeholders. The purpose of this Paper was not to set this agenda as an innovative policy agenda with minimal contemporary considerations in
Europe. We argued, that what currently seems to be missing and at the same time should be feasible to achieve, is an EU policy framework which could set out clear route regarding how to proceed with ever-growing intersections and interactions between operations in space and cyberspace. In actual technical domain, at the level of specific space projects, cyber dimension and more precisely cyber security dimension is being tackled. Del Monte (2013, 4) describes the case of ESA in this regard. “With the objective of ensuring a safe and security environment for its institutional missions, the European Space Agency has started an activity supporting the establishment of technical recommendations and of a policy through which ESA missions can define their own specific cyber- security requirements”. Pelegrino and Stang (2016, 26) state in similar manner, that the European Defence Agency and ESA “have been expanding their cooperation on cyber issues. The ESA conducted two classified studies with support from industry players to establish technical recommendations and an ESA-wide cyber security policy. This led to the establishment of a cyber range at the ESA facility in Redu with the aim of providing a training, simulation and testing environment to respond to and recover from cyber attacks”. Having a dedicated cyber-security policy for space activities just on the level of ESA is, however, from the overall EU perspective, not sufficient, given existing political and financial commitment of the EU to space activities. On the other hand, building upon already existing framework, such as this one, or on national inputs could provide solid ground in the process of establishing common EU approach for interwoven issues of space and cyberspace operations.

Taking into account above-mentioned findings about perceptions of space security and cybersecurity on European level, several policy recommendations (in addition to above mentioned recommendations by Ms. Robison) could be offered:

• Adoption of a new specific policy framework just for intersections between space security and cyber security is not necessarily needed as it does present an individual policy agenda. We argued for a need of a common approach on EU level, this can be achieved by more dedicated activities within separate policy frameworks, which, if properly coordinated, can create this common approach through their own separate channels. Should this happen, more focus to operational measures which can bring representatives from both communities closer to understanding importance of the other domain within space – cyberspace conundrum would be appropriate.
• Cyber dimension of space operations presents rather more critical issue that space dimension of cyber operations. Based on this, more attention to space – cyberspace intersections seems to be needed among space stakeholders and thus more resources, either technical or financial should be allocated at the European level for space community. These resources can include specific support for research studies or operational workshops, conferences or specific publications dedicated to cyber dimension of space operations. Recipients of this increased support should be members of both policy and actual technical side of space community in Europe.

• An EU-wide dedicated high-level political event on intersections between space security and cyber security is desirable and could provide benefits in two forms: in bringing representatives from individual member states together and thus pushing the agenda for more bottom-up approach at the level of member states; and to present publicly towards other members of international community that security connotations stemming from intersections of space and cyberspace operations are recognized and being tackled by European stakeholders – on both national level and EU-level.

Concluding Remarks

The presented paper was focusing on perspectives of adopting a joint approach for connected challenges of space security and cyber security at the European level. It provided background information on intersections between space and cyberspace operations, continued through outlining separate EU policies on space and cyberspace and through existing policy overlaps within these two agendas and concluded in offering several initial policy recommendations and considerations, should EU institutions decide to initiate described approach. The List with these recommendations is by no means conclusive and exhaustive but rather introductory to invigorate the discussion and bring-up inputs from different stakeholders. The essential idea, that there is place for such approach among existing EU policy frameworks remains relevant. The paper argues, however, that this does not necessarily have to take place in a separate policy document. Length limit of the Paper did not allow the author to deal with several related issues, which would also deserve to be mentioned to outline complex perspective, such as international regulatory and governance aspects for both space and cyberspace, complex institutional frameworks for these two agenda in European environment (ESA, EDA, NATO, OSCE...), national considerations, or detailed elaboration on the form of suggested operational measures at EU level to increase the level of understanding of intersections...
between space security and cyberspace security. Findings of the Paper suggest an existing need of improved understanding of intersections between space operation and cyberspace operation in order to enhance other European policies and strengthen the security of EU member states or European Union itself.

Reference list


Introduction

Arms transfers, defense cooperation and even licensed production contracts controversial to the normative ambition of responsible arms transfers are not a novelty; nor is the news of a perhaps stillborn Arms Trade Treaty (ATT), pro-forma regional arrangements (such as the Common Position 2008/944/CFSP), or nationally professed self-restraint policies (such as those of the UK). However, their systemic abandonment is of far greater interest. Recent developments in the MENA region have unmistakably reignited the Krausian triangle of primary arms transfer motivations and competition for these markets signals a systemic shift away from normative considerations. While aspects of this shift are not entirely without parallel in the past, this article focuses on the differentiating aspects that bear security implications for the region and Europe. Moreover, the identified trend is gravitating toward the characteristics of a new arms race in the Middle East which may, in parallel with the constellation of external drivers, successfully reverse the accomplished progress on responsible arms transfer policies. These include a diversification counter-push triggered by normative appeals, regional balancing ambitions based on domestic defense industrial ambitions, and others, including an emerging European giants’ competition over Brexit. Owing to the nature of the arms trade – being far more than a commodity and a very good indicator of foreign policy positions – the article analyses the impact of this trend on the regional security complex, Europe’s security standing, and its normative ambitions.

Global surge

Arms transfers, military aid and industrial defense cooperation are inherently and fundamentally different to other types of commodity trade, foreign
aid or international cooperation – especially when the term “responsible” is attached. Even a concise overview of state motivations to sell arms and the impacts of arms transfers on regimes, stability, interstate and intrastate conflict would far exceed the allotted scope. A pertinent summation would lead us to reflect Keith Krause’s triangle of motivations (Krause, 1992:12-17) (wealth, power, victory - regardless of which is currently prevailing) onto the fact that arms transfers are strategic acts of hard power, rather than solely economic exchanges, with tangible aforementioned impacts as evidenced by a host of authorship well summarized by Volker Krause (2004).

The 20 largest arms importers 2012–16

The trend in international transfers of major weapons, 1950–2016
These properties make arms transfers politically sensitive while revealing the foreign policy calculations of the involved actors, allowing for some, albeit tentative, prognoses. A close scrutiny is therefore warranted both in continuing trends and, more importantly, when trend shifts seem to be underway.

Year 2017 has seen multiple mainstream media outlets deliver otherwise scarcely publicized stories with titles on the booming arms trade. The volume of global arms trade has risen to levels not seen since the 1980s and, based on recent contracts, it is projected to grow even further in the coming years. While India still dominates as the single largest importer, two clear clusters have seen a dramatic share increase. The MENA region and Asia-Pacific. Not discounting the Asia-Pacific region with a substantially different set of dynamics, the MENA region is of particular interest and concern to the text and especially to Europe. In total, arms import to the region jumped by 86 percent between 2012 and 2016. In the past 5 years, compared to the previous period, Saudi Arabia has seen a 212% increase, Qatar a 245% increase, Kuwait 175%, UAE 63% (SIPRI Data) along with renewed military service in Qatar, Kuwait, and UAE. A surge all the more impressive against the backdrop of falling oil prices. Furthermore, the most dramatic increases in arms contracts and imports in 2016/2017 have occurred specifically in the Middle East – a cursory list of procurements by ISS indicates (2017).

While surges in arms transfers are not a historical novelty, each surge is accompanied by a specific set of circumstances promoting diverging outcomes. So, what makes the current surge in the Middle East crucially different? What's driving this surge? And most importantly, what are the role and expected impacts of Europe and the West alike? The following text will attempt to answer these questions while focusing on both the geopolitical and the normative cleavages involved.
Middle East arms race dynamics

The current MENA arms import surge may be explained by a list of direct and indirect drivers, some readily apparent like the Arab Spring and the feared instability; the wars in Libya, Syria, Iraq, and Yemen, which involve all states in the region either directly or via proxies; Iran's continued engagement abroad; and the need for new counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism capabilities among the most relevant. Others may be less apparent, like the increased west-east competition for leverage in the Middle East through arms sales; the implications of the JCPOA and the fast approaching 2020 lifting of the arms embargo on Iran; and the increased pressure on current and rising exporters to ramp up economies of scale at home. The last of these drivers is particularly relevant to Europe. Although further drivers are certainly present – such as the regional ambitions of multiple MENA players which could be analyzed in great depth (namely Algeria, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, UAE, Qatar, Israel, Iran, and Turkey) – the aforementioned remain at the heart of the novel surge constellation.

Crucially to the European and western perspective, the surge is occurring against the backdrop of a major achievement in setting up a new global responsible arms trade benchmark, championed by Europe, the 2014 Arms Trade Treaty. Although seemingly not a big step for Europe, which already applies the Common Position on Arms Exports 2008/944/CFSP with more stringent criteria, the post-2014 reliance on laxer interpretations of export limitations now bears a direct normative impact outside of the confines of the EU. The combination of the aforementioned drivers is quickly eroding the achieved progress. If current indications are an adequate gauge, there is little reason to expect any amelioration. On the contrary, if an arms race logic is to be presumed, further arms trade growth at the expense of normative ambitions is to be expected.

Whether we have arrived or are imminently heading toward a new Middle East arms race thus becomes crucial to the prognoses of future developments. Glossing over mainstream media and hawkish identifications of the situation as such, we are led to concede even under stringent academic definitions (Glaser, 2000; Mahnken, Maiolo and Stevenson, 2016: 11-20) that indeed, the current rapid growth is indicative of a regional arms race – and a multi-layered arms race at that. Arms races may take on multiple forms and although seemingly archaic, the action–reaction model of security dilemmas is still of utmost pertinence to modern state behavior and Middle East dynamics. The multi-layered characteristic goes beyond the core Saudi
Arabia versus Iran model and builds on some of the aforementioned drivers – namely the inter-west-east, the intra-Arab, Israel vs. regional threats, and government vs. insurgent capabilities dynamics (namely in the form of “hidden” arms races as set forth by strategic interactions (Arreguin-Toft, 2001). Individual drivers and their connection to the multi-layered arms race, as well as their relevance to further developments are discussed below.

Arms race drivers

While external conflict drives up volume with established partners, terrorism and internal conflict (direct or in the vicinity) drives contract renewals and extensions to new partners (Blomberg and Tocoian, 2016). Without a doubt, the MENA region is fraught with both and offers the primary driver for sidelined considerations over established or promoted normative frameworks. This vertical, horizontal, and by extension lateral (due to both the security dilemma and considerable regional proliferation) arms trade growth driver in the region is a novel post-CW combination. The post-Arab Spring deterioration of the security situation has activated GCC states outside of their borders to an unprecedented degree and jolted Iran’s activities in new areas. The proliferation of extremist factions across Syria, Iraq, the Sinai, Libya, Yemen, and Afghanistan is exposing GCC countries to previously unexperienced levels of potential instability spillover. The supportive role of Iran in some, but not all, of these hotspots then amalgamates the perceived regional threat. Both the state and non-state conflicts, coupled with a much more hands-off approach of the post-Libya 2011 west, are forcing countries in the MENA region into a new security role. One which Saudi Arabia, for example, had not experienced prior to 2013. As a result, and certainly in unison with enthusiastic western support for countering terrorist and extremist threats, GCC countries are acquiring a new set of military capabilities to this effect. High-end surveillance, precision guided missiles, counter-insurgency equipped combat helicopters, UAVs, and many newer weapons systems are in line with the preparedness to deal with non-state conflicts. However, interstate conflict seems to be of even greater focus. The regional struggle is seeing force projection and anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD), naval capacities, missile defense technologies, strategic transport, heavy weaponry, and air strike capabilities dominating the import portfolio in line with the arms race dynamic between Iran and Saudi Arabia with their allies. The primary indigenous driver thus seems easy to identify, but only its combination with the other drivers enables a comprehensive assessment.
Chief among these is the east-west competition over leverage, interest promotion, and a certain version of “stability” in the MENA region. Crucial roles can be ascribed to the USA, Russia, and most interestingly Europe. As our focus lies with the impact on the normative ambitions and security repercussions for Europe, a cursory and certainly not exhaustive indication of European drivers follows.

In Europe, the Ukraine crisis, the migrant crisis, and the carry-your-weight policy of the USA, strongly reinforced by Trump, means defense budgets and procurements across NATO’s European membership are on the rise. Yet most professional armies are small and specialized, the spectrum of tasks to cover wide, and the need to retain at least an elementary strategic defense industrial base is viewed as increasingly crucial. These considerations have still stayed clear of the “wealth” point of the Krausian triangle, but this is assuredly pertinent to every country employing a large or electorally significant defense-related workforce, often in state-run or former state-run companies. In a bundle, this translates into European countries searching for economy-of-scale savings on export markets. As the European defense market remains dominated and saturated by the big three, external markets are of the utmost importance. The last two years of European arms transfers indicate a continued propensity of Central and Eastern European countries toward aggressive export market search, relegating normative commitments when necessary.

While 8% of all arms export licenses to the MENA region were denied in 2000, only 2% were denied in 2010, up by a percentage point in 2014. The absolute number of denials remains comparable or has even grown, due to the increased license requests. The value of trade grew from EUR 60 million to EUR 8 billion. FAS reports a global trend, of which EU exporters are necessarily part of, where the proportion of export aimed at developing states has rocketed to 86% of all transfers between 2011-2014, MENA being the chief recipient (Theohary, 2016). A significant portion of these exports, according to verified reports as much as EUR 1.2 billion worth, has been transported in 2015 alone to UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey from Eastern European countries – most ending up in Syria or Yemen following previously known incompatibility with the equipment of the declared end users (OCCRP, 2016). Particularly the UAE has been featured as a prime point of the delivery diversion (PDD) hub for long-term weapons proliferation across the region and into Africa (SAS 2012).
Furthermore, intra-EU competition is likely to escalate with a looming Brexit as witnessed not only by meager progress on the European Defense Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB) in prior years but especially by the UK’s fierce competition for recent contracts. The dominance of the big three in the European Defense Equipment Market (EDEM) has offered fewer opportunities for medium and smaller states to break through on lucrative markets until now. The effects of Brexit on increased competition within the big three may further aggravate this situation and leave little ambition on the part of individual governments to stifle exports on normative grounds.

As the US role is self-explanatory – having not ratified the ATT and having been the prime supplier of GCC states since the seventies – the US reinforced this statute with the announcement of a USD 100 billion deal in May 2017 (which in reality is “fake news” and only builds on letters of interest for ongoing contracts and potential new business). But the US is also being pressured into continued supplies and increased technology transfers or risks losing leverage with its primary allies. Despite criticism at home and on the world stage, both the US and Canada have reapproved significant new export packages, while staying short of giving significant pause to Israel or sharing advanced technologies, such as UAVs with its partners.

Russia and China may be perceived as both competition and increasingly the adversary in the current arms race. In simple terms, their contribution to the driving force is locking in the west to its current commitments for fear of losing market share and leverage, and more importantly supplying Iran and Syria. While Russia's military expenditure has grown rapidly and commensurately to its role in Ukraine and Syria, reductions are expected in the coming years, with projections of -7 to -8 per cent for 2017. However, the connection to increased pressure on arms exports – via the necessity of economy-of-scale savings and export market orientation – does not apply to Russia equally. Russian arms transfer considerations, far more than those of other actors, are motivated more by their use as a foreign policy tool in achieving national interests abroad (Blank and Levitzky, 2015; Conolly and Sendstad, 2017). Without resorting to clichés about the reminiscent Soviet “military aid”, the fact remains that Russia is quickly ready to step in to replace western exporters and with the loss of Egypt and Iraq, will focus heavily on rearming Syria and Iran – not least to prevent successful competition from China. While Iran is still under a conventional UN arms embargo, Russia has supplied the controversial
S-300 system and concluded sizeable deals to be fulfilled in 2020 with the embargo’s lifting.

China’s growing defense sector and heavy dependence on middle-eastern oil incentivize China to aim primarily for a balance of power approach. While only holding a small portion of the current MENA market, China is increasingly offering to step in with the most desirable versions of arms deals – ones with technology transfers. UAV capability transfers denied to Saudi Arabia by the US have thus resulted in China opening a UAV factory amidst a (this time real) USD 60 billion arms deal. However, collaboration with Iran is even more intensive, focusing on extensive naval modernization, joint military drills, A2/AD capabilities and more. China is thus a new element in the Middle East arms race, further pressuring the west not to “lose out” and risk MENA import diversification or domestic production growth to a degree where it loses regional clout. Although judged unrealistic by experts, Saudi Arabia has presented its Vision 2030 including the ambition of sourcing half of its military spending at home (currently at 2%) again increasing pressure on exporters to offer more in the way of technology transfers through joint ventures and licensed production or be replaced.

Locked into a Middle East arms race

Realpolitik concerns, security maxims, and national interest dictate a continuation of weapons deliveries under the confines of the Krausian triangle, with continually less heed being paid to the normative ambitions displayed by Europe only a few years ago. In this respect, Europe is particularly vulnerable to “losing out” and becoming irrelevant in the MENA push for import diversification and greater self-reliance. Although there is no solid research on the topic yet, it is easy to see the connection between the increased emphasis on normative limits on arms transfers from the west and a push for diversification and autarky among the countries that were being perceived as the most controversial importers.

The locked-in nature of Europe’s relation to MENA arms transfers is perhaps best exemplified by Boris Johnson’s attestation that if we don’t supply weapons to Saudi Arabia, someone else will (The Guardian, 2016). As the UK maintains above standard arms export controls, the normative impacts are especially jarring. In 2017, the campaign to stop UK arms transfers to Saudi Arabia because of their direct criminal use in Yemen and diversion to Syria, with 4.5 billion USD in contracts since 2015 (both
vehemently documented by UN, EU, ICRC, and other watchdog NGOs) was thwarted by the UK High Court in a closed session. Over half of the evidence was heard in secret on national security grounds juxtaposed to even the minimum commitments to prevent breaches of IHL and moreover the standards of the UK-originated ATT, the Common Position, and above standard UK regulations on arms transfers. In the current climate, all were overruled by the High Court citing national interest, not unlike the 2007 UK bribery investigation which was halted at the behest of UK PM citing “public interest” in response to direct Saudi threats of cancelling the Typhoon contract, withdrawing intelligence, and diplomatic cooperation. While this may seem like another single occurrence among many other controversial arms deals – it indeed attests to a shift of priorities from the strongest proponent of responsible arms transfers and the initiator of the ATT to an “unmaneuverable” entanglement in the current Middle East arms buildup and a post-Brexit dominant supplier. Furthermore, although chosen as a prime example here, the UK is most assuredly not alone in this quandary. On the contrary, similar campaigns have cropped up repeatedly across Europe and North America post-2011 with an ever-increasing frequency.

The Egypt case may serve as a prime example on the European level. Amidst the strongest backlash in the summer of 2013, both the US and the UK (temporarily) revoked multiple licenses on substantial deals, but the EU bent over backwards in an attempt to support its own Common Position and the ongoing ATT negotiations, declaring a suspension of arms transfers. However, it shied away from imposing this cessation by decision or regulation, thus rendering it voluntary and disregarded (Council of the EU, 2014). Russia was ready with an arms deal by November 2013 – no strings attached, to be financed by GCC loans and Russian government backing via indirect payment. While much remains the same on the ground, regional security concerns and the fear of losing the Egyptian market/influence resulted in a resurgence of both EU and US arms supplies and military aid in grand fashion, catapulting Egypt to the 4th largest arms importer by 2015, almost exclusively based on western arms contracts.

**Responsible arms trade prospects**

The responsible arms trade concept appeared as a topic in the mid-90s, followed by a host of international treaties and instruments to codify a normative approach to arms transfers. Among them UNROCA 1993, Wassenaar 1996, International CoC 1997, the hallmark EU Code of
Conduct on Arms Exports in 1998, the Firearms Protocol and PoA in 2001, the EU Common Position on Arms Exports in 2008 (2008/944/CFSP), and others – all finally culminating in the launch of the Arms Trade Treaty negotiation in 2012. While many individual countries apply more stringent criteria to their own exports, the ATT adopted on December 24, 2014 is the first global, legally binding instrument introducing criteria of “responsible” arms trade. The EU Common Position on Arms Exports (2008/944/CFSP) with even stricter criteria served as a departing point and the EU lobbied for global adoption heavily throughout the ATT negotiation process (Depauw, 2012:2). The negotiation process was hindered by crucial national interests and ultimately resulted in a much heralded but problematic final text.

The many shortcomings of the ATT are too extensive to elaborate here (Chovančík, 2016), but a consensus treaty can be expected to have flaws. The key aspect being discussed here is that subsequent behavior of signatories and especially State Parties may either diminish or aggravate these flaws. The argument being made here is that over and above aggravating the flaws of the ATT, the current European and North American export policies to the MENA region are pushing the whole ATT towards irrelevance and reversing the trend toward “responsible” arms transfers. Realpolitik considerations and the pull of the Krausian triangle certainly indicate a trend away from normative hindrances.

The internal flaws of the ATT and the clear practical non-application of its principles by key constituent State Parties in the first years following its adoption leave small expectations of improvement. The number of state signatories, the Conferences of State Parties, and especially reporting practices of state parties are telling signs of the reversing trend. As of mid-2017, of the 130 signatories, only 92 have become state parties (still excluding all major arms exporters outside of the EU + ROK and most of the largest arms importers). Out of the 92 state parties, only 59 submitted initial reports in 2014, drawing down to 50 in 2015, and only 43 for 2016 (Bales and Mutschler, 2016). Moreover, many state parties are taking every advantage of the vagueness in the ATT clauses in the reports. Withholding information on arms transfers (with or without indicating their doing so), not reporting on any small arms or light weapons transfers (which is voluntary, the same as ammunition), making the reports confidential (as Slovakia did in 2015), omitting re-transfers and imports (as the Czech Republic did in 2015), or simply misreporting on the actual or contracted export deals. Despite adjusting for the reporting deficiencies of primarily African states, the “learning curve”, and natural error rate, the
trend still appears to be toward sub-standard reporting with a discretionary withholding of information by some of the strong proponents of the ATT. The 3rd Conference of State parties will again attempt to improve on this situation, but attempts were already made at the 1st and 2nd conferences and again, the constellation of disincentives seems to be directed in the opposite direction – or at the very least, the maneuvering space has become paper-thin.

**Conclusion and security repercussions**

Arms transfers are strategic acts of hard power, rather than solely economic exchanges, with tangible impacts, accompanying leverage, and relevant (often unforeseen) consequences to the importing, but also exporting, countries. Long-term arms trade dominance with a country can serve as a defense pact substitute. As Krause shows, this link is relatively fragile in its dependency – while remaining strong, the likelihood of interstate conflict initiation is lowered, but fluctuations in support erode this pacifying effect (Krause 2004:365-367). On the other hand, the incidences of internal conflict and proxy wars are both adversely affected by the level of arms imports as intrastate conflict draws predominantly on existing stockpiles, rather than licit or illicit imports (drawing down with duration) (Jackson, 2010). Furthermore, in their brief chapter “The Quest for Security”, Brett Leeds and Clifton Morgan summarize decades of peace research to conclude that arms races, especially regional, increase the likelihood of armed conflict contrary to balance of power theories (2017: 144).

This combination of drivers and known causal links leaves western arms exporters to the MENA region seemingly with a single sub-optimal scenario in the currently unfolding arms race. Continuing exports and indeed adopting a more lenient approach to technology transfers, thus at least temporarily maintaining political clout over regional events and counter-terrorist cooperation in the short term. This however translates into an acknowledgement of engaging in an arms race that can optimistically only lead to substantial arms proliferation across the region (and beyond) and pessimistically to more grievous proxy or direct interstate armed conflicts. As mentioned above, due to the security, geopolitical, and economic drivers currently in place – this is clearly the path chosen so far and runs contrary to the normative ambitions championed by Europe and adopted globally in the ATT. There is understandably next to no room for the opposite course of full stringent adherence to the extent of the adopted norms, as it would quickly lead to the substitution of imports from west to east and an overall
lack of both leverage and cooperation – hardly a viable short or long-term strategy in the current state. Nevertheless, a coordinated realization and acknowledgement of the arms race reality, especially by Europe, may leave breathing space for the implementation of many of the ATT and Common Position clauses including due diligence, stockpile management, exhaustive reporting, and many others including a selective, rather than a blanket secrecy of arms export license denials to the region. While bolstering the adopted normative commitments, the acknowledgement of the reality and possible consequences of a Middle East arms race also opens up debate opportunities on more long-term and coherent European policy packages toward the region.

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PROMISES AND OUTCOMES: A LOOK AT THE NATO WARSAW SUMMIT

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Introduction

The dissolution of both the USSR and the Warsaw Pact, as well as the fall of the Iron Curtain raised the question about the role of NATO in the new security environment. Subsequently, the war in Yugoslavia in 1991-1992 soon provided an answer to this question. The Alliance found its new role in out-of-area missions. For NATO, this was the beginning of the era when its primary role was not to defend its own territory, but rather carry out crisis management in the countries beyond the Alliance’s border, to enlarge and to build new partnerships. Despite that, NATO also kept its deterrent posture against potential adversaries after the end of the Cold War. In fact, since the establishment of the Alliance in 1949, there has been no attempt of a conventional attack on any NATO country. The core of the Alliance’s deterrence lies in Article 5 of the Washington Treaty: “The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all.” (NATO, 1949) According to Knopf, the aim of deterrence is “to prevent an action that could potentially harm us,” (Paul, Morgan and Wirtz 2009, 34).

Consequently, the Alliance found its new purpose even in times when its biggest adversary ceased to exist. Until today, there are three core tasks of the Alliance defined in the current Strategic Concept which was adopted at the Lisbon Summit in 2010. These tasks are the following: collective defence, crisis management and cooperative security (NATO, 2010).

In 2009, a group of Central and Eastern European intellectuals and former officials sent an open letter to then President Obama in which they expressed concerns about “Russia’s more assertive policy and a number of trends which threatened to undermine transatlantic solidarity and ties to Central and Eastern Europe” (Larrabee, 2010, 44). This letter called for a more visible assurance from the U.S. in the region of Central and Eastern
Europe. The authors were afraid that not responding to Russo-Georgian conflict made the Alliance look weak as a security provider in Europe (Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty 2009). Knopf (2012, 376) defines assurances as “promises which involve declarations and signals to convey a commitment to take or refrain from taking certain actions in the future.” Knopf (2012, 379-381) distinguishes two types of assurances. The first type is called assurance as a component of a deterrence. In this case, “assurance signals the ability to deter a potential adversary from taking unwanted action because it can face punishment/response.” The second type is the alliance-related assurance, which “emphasizes promises to protect friends rather than to refrain from attacking states if they comply with one’s deterrent demands.” This paper covers both types of the assurance defined by Knopf. The former is focused on deterring the adversary Russia and the latter is focused on showing assurance and solidarity within the Allies in NATO.

After the outbreak of the Ukraine crisis, NATO responded by strengthening its military presence and visibility in the Baltic states, Poland and the Black Sea region. These Allied forces are deployed for exercise in land, sea and in the air. New air and maritime policing missions were added to the old ones (Ringsmose and Rynning, 2017, 131). Measures taken at the previous summits in Wales and Warsaw helped to enhance the Alliance’s defence and deterrence posture. On top of that, it has helped to reassure the Allies that NATO was capable of protecting Allied territories and populations.

A changed security environment and Russia’s behaviour

The year 2014 marked a significant change in the European security environment. In the Warsaw Summit Communiqué (2016b), the Allies declared there were two big threats that could be geographically defined as coming from the south and the east respectively. “The Alliance faces a range of security challenges and threats that originate both from the east and from the south.” (NATO, 2016b). This destabilization of the neighbourhood forced Europeans to think about their own security more deeply. The war in Syria, turmoil in Iraq with the fear of the terrorist group of Daesh from the South, the illegal annexation of Crimea and the war in the Eastern part of Ukraine supported by Russia have raised huge security concerns in many European states. Furthermore, the instability in the Middle East and North Africa is contributing to the refugee and migrant crisis. All these challenges and threats stimulated NATO Member States to strengthen their own defence capabilities.
However, changes in the European security environment originated in an earlier period during the Russo-Georgian conflict in the summer of 2008. The truth is that NATO did not respond to this conflict in the same way as it did in the case of the war between Russia and Ukraine of 2014. Indeed, NATO countries were trying to maintain good relations with the Russian Federation when the conflict in Georgia occurred. In other words, they started to perceive Russia as a threat in 2014 because of several reasons.

Firstly, the still ongoing conflict in Eastern Ukraine has lasted for more than four years now, but the duration of the conflict in Georgia was only five days. Secondly, the number of casualties is significantly different. While approximately 850 people died in Georgia in 2008 (Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia, 2009, 229), in Ukraine the number reached nearly 10,500 casualties by the summer of 2018 (Alexe, 2018). Last but not least, Ukraine is geographically closer to NATO countries than Georgia. While Ukraine borders directly on four NATO countries – Slovakia, Hungary, Poland and Romania, Georgia borders only Turkey.

The withdrawal of the Russian Federation from the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe in 2007 was one of the turning points in the relations between the West and Russia. It shattered trust among Russia and the Alliance and also led to the lack of transparency of the size of Russian exercises. The scope, frequency and purpose of Russia’s military exercises are troubling for the Alliance as well. Russia jointly conducted two exercises, Zapad-09 and Ladoga, in the autumn of 2009. Russia rehearsed the invasion and occupation of the Baltic Region, with a corridor some 100 kilometres west of the Russian border. The exercise Zapad-09 also significantly worried the Allies in the Eastern part of the Alliance because it envisaged the deployment and use of nuclear weapons while one of the targets was Warsaw (Lucas, 2015, 8). At the end of June 2017, Russia exercised navy cooperation with three Chinese battleships in the Baltic Sea. The high point of the Russian military exercises of that year were the traditional Zapad manoeuvres conducted in September 2017. Lithuanian minister of Defence Raimundas Karoblis commented on this exercise: “It is not very pleasant if your neighbour is conducting an exercise which simulates an attack on you. The biggest problem is the lack of transparency.” (Ehl, 2017). The Russian territory of Kaliningrad, situated between Poland and Lithuania in the Baltics, is another source of tensions among NATO countries and Russia. Russia is strengthening its military
presence there using both defensive and offensive missile systems. The most troubling for NATO is the deployment of Iskander-M from October 2016 (Reuters, 2016).

The intervention of Russia in Georgia in the summer of 2008 revealed the shortcomings in the Russian armed forces. Since then, Russia has begun with a broad modernisation of its army. The aim of the modernisation was to change the structures and re-arm the armed forces so that they were permanently ready for deployment (Military Balance, 2017, 184). On top of that, Russia has significantly raised its defence expenditures in the last couple of years. In comparison, Russia spent 1.7 billion roubles in 2010 and more than 4 billion roubles in 2015 (Military Balance, 2017, 191).

**From Wales to Warsaw**

Before getting to the core of this paper – the Warsaw Summit of 2016, it is important to mention the outcome of the 2014 Wales Summit which took place as the first NATO summit since the annexation of Crimea and the outbreak of the war in Eastern Ukraine. Many find the summit in Wales to be a historic one because of the changed security environment in Europe and the need to react to the new situation. The Allies sent a clear message to Russia that its steps regarding Ukraine are unacceptable. NATO-Russia Council meetings were suspended for almost two years. According to the Alliance, the dialogue with Russia is important in order to prevent misunderstandings, miscalculations and unintended escalation. Subsequently, Russia and NATO renewed their common dialogue in April 2016, shortly before the Warsaw Summit.

At previous NATO summits (Strasbourg-Kehl, Lisbon and Chicago), the Alliance called on the Russian Federation to comply with their international commitments and to respect the territorial integrity of Georgia. In spite of the temporary suspension of the NATO-Russia Council meetings at the time, the Allies stressed the importance of maintaining the political dialogue with Russia at the Strasbourg-Kehl Summit (2009). The Alliance still had an interest in a common dialogue with Russia because of several common topics: the stabilization of Afghanistan, arms control, the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, crisis management and building ballistic missile defence systems (NATO, 2009). On the other hand, Russia was not perceived as a partner anymore, but rather as a threat after 2014: “There is an arc of insecurity and instability along NATO’s periphery and beyond. The Alliance faces a range of security challenges and threats
that originate both from the east and from the south; …“ (NATO, 2016b). The moderate approach of NATO towards Russia changed at the Wales Summit in 2014. The NATO military presence in its own member countries was enhanced mainly following the events of 2014. Firstly, the conflict in Ukraine and the annexation of Crimea deeply troubled many Allies, in particular those closer to Russia. Secondly, the destabilization of the Middle East and North Africa region became a security threat for the Southern part of the Alliance. And finally, the end of the biggest crisis management operation in NATO's history in Afghanistan: the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) created a space for the “back to basics” approach. Hence, the Alliance had a great opportunity to come back to its main purpose – collective defence in the name of Article 5.

In early 2014, during NATO preparations for the Wales Summit, only very little attention was paid to the concerns of Central and Eastern European countries. Russia made these concerns, mainly of the Baltic states and Poland, valid in the spring of 2014 by annexing Crimea and supporting the war in Eastern Ukraine. Indeed, the centre of debates in Wales was supposed to be the post-ISAF NATO’s future and maritime security, not responses to Russia as a potential military threat (Larsen, 2016, 4).

At the Wales Summit, the Readiness Action Plan (RAP) was approved by the Allies “in order to ensure that our Alliance is ready to respond swiftly and firmly to the new security challenges. RAP provides a coherent and comprehensive package of necessary measures to respond to the changes in the security environment on NATO’s borders and further afield that are of concern to the Allies.” (NATO, 2014). The elements of the Plan include two types of measures – assurance and adaptation. “Assurance measures mean an increased military presence and activity for assurance and deterrence initially in the eastern part of the Alliance. These measures are designed to reassure their populations and deter potential aggression” (NATO, 2016a).

Adaptation measures are changes to the Alliance’s long-term military posture and capabilities to enable it to respond more quickly to emergencies wherever they arise. These adaptation measures include the following: Firstly, the size of the NATO Response Force (NRF) tripled from 13,000 to about 40,000 troops in 2015. Secondly, within the NRF, a new quick-reaction “Spearhead Force” (Very High Readiness Joint Task Force VJTF) of around 20,000, of which about 5,000 are ground troops, is now operational and is ready to deploy to any location within days. Thirdly, the
small multinational NATO headquarters - NATO Force Integration Units (NFIUs) - were established on the territories of the Eastern Allies - Bulgaria, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania and Slovakia (NATO 2016a).

At the Warsaw Summit in 2016, the Allies agreed on further enhancing their forces specifically on two flanks: in the Baltics and the Black Sea region. In the Baltics, it is in the form of an Enhanced Forward Presence, while in the Black Sea Region, the initiative is called Tailored Forward Presence. In both initiatives, there is a continuous presence of rotating troops. The only difference is that land forces are only present in the Baltics (Ringsmose and Rynning, 2017, 131). The Allies declared their commitment to a “back to basics” approach in the Warsaw Summit Communiqué (2016b): “The greatest responsibility of the Alliance is to protect and defend our territory and our populations against attack, as set out in Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. And so renewed emphasis has been placed on deterrence and collective defence.”

Enhanced Forward Presence in the Baltic states and Poland

The most important step further taken in Warsaw was to permanently station Allied soldiers in Member States bordering Russia. This step would have seemed unrealistic two years earlier in Wales (Zapfe, 2017, 148). The narrative of Russian officials often criticizes NATO for enhancing its military presence in the Eastern part of the Alliance. The Russians are blaming the Alliance for breaching the NATO-Russia Founding Act (1997). In fact, the battalions are comprised of multinational forces on a rotational basis in order not to violate the part of the NATO-Russia Founding Act of 1997 which states the following: “NATO reiterates that in the current and foreseeable security environment, the Alliance will carry out its collective defence and other missions by ensuring the necessary interoperability, integration, and capability for reinforcement rather than by an additional permanent stationing of substantial combat forces” (NATO, 1997). This rotation of forces ensures that NATO continues to comply with the Act. Although, it can be argued that Russia has changed the security environment by its actions (e.g. the cyberattack on Estonia in 2007, the invasion of Georgia in 2008, the annexation of Crimea or the invasion of Eastern Ukraine in 2014) which makes the agreement not valid anymore in this respect. In other words, it is necessary to keep in mind the fact that this agreement was signed by both Russia and NATO twenty years ago when “the current and foreseeable security environment” was not hostile as it is today.
The four battalions in the region represent a major shift compared to the past. The number of foreign soldiers in the region was significantly lower in the past than now in the battalions. On top of that, the presence of these troops is meant to send two messages to Russia. Firstly, that Baltic states and Poland have the full support of the Alliance and, secondly, that an attack on the Baltic states or Poland will be considered as an attack on all. This commitment of the Alliance to Article 5 is enhanced by the multinationality of the battalions. The logic of deterrence in this case is a simple one – if a potential aggressor attacks one of the Baltic states or Poland, it will have to face American, British, French, German or Canadian soldiers, not only Latvians, Lithuanians, Estonians or Poles. Therefore, the first aim of the Enhanced Forward Presence is to deter any potential Russian aggression against the Baltic states and Poland which share a common border with Russia. The second aim is to symbolise Allied solidarity and therefore reassure Allies in the Eastern part of the Alliance. Indeed, the concerns of the Baltic states are legitimate. For instance, according to a RAND Corporation analysis, Russia would be able to occupy the territories of the Baltic states within two or three days (Shlapak & Johnson, 2016, 6).

The first negotiations regarding an enhanced military presence of the Alliance on its Eastern flank began in early 2016. The decision to deploy four multinational battalions was made at the Warsaw Summit in July 2016. Nevertheless, it is important to perceive this decision in the context of the Readiness Action Plan which was previously adopted during the Wales Summit in 2014. The composition of the battalions was approved at the Defence ministers meeting in Brussels in October 2016. The description of the biggest deployment of NATO troops in the post-Soviet states on the official NATO website says: “NATO’s enhanced forward presence is defensive, proportionate, and in line with international commitments. It represents a significant commitment by Allies and is a tangible reminder that an attack on one is an attack on all.” (NATO, 2017a)

These four multinational battle groups are situated in the Baltic states – Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, and in Poland. In each of the aforementioned countries “there are multinational forces provided by framework nations and other contributing Allies on a voluntary, sustainable and rotational basis.” (NATO, 2016b). The framework nations are the United Kingdom in Estonia, Canada in Latvia, Germany in Lithuania, and the United States in Poland. All these four multinational battalions are fully deployed to this date. Beside the framework nations, there are also other contributing countries from all over the Alliance (NATO, 2017c).
Tailored Forward Presence in the Southeast

At the summit in Warsaw, the Allies agreed on developing a Tailored Forward Presence in the Southeast part of the Alliance. The measures are tailored to the Black Sea Region where the regional security changed after the annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation in March 2014. Since then, the tensions in the region have been rising as Russia has been enhancing its military presence on the Crimean Peninsula. Therefore, the balance of power in the region changed significantly in favour of Russia. It is estimated that its military potential is bigger than the potential of all other states in the Black Sea Region combined (Ondrejcsák, 2016, 9).

The measures include land training within a multinational framework brigade in Romania which brings more NATO forces and more exercises and training under the Multinational Division Southeast Headquarters in Romania. NATO is therefore increasing its presence in the Black Sea Region. Some specific measures were approved by Defence ministers at the meeting in October 2016. Several countries pledged their forces and capabilities to enhance the NATO presence in the region, on land, at sea and in the air. In February 2017, the Ministers of Defence approved an increased NATO naval presence in the Black Sea for training, exercises and situational awareness and a maritime coordination function for NATO Standing Naval Forces when operating with other Allied forces in the Black Sea Region (NATO, 2017a).

Defence spending

At the Wales Summit, the Allies agreed on the commitment to increase their defence budgets, so they could consequently reach the guideline to spend a minimum of 2% of their GDP. The main aim of the Defence Investment Pledge has been to reverse the trend of decreasing defence budgets since 2009. There were some objective reasons for this trend at the time. Firstly, European countries did not see any direct threat to their security. Secondly, the year 2009 was marked by the financial crisis. Therefore, there was no political will or interest to increase the defence spending in European countries. The main turning point came in 2014 with two emerging threats in the European neighbourhood – a destabilized Middle East Region with the rising power of Daesh and both the illegal annexation of Crimea and the war in Eastern Ukraine (Csiki, 2016, 9).
In the Warsaw Communiqué, the Allies claim that the commitment to increase their defence spending was an “important step” (NATO, 2016b). They also evaluate the step forward in this matter since the Wales Summit. Collective defence expenditures had increased in 2016 for the first time since 2009. However, the Allies are aware that they need to maintain the trend. Moreover, the Defence ministers will continue to review the progress annually as they agreed in the Communiqué (NATO, 2016b).

By July 2016, when the Warsaw Summit was taking place, five NATO countries had met the NATO guideline to spend a minimum of 2% of their GDP on defence – the United States, Greece, Estonia, the United Kingdom, and Poland (NATO, 2017b). According to the evaluation provided at the Warsaw Summit, ten Member States met the NATO guideline to spend more than 20% of their defence budgets on major equipment, including the related Research and Development.

The low defence budget debate is associated with the criticism from the U.S. towards European Allies. The United States criticizes the Europeans for their reliance on security guarantees and assurances from the U.S. and for not doing enough to ensure their own security. However, this criticism was not first voiced by the current administration of President Donald Trump. It also came from the previous administration of Barack Obama in 2011. Then Secretary of Defence Robert Gates warned Europe that “future U.S. political leaders, those for whom the Cold War was not the formative experience that it was for me, may not consider the return on America’s investment in NATO worth the cost.” (Washington Post, 2011).

In 2017, with the new Trump administration in office, the U.S. pressure on European Allies to increase their defence budgets in order to ensure their own security, increased. Current U.S. Secretary of Defence James Mattis during his first visit in Brussels Headquarters gave European NATO members a spending ultimatum and he added for his colleagues in Europe: “The impatience Secretary Gates predicted is now a governmental reality.” NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg reacted: “This is not the U.S. telling Europe to increase defence spending. This is 28 allies, heads of state and government, sitting around the same table in 2014 and looking into each other’s eyes and agreeing that we shall increase defence spending.” (Politico, 2017). Although, the rising defence expenditures are widely perceived as a positive step, there are still some doubts whether the 2% guideline is a realistic goal for some countries. The question whether political leaders are willing to continue in rising national defence budgets still remains open.
Special meeting in Brussels

The meeting of Heads of State and/or Government in Brussels was accompanied by some novelties in May 2017. Firstly, it was held at the new NATO Headquarters in Brussels. Secondly, it was the first NATO meeting with two newly elected core leaders in the Alliance – the U.S. President Trump and French president Macron. Last but not least, Montenegro was represented by the Prime Minister Duško Marković at the meeting for the first time as it was soon to become the 29th NATO Member State. This was a clear sign that the NATO open door policy is still in place. At the summit, the following topics were high on the agenda: the fight against terrorism and fairer burden sharing among Member States, Russia’s military posture, the Russia-NATO relationship and the South and the migration issue (NATO, 2017d).

In order to do more to ensure fairer burden sharing across the Alliance, the Allies decided to develop annual national plans. These plans cover three major areas: cash, capabilities, and contributions, to meet the Defence Investment Pledge made at Wales summit in 2014. In fact, no concrete decisions on security issues were adopted at the Brussels Summit. The summit was more about showing the Alliance’s commitment to the collective defence of Article 5 of Washington Treaty and that the transatlantic bond among the Allies in North America and Europe is still valid (Dibenedetto, 2017).

Conclusion

While the Wales Summit of 2014 is considered to be a historic one, it does not mean that the Warsaw Summit is of less importance. In fact, further steps forward were taken there. One of them is the very ambitious Enhanced Forward Presence in the Baltics and Poland. It shows both the Allied solidarity and strengthens the deterrent posture of the Alliance on the Eastern flank. Four battalions are fully deployed to this date and the Allied forces have a great opportunity to cooperate and learn from each other and thus increase their interoperability. On top of that, adapting to the new security environment requires relearning how to move large forces and equipment across European territory. This lack of practice is the result of the last couple of years, when NATO focused rather on crisis management in its out-of-area missions (Ringsmose and Rynning, 2017, 133). Now, with its “back to basics” approach, the Alliance is again focusing on territorial defence. The Tailored Forward Presence is the second
important step because it also responds to the issue of the Black Sea Region which is highly affected by changes in the security environment, mainly by the illegal annexation of the Crimean Peninsula. Last but not least, the increase in defence spending by European NATO members has definitely been a positive step forward. However, there is still the question of political will in the countries when it comes to improving defence capabilities.

To conclude, there is still much that should be done to enhance NATO's defence and deterrent posture. The question of the reassurance of the Eastern Allies is still on the table and the administration of the U.S. president Donald Trump has brought new concerns that primarily have to do with the question of whether the United States would be willing to help Europe in case there were an attack on one of the Allies. That is why European NATO members have to continue on the path set by the NATO summits in Wales, Warsaw, and the Brussels meeting in case they want to be able to defend their territories and populations in the new security environment.

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Does Britain do strategy?

For decades British strategy was defined by reliance on American strategic guidance. It combined a "special partnership" type alliance with the US and (at a later stage) strong economic bonds with the European Communities, toying with the idea of being a meeting point between the EU and the US. Consequently, British security thinking was more concentrated on managing and adjusting its military capacities than on properly considering the country’s place in the world. Nearly a dozen post-war defence reviews, accompanied by the yearly Statements on Defence estimates, reflected the UK’s slow adaptation to the post-imperial world, the gradual erosion of its influence and engagement worldwide, further concentration on the defence of its own territory, progressive defence spending cuts, and ever-increasing reliance on NATO allies (see Walker and Mills 2015).

The post-Cold War period did not immediately bring strategic reassessment, until mistakes and misperceptions encountered in the Iraq and Afghanistan campaigns questioned the limits of following the US lead and demanded defining what British strategic interests and choices really are. Combined with the repercussions of the economic crisis, which imposed austerity and further reduction in funds available to defence, the discourse of the need to “return to strategy” gained a place in British public debate. What strategy should the UK pursue in a new world? How should it respond to the new threats? What are the limits of the special partnership with the US? Should it weigh in the world beyond its limits? Even how should the strategy be defined and implemented and by whom?

The initial 2008 and 2009 Labour Government’s takes on creating National Security Strategy were short-lived and criticised for their descriptive and non-strategic approach: “It offers a free lunch where the UK can simultaneously be Europeanist and Atlanticist, pro-sovereignty and pro-human rights; an upholder of ‘rules’ yet the spreader of values”, complained
one observer (Porter 2010, p. 6). Thus the 2010 National Security Strategy (NSS) and Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR), prepared by the coalition Conservative-Liberal Democratic Government, were expected to become a breaking point of a new era of British strategic thinking. The government aimed to resolve at least three puzzles: to institutionalize strategic thinking capacity, to mend serious budget imbalances via cuts in defence expenditure, and to respond to the changing nature of warfare and new threats of the post-Cold War period. The results proved to be mixed at best.

On the positive side, the institutional arrangement for creating strategy was established. From now on, the government engaged to publish the NSS and SDSR every five years, thus linking them to the parliamentary mandate, as well as to produce yearly reports on progress in their implementation. The “Whole of Government” approach to security was officially adopted: in addition to issues of defence and armed forces, the NSS and SDSR considered counter-terrorism, diplomacy, international aid, homeland defence, border security, cyber security etc. Both documents were prepared across the government, diminishing the role of the MoD. To enhance leadership and coordination, the National Security Council from the representatives of ministries was established to oversee the development and implementation of the NSS and the post of National Security Adviser was created. This structure was largely retained with some improvements for the 2015 NSS-SDSR. Another innovation that persisted was the risk-based approach, which the National Security Risk Assessment ranged the risks (and not threats) to British security in three tiers. The four first-tier risks in 2010 included international terrorism, hostile attacks upon UK cyber space, a major accident or natural hazard, and an international military crisis between states.

On the level of substance however, the results were much less impressive. Relying on the overarching idea that economic security was even more important than military security, and reflecting heavily on the Iraq-Afghanistan experiences, the 2010 NSS and SDSR had assumed that many conventional capacities for state-on-state conflict were outdated and could be scrapped. It supposed that the less numerous and more efficient military would now focus on infrequent stabilisation operations in fragile states overseas, mostly fighting lightly-armed insurgents and terrorists. The NSS and SDSR thus introduced drastic cuts to the military budget (8% fall in real terms to the defence budget up to 2014/15, according to the 2010 Comprehensive Spending Review). With retiring Harrier aircraft and
delaying the building of new aircraft carriers, the UK was losing carrier strike capability until 2020. With retiring HMS Ark Royal and Type 22 frigates, the surface fleet was reduced to only 19 frigates and destroyers. Cancellation of the Nimrod MRA4 maritime patrol aircraft programme wiped out maritime patrol capacity, making Britain dependent on its allies. The British Army was to go through a reduction in the armed forces by 17,000 personnel and a major restructure (Future Force 2020), thus becoming the smallest in decades. Because of the drastic cuts, US representatives expressed concern over “disengagement” of the UK and inside the country a question arose of whether the army could fulfil its duty at all (Brooke-Holland 2015, p. 4). Some of the decisions were retracted only 2 years after being taken: Prime Minister Cameron decided to build a second aircraft carrier already in 2012.

Evolving threats have quickly proven that the 2010 documents were at best interim. The huge concentration on Afghanistan became non-relevant within a few years as Russian aggression in Ukraine together with instability in the Middle East and North Africa (Libya, Syria, and ISIS) have created a new security environment, while unprecedented cuts exposed further vulnerabilities. Most tellingly, the capability gap related to scrapping Maritime Patrol Aircraft proved critical since a Russian submarine first appeared off Scotland’s shores and Britain was forced to ask its NATO partners for help (The Telegraph 2014).

Thus, an important consensus in favour of the new strategy emerged across parliament (i.e. a series of reports from the Joint Committee on National Security Strategy and the Defence Committee), government (i.e. lectures by the Chief of Defence Staff and Minister of Defence, MoD Global Strategic Trends document (MoD 2014), as well as security experts. In a nutshell, they all demanded development of a new and viable security strategy with a fundamental review to the threats, which would preview both rebuilding conventional capacities and developing capabilities to respond to asymmetric or hybrid warfare, as well as an unwavering commitment of 2% of GDP to defence. The US and other allies exerted additional pressure against any further cuts before the 2015 NSS and SDSR were published.

A whole lot of necessary strategic changes were demanded precisely in connection to Russian aggression against Ukraine: Russia was absent from the 2010 NSS altogether. This included developing analytical capacity to understand Russian motivation and strategy, enhancing the UK’s activity in NATO, reassessing defence priorities to be capable of addressing a threat from an advanced military nation (maritime surveillance, CBRN
warfare, ballistic missile defence) and ambiguous warfare, including cyber capabilities and special forces capabilities. (see Defence Committee 2014 and Defence Committee 2015, p. 14-17).

**2015 NSS-SDSR: the impact of Russian aggression on British strategic choices**

After this wave of harsh critique, the November 2015 NSS-SDSR, combined into a single document, took on the task of introducing visible changes as to previous policies on the one side and not exceeding budgetary capacities on the other. It kept the 2010 rhetoric of linking economy and security but shifted attention more to defining Britain’s place in the world, although still doing it in quite a generic way.

“Our vision is for a secure and prosperous United Kingdom, with global reach and influence”, declared the NSS-SDSR, defining three “National Security Objectives” – “protect our people, project our global influence and promote our prosperity”. The risk assessment had not significantly evolved compared to 2010: Tier 1 risks remained terrorism, international military conflict, cyber and major natural hazards, but two other risks were added (public health risks and instability overseas). Nevertheless, the 2015 document also set out four main challenges for British security: (1) the increasing threat posed by terrorism, extremism and instability, (2) the resurgence of state-based threats and intensifying wider state competition, (3) the impact of technology, especially cyber threats, and wider technological developments, and (4) the erosion of the rules-based international order. Russia’s aggressive policy could theoretically be classified under any of these challenges; still the most evident would be challenges 2 and 4, resurgence of state-based threats and erosion of rules-based order.

As the 2010 NSS and SDSR barely featured Russia at all – the country was not present either as a meaningful threat or as a valuable partner– the changes in this part of strategy were imminent and evident. Throughout the document they are palpable on two levels: that concerning immediate response to the Russian challenge and the other, more indirect and influenced by other challenges, concerning general strategic choices.

**Direct response to Russia’s actions: leading from behind**

The 2015 NSS-SDSR does directly acknowledge the disturbing evolution of Russia’s behaviour in several dimensions:
3.19 ...Russia has become more aggressive, authoritarian and nationalist, increasingly defining itself in opposition to the West. The illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014 and continuing support to separatists in eastern Ukraine through the use of deniable, hybrid tactics and media manipulation have shown Russia’s willingness to undermine wider international standards of cooperation in order to secure its perceived interests.

The NSS-SDSR underlines that Russia poses “no immediate direct military threat to the UK mainland”, but admits that “with increasing frequency, our responses are tested by aircraft, including Russian aircraft, near our airspace, and maritime activity near our territorial waters” (4.14), and due to its military build-up, including nuclear, and unpredictable behaviour “we cannot rule out the possibility that it may feel tempted to act aggressively against NATO Allies” (3.20). Finally, the NSS-SDSR admits that “Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea and destabilising activities in Ukraine directly challenge European security and the rules-based international order” (5.45).

Having thus assessed the Russian threat on three levels, the Strategy does not propose a direct response on a bilateral level, underlining the UK’s commitment to act through alliances and international organisations. Thus, via the UK’s work in NATO, the EU, the UN, and the OSCE, the aim is: to ensure that Russia is held to account for its actions, complies with the commitments it entered into at the Minsk Summit, withdraws from Crimea, and meets its international obligations in respect of the rule of law, human rights and democracy (5.45).

Detailing the response via the framework of NATO, the NSS-SDSR pledged that “The 2014 Wales Summit, under UK leadership, delivered an effective and united response to Russian behaviour” (3.20), citing the UK’s involvement into the defence investment pledge, Readiness Action Plan, Very High Readiness Joint Task Force, NATO Air Policing Mission in the Baltics, Maritime Patrol Aircraft, UK participation in NATO exercises, as well as training and military expertise sharing with its partners.

Response in the EU framework equally highlights the UK’s commitment to the multilateral instruments. This relates to imposing EU sanctions “at UK urging” (3.21) as well as UK support and initiative for the EU Assistance Mission, and a pledge to “work with the EU to shape the single energy market, helping to reduce the EU’s energy dependence on Russia” (4.142).
In 5.47 the NSS-SDSR declares its support for a diplomatic resolution of the crisis in Ukraine and pledges to “continue to work to uphold Ukraine’s sovereignty, assist its people and build resilience”, admits providing humanitarian aid, advice and assistance on fighting corruption, defence reform and training Ukrainian Armed Forces. Simultaneously, there is certain ambiguity as the desire to cooperate with Russia is manifested twice in the document (3.22 and 5.46). Acknowledging Russia’s role as one of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, it states the will to engage with Russia on a range of global security issues, such as ISIL and referring to “successful cooperation that we shared in negotiations on Iran’s nuclear programme”.

General strategy evolution: getting conventional back

The second level of change in security approaches was informed not only by Russian actions, but also by the general changes in the security environment, driven by the acknowledgement that the conflict between states is no longer unimaginable or outdated. According to the PM’s Foreword, “we cannot choose between conventional defences against state-based threats and the need to counter threats that do not recognise national borders. Today we face both and we must respond to both” (2015 NSS-SDSR p. 5). Thus, he listed the priorities as “deter state-based threats, tackle terrorism, remain a world leader in cyber security and ensure we have the capability to respond rapidly to crises as they emerge” (2015 NSS-SDSR p. 6).

The first step was to regain credibility via announcing an end to the cuts. Thus, the government has committed to meet the NATO target of spending 2% of GDP on defence every year. Already the Summer Budget 2015 announced that the defence budget would rise by 0.5% each year from 2016 to 2021. To resolve the financing issues, more emphasis was placed on promoting prosperity through international trade (especially with emerging powers such as India and China, as well as boosting defence and security exports). Also, ambitious savings were expected from the MoD (mostly relating to personnel and efficiency, not equipment).

As to deterrence, the most significant decision was that the NSS-SDSR has explicitly committed to retain a nuclear deterrence capacity “as long as the security situation demands” and to launch a costly Successor programme: construction of four new Trident missile-carrying submarines. On another level, the UK committed to lead “a renewed focus on deterrence” in NATO, in order that “our potential adversaries are in no doubt about
the range of responses they should expect to any aggressive action on their part” (4.12).

For this deterrence to become credible, a whole range of new acquisitions and regaining capacities has been announced: establishing two additional Typhoon squadrons and an additional squadron of F35 Lightning combat aircraft to operate from new aircraft carriers, buying nine new Maritime Patrol Aircraft, creating two new Strike Brigades, and in the longer term committing to increase the size of the frigate fleet.

The much-criticized Future Force 2020 army structure was to be remodified as the Joint Force 2025, with an increased expeditionary force of around 50,000, up from the 30,000 previewed in 2010 and with closer integration of reserves with regular forces. Again, the explicit obligation not to make further cuts to the army was crucial.

Defence engagement became one of the core tasks for the MoD as building stability overseas in fragile states was deemed a priority for British security. This involved focus on institutional and capacity building, increased training for international partners, as well as committing to doubling the number of military personnel contributed to UN peacekeeping operations (5.12-5.14).

Cyber security was rather on continuity than change track, since the first Cyber Security Strategy (CSS) and the National Cyber Security Programme were established already in 2011. The new CSS, acknowledging the growth of scope and variety of cyber threats and challenges, was adopted in 2016.

**Evolution in security discourses: between Brexit and the Russian threat**

The 2015 NSS-SDSR went through several rounds of discussion in parliament and government, both before and after its presentation, but it largely failed to initiate a meaningful public debate. Lunn and Scarnell argue that “the apparent semi-eclipse of the 2015 UK NSS” happened because of the feeling that the strategy was more refreshed than transformed (Lunn and Scarnell 2015), which corresponded to Prime Minister Cameron’s vision. As a significant portion of army commanders, experts and allies were visibly relieved that the most drastic cuts were finally over, the 2015 NSS-SDSR was greeted somewhat positively. Nevertheless, the Joint Committee
on the National Security Strategy lamented the generic way to describe a range of threats and risks, lack of clear vision on how three national security objectives would be combined, doubted if Joint Force 2025 would be able to meet the national security challenges, or even if the MoD could succeed in making the efficiency savings of £9.2 billion expected of it over the next five years (JCNSS 2015).

Still these debates have been quickly outshone by the advent of the Brexit referendum in mid-2016. For political reasons mostly, as the negotiations of PM Cameron with the EU were underway at the time, there were no provisions in the 2015 NSS-SDSR as to strategic challenges to Great Britain in the case of Brexit. Thus, half a year after the adoption of the Strategy, Britain had to contemplate a modified security environment with new tasks and new threats, for which no recipes had been previewed. Not only did the question of the future of the UK’s alliances and its post-Brexit positioning in the world emerge, but even questions of the unity of the UK – with Scotland launching the idea of another independence referendum – or the future of the Northern Ireland peace process with the emergence of the Irish border problem came to the fore. Questions about the financial capacities for security and defence after the UK quits the EU or the nature of future UK-EU security cooperation became imminent.

The idea of developing an ambitious post-Brexit security partnership between the EU and the UK gained its place in PM May’s speeches, still the task of rethinking the strategy was reported towards 2020. Meanwhile, the government publicly defended the position that the 2015 NSS was perfectly compatible with the Brexit process: in a first yearly review the Government has reassured that the only commitment that would suffer because of Brexit – is the pledge to champion the free trade agreement between the EU and India (Cabinet Office 2016 p. 7). In her Lancaster House speech, Prime Minister May painted the future of Britain as a globally engaged nation (Lancaster House Speech 2017), which perfectly corresponded to the three national objectives of the 2015 NSS.

In parallel to the general Brexit debate, public rhetoric towards Russia became harder in 2017. Edward Lucas even announced that “the outlines of a new Russia policy are taking shape in Britain”, which is “tough, cautious and pragmatic”, and centred on containment and protecting allies (Lucas 2017). In November 2017 Premier May gave two speeches – one at the Lord Mayor’s Banquet in London, another at the Eastern Partnership Summit in Brussels. In both she spoke against Russia’s threatening of the
world order, mentioned Russia’s attempts to undermine western institutions, its involvement in the conflict with Ukraine, violations of national airspace of several countries, meddling in elections and mounting a campaign of cyber-espionage and disruption.

*I have a very simple message for Russia. We know what you are doing. And you will not succeed. Because you underestimate the resilience of our democracies, the enduring attraction of free and open societies, and the commitment of western nations to the alliances that bind us.* (PM speech to the Lord Mayor’s Banquet 2017).

This hawkish line of discourse, underlining the Russian threat, was supported by other ministers. In the last months of 2017 – first months of 2018 Michael Fallon, former Defence Secretary, underlined that Russia spent twice as much on defence as did the UK. Actual Defence Secretary Gavin Williamson maintained that Russia was looking to damage the British economy and infrastructure, potentially causing “thousands and thousands and thousands of deaths”. Chief of the General Staff Nick Carter described Russia as the biggest state-based threat to the UK since the Cold War, warning that Britain would struggle to match Russia’s military capabilities on the battlefield. The head of the Royal Air Force, Air Chief Marshal Sir Stuart Peach warned that Russia is an increasing threat. News about Russian ships and planes appearing close to UK territorial waters and airspace, increase in the activities of Russian submarines near undersea data cables became numerous in the media at the end of the year. On December 3, the intelligence service MI6 reclassified Russia as a “tier one” threat, after years of regarding it as a security issue of secondary importance.

Partly the reason for this heightened attention to the threat from Russia was the National Security Capability Review, commissioned in July 2017 and due in January 2018: at the end of the day, its defence part (Modernising Defence Programme) was reported until July 2018. The review process rendered obvious that the defence commitments under the 2015 strategy have been too ambitious and either more money was needed (which the Treasury resisted), or further cuts were inevitable. Thus, the need to increase defence spending in general, often citing the threat from Russia, was regularly underlined. Michael Fallon, for example believed that the growing threats from Russia and cyber-attacks demanded an increase in the defence budget to 2.5% of GDP. The Chief of General Staff Carter defended retaining a forward base in Germany although the UK is gradually withdrawing troops to be able to return quickly if necessary.
Another line of discussion considered the current projects of economizing in relation to the Russian threat: two amphibious landing ships (HMS Bulwark and HMS Albion) were reported as considered for the chop, together with 28 Wildcat helicopters. The counterargument thus went that these ships and naval helicopters were vital components of the conventional deterrent of Britain via NATO in the Baltic. Also, the British government is believed to be contemplating combining elite units of paratroopers and the Royal Marines, thus reducing the number of military personnel by 14,000. Assessing the proposed changes as to the Russian threat, Mark Galeotti was very sceptical about an independent nuclear deterrent, vast equipment procurement or concentrating on an aircraft carrier. Instead he underlined the importance of special and intervention forces in deterring Russia as well as keeping a lighter navy such as submarines or frigates. (Galeotti 2017)

Parliament has also been an important contributor to the Russia debate. The opposition decided to investigate potential Russian involvement in the Brexit referendum and June 2017 parliamentary elections via the bots in social media. Ben Bradshaw, a Labour MP, has called for a judge-led inquiry and MPs on the House of Commons media committee wanted to hear from representatives of Twitter and Facebook about ads purchased by Russian accounts. Damian Collins, chair of the Digital, Culture, Media and Sport Select Committee, has requested details including how much money was spent on ads, how many times they were viewed, and which Facebook users were targeted. Labour’s shadow digital minister Liam Byrne proposed that laws should be changed to safeguard future elections (banning political advertising on social media, recognising Facebook and similar platforms as publishers, and giving the Electoral Commission more possibilities to investigate foreign money in election campaigning). The Intelligence and Security Committee warned that Russia's threat to the UK remains “significant”, citing evidence from British agency GCHQ on the Kremlin’s influencing campaigns to manipulate public opinion in Europe. Also, the heightened interest in Russian topics was manifested in several reports on relations with Russia, prepared by the Committees of the House of Commons. Most interesting of them were the Defence Committee’s “Russia: Implications for UK defence and security, First Report of Session 2016–17” and the Foreign Affairs Committee’s “The United Kingdom’s relations with Russia, Seventh Report of Session 2016–17”.

As to the opposition, Labour under Jeremy Corbyn has been somewhat cautious and dialogue-prone regarding Russia. Jeremy Corbyn himself demanded more evidence to the allegations that Russia is trying
to undermine Western democracy, supported a dialogue to ratchet down tensions with Russia and has opposed the deployment of British troops to Estonia, referring to the threat of unnecessary escalation with Russia. Also, Corbyn was disappointed with comparatively little attention to human security in the current strategy and – traditionally – opposed the decision to keep the nuclear deterrent and develop the Successor programme. (Even prior to the 2015 election, the nuclear deterrent was a contentious point: the Scottish National Party and Plaid Cymru also wanted to get rid of it and the Greens were contemplating for a small defence).

Transformation of security policies: focus on NATO response

The practical British reaction to Russian aggression quite literally corresponded to the priorities and principles outlined in the 2015 NSS-SDSR. Britain was one of the leading countries to formulate the NATO response to Russian incursions at the 2014 and 2016 NATO summits (summarized in Brooke-Holland 2016). The 2014 Newport Summit enlarged the Response Force from 13,000 to 40,000 troops, improved its decision making, created a new Very High Readiness Joint Force (VTJF), introduced continuous presence of NATO forces on a rotational basis and pre-positioning equipment in eastern Europe, established headquarters in Baltic and eastern European states, and decided to conduct more joint exercises. The 2016 Warsaw Summit introduced an ‘enhanced forward presence’ of four multinational battalions in Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia and Poland on a rotational basis from 2017 onwards.

The UK played a prominent role in most of these policy decisions. It became one of seven framework nations leading the VTJF, contributed a battlegroup of up to 1,000 personnel each year, led the VJTF in 2017 and pledged a battlegroup for the Polish-led VJTF in 2020. It also supported establishment of NATO Force Integration Units (NFIUs) in Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Romania (2015), Slovakia (2016) and Hungary (2017) to ensure that the very high-readiness forces can deploy into an assigned region as fast as possible and contributed manpower.

As to the pivotal decision on ‘enhanced forward presence’, since May 2017 the UK has led battalion to Estonia, and deploys a company to support the US-led battalion in Poland. It deployed Typhoon aircraft to the Baltic Air Policing mission in 2014, 2015 and 2016 and to the NATO Southern Air Policing mission based in Romania in 2017. It contributed Sentry aircraft for NATO air surveillance missions to Romania and Poland.
The UK has significantly increased the number of personnel deployed on NATO exercises from fewer than 700 in 2011 to over 9,000 in 2016. It also contributed to the Standing NATO Maritime Group in 2016 for the first time since 2010 with a frigate and a destroyer patrolling the Baltic Sea. In 2016 three Royal Navy minesweepers were deployed to Standing NATO Mine Countermeasures Group.

The UK, alongside other nations, launched the Transatlantic Capability Enhancement and Training (TACET) initiative in February 2016, providing training and expertise to Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland. The UK has a lead nation status for the initiative, alongside Germany and the US. Finally, the UK leads a NATO C4 (Command, Control, Communications and Computers) Trust Fund for Ukraine and will contribute over €400,000 to this initiative. In January 2018 it was announced that a radar station on a Shetland island will soon be relaunched in order to track Russian war planes, as already it did during the 1960s and 70s, to better protect both the UK’s airspace and that of its allies.

Generally, the UK follows the idea of stepping its presence in countries that border Russia, increasing the number of NATO military exercises with Ukraine, Poland and Estonia, as well as financial commitments to support reforms and security in Central and Eastern Europe.

Conclusions

The short overview of the evolution in British security thinking explicitly shows that the changes to the security situation are quicker than the ability of the government to inscribe them into a viable mid-term strategy. In both the 2010 and 2015 cases, non-anticipated developments demonstrated the limited scope of the strategy: the 2010 NSS was overinfluenced by the Iraq and Afghanistan experiences and did not preview the emergence of new threats in the Middle East and Eastern Europe. The 2015 NSS-SDSR fully ignored any possible influence of the perspective of Brexit on the British strategic situation, which granted it again with the temporary status. Nevertheless, the 2015 NSS-SDSR introduced quite a comprehensive assessment of Russian aggression and its implications for the UK and world security on a scale from a resurgence of state-based threats to undermining the rules-based order. The UK’s has been one of the most consistent positions of all the European states and it has indeed led the NATO response, particularly reassuring NATO members from Eastern Europe. The UK also made necessary conclusions for its own defence, trying to regain some capacities,
restructuring the army, and adhering to the nuclear deterrence disregarding great costs and lack of unanimous public support. Still the lack of will to go beyond multilateral forums combined with limited possibilities to influence decisions inside the alliances have limited the UK’s leverage to resolve the conflict as only Germany and France are implicated in direct negotiations. The UK’s departure from the EU will weaken this dimension even further.

Reference list


Seeking to define the exact starting point for the migration crisis currently faced by the EU is probably a futile exercise. Most of its defining features have been observed since as early as 2011, in the immediate aftermath of Gaddafi’s fall, and several others even earlier. As for the EU’s current policy response to that, the situation is much easier.

Jean-Claude Juncker’s Five-point plan on migration (2014) published before the European elections of 2014 was rather precisely developed in further detail into the European Agenda on Migration (European Commission, 2015a). The way the ideas in the former were translated in the latter deserves to be recognized as a masterpiece of clarity and transparency in policymaking. In addition, the European Commission has remained remarkably faithful to not only the core policy objectives, but also the individual measures set out in the European Agenda for Migration. True, some elements in this policy edifice have been changed, but most can be seen as technical changes, having no influence on the overall consistency of the Commission’s narrative. Probably the only change of narrative on a politically important issue could be seen in not following up explicitly on the idea that “… Even Europe, as the richest continent in the world, will not be able to accommodate the distress and pain of the whole globe.” Ostensibly, in reaction to being reminded of this idea, Mr. Juncker offered an angry display of moral outrage in his State of the Union address of 9 September 2015 (European Commission, 2015b). The policy message he included in his remarks, though, pointed firmly to the conflicts in third countries, which, until resolved, would propel migration movements towards Europe. The solution, he indicated, was to be sought there.

The European Agenda on Migration, particularly the first part thereof listing “immediate action”, has become the axis of the Commission’s policy initiatives and legislative proposals tabled since, particularly in 2015. That year was profoundly marked by a surge in the number of irregular
migrants coming into the EU (inter alia, Frontex, 2016a), particularly by transiting from Turkey, via Greece, the Western Balkans and Austria, towards Germany (the Western Balkans route). Using the momentum of the situation, the Commission pushed several core elements of the European Agenda on Migration. Little attention has been given to the fact that the document was received lukewarmly by the Council and by the European Council, as the usual words of endorsement and support were not expressed by either institution. The underlying disagreements between Member States focused primarily on the concept of allocating asylum seekers to Member States according to pre-set quotas, rather than leaving the responsibility for examining the asylum claim with the Member State of first entry, such as Greece and Italy. These disagreements culminated in the so-called Second Relocation Decision (Official Journal, 2015) which was adopted on 22 September 2015 by a qualified majority voting against the opposition of four Member States, with one abstaining.

The immediate consequence of the intense, exhausting and increasingly acrimonious clashes Member States had that summer was a pronounced dearth of appetite for a further deepening of the divides made manifest on 22 September 2015. Following its plans announced earlier in the European Agenda on Migration, the Commission duly presented a proposal (European Commission, 2015c) for incorporating a very similar quota-based allocation system in the Common European Asylum System. This term, despite being a definite overstatement when compared to the reality, is being used in Art. 78(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to refer to the asylum law of the EU. The remarkable lack of attention this Commission’s proposal received not only in the Council, but also in the European Parliament, can be considered the first major defeat the Commission has suffered in its effort to implement the European Agenda on Migration.

In the meantime, however, EU policymakers were visibly refocusing on ideas promising unity among Member States. Very soon, therefore, “relations with third countries in the area of migration” have proven to be a generally acceptable catchphrase to designate the direction to that promised land. Between November 2015 and March 2016, a series of highly informal agreements between Member States and certain third countries, most importantly the Republic of Macedonia and Turkey, have led to a decisive decrease of the volume in migration flows along the Western Balkans route. Unlike the earlier relocation scheme, these agreements had the advantage of actually and immediately decreasing the burden borne by
Member States. While it is doubtful if the Western Balkans route can really be considered “closed”, the number of migrants coming along has been significantly lower than in 2016. The European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex) data indicated, for instance, 122,779 detected irregular border crossings in 2016 as compared to 764,038 in 2015 and 43,360 in 2014 (2016b). As the number of migrants coming to certain Member States did not decrease by redistribution to others, but rather by preventing their entry into the EU, it also became possible to enjoy a newly found sense of unity among Member States. The idea of outsourcing the management of troublesome migration pressures to third countries found renaissance in EU policymaking circles, its criticism being inhibited by a lack of an equally efficient alternative.

The situation in Italy, in the meantime, had largely been left out of the spotlight. This country had been enduring migration pressure for years, yet in 2015 it became overshadowed by the dramatic scenes from further East. After many attempts at bringing their concerns to the fore, on 15 April 2016 the Italian government published a non-paper coining the term of “migration compacts” (Government of Italy, 2016). In general, there is no shortage of policy concepts circulated by EU Member States on all different issues, publicly or less so, in a similar form of non-papers. There are however very few, particularly in the notoriously contentious area of migration policy, to receive an echo comparable with this one. The authors of the piece did not have the patience not to list the differences of the Italian situation in the very beginning. Indeed, the majority of migrants arriving in Italy have had, and continue to have, no entitlement to international protection. Most of them are simply economic migrants from Africa, with the peculiar phenomenon of Bangladeshi and some other Asian nationals taking the complicated route to Europe via Italy (e.g. International Organization for Migration, 2017). As such, they are simply left in Italy or with the prospect of irregular secondary migration northwards, which threatened to damage the relations of Italy with its northern neighbors. In contrast, migrants likely to qualify for international protection on account of their land of origin could be relocated from Italy, as the divisive relocation scheme only applied to migrants belonging to nationalities with a high (more than 75%) rate of recognition of asylum claims. What that meant in practice was that Italy was stuck with economic migrants, while being offered the option of relocating migrants who were simply not present. Member States supporting the relocation decisions have insisted on that 75% threshold for their “flexible solidarity”, as they felt that their citizens would probably not accept relocations of people without likely claims for
international protection. The burden experienced by Italy, however, is very similar regardless of the applicant’s nationality.

The Italian non-paper argued, therefore, that the solution needs to be found in supporting the countries of origin on migrants, and investments focused on providing a better perspective for their lives in order to dissuade them from migrating towards the EU. The support was not seen as unconditional, though, and would depend on the willingness of that third country to cooperate in managing migration – a concept known as “more for more”. While avoiding an explicit reference, the Italian non-paper amounted to the re-focusing of attention from strictly asylum issues, ultimately irrelevant to most migrants arriving to Italy, to migration policy broadly conceived. This pitch was very similar to the positions of other Member States, including some rather unlikely allies such as the Visegrad Group (Visegrad Group, 2016). After removing the contentious idea of common debt instruments issued to finance that endeavor, the Italian non-paper found a distinct echo in paragraphs 2 through 8 of the European Council conclusions of 28 June 2016 (European Council, 2016a).

The European Council conclusions offer a peculiar terrain for policy analysis. While the Court of Justice does not attribute the legal nature of legislation to them (Court of Justice of the European Union, 2017), in EU policymaking they are generally attributed a rather high importance. In particular, according to Art. 68 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, “The European Council shall define the strategic guidelines for legislative and operational planning within the area of freedom, security and justice.” As these conclusions are adopted unanimously by the most senior political representatives of Member States and of the Commission, they naturally avoid addressing contentious issues and usually suffer a degree of the “Christmas tree” approach, meaning that Member States seek a reference to their pet issues in order to support the draft conclusions. That leads to a proliferation of exhaustive lists of policy response elements, as well as umbrella phrases such as “comprehensive approach”. The comparison of the European Council conclusions and statements since April 2015 can however be understood as indicating an evolution of the EU’s focus in responding to the migration crisis. In April (European Council, 2015a) and June 2015 (European Council, 2015b), the European Council declared preventing further loss of life at sea to be its primary concern, but no such language can be found later, unless framed as a “structural challenge” (2017). Instead, operational measures and securing the external borders of the EU take the fore in the European
Council concluding documents of September (2015c), October (2015d) and December of 2015 (2015e). Already in September 2015, the reference to "stemming and managing migratory flows" made its debut. In December 2015, the Commission followed the mood by submitting a proposal to create a European Border and Coast Guard. Following a rarely seen rush in the legislative process, the adoption of the Regulation (Official Journal, 2016) answered the demand for increased control of the EU external border. The change of mood towards securing external borders and "stemming the flow" culminated on 26 June 2016, as already outlined, in the European Council endorsing a “Partnership Framework” to “… deliver(ing) rapid results in preventing illegal migration and returning irregular migrants…”.

The implementation of this “new approach” was to be led by the High Representative, Ms. Mogherini.

Kicking the ball to the remit of Ms. Mogherini and her European External Action Service (EEAS) translated the move towards seeking the solution in the external dimension to the inner workings of the EU bureaucracy. While the European Council cemented its expectations of delivery from abroad in September (2016b), October (2016c) and December of 2016 (2016d), implying that new ideas are not needed, conspicuously little was changing on the ground. The EEAS cultivated a narrative based on the idea of a mutually beneficial partnership (inter alia, 2016), where the number of returned illegal migrants was merely a part of the picture. In fact, the EEAS and its head have proven inventive in developing a narrative focusing on all elements other than returns, except of course voluntary returns. During the High Level Conference on Migration held at the European Parliament on 21 June 2017, Ms. Mogherini held a speech on cooperation with third countries in migration, in which she managed not to refer to involuntary returns even once (European External Action Service, 2017). Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Mali and Ethiopia, selected as the "pilot cases" for the Partnership Framework, have proven remarkably immune to incentives to increase the return of their nationals who have migrated to the EU. The interaction with some of them was bordering on farce, with initial steps and no effective return still being a reality with some of them more than a year after June 2016. “More for more” does not seem to be an attractive enough proposition. This can clearly be derived from the periodic tri-monthly progress reports of the Commission on “Partnership Framework with third countries under the European Agenda on Migration”.

The difficulty of interaction with third countries on returns is hardly a new phenomenon. Since 2005, the Global Approach to Migration
and Mobility (European Commission, 2017) has been the conceptual fundament of the EU’s interaction with its neighboring regions in migration. The claim to represent a “global approach” was translated in several regional “processes” with regional groups of countries, each reflecting their common traits. In the Rabat Process, involving 55 African and European countries, this course of action has been pursued since July 2006. However, given the increased urgency of migration pressures from Africa, in November 2016, an extraordinary meeting of European leaders with their African counterparts was convened to La Valletta in order to reinvigorate the engagement of the EU with Africa. The common declaration and action plan, agreed together with African leaders, reflected an uneasy agreement along the usual lines: promises of development aid, humanitarian resettlement, facilitation of remittances and other flows of money against promises of cooperation in the readmission of illegal migrants. As already stated, the subsequent reports on the implementation of the Partnership Framework have, however, shown these commitments to have remained largely on paper.

The Italian non-paper and the policy initiatives based on its logic have outlined the stark nature of the challenges faced by the EU in migration. A large majority of migrants arriving in the EU are not refugees and neither do they qualify for another form of international protection besides asylum. The surge in arrivals in 2015, with an important component of Syrians fleeing either the civil war in Syria or camps in neighboring countries where they had been staying since as early as 2011, was an exception. However, many governments prefer to describe this inflow as including refugees, as it is the only available way of presenting them to their citizens as worthy of compassion and acceptance. These features have become undeniable in 2017. The analysis of asylum applications lodged in the EU in 2016 and the first half of 2017 shows a decrease of new applications lodged, with an increasing proportion of applicants who are, considering their nationality, unlikely to qualify for international protection (European Asylum Support Office, 2017). A persistent feature of the particularly concerning situation in Italy is a low proportion of applicants with a credible case for international protection, with the notable exception of Eritreans. It can therefore be argued that in the first half of 2017, the migration crisis has reached a point of conceptual clarity. The migratory flows to Europe clearly do not include a majority of people qualified for international protection. This crisis can no longer be credibly interpreted as an asylum crisis. It is a crisis of arriving economic migrants, on the background of the EU’s distinct incapacity of returning them to their countries of origin, or to the countries of their transit. The reluctance of these third countries to accept returns remains the main reason for that inability.
The same basic geometry of interests can also be seen on the global level. On 19 September 2016, the UN General Assembly unanimously adopted the New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants (2016). Below the thick layer of references to fundamental rights, one can clearly discern a conceptual differentiation between refugees and other migrants. Commitments also include “... steps to ensure the credibility of asylum systems, including through collaboration among the countries of origin, transit and destination and to facilitate the return and readmission of those who do not qualify for refugee status”. On the other hand, the overall framing of the Declaration interprets migration as an intrinsically positive phenomenon, if well managed. Unless one takes “managing migration” to include also preventing spontaneous migration flows, that view is not consistent with the EU’s policy response and the UN General Assembly is far from consensus on that point. This declaration has spawned a number of follow-up activities, most notably the work of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees’ Office (UNHCR) towards a “global compact on refugees” (2017). Given the focus on refugees and the UNHCR’s usual interpretation of its mandate, returns are obviously not going to be a major priority in this effort. On the contrary, the future “Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration” is likely to include a more prominent role of returns. In any case, the adoption of that Global Compact is foreseen for 2018. From the work done so far, it is very visible that the facilitators of this process are strenuously trying to avoid transactional dynamics between the countries of origin and the countries of destination. The narrative of migration as a generally beneficial process, just in need of proper management, remains the only other option.

The UN is not generally known for being a source of swift and practical policy solutions. In the meantime, the EU has been struggling with the apparent failure of the “more for more” approach, which is explicitly based on a transactional view of migration management. Well-functioning readmission arrangements remain the EU’s core interest and, at the same time, its African counterparts’ most difficult issue to accept. From the EU’s transactional point of view, the problem is sometimes seen as being essentially one of leverage. The attempts to frame this interaction as one of mutual benefit have failed to propel African counterparts to greater openness to readmission. In consequence, the EU is increasingly motivated to seek unilateral pressure points to achieve its core goal.

From the analysis of available options, it is difficult to identify such potentially useful pressure points. There is, for instance, the issue of
remittances. As had already become common knowledge, the net cash inflow that countries of origin obtain from the remittances of their citizens working in the EU are much higher, multiple times, than the development aid they receive from EU governments (World Bank Group, 2016). In the cases where nationals of those countries are unlikely to receive international protection in the EU, most of that money is earned working illegally, at best. One can conceive of a system to prevent the using of such money transfers, for instance, mechanisms already available in the framework of countering money laundering. At the very least, such measures are bound to increase the transactional costs of such transfers, decreasing the total amount of money transferred to countries of origin. Other, more restrictive measures on the acceptance of asylum requests and externalizing asylum claims can be considered to be gaining mainstream acceptance (inter alia, Le Figaro, 2017).

Such measures promise the same advantages as the deals EU Member States made with Turkey and other neighboring countries in 2015 and 2016: the immediacy of effect and independence from wider policy frameworks, while also being easily understood by the public. The temptation is there and likely to increase with the lack of other solutions. There are, however, also systemic risks associated with this approach. The interaction between the countries of origin of migrants and the countries of their destination is likely to become even more adversarial. While the superficial picture will be one of good-willed cooperation and a search for agreement, the underlying structure of perception will remain uncondusive to cooperation in good faith. And, one could conclude, the same way this perception is seeping from the relations among EU Member States to the external relations of the EU with their African counterparts, the opposite can occur. The failure of the EU to achieve its core goals in the interaction with third countries can weaken the case for a joint EU external policy and reinforce the quarrels that latently exist among Member States.

A good indicator of the state of the EU’s external policy in the area of migration will be the post-Cotonou process. The Cotonou Agreement of 2000 forms the framework of the EU’s relations with 79 countries of Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific (ACP). The agreement famously includes Article 13, which commits the Parties to accept the return of and readmission of any of its nationals who are illegally present on the territory of other Parties, at that Party’s request and without further formalities. While being ineffective in practice, this Article is bound to become a point of contention of the EU – ACP relation after 2020, when the current agreement is due to
expire. The work on the post-Cotonou framework will likely also be a leading indicator of the real value of the policy concept of migration compacts. It remains to be seen if that term will still be in vogue in migration policy debate after 2020.

Reference list


VERNACULAR SECURITY IN A SOCIALLY EXCLUDED LOCALITY

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Introduction

Urban marginality presents an important challenge to governance in the Czech Republic. Seen in terms of social exclusion, it has a distinctive security dimension. Socially excluded localities – the areas where mostly poor Roma live – were conceptualized as a source of insecurity, involving both street crime and extremist crime. Following the higher rates of crime allegedly committed by the localities' inhabitants, the mobilization, even radicalization of the local public emerges and creates an opportunity for far-right politicians to gain support (Walach, 2016b). This narrative has been advanced especially after the so-called 'Events in the Šluknov Hook' (MV ČR, 2011), a series of protests that took place in Northern Bohemia between August and October 2011 and were explicitly anti-Roma and anti-government. Moreover, this narrative helped to establish the interpretation according to which the population of socially excluded localities is perceived as a 'security risk for the majority society' (GAC 2008, 25; Kluknavská and Zagibová 2013; Slačálek 2014, 137–188).

The perception is examined in this chapter. By turning the perspective upside down, I seek to understand what security means for those understood as dangerous. The analysis is based on the four-year long ethnographic research that I conducted in a socially excluded locality in the city of Havířov, Northern Moravia, the Czech Republic. The neighborhood is known as Havířov-Šumbark in the common parlance. Around 2011, it officially had about 3,500 inhabitants, including 1,200 Roma. Before the Velvet Revolution, it served to accommodate workers from the nearby industries, mainly metallurgical and mining industries. After 1989,
it experienced a significant migration, both inside and outside. Emptied flats were soon occupied by the new Romani inhabitants whose numbers had almost doubled since the late 1980s (Sociotrendy, 2011). This caused discontent among the former population, both Czech and Romani and further nourished frustration stemming from the ever increasing rents and the decline of living-standards in general.

The results of this ethnographic endeavor have been published in several papers (Walach, 2018, 2016a, 2015, 2014, 2013a, 2013b, 2013c; Walach and Císarč, 2013; Lupták and Walach, 2015) and also provided the empirical basis for my Ph.D. thesis (Walach, 2016c) which was defended in February 2017. The subsequent text relies on its findings as well as the theoretical and methodological assumptions that governed their production. This chapter aims to present an answer to the question of what security can mean in the context of a socially excluded locality when seen from the perspective of its inhabitants. And in doing so, it specifically addresses the issue of the complex and negotiable character of security.

As for the structure of this chapter, firstly, vernacular security is described. I used it as a research orientation that enables studying the security conceptions of ‘ordinary’ people, people outside the formal structures of security governance. Then, the methodology of my inquiry in Havířov-Šumbark is discussed briefly, reflecting upon the premises of data construction and analysis. The third section is devoted to the three interpretations of Havířov-Šumbark security discourse which I call realistic, symbolic and dramaturgical. In concluding remarks, insights from interpreting the discourse of the socially excluded locality are brought back to the vernacular security studies, pointing out how engagement with the ‘ordinary’ people’s perspective might produce a more comprehensive understanding of security workings in the social realities.

Vernacular Security

Vernacular security may be seen as a double opposition to contemporary theorizing on security. In accordance with critical security studies, vernacular security opposes traditional security studies which prefer the security of the state over the security of the individual or community.

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6 I adopt here the most frequent designations for the local ethnic identities. As far as I know, the majority of Roma in Havířov-Šumbark had Czech citizenship.
(Peoples, Vaughan-Williams, 2014). Contrary to the dominant strands of critical security studies, it does not focus on the political elites or security professionals, or ‘those at the top of national, gender, class and racial hierarchies’ (Stern-Petterson, 1998, unpaginated). Its main interest lies in the study of the conditions of (in)security as experienced, resisted or constructed by ‘ordinary’ people in their everyday life (Jarvis and Lister, 2013, 158). Whether they are the Roma travelling through France (Aradau, 2015), failed asylum seekers in the United Kingdom (Innes, 2014), residents of the Aamjiwnaang First Nations reserve (Wiebe, 2012), children of a Colombian barrio (Berents, 2015), Palestinian women (Ryan, 2013), inhabitants of a Southern African metropole (Lemanski, 2012), or Egyptian and Jordanian citizens (Gutkowski, 2015).

The emphasis on ‘ordinary’ people is legitimized in two ways. Firstly, it is generally agreed that ‘we all engage in (in)security practices, however far from the conventional centers we appear to be situated’ (Rowley and Weldes, 2012, 526). Power asymmetries in speaking or performing (in)security are undoubtedly real. This however does not mean that ‘the voiceless, the unrepresented, [and] the powerless’ (Wyn Jones 1999, 159) should be omitted from security studies. Secondly, the bottom-up narratives provide different, if not conflicting visions to the top-down conceptions of (in)security (Mac Ginty and Firchow, 2016). The study of (in)security through the prism of ‘ordinary’ people thus promises to generate a more complete knowledge of what security means and does in specific contexts, as well as of potential emancipatory possibilities that exist within them.7

Apart from the perspective of ‘ordinary’ people, there are four elements that I find typical for vernacular security: discursive reading of security, context dependency, qualitative methodology, and emancipatory

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7 Historically, both of these principles are grounded in the feminist and the Welsh school of security studies. The focus on ‘real people in real places’ (Booth, 1995, 123) and, specifically, on those who are the ‘most marginalized in the society’ (Stern 2006, 178) was comprehended as not only challenging to the status quo of security theory but also as a way to ‘eradicate the human wrongs that stain so much of world politics’ (Booth, 2005, 17). Later on, there was an attempt to apply the critical edge to human security studies – a research orientation inspired by the United Nations policy that also replaced the state with people in the position of security referent object (see e.g. Newman, 2010). However, the project of critical human security studies has been overshadowed by the critique that, among other things, accused human security of ‘paving the way for military interventions in the affairs of fragile states’ (Luckham, 2017, 111).
orientation. All of these were already part of Nils Bubandt’s (2005) paper that gave rise to the vernacular security scholarship, although some only implicitly. In his study of Indonesian politics, the author analyzed the contradictions within and interplay between global, national and local discourses on security. He treated security as a ‘socially situated and discursively defined practice open to comparison and politically contextualized explication, rather than merely an analytical category’ (Bubandt, 2005, 257) and stressed that it is ‘conceptualized and politically practiced differently in different places and at different times’ (Bubandt, 2005, 291). Not only is security far from being a stable or universally homogenous concept, the different conceptions often find themselves in an antagonist relationship. That was also the case of the nation-state discourse of safety and order and the ‘traditionalist’ discourse of local communities which both functioned as a vernacular alternative to the global discourse of human security.

An anthropological approach was used to challenge the universalist pretensions of security by Alexandra Kent (2006) as well. She demonstrated that the ‘ultimate referent object of Cambodian security might be appropriately defined as dhamma, eternal cosmic order’ (Bubandt, 2005, 357). As Buddhism provides grounds from which ordinary Cambodians perceive their condition and which shapes their everyday practices, religion and politics clearly cannot be understood separately. And if one aims to understand and enhance security in this context (or in any context), a culturally sensitive framework is necessary (Kent, 2011). Otherwise he or she will end up like the Western director of a non-governmental organization who could not make sense of why poor Cambodians donate their scarce resources to monks and the pagoda rather than invest them in a cow or seed grain – an anecdote told by Kent herself.

Pioneering the technique of focus groups in critical security studies, Lee Jarvis and Michael Lister (2013) examined public attitudes towards security, citizenship and anti-terrorism policy within the UK. As a result, they created the typology of vernacular securities that mirrored the views of research participants. The typology consists of six vernacular security conceptions: survival, belonging, hospitality, equality, freedom, and insecurity. Some of these are closer to the image of security conceived as a matter of needs, social recognition or parity between individuals and communities. Others have critical underpinnings, equating security with undesirable or unjust state practices. The mixed findings were also found in the authors’ study on the public visions of effective counter-terrorist policy
(Jarvis and Lister, 2016). On the one hand, the public suggested measures such as improving education or addressing the social fracture. On the other hand, they called for more punitive state powers, including the greater use of prison, deportation, or exceptionalism in general.

Qualitative methodology offers an opportunity to identify a variety of different and contradictory conceptions of security. This is the basis for emancipation as developed by Nick Vaughan-Williams and Daniel Stevens (2016) in their ‘disruptive’ approach. Inspired by the work of Jacques Rancière, they opt for the identification of political moments within the non-elite discourses that have a capacity to challenge the police order of contemporary societies. The two terms – politics and police – are at the heart of Rancière’s political theory. In his view, what we usually understand as politics is actually police: ‘the organization of powers, the distribution of places and roles, and the systems for legitimizing this distribution’ (Rancière, 1999: 28). The logic of police is the logic of the dominant social order where everything and everyone has its place. ‘Politics’ is reserved for activity that challenges the dominant order by revealing its historical contingency. From the perspective of equality, all social hierarchies are constructed, and thus open to de-construction. And the same is true of hierarchies existing in the understandings of security.

The aim of the disruptive approach is to problematize the dominant discourses on (in)security, using the marginalized discourses as a source of its counter-versions in a manner not dissimilar to immanent critique (Booth, 2007, 250–253). Except that it is not the ‘experience of those men and women and communities for whom the present world order is a cause of insecurity rather than security’ but rather their discursive representations which can serve as a point of departure. Immanent critique starts from the idea that there are possibilities for social progress in every historical situation. Emancipation is thus not related to the idea of ideal social order, it rather exists as a potential to be fulfilled by making true the values that a political regime embraces but is not able to deliver to ‘ordinary’ people in a satisfying way.

Either way, the vernacular discourse may present a bottom-up account of threats and security that differ significantly or even contradict the top-down narratives. The ultimate task of critical security researchers is to make them visible and to contribute to their political relevance.

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8 For the critical reflection of experience as an analytical unit, see also Jacoby (2006).
Methodology

Vernacular security studies helped me to focus the study of security ontologically and epistemologically. Methodologically, I decided to reconstruct the security discourse of a socially excluded locality on the basis of data composed of interview transcripts and field notes. I recorded 80 interviews with 102 people. Whereas some of them were local politicians, bureaucrats, social or community workers, the majority consisted of the inhabitants of Havířov-Šumbark. I tried to take into account all possible social types occurring in the neighborhood. Hence, the interviews were conducted with both men and women, old and young, Roma and non-Roma (‘Czechs’), newcomers as well as old-timers, etc.

In the field, however, I spent most of the time with my best informant. He was a man in his early twenties who has two children and considered himself to be a ‘Gypsy’. Since he was a natural leader, I usually left the initiative up to him and accompanied him in his everyday routines, including gambling on slot machines and drug use (methamphetamine). In my not always entirely participant observation, I was thus allowed to socialize with the young marginalized men whose perspective forms an important part of the discourse under study. In total, the fieldwork took about 1,100 hours.

The discourse was conceptualized in an explicitly post-structuralist manner (Shepherd, 2008, 20). Although I disagree with the assumption that ‘there is nothing outside the discourse’ (Campbell, 1992, 4), I fully acknowledge that the world is meaningfully approached only through certain discourses. ‘The world exists independently of language, but we can never know that (beyond the fact of its assertion), because the existence of the world is literally inconceivable outside of language and our traditions of interpretation’ (Campbell, 1992, 6). If my analysis and its subsequent reflection therefore represent anything, it is a representation of discourse. It is only within its coordinates that an object is constituted as an object of discourse and only by means of it can certain knowledge about them be acquired (Laclau and Mouffe, 2014, 131–135).

It is also my assumption that discourse is inevitably open-ended and incomplete. ‘Its exterior limits are constituted by other discourses that are themselves open, inherently unstable and always in the process of being articulated’ (Doty, 1996, 6). And, finally, discourses are always historicized. That is to say, the knowledge they produce along with objects, subjects and
practices is valid only for a particular historical and cultural context (Hall, 1997, 46–47).

The following findings should also be read from this perspective. They only imperfectly represent the investigated problématique and are completely grounded within my interpretation. ‘The researcher is the research instrument’ (Jackson, 2008, 92, italics in original) – the tool of cultural translation that is ‘always necessarily flawed and biased’ (Scheper-Hughes, 1995, 417). The researcher nonetheless is the instrument; he or she finally decides what is included in the analysis and what is left, as well as what shape the presented findings will have.

In the following section, I offer three interpretations of the meaning of security within the discourse of the socially excluded locality of Havířov-Šumbark. The interpretations are called realistic, symbolic and dramaturgical to capture their epistemologically different nature. Although they are all grounded within the discourse of Havířov-Šumbark inhabitants, they differ in a degree to which the research participants would probably identify with them. In another way, the interpretations are located on the continuum from the most emic to the most etic position, from the perspective most familiar to participants to the perspective that reflects the researcher’s ideas. Whereas the realist interpretation is closer to the emic end of the continuum, the symbolic and dramaturgical interpretations are approaching the etic end.

Of course, as I have no tools other than my judgment and intuition, the whole elaboration described above has to be understood as a speculation. I do not really know what the participants would think of such interpretations, because I have never asked them about it. Nevertheless, I think that this differentiation between interpretations has a certain heuristic value. It teaches us that it would be a mistake to treat security as a non-problematic, transparent thing that one just needs to ask about and it will come to him or her directly. Researchers interviewing people should never take what they say at face value. And the same applies even more to the security practitioners, professionals of all kinds, to whom this chapter is primarily addressed. They should be attentive to what the people whose security they want to enhance but also very careful when doing so. Security is one of the most complex and ambiguous political concepts (Rothschild, 1995; Stone, 2002). This also has to be taken into account when devising political solutions to the issue of insecurity in the context of socially excluded localities.
Three Interpretations of the Security Discourse of Havířov-Šumbark

The realistic interpretation of security posits that it is ultimately the physical violence of, to use the participants’ expressions, ‘Gypsies’, ‘Junkies’, and/or the ‘Inadaptable’ that lies at the core of security concerns of informants. The security provision by the responsible actors such as the state, municipality, police, and private housing providers is predominantly seen as insufficient, which makes the inhabitants resort to a variety of security strategies, ranging from total abstention from the public space to political activism. The informants’ visions on desirable security solutions were similarly varied. Some requested the tough law-and-order approach, excluding the dangerous subjects out of the local moral universe (Opotow, 1990). Others refused to see any person solely in terms of insecurity, and demanded security solutions based on the inclusive strategies of community building and trust strengthening.

The stories about violent ‘Gypsies’, ‘Junkies’ and the ‘Inadaptable’ form a significant part of my data. They were also usually the first thing that the research participants said when I asked them about their neighborhood. Nonetheless, they did not really fit my experiences gained by participant observation. I saw very little physical violence. The police officers from both the municipal and state police basically confirmed my observation. They did it in interviews with me as well as at a city council meeting where they were invited to present information on crime in Havířov-Šumbark. They argued that not only do they not have any data to verify the bad reputation of the neighborhood but that it even seems that the neighborhood actually has a lower crime rate than other parts of the city. Interestingly, the city councilors did not appear to be convinced by their presentation.

Nor was I, but the police accounts definitely worked to deepen my doubt as to whether it is right to see the meaning of security within Havířov-Šumbark as simply the problem of ‘Gypsies’ or ‘Junkies’, especially when there was no consensus on whom these categories actually represent. I had oftentimes heard that not all ‘Gypsies’ are dangerous, that there are many of them who are absolutely alright. ‘Junkies’ are also mostly fine; the truly dangerous ones are just those who have lost self-control as a consequence of their drug habit. And apart from this, I could not see that there is a notable structural correspondence between this interpretation and the public discourse of stigmatization. All of this made me to think of what else the narrative of ‘Gypsies’, ‘Junkies’ and the ‘Inadaptable’ might have to tell us about security.
In the end, I formulated the symbolic and dramaturgical interpretations to oppose the aforementioned interpretation, to understand the physical violence of 'Gypsies', 'Junkies' and the 'Inadaptable' rather as a symbol for different security concerns. In the symbolic interpretation, it is the symbol of ontological insecurity that arises from living in a socially stigmatized area. The stigmatization of the locality is derived from the presence of the (ritually) impure social categories within the locality (Douglasová, 2014). As ‘Gypsies’ and ‘Junkies’ belong among the most stigmatized groups in Czech society (Rabušic, 2000; Zeman et al., 2011, 30–39), living in the neighborhood widely associated with them is experienced as moral harm to one's self-esteem.

Loïc Wacquant (2007) coined the term ‘territorial stigmatization’ to show that even the place of residence, apart from physicality, morality, and tribality (an affiliation to a certain collective) (Goffman, 2003), may function as the source of social disqualification. Stigmatization then is a matter of a disadvantage. Wacquant also identified the strategies which the inhabitants of stigmatized neighborhoods use to escape the acute sense of social indignity that territorial stigmatization bestows upon them. One of these strategies is called lateral denigration and mutual distanciation, and it involves transferring the stigma to someone else, to a ‘faceless, demonized other’ (Wacquant, 2007: 68) who can be made responsible for all social ills, including physical violence. From this perspective, all the talk on violent ‘Gypsies’ and ‘Junkies’ might be simply a way through which my informants addressed a different issue, that of the degrading effects of territorial stigmatization.

The last interpretation was produced as part of further reflections upon the role of informants in the research. I named it as dramaturgical to emphasize their agency; in this view, the informants are not only passive objects of inquiry, they actively shape it and infuse the security talk with their own interests. Inspired by the dramaturgical analysis (Goffman, 1999; Krčál and Lupták, 2018; Lupták, 2017), I started to see the ethnographic research as a play in which a researcher and the researched partake of the roles of actor and audience. It is important to say that these roles exist only in mutual relationship and that they may easily be switched. A researcher talks to a participant, then the participant talks to the researcher. They both play active roles in an interview.

However, as I argued in the methodological section, the roles of researcher and the researched are not symmetrical in the end. Rather than
an actor, a researcher is a dramaturge who writes a play, to which other participants are invited. This obviously determines what can be said and how it can be said. From the Althusserian perspective, it is a researcher who interpellates; he is like that police officer who exclaims: ‘Hey, you there!’ And the research participant is the one who reacts and accepts the position in the officer’s play (Althusser, 2008, 48). This does not mean that there is no agency on the part of the research participants. Interpellation is never perfect, there is always a gap between the processes of subjectivation and the subject himself or herself (Myers, 2008; Žižek, 2007). And so is there a space for resistance too.

To put it simply, I might have approached the inhabitants of Havířov-Šumbark with a research design and prepared questions. But I could hardly have made them speak only about issues and in manners other than they wanted. These issues related mostly to the perceived decline of living standards. Even though they certainly may be framed as a security issue (cf. Walach, 2018), such framing is far from natural. They can also be seen as a separate problem. Based on this perspective in which physical violence and inadequate living standards are two distinctive things, the last interpretation of the meaning of security in a socially excluded locality Havířov-Šumbark can be stated as follows:

The narrative of dangerous ‘Gypsies’, ‘Junkies’ and the ‘Inadaptable’ was appropriated by the research participants in order to stress their frustration stemming from structural victimization, from one’s low social position (Sessar, 2001). And as this victimization was generally seen as a consequence of the regime transition after 1989, the violence of ‘Gypsies’, ‘Junkies’ and the ‘Inadaptable’ was used to create a regime critique that appears more legitimate and gives it all the urgency and gravity that is inherent to the security talk. Living in poverty is definitely less serious than having a life fatally threatened. In this sense, security is defined not so much by a matrix of threats, referent objects, security providers or security measures as by the emotional and political effects it produces when applied to certain issues.

* * *

The three interpretations presented above are not mutually exclusive. As they refer to three specific threats – physical violence, territorial stigmatization,
and structural victimization – they rather denote the distinct dimensions of insecurity that all have to be considered if one wants to enhance security in socially excluded localities.

The research findings can provide important guidelines to policy-makers and other stakeholders. So far, in the context of socially excluded localities, security has been predominately understood in accordance with the realistic interpretation, as a matter of physical violence and less serious acts of disorderly conduct (or: ‘crime’). Despite its name, this interpretation is far from being superior to the symbolic and dramaturgical interpretations. In fact, the latter two could be even more important, depending on the particular context. The label ‘socially excluded locality’ has been applied to very diverse areas (Hurrle et al., 2016; Walach and Kupka, 2016). As stated above, I personally witnessed only a few cases of aggression. In addition, other authors problematized the idea that crime is more widespread in excluded localities (e.g. Topinka and Janoušková, 2009; Růžička and Lupták, 2013). On the other hand, the frustration arising from bearing the stigma of living at a ‘bad address’ or experiencing the significant decline of living standards are no less real than physical threats. Both of them fundamentally limit one's well-being and determine choices one can freely opt for.

The condition of insecurity is thought to give rise to exceptional and usually illiberal measures (e.g., Bigo and Tsoukala, 2008). My research, however, shows that the situation is much more complex. For many informants, the best security measures do not equate with more surveillance and punishment, whether executed by the criminal justice system, the municipality police, or landlords. They preferred more community-oriented practices such as organizing public meetings, cultural and sports events, or community work in general rather than those which are enemy-oriented. This is another important corrective to the public discourse on the topic. To be effective, all security solutions have to consider the preferences of those who are supposed to be their beneficiaries. The top-down approach should always be exposed to the bottom-up initiatives, otherwise it risks failure.

Last but not least, the figures of ‘Junkies’ and the ‘Inadaptable’, however maligned they are at first sight, draw attention to the inadequate ethnicizing of security concerns. They were usually mentioned by my informants in order to challenge the idea that insecurity has something to do with the Roma. To quote one:

For a more detailed analysis of these interpretations, see Walach (2018).
'I'm quite fine here. Although if there were less Gypsies... No! I don't mind Gypsies, I mind junkies. There is a lot of honest [Roma] who work, I know them. There are really decent Gypsies who try hard, go to work, it's great to talk with them, no problem. If only several things changed, we'd live here even better.'

The participant was replying to the question on how she was doing in the neighborhood. During this, she openly refused the impression, held both by many of her neighbors and the public, that the Romani ethnicity/culture is the main cause of troubles within the localities like Havířov-Šumbark. The symbolic hierarchies, not only ethnic but also class and spatial, are at the core of urban marginality. They have to be challenged, along with the other security concerns. Otherwise they will exclude a significant part of the excluded localities' population.

Concluding Remarks

In this chapter, the understanding of security à la vernacular security was introduced to make sense of the issue of security in the context of a Czech socially excluded locality. Security studies, including their critical branch, are still characterized by the ‘propensity to speak for, rather than to (or, perhaps better, with) “ordinary” people’ (Jarvis and Lister, 2013, 158, italics in original). The proponents of vernacular security depart from this tendency, arguing for the inclusion of understandings that are not limited to those of security professionals, be it politicians, bureaucrats or police officers, military personnel, or warlords. The study of what ‘ordinary’ people think of security, how they perform it or how they evaluate those officially responsible for its provision promises to enrich the existing security knowledge. And not just this. Vernacular security also allows for the critique of dominant security representations, discourse and practices which are too often targeted against the most marginalized in the society. If ‘ordinary insecurity is often what society (the powerful) makes it’ (Booth, 2007, 104), vernacular security is meant to be the approach to counter it.

If vernacular security studies are to have a critical edge, they nonetheless have to also apply it to vernacular discourses. In this chapter, I tried to show that ‘ordinary’ people may reproduce the repressive rhetoric that is typical for the public discourse. There are basically two ways how to approach it. First, one can focus on the opposite elements of discourse under study, on more inclusive, trust-building and cooperative initiatives. The second critical approach would engage with the inconsistencies and gaps within the discourse, trying to come up with a different perspective on what people
say. It has been said that every discourse is open-ended and incomplete, as well as all the meanings being complex and negotiable. And as security is an important political goal and symbol (Stone, 2002), one should resist hasty conclusions in its analysis.

Reference list


VERNACULAR SECURITY IN A SOCIALLY EXCLUDED LOCALITY


NEW SECURITY THREAT: APPROACHES AND RESPONSES TO CYBERSECURITY WITHIN THE V4 NATIONS

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Introduction

The Czech Republic, Slovakia, Poland and Hungary constitute the Visegrad Group nations (V4), which is a political and cultural organization with the purpose of furthering European integration, while advancing military, economic and energy cooperation with one another. The V4 has acknowledged the importance of cybersecurity issues and the necessity to form a comprehensive approach that will protect the security of citizens using online services while also preserving traditional values such as democracy, speech, access to information and privacy.

The European Union (EU) and NATO have urged their Member States in recent years to strengthen their cybersecurity capabilities in an effort to fight against the rise and proliferation of cyber threats (EuroPal, 2017). Since the V4 nations are also members of EU and NATO, a multi-sectoral approach to cybersecurity is required. This serves two additional purposes: ensuring an adequate level of national security as well as contributions to EU and NATO security agendas. However, the region of Central Europe is underdeveloped as regards the topic of cybersecurity.

Each country has different capabilities; the Czech Republic and Poland have adopted new strategic approaches and made significant progress in recent years, while Hungary and Slovakia lag behind. It is true that the V4 countries have experienced similar problems that slow overall progress, yet mutual cooperation can mitigate these issues at the regional level. In 2013, the V4 countries, along with Austria, launched the Central European Cybersecurity Platform, which can be offered up as evidence of the V4 taking this topic seriously. Organizations from the Czech Republic, such as the Prague Security Studies Institute, the Casimir
Pulaski Foundation in Poland and the Centre for Euro-Atlantic Integration and Democracy in Hungary have strengthened the capacity of the V4 to contribute to the creation of policies both at the institutional level as well as within the international scene at the European Union and NATO levels within a short while. Beginning in January of 2016 and ending in December of that year, discussions along with research and study trips were held at universities in Bratislava, Prague, Budapest and Warsaw. The question that served an overarching function during this consultation period was what new security threats in the twenty-first century might pose a risk to these integration efforts. One such security threat is that of cyber activity.

Specifically, in addition to topics such as propaganda, fact-checking and internet trolling, cyberattacks shall be investigated to determine what, if any, influence and interest external actors (non-Members) have had in influencing public opinion in these V4 nations. Such influence may or may not have had an impact in the election and referendum results during the years 2013-2016. The following article utilizes the comparative method and the “small-N” analysis on the Visegrad nations of the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Poland and Hungary.

The Essentials

There are three essential fields for cybersecurity from the technical perspective: data integrity, confidentiality and availability (Geers, 2011; Graham, Olson, & Howard, 2011). These fields of security cover the more complex issues related to cybersecurity. Data integrity means the information received or sent via the Internet remains the same and is not altered or compromised. Data confidentiality refers to the authorized access to data. Authorization includes anyone with the password to access it. Data availability refers to whether information is accessible on a particular server. If a server is not available, then its availability has compromised its confidentiality. If a cyberattack occurs on a server it is typically from DOS or DDOS (distributed denial-of-service) wherein the bandwidth or specific system is not available due to multiple systems assaulting the server, though other ways are also possible. However, an example of this massive overload is the attack upon Estonia in 2007, where the capacity of servers to handle a large amount of false requests forces them to shut down, restart, or renders them unable to answer because the DDoS has come from dozens or often even hundreds of thousands of interconnected computers or mobile phones. It is not only these three fields that are necessary to remember. Other terms must also be understood such as cyber threat, vulnerability
and exploit where the former is a ‘hole’ in the system or software that runs
the system occurring unintentionally creating shortcomings of the software.
Exploit is the method on how such a vulnerability can be exploited by an
attacker. Lastly, cyber threat is the term used by policy makers seeking to
draw attention to the probable implications of exploiting the vulnerability
on national security. How to determine what and if those risks are real is the
task for agencies, programs and personnel.

Determining risks

There is an equation often used in cybersecurity, though long known across
security studies. It is exclusively attached to cybersecurity and has been
adopted by the cybersecurity field.

\[
\text{Threat} = \text{opportunity} + \text{capability} + \text{will}
\]

An attribution problem, the action of regarding something
as being caused by a person or thing, might increase an attacker’s will;
capability relates to the attacker’s general and specific key knowledge,
while opportunity refers to all available vulnerabilities to be exploited. A
sufficiently developed will must be a condition, though this is often included
in the criticism of threats exaggerated by policy makers in cybersecurity
because of the incorrect equating of opportunity with threat (Gartzke,
2013, 42). Nevertheless, a threat environment is constructed upon the
possibilities that cyberspace affords and while possibilities exist in all areas
of life, the focus of this article is only on cyberspace. An example of such a
threat environment from which a reason for a cyberattack was created was
the Iranian nuclear facility in Natanz, where the Stuxnet virus was launched
and caused the physical destruction of the nuclear centrifuges located
there (Collins & McCombie, 2012; Farwell & Rohozinski, 2011a; Nicoll,
2011). Within critical theory, a construction of a threat is interesting for its
main argument. Thoroughly analyzed by Myriam Dunn Cavelty (Cavelty,
2007), it posits that politics lies in the analysis of political reasoning for
the development of threats nowadays, with the fact that common sense
is not enough to provide a satisfactory threat evaluation, but supports
securitization waves. The problem of definition provides support to the
inability to offer a satisfactory threat evaluation in the V4.

Simply stated, there is no V4 or for that matter, nation-wide
definitions about what constitutes cybersecurity/defense incidents. The
Cybersecurity Act is vague.
In the Czech Republic, cybersecurity is defined as an incident where “an information security breach in information systems, a security of services breach or a breach or integrity of electronic communication networks resulting from a cybersecurity event occurs” (NBU Act, 2014). Such a broad categorization sets a low reporting threshold and data collection along with an effective cost and benefit analysis needs to be improved.

In Poland, definitions vary depending on the institutional body that developed them. This is a significant explanation for a rather confusing context where the term cybersecurity is described under the term “security of the cyber domain” in the Cyberspace Protection Policy of the Republic of Poland, meanwhile the Doctrine of Cybersecurity of the Republic of Poland developed by the National Security Bureau offers a dual definition, both “cybersecurity of the Republic of Poland/security of the cyber domain of the Republic of Poland”. This is confusing and incoherent because the definitions both have different names as well as substantive differences. While it is often true that legislation often plays catch up with technology, the limitations of the language highlights the specific characteristics of cybersecurity on the international and national levels.

In Slovakia, cybersecurity has recently been correctly placed in an independent area of national security from its obscure subsystem of information security. With the adoption of a new concept, the perspectives on clearly defined terms of cyber related issues need to occur. Moreover, there is no distinguishing of cyberattacks from cyber incidents in any draft legislation. This means that what one institution may regard as a cyberattack another one considers to be a cyber incident. This obviously causes confusion as different incident handling procedures are applied. Therefore, in Slovakia, a unification of terminology is necessary to improve both intra-state and international cooperation.

In Hungary, cybersecurity terminology is defined in Act L of 2013 for the Electronic Information Security of Central and Local Government Agencies. The main focus, however, is on “Hungarian cyberspace” which limits applicability. Moreover, while Hungary has defined a cyber event, organizations have not tailored such a definition to their specific functions or operational requirements thus making reported security incidents inaccurate due to the large deviations. In each V4 nation, there is a likelihood of errors. The broad categorization of incidents in the Czech Republic, the specific legal language in Poland, the incident handling procedures in
Slovakia and deviations in the reporting of security incidents in Hungary, all expose flaws in each nation's individual preparation, but also highlight the difficulty in determining what is real and what is fictional.

**Scenarios: Fiction and Reality**

Comprehensive cybersecurity policies have been developed throughout the Western world, yet from the decentralization of entire cyber installations to strictly military defensive measures, there is still uniformity in the ability to determine between fiction and reality. Some incidents showcase the plausibility of an action such as in 2000 when a teenager successfully downed several big sites such as Amazon and eBay “just for fun” in a DDoS attack (Barabási, 2002, 1). Meanwhile, Stuxnet may serve as an example that other scenarios are fully possible. Cyber threats and their evaluation are indeed a difficult task, nevertheless comprehensive cybersecurity policies need to be discussed and planned for such exaggerated scenarios.

Within the individual V4 nations, significant problems are present in the essential fields of cybersecurity mentioned in the first section: data integrity, confidentiality and availability. Data integrity received or sent via the Internet is commonly altered and compromised via trolls or the planting of false stories. Although Data confidentially and Authorization has not thus far been compromised, interference with potential candidates and/or current politicians and groups is real. It is a cyber threat that no V4 nation is prepared to fight at present. Therefore, a DOS or DDOS attack will happen when this occurs. Unfortunately, when discussing the V4, dissimilarities immediately arise in conducting a small N analysis.

**Dissimilarities (small N analysis)**

Within the V4, each nation prioritizes cybersecurity differently within their different governments, election cycles and political agendas. Moreover, each nation has a different level of cybersecurity, making cooperation, which ebbs and flows depending on the internal political situation in each individual nation, complicated. It is also necessary to mention the differences based upon the diverse institutional backgrounds, budget possibilities and adoptions of cyber initiatives in each nation.

*Czech Republic*

The attitude of Czech Republic towards cybersecurity is ambitious. Despite
a lack of significant cyber incidents and the generally small size of the nation, Czech Republic has established the National Cybersecurity Strategy. It is one of the first European nations to outline a strategy to deal with cyber threats, placing the Czechs at the forefront of cyberspace in both the regional and European context.

**Poland**

In October 2015, the new Polish government prioritized cybersecurity within its political agenda, creating the Ministry of Digital Affairs. In addition, the initial and subsequent development of a national computer security incident response team (CSIRT) and the adopting of the Cybersecurity Act along with other relevant EU laws, makes Poland a stable partner for international cooperation.

**Slovakia**

The debate on the issue of cybersecurity there is relatively new. While the first tentative steps were made in 2008, the adoption of cybersecurity was only included within the broad concept of information security. Since that time, cyber related issues have not been viewed with urgency. In 2015, a new strategic approach was introduced that updated the National Strategy for Information Security, which had grown inactive in organizational and regulatory areas. The fragmentation of authorities is the most visible and persistent issue of Slovakia. The lack of stable institutional coverage did not exist until the Concept and Action Plan in 2015 (Concept), taking the role of information technology AND cybersecurity from the Ministry of Finance, though classified information was placed under the supervision of the NBÚ (Slovak abbreviation for National Security Authority). However, the Ministry of Defense is responsible for the military aspects of cybersecurity, while critical infrastructure is under the authority of the Ministry of Interior (MoI). Antagonism has led to unwilling cooperation and information sharing between national institutions with international cooperation prioritized at the expense of national cooperation. A significant change that occurred after the Concept Plan 15 took effect was that the NBÚ became a central authority, serving as a central hub for all institutions on the matter of cybersecurity with responsibilities for the division of tasks and duties at the national level, instructing the MoI and other sector oriented central state authorities. Additionally, CSIRT.SK had been the main response team in the civil sector and directly cooperates with similar teams on the international platform (FIRST), as well as on the regional level with the
teams from other V4 countries and Austria. The Concept also sets up a new institution, National CERT/CSIRT, a direct subordinate of the NSA, which has established cyber incident management and coordination structure.

**Hungary**

Hungary did create a framework and organizational structure for cybersecurity, but the subject was removed from the political agenda after the 2014 elections. Moreover, enthusiasm within the government and public opinion has decreased as new political topics, notably immigration, became more important. Still, multiple organizations handle cybersecurity. At the governance level there is a National Cybersecurity Council, which is supported by the National Cybersecurity Forum, an academic and business sector council, and some task-oriented cyber security workgroups. It is unfortunate then that while the six workgroups and Cybersecurity Forum are operational, they do not fulfill their strategic function and tactical organizations such as CERTS cannot operate effectively or efficiently due to the limited strategic support received. This is partly because they are not consistently defined and there are some overlapping or neglected fields of interest. Moreover, information sharing is not sufficiently carried out, with GovCERT and the MILCERT usually keeping secrets from each other instead of sharing data. Moreover, along with the strategic institutes, there are also some sectoral Community Emergency Response Teams which handle operational responsibilities.

**Resolve and Practice**

With resolve in purpose, but often fragmentation in practice and no unified plan of action, the most appropriate question is what, if any action can be taken? This question is even more relevant due to evidence of two additional problems. First, while attacks upon a country or people typically take the form of physical destruction, cyber power does not necessary translate to this type of result from attack, making the assertion of such a 'conventional' attack dubious. Second, International law operates based on customary regimes and century-long traditions that may be dated as far back as the Westphalia peace of 1648, but in its current regime of international security, fall under the auspices of the Law of Armed Conflict lays on Geneva Conventions, Hague Conventions and the UN Charter, as well as the whole system that surrounds it (Kirsch, 630). Therefore, the relevance of international law and its application in cyberspace is a pertinent question. Yet, determining if a nation has been 'attacked' is harder
to figure out, unlike in the Estonian and Georgian examples of 2007 and 2008 respectively. Furthermore, several additional dilemmas and common problems must be addressed.

- Do cyber activities constitute a use of force?
- What sovereignty do states possess in cyberspace?
- Is cyberspace surrounded with borders?

The first real broad debate on international law applicable to cyber warfare began with Koh’s speech and consequent article (Schmitt 2012). A comprehensive analysis occurred under the auspices of the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defense Centre of Excellence (CCD COE) in Tallinn, Estonia producing the Tallinn manual (CCDCOE 2013). Additionally, the NATO Wales Summit conclusions uphold the recognition of the 5th domain, which offers the potential application of Article 5 – collective self-defense. The analysis and its recommendations are instructive and beneficial, yet implementation is difficult in the V4 nations for several reasons.

There is a specialized agency called NÚKIB (a former part of the Czech NBÚ) responsible for cyber and information threats in the Czech Republic, however, it lacks qualified personnel. Moreover, cybersecurity is not a concern of the Czech NBÚ anymore. There is a specialized agency called NÚKIB (Národní úřad pro kybernetickou a informační bezpečnost or National Authority for Cyber and Information Security in English), that deals with all cyber issues. Nevertheless, such a shortage of cybersecurity professionals is attributed to the smaller salary in comparison with the private sector. Similarly, in Poland, while there is no lack of qualified specialists, the State cannot offer the same salaries. An attempt to offer incentives and the motivational “Golden Hundred” program for IT specialists throughout the government has been started with its main goal being to decrease the outflow of specialists to the private sector. Both salary differences and insufficient motivation create the critical situation in Slovakia where the nation faces resource difficulties such as a shortage of cybersecurity experts. Likewise, in Hungary, the salary gap is more than twofold and growing, especially in the ICT field, which is hampered by legislative rules and a limit on salaries.

Most unsettling, arguably, is that the public is not aware of the threats posed by cyberspace. The Internet of Things (IoT) is inappropriately configured from mobile phones to computers with other devices. Within
higher education, the situation is complicated. No coordinated V4 or national cybersecurity related research projects are underway. Moreover, current academic projects do not support security/defense hardware, software, methodology, or process development, therefore the level of cybersecurity professionals and institutions of higher education is poor. This provides an immense challenge in the definition and conceptualization of cyberspace. Academic institutions and ministries of defense may offer analysis from a topological perspective (Dodge and Kitchin, 2001) or planning and strategic thinking, but practical applications within V4 nations are still largely unfulfilled when faced with threats and actual attack.

**Threats and Warfare**

There are seven characteristics that fit under the terms, cyberspace, cyber power, cyberwar and conflict escalation. Accordingly, they are:

1. Temporality, near instantaneity replaces temporality
2. Physicality, there are no geographical and physical constraints
3. Permeation, penetration of jurisdictions and boundaries
4. Fluidity, creation of sustainable shifts
5. Participation, barriers to political expression and activism are reduced
6. Attribution, identities are obscured
7. Accountability, mechanisms of responsibility are bypassed
   (Choucri, 4)

Joseph Nye enlarged the discussion of hard and soft power replacement by adding cyber power as a new kind of power focused on information and the ability to cognitively reflect as well as the capacity to disrupt. This applies in warfare against enemies in support of a country’s conventional power (Nye, 2010). While some policymakers argue for a large investment in cyber power claiming cyber warfare is inevitable (Clarke and Knake, 2012), others highlight the likelihood of cyber application in espionage, sabotage and propaganda (Rid, 2013), pointing to the need for further study and proper countermeasures throughout the EU, but more so in Central Europe, specifically the V4 nations. The inconsistencies in these nations have been explained in the above section. However, how these V4 nations are able to handle a cyberattack of a magnitude of shutting down power and electrical grids is clear from the above sections. They would not effectively or efficiently prevent such a result. Instead, the point of interest is how these nations may or may not be able to counter the subtle, but relevant propaganda and trolling of a cyberwarfare campaign. This is important,
since the V4 is yet to find an answer to what defines the use of force in cyberspace where the deployment of malicious code may or may not be a violation of sovereignty. Such a fact reiterates the questions offered in a prior section of this article, namely, do cyber activities constitute a use of force? What sovereignty do states possess in cyberspace? And is cyberspace surrounded with borders?

Notable examples of the first and third questions were the cyber operations conducted during the war between Georgia and Russia in 2008 and cyber activities during the Ukrainian-Russian war that began in 2014 and are arguably on-going. Disruptions of news servers were the most problematic parts of the campaign and began before the conventional invasion by Russian forces to South Ossetia. The focus of the cyberattacks was on web sites which were shut down or defaced, by alternative and more pro-Russian information. Independent journalists reacted quickly and within days global servers covered the unfolding events. Yet the Russian cyberattack in support of a conventional invasion showed clearly how the two elements of warfare could be paired successfully. However, as previously stated in this section, cyberwarfare components are visible in propaganda and trolling tactics on various websites and social media outlets. Therefore, even if a conventional invasion would not occur, components of cyberwarfare might and from the available literature and recent events, the V4 is not prepared.

**Cyber Warfare in the V4**

In the past four years, there have been national presidential and parliamentary elections in the V4 nations along with referendums that mobilized the citizens. One nation interested in the outcome of these democratic contests is the periphery of the EU and on the border with the V4: Russia. In recent years, the Russia Today (RT) news site and the online journal Sputnik have made steady progress in attracting a reading and watching audience despite its limited reach in Europe. Usually, the popularity of a story is the result of its having been amplified online via Russian trolls and clusters of fake, automated social-media accounts known as “botnets”. The use of trolls and botnets to assist in disinformation campaigns are commonplace. In the Czech Republic and Slovakia, for example, multiple sources using extensive social media activity and through organizing public events and gatherings, have been used to spread and enhance anti-American, anti-EU, anti-NATO and anti-immigrant messages.
As Nimmo (2015) pointed out, the Russian propaganda network is sophisticated, utilizing a network of locals, journalists, likable commentators and Internet trolls to deliver its messages. Also important is the lack of transparency, where the public is unaware that various spokespeople actually work for the Kremlin (Knezevic, 2014). The frequent and most visible disseminators of pro-Russian disinformation campaigns in the V4 are traditional sources such as several printed periodicals, radio broadcasts; and non-governmental organizations; and non-traditional sources, such as the numerous pro-Russian websites and informal groups and communities on social media.\(^\text{10}\) Thus, Russia's approach to manipulation of information and national media in the V4 is on a country-by-country basis allowing for separate strategies for different regions.

Discussions regarding the pro-Russian disinformation campaign accelerated in February 2015, for example when Slovak activist Juraj Smatana published a `List of 42 websites that intentionally or unintentionally help to spread Russian propaganda in the Czech Republic and Slovakia (Šnidl 2015). Protests and public discussions are also highly effective examples in the Czech Republic and Slovakia, where public discussions are regularly organized by Slovak Zem & Vek magazine,\(^\text{11}\) anti-NATO demonstrations supported by the Slovak-Russian Association have occurred and a protest was recently initiated by the Institute of Slavic Strategic Studies. The Czech magazine Vědomí, founded by the website AC24.cz 2014 and the Slovak Zem & Vek actively spread information to the benefit of Russia, with their articles frequently based upon conspiracy theories and a mixture of facts, half-truths and outright lies. Additionally, radio stations such as Slovak Slobodný Vysielač (“Free Transmitter”) founded in January 2013 spread disinformation.

Russian information warfare theory derives from spetspropaganda taught from 1942 until the 1990s and reinstated in 2000 (Darczewska, 9-10). Pomerantzev and Weiss (2014, 6) refer to Russia’s assault on media and disinformation activities as the weaponization of information, conducted alongside the weaponization of money and culture. In the V4, civil society in these small countries of Central Europe faces a formidable enemy. The

\(^{10}\) These groups are very often linked to Russian Embassies or Russian Centers of Science and Culture through project cooperation and joint events.

\(^{11}\) According to Zem & Vek’s website and its Facebook page, more than 40 public events have occurred since 2013.
Kremlin doesn’t invent anti-European or anti-establishment ideas. They already exist, so it simply supports them in whatever form, customizing their tactics to suit each country. Therefore, rather than openly promoting Russia’s cause, the aim of pro-Russian disinformation activities in the Czech Republic and Slovakia are to weaken opponents. Moreover, the majority of pro-Russian disinformation activities in the Czech Republic and Slovakia are conducted by sources with no direct organizational or financial links to the Kremlin. The disinformation campaigns within the V4 are activities that abuse information, confuse citizens and shift public opinion in the direction of predetermined policy objectives. Clearly such campaigns fulfill six of the seven conditions Choucri (2012) references. There are no geographical and physical restrictions; barriers to political expression and activism are reduced and identities are obscured. Moreover, since these campaigns are most successful within cyberspace and social media outlets, temporality and fluidity are important factors as well. Additionally, since IoT is inappropriately configured from mobile phones to computers with other devices and with no coordinated V4 or national cybersecurity related research projects underway in the V4, this makes the V4 nations fertile ground.

It is evident from public opinion in Slovakia and the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland that most of the promises and excitement generated following the 1989 Revolutions have brought disappointment in the past 25 years. The dissatisfied and impressionable youth do not remember life under communism, meanwhile, the Iraq War created disillusion with the Transatlantic Alliance, and the financial crash of 2009 created skepticism of the ‘West European model’ that had been admired. The allure of pro-Russia/ pro-Kremlin media, especially social media channels is one where growing public distrust towards mainstream media, politicians (plagued by corruption scandals) and oligarchs can be expressed and the arrogance of public figures can be criticized, while discontented individuals can connect on such platforms. A nightmare scenario for the European Union is arguably the goal of the pro-Russian disinformation campaign: shifting public opinion against the West and its own institutions. Russia emerges as both the savior and moral authority, the guarantor of political stability and peace. If the campaign were to succeed, the installation of anti-Western politicians in power and the undermining of EU unity would occur (Šnídl, 2015). The illiberal democracy that has taken root in Hungary arguably supports this Russian narrative.
Useful Idiots

Rastislav Káčer, a veteran diplomat who served as Slovakia’s ambassador to Washington and at NATO’s headquarters in Brussels said in a New York Times article that this information war taking place in cyberspace, “is just part of a bigger struggle” and while not involving bloodshed, he added, it “is equally as dangerous as more conventional hostile action” (Higgins, 2016). The Twitter and Facebook structure and algorithms increase fake news and allow for echo chambers. In the V4 nations, misinformation has profoundly affected the dynamic of public debates and placed Russia’s critics on the defensive. This has the negative side effect of forcing them to waste time debunking baseless claims. A fabricated story in 2015 regarding a public protest against Czech President Milos Zeman that had been organized by the US Embassy in Prague in an effort to start a Ukrainian-like “Maidan” revolution was quickly reposted by more reputable websites, prompting a number of foreign ministries to confirm its authenticity. One may argue that this represents a link to Choucri’s 7th point: Accountability; the mechanisms of responsibility are bypassed.

There are also anonymous or partial anonymous think tanks and foundations that spread disinformation and propaganda. While the Institute for Slavic Strategic Studies is an example of a think tank, public figures in Slovakia and the Czech Republic have been effective too. The former Slovak Prime Minister Jan Carnogursky is a member of the Valdai Club, a discussion club of leading world experts, that periodically meets with Russian President Putin and other senior Russian officials. Sergei Chelemendik, a Slovak publisher, has his own website and publishes Russian propaganda. Another politician visiting Moscow – recently the speaker of the Slovak Parliament, defended the Russian narratives… And there is the longtime political advisor to former Czech President Vaclav Klaus, Petr Hajek, editor of Protiproud (Countercurrent) a journal full of conspiracy theories, flamboyant graphics and over-the-top headlines.

Russia has benefited immensely from the cyber campaign. It is depicted as a bulwark against Western decadence, whether on specific referendum-topic issues such as opposition to same-sex marriage or other culturally conservative views. “In Poland, which is much bigger [than Slovakia or the Czech Republic], there is only a handful of such websites,” said Smatana. “And those that do promote an anti-gay agenda tend to do so from a traditional or Catholic perspective. They definitely don’t combine it with pro-Russian propaganda” (Rohac, 2015). However, Russia has
been subtler in Poland, supporting the environmental movement which is opposed to the Polish domestic policy of developing its large reserves of unconventional gas, which as a positive for Russia, keeps Poland dependent on Russian imports. Different methods for different nations within the V4 allow for reflection. The V4 nations do not have an effective or efficient cyber strategy for the reasons stated in section 2 and they have increasingly been susceptible to disinformation campaigns in cyberspace.

Since the fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of communism, the West has spent its time, money and technology on issues other than Russia. Central Europe and the V4 nations have pursued economic and political transitions and integration within the European Union. Since the early 2000s, Russia, meanwhile has arguably pursued a grand strategy that de-legitimizes NATO, undermines the EU, and reverses the transitions of the 1990s. After twenty years, anti-establishment and anti-European sentiment is on the rise and utilizing disinformation cyber campaigns. Russia has been successful thus far. Czech President Milos Zeman’s presidential campaign was openly financed by Lukoil, a Russian energy company. In Hungary, it’s centre-right prime minister, Viktor Orban, has publicly called for the abandonment of ‘dogmas and ideologies’ such as liberal democracy. Infamously, Orban then explained that he preferred the ‘illiberal democracies’ of nations such as Russia. Robert Fico, Slovakia’s prime minister has been a critic of EU’s sanctions on Russia. In Poland, arguably the most successful of the V4, cyber campaigning has planted the idea that the last twenty-five years have been disastrous and that the Third Republic (1989-present) is a catastrophe. Precisely because the IoT is inappropriately configured from mobile phones to computers with other devices and there are no coordinated V4 or national cybersecurity related research projects underway, disinformation and propaganda within cyberspace is prolific while posing a real threat to V4 cybersecurity. Acts of disinformation paralyze the decision-making process, incite fear and uncertainty, and distort the truth. This is precisely what has occurred in the V4 nations since 2013. In support of national candidates for presidents and parliament and referendums, distortions of truth, uncertainty, and fear have been used effectively on a broad range of issues both domestic and EU related, from national elections and referendums to broader EU issues such as Greek debt relief and the migration crisis. Russia does not necessarily need friendly pro-Russian governments, they only need anti-Western or even incompetent governments. Therefore, a rather successful cyber strategy, while Poland, Slovakia, Czech Republic and Hungary flounder both politically and technically with their responses. This difficulty arguably stems from the legal difference within the V4 states themselves.
Legal Difference Within the V4

There are legal differences within the V4 nations as Cybersecurity legislation is under development in most countries and remains generally scattered over different areas of law. For example, legislation that imposes requirements on public authorities and private operators ensuring security measures that exist to prevent attack fall under domestic law security requirements. Though typically understood to protect public service functions in case of cyber threat, data privacy also belongs to this group. Legislation that restricts exports and the supply of critical security technology falls under national defense interests and while not often, such a type of law may be used for V4 nations to override market principles, restrict foreign investment or restrict foreign suppliers from obtaining contracts in critical infrastructure projects. An area of law that the V4 nations have not kept pace with other EU member states are laws that aim at criminalizing specific acts by digital or electronic means. While domestic laws exist on topics such as burglary or theft, cyber-enabled crime has increased. Despite the Budapest Convention, the theft of data and illegal hacking still occur.

For the past several years, an evolution of industry standards has set the level of actual security requirements in the V4. This appears to have changed within the last year as domestic security requirements and national security interests have been either re-defined or merged. Moreover, since the national security interest policy is beyond foreign investment review, restrictions are possible for the future. This is plausible when from May 2018, the EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) (2016/679) will be one law that all V4 nations must follow and have integrated into their national legislation. Nevertheless, it is important to examine what if any specific legal differences are evident.

Poland

Since 2016 the Polish Ministry of Digital Affairs has supported draft legislation that would implement the European wide Network Information

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12 The Budapest Convention covers four categories of cybercrime: (1) offences against the confidentiality, integrity and availability of computer data and systems (illegal access, illegal interception, data interference, system interference, misuse of devices), (2) computer-related offences (computer-related forgery and fraud), (3) content-related (child-pornography) and (4) infringement of copyright.
Systems (NIS) directive\textsuperscript{13} within the Polish legal framework, thus imposing obligations on the various stakeholders, including providers of digital services. Additionally, in a law on counter terrorism, the prevention of hate speech on the Internet was included, acknowledging that privacy is a topic that will be regulated in the near future. In March 2017, the Strategy for Cybersecurity for Poland 2017-2022 was published and describes key strategic directions for the next five years, yet surprisingly there is no draft law on cybersecurity (Kobylanska and Lewoszewski, 2017). This is not the case in Hungary.

\textit{Hungary}

The constitution of Hungary, adopted in 2011 and in effect since January 2012, contains a section on ‘Freedom and Responsibility that describes the fundamental rights of individuals.\textsuperscript{14} Article VI (1) respects the privacy of home and family life, but Article VI (2) is more to the point, providing the right to the protection of personal data and the right to access and disseminate information. In addition, Article VI (3) lays out that an independent authority shall be responsible for the enforcement and protection of personal data.

While 2017 saw Hungary prepare to implement the new GDPR protocol, little difficulty is anticipated because Hungary is a single legislative privacy regime and personal data and freedom of information is protected under Act CXII of 2011 on Informational Self-Determination and Freedom of Information (the Privacy Act) that is in fact the implementation of the European Data Protection Directive 95/46 (Godolle, 2017). This is different in Slovakia, which has a deficit in comparison to its neighbors on this topic.

\textsuperscript{13} See the full text of the Directive (EU) 2016/1148 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 July 2016 concerning measures for a high common level of security of network and information systems across the Union (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv%3AOJ.L__2016.194.01.0001.01.ENG)

\textsuperscript{14} The translation of the consolidated version of the Fundamental Law of Hungary is available at www.kormany.hu/download/e/02/00000/The%20New%20Fundamental%20Law%20of%20Hungary.pdf
Slovakia

While proposals for specific legislation on data protection and cybersecurity have been in existence since 2013, the new GDPR protocol has forced Slovakia to finally act in January of 2018. On account of the creation of the EU General Data Protection Regulation (2016/679), which harmonizes regulations across all EU Member States, Slovak legislation will have to be made in order to implement the newly regulated processes. In this effort, a new law, approved with 88 yes-votes, was drawn up by the National Security Authority (NBÚ) in cooperation with the Office of Deputy Prime Minister for Investments and Informatization of Peter Pellegrini.

This is a significant step for Slovakia, since in prior years, Slovakia used standard IT security systems to protect against threats such as anti-virus, yet modern threats such as ransomware have been not significantly dealt with. Therefore, the January 30 law, Act No.69/2018 Coll, on cyber-security will ensure the security of Slovakia’s cyberspace, an increasingly more likely attack scenario than classic military invasion (Spectator, 2018).

Czech Republic

The Czechs have legislation that ensures detailed IT security policies. It is within the scope of the cyber infrastructure including large public authorities and telecom operators.

In July 2016, the Czech parliament amended its Cybersecurity Act that conforms to the GDPR, which has been in effect since 2018. The new Cybersecurity Act is based on two principles and three pillars. It is explained as follows:

The first principle is to minimize interference with the rights of private persons; the second is the principle of individual responsibility for the security of respective information systems. The three pillars are as follows:

1. Security measures (standardization),
2. Cybersecurity incidents notice,
3. Countermeasures, meaning the response to incidents.

The draft of the Act allows for two supervisory units - national and governmental. The National CSIRT is meant for the private and academic sectors, Governmental CERT for state institutions and critical information infrastructure.

After the completion of the evaluation of the consultation procedure, the NSA plans to submit the Cybersecurity Act to the Government of the Czech Republic, including the draft of implementing regulations, for approval, at the end of June this year.

As can be observed, not each V4 nation is uniform in its cybersecurity legislation. There are legal differences based upon available statutes and laws. The only commonality is how the V4 nations have responded to the EU wide GDPR.

**Conclusion**

The European Union and NATO have urged their Member States in recent years to strengthen their cybersecurity capabilities in an effort to fight against the rise and proliferation of new cyber threats. Since, the V4 nations are also members of EU and NATO, a multi-sectoral approach to cybersecurity is needed. This serves two additional purposes: the ensuring of an adequate level of national security as well as contributions to EU and NATO security agendas. However, the region of Central Europe is underdeveloped on the topic of cybersecurity.

The following article utilized the comparative method and the “small-N” analysis on the Visegrad nations of the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Poland and Hungary exploring topics such as propaganda and internet trolling to determine what, if any, influence and interest external actors (non-Members) have had influencing public opinion in these V4 nations. Such influence may or may not have had an impact on the election and referendum results during the years 2013-2016. In determining risks there is an equation often used in cybersecurity. This equation is an attribution problem; the action of regarding something as being caused by a person or thing might increase an attacker’s will; capability relates to the attacker’s
general and specific key knowledge, while opportunity refers to all available vulnerabilities to be exploited in which the V4 nations are fertile ground.

The disinformation campaigns within the V4 are activities that abuse information, confuse citizens and shift public opinion in the direction of predetermined policy objectives. It is evident from public opinion in Slovakia, Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland that most of the promises and excitement generated following the 1989 revolutions have brought disappointment over the past 25 years. The dissatisfied and impressionable youth do not remember life under communism, meanwhile, the Iraq War created disillusion with the Transatlantic Alliance and the financial crash of 2009 created skepticism of the ‘West European model’ that had been admired. The allure of the pro-Russia/ pro-Kremlin media, especially social media channels, is one where growing public distrust towards mainstream media and politicians, (plagued by corruption scandals) oligarchs and the arrogance of public figures can be expressed and discontented individuals can connect on such platforms. Additionally, a lack of uniformity within legal structures across these nations is a problem, though the GDPR has helped address these deficits and is forcing legislative changes. Nevertheless, the new security threats and how the V4 Group approaches such threats and responds to them will determine the safety of its citizens as well as the protection of cyberspace.

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Neighbouring regions: Eastern Partnership countries and Eastern Europe
THE RETURN OF CLASSICAL GEOPOLITICS: THE BLACK SEA REGION AFTER THE ANNEXATION OF CRIMEA

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Introduction

The Black Sea area is more of a geographical notion than a region with a clear common identity and a similar economic/political environment. There are serious divergences among the Black Sea countries in terms of economic, social and cultural aspects (Aydin, 2005, 59). Different parts of the Black Sea area can be included in other geographic and geopolitical regions, such as Asia Minor, the Balkans and the Caucasus.

However, from a geostrategic point of view, the Black Sea can indeed be considered as a separate region because of its geographic peculiarities. The Black Sea is a semi-enclosed sea, clearly separated from the Mediterranean and from the oceans of the world. In addition, the Montreux Convention restricts the passage of the warships of non-Black Sea states through the Turkish Straits. This is why external actors have only limited abilities to alter the regional balance of military power.

The goal of this paper is to describe and analyze the changes in the security environment in the Black Sea region after the annexation of Crimea by Russia in March 2014. We subscribe to the rational actor model; accordingly, the state with its respective institutions will be the main unit of analysis. At the same time, we acknowledge that, as NATO members, Romania, Bulgaria, and Turkey align their foreign and defence policies with this military organization.

We apply the security dilemma theory in order to explain the logic of the confrontation between Russia and NATO in the region after March 2014.
In the first part of this article, we analyze the geopolitical consequences of the main events in the region in the last four years: the annexation of Crimea, the separatist revolt in eastern Ukraine, the repercussions of Russia’s and Turkey’s involvement in Syria for the Black Sea region, and the growing uncertainty of the foreign policy of the USA under the presidency of Donald Trump. Then, we turn to an examination of Russia’s military build-up in Crimea as well as NATO’s response. Finally, we delineate Turkey’s specific position within the new post-Crimean reality in the region and explain why Georgia and Ukraine are highly unlikely to become members of NATO.

**Geopolitical changes in the Black Sea region after 2014**

Six countries have an outlet to the Black Sea. They differ in terms of their size, political systems and geopolitical orientation. Two - Romania and Bulgaria - are members of the European Union; and they both, with the addition of Turkey, also belong to NATO. Russia represents an independent geopolitical pole, while the former Soviet republics of Ukraine and Georgia currently aspire unsuccessfully to membership in Euro-Atlantic organizations.

Several important events and long-term tendencies have substantially changed the strategic landscape in the Black Sea region after February 2014. The first was the annexation of Crimea in March 2014. Russia took control over the strategically important peninsula with its unique bays of Sevastopol and Balaklava. In practice, the Azov Sea became a Russian lake; even though a substantial portion of the coastline (including the port of Mariupol) remains under Ukrainian Government control, the body of water is now accessible only via the Kerch Strait—which is fully controlled by Russia.

Until 2014, the Bay of Sevastopol had been a base of the Ukrainian Navy. However, during the events in February-March 2014, Russia took control over the larger part of it. Ukraine also lost control of its main underground naval ammunition storage site in the Inkerman valley, as well as its helicopter-repair facilities. Moreover, its 1st Naval Infantry Battalion, at Feodosia, was overrun by pro-Russian forces, its personnel arrested, and its equipment seized (Ripley 2014). The loss of Sevastopol, along with the majority of its ships and personnel, has, for all practical purposes, resulted in Ukraine ceasing to be a naval power.
In spring 2014, a separatist revolt began in eastern Ukraine, one actively inspired and supported by Russia. At least several thousand people were killed during the armed clashes in the Donetsk and Luhansk provinces of Ukraine, after which the so-called Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics proclaimed independence. For the time being, the situation in eastern Ukraine is a stalemate. The central authorities in Kiev lack the military capabilities to regain control over the separatist republics, which receive substantial financial and military support from Moscow. Yet, at the same time, Russia does not intend to annex these territories as it did with Crimea. Thus, it is clear that a further frozen conflict is now ongoing in the wider Black Sea region. Furthermore, since one of the main results of the conflict with Russia was the radicalization of the Ukrainian public debate and politics, we cannot expect reconciliation between Moscow and Kiev in the foreseeable future.

In recent years, Russia has also fortified its positions on the eastern shore of the Black Sea, where the separatist region of Abkhazia broke away from Georgia at the beginning of the 1990s. After the Russo-Georgian War of 2008, Moscow recognized the independence of Abkhazia, later signing a military agreement with the separatist republic in November 2015. According to this agreement, Russia can establish a military base on Abkhazian territory to which it can deploy two motor rifle battalions, artillery and aviation groups and a special-purpose detachment (Morrison, 2016). As a result, half of Georgia’s Black Sea coast is under Russian military control. In addition, during the 2008 war, Russia sank almost the entire Georgian fleet at the port of Poti; at present, the Georgian navy is practically non-existent - in fact, it has been merged with the Coastal Guard under the command of the Ministry of Interior (Bosphorus Naval News, 2008).

Meanwhile, the two biggest Black Sea powers – Russia and Turkey—have intervened very actively in the Syrian conflict and sent military units to the territory of this Middle Eastern country.

Finally, we must mention that the Black Sea policy of the world’s leading power – the USA – has become unclear and unpredictable since Donald Trump took office as president in January 2017. This is true first, because the new U.S. president has no coherent foreign policy strategy, and second, because even the incoherent vision that the White House does have for the role of the country in the international arena conflicts, often dramatically, with that of Congress.
The new American president has been sending confusing and contradictory signals. At first, he said he would conclude a deal with Vladimir Putin. But under pressure from Congress, Trump became more cautious in terms of his policy toward Russia. In April 2017, the then-U.S. Secretary of State, Rex Tillerson, asked his European counterparts why American voters should care about the conflict in Ukraine. It signaled that the new U.S. administration would most probably be less engaged with the Russo-Ukrainian conflict than its predecessor (Balmer 2017). However, we cannot say the same for the wider political system, in particular Congress, which has continued to extend the framework of sanctions on Russia.

In general, the geopolitical changes that have occurred in the Black Sea region after February 2014, reinforced the positions of Russia, weakened Ukraine and Georgia and provoked alarm in NATO.

**How does the security dilemma explain the confrontation between Russia and NATO in the Black Sea?**

The existing strategic standoff between Russia and NATO in the Black Sea can be explained by the security dilemma – one of the most important theoretical ideas in international relations. This concept is based on the notion that international politics is anarchic because the world does not have a single government. In such a situation, every country must rely on itself in order to guarantee its security, whether through increasing its military strength or by forming alliances. However, other countries then respond with similar measures, producing increased tensions that can create a conflict, even when no side really desires it. Countries usually do not trust each other and consider their own measures as defensive but the other’s measures as offensive. The security dilemma and the broader spiral model help researchers to explain major events in world history, such as the First World War and the origins of the Cold War (Shiping, 2009).

The security dilemma model reveals the logic behind the behavior of the great powers on the global level, but it can also be applied in a regional geopolitical context, such as the Black Sea, where we have a standoff between one classical nation state (Russia) and a military bloc, including three states from the region as well as many others that have no outlet to the Black Sea. The annexation of Crimea was the trigger event that pushed the Black Sea into a classical security dilemma. From March 2014, Russia started to increase its military strength in the region to discourage any Ukrainian attempt to retake the peninsula. Moreover, Russia is now willing to
maintain the status quo. The annexation of Crimea eliminated the risk that the Russian Black Sea Fleet might lose its base in Sevastopol; Moscow has since had a free hand to invest in its modernization.

NATO felt threatened by the belligerent behavior of Russia in the Black Sea and outlined measures to contain Moscow and to protect its eastern flank. At the 2016 Warsaw Summit, the allies decided to deploy four multinational battalion-size battle groups to Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland, as well as a multinational brigade in Romania. It is understandable that NATO should direct more military resources to the Baltic Sea Region where four members of the Alliance have a land border with Russia, of which two (Latvia and Estonia) have substantial Russian-speaking minorities. Concerning the Black Sea, it was decided at the Summit that NATO would increase its presence in the region “on land, at sea and in the air” (NATO 2017).

However, the strengthening of the NATO military presence in the Black Sea region is rather symbolic. First, NATO cannot and does not want to deploy military forces in the two countries that have suffered directly from Russian expansionism – Ukraine and Georgia – since they are not members of the Alliance. Moreover, the Montreux Convention restricts the passage of non-Black Sea warships through the Bosporus. No more than nine such ships can be in the Sea at the same time, and they cannot stay longer than twenty-one days (Montreux Convention).

Russia and NATO do not trust each other and suspect the other side of aggressive intentions. NATO strategists do not exclude the possibility of new Russian military aggression against Ukraine or other Black Sea states. At the same time, Russian leaders are afraid that NATO could launch a geopolitical offensive by admitting Ukraine and/or Georgia into the Alliance or helping central authorities in Kiev in their attempts to regain control over Donetsk and Luhansk.

It is not realistic to expect that the confrontation between Russia and the “collective West” will ease up in the foreseeable future. The main reasons for this confrontation are Crimea and the conflict in Eastern Ukraine. The Western countries will never recognize the annexation of Crimea, while it is even more improbable that Russia will one day return the peninsula to Ukraine.
The Russian military bubble over the Black Sea

In the years after the annexation of Crimea, Russia has turned the peninsula into a real military fortress. In March 2015, President Vladimir Putin announced that Russia had placed Bastion mobile coastal defense missile systems in Crimea. Later on, the most advanced Russian anti-air missile system, the so-called Triumph S-400s, were also deployed to the peninsula in addition to the S-300 missile system. Russia has also based submarines equipped with the Caliber missile system – successfully tested in Syria – in Crimea. Meanwhile, the Soviet-era bunkers on the Crimean coast have been refurbished and early-warning radar stations reactivated (Kurtdarcan and Kayoglu, 2017).

In 2017, Russia installed the modern Murmansk BN mobile electronic warfare system in Crimea. This system is designed to both collect signals emanating from adversary ships or aircraft as well as to jam high-frequency communications (Lagronne, 2017). Russian officials, including the foreign minister, Sergei Lavrov, have emphasized that Russia retains the right to deploy nuclear weapons to Crimea (Keck, 2015).

According to Ukrainian military intelligence, as of May 2016, Russia has nearly 24,000 troops (compared to 12,500 in 2014), 613 tanks and armoured combat vehicles, 162 artillery systems, about 101 fighter jets, 56 helicopters, 16 coastal missile systems, 34 ships (26 in 2014) and 4 submarines in total in Crimea (Shelest, 2016). Russia plans to spend $2.4 billion by 2020 to modernize its Black Sea fleet with next generation warships, submarines, and air-defense systems (Chong, 2017).

All the above-mentioned activities have transformed Russia into the dominant military power in the Black Sea, as, until 2014, the Turkish military fleet in the Black Sea had been considered stronger than that of Russia. Of course, the Russian-Turkish military balance is more complicated because both countries have significant naval forces located outside of the Black Sea.

The long-term aim of Russia is to establish an anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) zone or “bubble” over the region in the Black Sea. The concept focuses on deploying capabilities that firstly, prevent forces from entering an area (i.e., anti-access); and secondly, limit an opponent’s freedom of action and maneuver within the operational area, i.e., area denial (Lasconjarias and Marrone, 2016).
In September 2016, the Russian chief of the General Staff, General Valery Gerasimov, stated that Russia’s “Black Sea Fleet should be able – and it has already demonstrated this capability – to destroy a potential enemy’s amphibious force on the way, starting from the ports of embarkation” (Kurtdarcan and Kayoglu, 2017).

With its perfect geographic location in the centre of the northern part of the Black Sea, Crimea will become the epicenter of the Russian A2/AD zone. This was specifically acknowledged by General Philip Breedlove, the-then NATO’s supreme allied commander in Europe, in September 2015 who stated that: “[Since] their occupation of Crimea, Russia has developed very strong A2/AD capabilities on the Black Sea. Essentially, their [anti-ship] cruise missiles range the entire Black Sea, and their air defense missiles range about 40 to 50 percent of the Black Sea”.

Given the Russian military build-up, Romania and Bulgaria cannot be considered as serious maritime powers. National naval forces there are largely outdated, with poor strike capabilities and limited range (Shelest, 2016, 195). However, Bulgaria and Romania can host naval drills with the participation of non-littoral NATO countries and provide opportunities for surveillance on the Russian military build-up in Crimea.

Turkey between NATO and the Montreux Convention

The other major Black Sea power, Turkey, is a NATO member but follows its own regional military agenda that does not always fully coincide with the policy of the Alliance. This tendency has become more visible after the failed coup attempt against president Erdoğan in July 2016. Ankara is in a tense relationship with the USA because the main political adversary of Mr. Erdoğan – the Turkish Islamic preacher, Fethullah Gülen – lives in Pennsylvania. Meanwhile, the EU has strongly criticized Ankara for human rights violations after the failed coup; this criticism has irritated President Erdoğan.

Ankara prefers to keep non-littoral NATO countries outside of the Black Sea. In 2006, Turkey joined Russia in rejecting the U.S. administration’s proposal to expand a NATO-led Mediterranean counterterrorism operation, Active Endeavor, into the Black Sea area (Torbakov, 2006). In August 2008, Turkey declined entrance to the Black Sea for two U.S. Navy hospital ships with humanitarian aid for Georgia through the Straits.
In both cases, Turkey had one main consideration that influenced its decision – fear of the erosion of the Montreux Convention, something unacceptable for Ankara. Punctual adherence of Turkey to the Montreux Convention also favors Russia since, as a Black Sea state, its military ships can pass through the Straits without any restrictions. This fact has become particularly important for Moscow after the beginning of Russia's military operation in Syria. Free passage through the Straits allows Russia to project military power in the Mediterranean.

Turkey had an ambition to play a leading role in two regional military naval initiatives in the Black Sea – BLACSEAFOR (launched in 2001) and Black Sea Harmony (launched in 2004). These initiatives are almost defunct now because of the Ukrainian crisis – Russia and Ukraine do not want to participate together in any regional organizations or forms of regional cooperation. It is also difficult to imagine that Russia and the two NATO members – Romania and Bulgaria – could cooperate in the military sphere. Thus, Turkey has two remaining options for military cooperation in the Black Sea – either the NATO format or bilateral ties with Ukraine, Georgia and Russia.

Moscow and Ankara have already overcome the consequences of Turkey’s downing of a Russian jet in November 2015. Since the summer of 2016, the relations between these two countries have been improving. Russia has begun the construction of the Turk Stream gas pipeline, which is going to deliver Russian gas directly to the European part of Turkey. In April 2018, Russia’s state atomic corporation, Rosatom, started the construction of the Akkuyu Nuclear Power Plant in Turkey. The estimated cost of the project is over $20 billion, and the Russian company intends to sell a 49% share to Turkish partners (AA Energy, 2018). Moscow and Ankara have also concluded a large deal in the military sphere – the supply of S-400s, Russia’s most advanced missile defense system, to Turkey. The expected date of delivery is July 2019 (Butler, 2018).

However, Moscow and Ankara are more geopolitical competitors than partners. Turkey has the resources (both financial and technological) to create its own A2/AD zone, although, most probably, it will be smaller and weaker than the Russian one. Recently, Ankara has started a reorientation of its military naval strategy, aiming to create its own A2/AD zone around the Turkish Black Sea cost. In May 2017, a successful experiment with the domestically produced Khan ballistic missile was carried out in the Black Sea province of Sinop. The missile had a range of 280 km that means,
theoretically, it could reach the southern part of Crimea (Daily Sabah, 2017). Turkey has developed a national program for the building of military ships; and President Erdoğan even declared Turkey’s intention to build its own aircraft carrier (Peck, 2017).

Despite military cooperation with Moscow, Turkey does not intend to concede control over the Black Sea to Russia. For historical and geopolitical reasons, Turkish political and military elites perceive Russia as a threat, or at least as a competitor, rather than as a new friend. As one leading Turkish security expert commented, “Turkey’s strategy is aimed at balancing Russia” (cited in Bechev, 2018). Balancing includes the South Caucasus, Syria, and also the Black Sea. That is why Ankara has been alarmed by a Crimean build-up that has profoundly altered the military balance in the Black Sea. Before 2014, Turkey had a clear military superiority over the Russian Black Sea Fleet, but now the situation has been transformed to the exact opposite.

The recent reconciliation between Turkey and Russia is a result of economic considerations and Erdoğan’s disappointment with the West, especially the USA. Meanwhile, Turkey remains an active member of NATO and signed the final declaration of the Brussels North Atlantic Council in July 2018 – a document that pointed out “Russia’s aggressive actions” that “challenge the Alliance and are undermining Euro-Atlantic security and the rules-based international order” (Brussels Summit Declaration, 2018). In a joint statement, in September 2018, the foreign ministers of Turkey, Romania, and Poland have expressed concern about what they call Russia’s “increasing and visible offensive military posturing,” near NATO borders (The New York Times, 2018).

And whereas NATO membership is not of vital importance for Turkey’s geopolitical positioning in South Caucasus and Syria, it is an essential pivot of Ankara’s policy in the Black Sea basin.

**Georgia and Ukraine – on the other side of the NATO’s “red line”**

The two former Soviet republics, Georgia and Ukraine, have serious security deficits. This is not simply a subjective perception, but was proven in 2008, during the Russo-Georgian War and in 2014, by the annexation of Crimea and the emerging of the armed conflict in Donbas. Georgia and Ukraine have tried to compensate for this security deficit through efforts to increase their own military strength (in a process which IR theory calls “internal
balancing”), but it is clear that neither of these two countries can be an equal opponent of Russia. That is why Tbilisi and Kiev have been counting on an alignment with NATO, with a final goal of becoming full members of this organization. Ukraine’s and Georgia’s candidacies for NATO were rejected during the Bucharest Summit in April 2008. And after 2014, the admission of these two countries to the Alliance has become even more unlikely. First of all, the governments in Tbilisi and Kiev do not control the full territory of their respective countries. Second, bearing in mind the current situation, NATO is not capable of defending Georgia and Ukraine in time. Turkey is the only serious NATO military power in the Black Sea and on the borders with Georgia, but this does not mean that Ankara is ready to confront Russia militarily in order to defend former Soviet republics. This did not happen in 2008 or in 2014. Thus, to put it bluntly but clearly: Georgia and Ukraine would be more of a burden than an asset for the security of the present NATO members.

After the annexation of Crimea, NATO has drawn a clear “red line” that Russian expansionism will not be allowed to cross. Not surprisingly, this red line coincides with the borders of the NATO members in Eastern Europe – and Georgia and Ukraine are on the other side of it. Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty is topical again and it makes the distinction between NATO members and non-members clear.

In the present security architecture in the Black Sea, Georgia and Ukraine are trying to engage in joint military activities with NATO. That is a more realistic goal than membership. In the spring of 2016, the Ukrainian president, Poroshenko, declared the readiness of Ukraine to join a permanent NATO flotilla in the Black Sea, if such a force would be established (MoD of Ukraine, 2016). In March 2017, Brigadier General, Vladimir Chachibaia, Georgia’s Chief of the General Staff, announced the idea that NATO could create “a coast guard base on Georgia’s coast” (Kucera 2017). There is no positive development on these initiatives, but Georgia and Ukraine will continue to look for an extension of NATO’s umbrella – at least a political one, if the military one is not available.

And finally, Ukraine and Georgia have an option to develop bilateral military cooperation with the USA outside the framework of NATO. For example, in the spring of 2018, the U.S. Government delivered Javelin antitank missiles to Ukraine (Reuters, 2018). The delivery of American weapons to Ukraine and Georgia can improve the defense capabilities of these countries, but cannot dramatically alter the military
balance in the Black Sea region and it does not mean that the USA will be ready to intervene directly in order to protect Ukrainian or Georgian territory.

In the period of the confrontation between Russia and the West after the annexation of Crimea, strategic considerations have become more important than the values and the free choice of nations. A vast majority of Georgians and, perhaps, a slim majority of Ukrainians want NATO membership for their respective countries, but the admission of Georgia and Ukraine to the Alliance depends mostly on the relations and strategic balance between the West and Russia. In a cynical manner, this situation has been described by the renowned American IR specialist, John Mearsheimer, who pointed out that “small states that are in the orbit of great powers have no rights when it comes to policymaking” (Kommersant, 2016).

Conclusions

For the time being, NATO has limited capabilities to prevent Russian domination in the Black Sea. Globally, the Alliance has enormous economic (the combined GDP of the NATO countries is more than 25 times bigger than Russia’s) and serious technological supremacy over Russia. However, in the Black Sea region, the geography and the possibility for the concentration of military forces work in favor of Moscow. Russia strives to strengthen its security in the Black Sea and (to paraphrase the famous saying of Lord Ismay) to keep Ukraine down, NATO – out, and Turkey – calm. NATO suffers a lack of coherence and cannot fully benefit from the fact that Turkey is a member of the Alliance. The other two NATO littoral states – Romania and Bulgaria – have no potential to hinder Russian military plans in the Black Sea.

It should be emphasized that, after February 2014, we have been observing the return of classical geopolitics in the strategic standoff between Russia and NATO in the Black Sea. Prior to the annexation of Crimea, NATO had focused on non-traditional threats, such as terrorism and illegal trafficking. But after 2014, geography matters again, and NATO has returned to its initial core mission – the territorial defense of its members. In 2017, the USA led eighteen exercises in the Black Sea area, including the Sea Breeze multinational exercise and Saber, a massive land-based drill involving some 25,000 soldiers from 23 allied and partner countries (Bechev, 2018).
NATO activated the Multinational Division Southeast headquarters in Bucharest at the end of 2015. Since July 2018, the British Royal Air Force has deployed Typhoon jets in order to protect NATO airspace in the Black Sea region (Young, 2018).

Geopolitics in the Black Sea region has returned a zero-sum game in which the reinforcement of one of the main adversaries means the weakening of the security of the other one. Nevertheless, we cannot expect the return of the level of confrontation between Moscow and the West that existed during the Cold War. The tension in the Black Sea region is one which is likely to decrease slowly rather than continue to increase.

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MoD of Ukraine, 2016. Ukraine and Romania stand for establishment of flotilla


EU-TURKEY MIGRATION DEAL: A PYRRHIC VICTORY

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Introduction

This research paper delves into ambivalences created by the EU-Turkey refugee deal from March 2016 (also known as the EU-Turkey Statement 2016). It seeks to explore the impact of the EU-Turkey Migration deal on the EU-Turkey relationship. While the deal itself (and the preceding negotiations) was considered a significant improvement in the otherwise bumpy relationship, the aftermath of the deal proved to be a double step back for both actors. In that sense, the struggle in keeping the provisions of the deal working while attempting to re-energize accession negotiations yielded three developments. Firstly, the strengthening of President Erdoğan’s political position and a legitimization of AK Party’s (and his) discourse on Turkey’s role in the refugee crisis and the EU’s treatment of Turkey (and Muslims). Secondly, the further alienation of the EU and Turkey. Thirdly, the tension between the EU’s treatment of candidate states and its treatment of Turkey as a border state for refugees (this ultimately contributed to the second development). Therefore, this research paper will try to answer two questions. First, can we understand the Turkey-EU refugee deal as a mechanism for further securitization of refugees in Europe? Second, how can we understand the impact of the deal, and the process of securitization of migrants, on the relationship between the EU and Turkey?

After the Deal: Discourse and Othering

Even though the negotiation framework and the deal itself have been presented in the media as diplomatic victories that have a potential to restore good relations between the EU and Turkey, the subsequent failure of communication with regards to the visa liberalization regime and demonstrated inefficiencies of the relocation scheme (regardless of the fact that there was a decrease in migration flows, something used in the public discourse to legitimate the deal) have unveiled that the relationship between the two is much more unstable and that the main reason for the discursive
emphasis of the importance of the deal was to offset the heavy securitization process of refugees/migrants within both Turkey and the EU. With that in mind, this sub-chapter will discuss two main things. The first one is the debate on the concept of securitization and its application to the EU-Turkey deal. The second one is the discussion of the discursive struggle between the EU and Turkey wherein migrants were used as transactional-strategic elements to coerce each other into cooperation on issues such as the visa liberalization regime.

Securitization of Migrants in the EU-Turkey Relationship

Before delving into the EU and Turkey’s discursive struggle, we need to provide a brief overview of the securitization theory in order to contextualize our conclusions and theoretically position them within the debate on securitization. The process of securitizing migrants in the EU-Turkey relationship has been ongoing for quite some time, however, with a clear escalation in the last three years (2014-2017), due to increasing numbers of migrants crossing from Turkey to the EU. In that sense, while the relationship between the EU and Turkey became more transactional due to stalled accession negotiations, migrants have become a transactional element in a “push and pull” style discourse.

Securitization theory was developed in the 1990s by the members of the Copenhagen School, Ole Waever and Barry Buzan in particular. Waever, in Williams’ (2003), defines securitization as:

What then is security? With the help of language theory, we can regard “security” as a speech act. In this usage, security is not of interest as a sign that refers to something more real; the utterance itself is the act. By saying it, something is done (as in betting, giving a promise, naming a ship). By uttering “security” a state representative moves a development into a specific area, and thereby claims a special right to use whatever means are necessary to block it (2003, 513).

In that sense, securitization as a process analyzes speech acts and their construction of existential threats. The reasoning behind this draws inspiration from Derridean work; the idea that speech acts need to be analyzed internally, their meaning referenced to their constitution and the acts they evoke. Consequently, Waever and Buzan argue that speech acts per se constitute action and have characteristics of illocution (Williams 2003). This means that an act of securitization is based on a socially constructed
notion of security (therefore, it belongs to the theoretical paradigm of constructivism in International Relations). This has had great consequences for the study of security in International Relations because it allowed for an understanding of security as constituted by the act of speaking (which then opened more research into what underlines that act and its meaning). Securitization theory, then, focused on how the securitizing speech acts are formatted in order to be accepted by audiences and expands the notion of security (beyond merely preventing harm) to the social realm wherein security is constituted, not given. In that sense, early securitization theory is internal to the social realm as it focuses on how speech acts (illocution) create the meaning of threats for certain audiences and consequently encourage solving an issue by using extraordinary measures (e.g. EU Commission's change in Turkey Report publication date, see above).

However, with time, securitization theory was expanded and from this internal viewpoint (that is, illocution), it was merged with perlocution, context (Stritzel 2007). This externalization process contributed to extending the securitization process from speech acts to the sphere of more comprehensive social power relations (e.g. behaviours). With that in mind, Stritzel writes that by conceptualizing security merely as a speech act, we present it as a static and almost causal mechanism, contrary to the Derridean inspiration for the concept that Waever and Buzan acknowledged (Stritzel 2007, 366). By adding social dynamism to the concept, Stritzel aims to reconceptualize securitization as not only a speech act but rather as a dynamic social process of meaning-making, that is- he situates the speech act and securitizing actors within a social and linguistic context (Stritzel 2007, 366;367).

In 2015/16, Europe witnessed a migration crisis at an unprecedented level. Images of stranded migrants on Greek and Italian islands and beaches were broadcast around the world and caused grave concerns, not only for the lives of migrants (e.g. humanitarian issues) but also for the European identity. Migration came to the view as one of the foremost security issues, causing such drastic measures as the provisional closure of the Schengen borders (Austria and Hungary, for example) and instilling fears in Europe of poor Africans and Arabs settling there and fundamentally altering its social structure. If we apply the securitization theory to the construction of migrants as existential threats, we see an interesting social dynamic and perlocutionary mechanisms that have escalated in the public and political discourse on migration and security. Huysmans (2000) writes:
Migration is identified as being one of the main factors weakening national tradition and societal homogeneity. It is reified as an internal and external danger for the survival of the national community or western civilization. This discourse excludes migrants from the normal fabric of society, not just as aliens but as aliens who are dangerous to the reproduction of the social fabric (2000, 758).

Furthermore, Williams writes that through the process of securitization, reified and monolithic identities emerge that entrench the “us” vs. “them” distinction (Williams 2003, 519). While this paper deals with the securitization process mainly within the EU-Turkey deal-making framework and its subsequent influence on the relationship between the two, it must acknowledge the importance of identity concerns in the relationship. The EU (mostly Chancellor Merkel and the German Foreign Ministry) negotiated the deal against a background of an unprecedented populist surge on the continent, one that has been threatening the EU’s very existence. In the aftermath of the deal (see the next sub-chapter), the existential fears of Europe were exploited not only by populist politicians on the continent but also by the Turkish political elite in order to achieve political aims (e.g. visa liberalization regime) and a symbolical elevation of status vis-à-vis Europe. Although this has failed on a policy level (e.g. visa liberalization regime is not operational), it succeeded in its bargaining effect- Turkey was perceived as one of the holders of European security.

Huysmans writes that we cannot view securitization theory by applying it only to some actors and merely by looking at its effects (2000, 758). For this paper, we consider the constitution of securitization of migrants in high-level politics, in relation to the social context of those politics- that is, we apply a structural view of securitization. Consequently, we assume an approach to securitization that treats it not only as an illocutive element, but rather as a perlocutionary mechanism in the relationship between the EU and Turkey. Given that both the EU and Turkey have behaved in a transactional way, relative to migrants, towards each other in the relationship indicates that the process of securitization took place. The hastiness of arranging the bilateral agreement, its transactional nature, and fundamental human rights issues within it are a demonstration of the existential nature of the security concerns at the time.

**Discourse on Othering in Practice**

From the EU perspective, if we take the refugee crisis as a crisis of the
Dublin system\textsuperscript{16} and, consequently, of the nation states’ prerogative over the EU asylum policy, we can indicate that the crisis, which is not resolved, is rather heating up the nationalist discourses and thus avoiding reform (of the Dublin system) under the guise of protecting European civilization. The process of heating up nationalist discourses is relevant because it uses the concept of security as a tool for homogenizing the ruptured public space by discriminating “them” versus “us”. This process indicates the existence of a common single identity within the European nation states (and within Europe) that needs protection from other identities (e.g. refugee identity). If we take the Turkish perspective, the issue of refugees was used discursively to highlight Turkey’s “humanitarian” approach to dealing with their Muslim brethren in need, while ostracizing the EU policies by using constructs such as the “Christian Club” to legitimize their position in the political relationship with the EU. That is, by “othering” the EU, Turkey’s political elites have managed to position themselves well in the process of deal-making.

On one hand (Europe), migrants were presented as the existential threat (securitized referent subject) in the political discourse, while on the other (Turkey), the transactional nature of the relationship was accepted and legitimized by escalating the discourse of securitization (i.e. threatening to open borders and let the flood of migrants into Europe). This fits neatly with the overall theory of securitization because it indicates the wider social acceptance of migrants as existential threats on one hand, and migrants as bargaining elements in a political relationship on the other. Here, we demonstrate this discourse by presenting statements (or attitudes) from President Erdoğan after the deal was made and the EU’s response to them. It is crucial to note that there is ample data on how migrants are perceived both within the EU and Turkey, however, this paper does not dwell on these perceptions. What this paper tries to do is to present the elements of securitization through practices of the deal-making with regards to the EU-Turkey Statement and the consequent impacts of this on the EU-Turkey relationship.

\textsuperscript{16} The core principle of the Dublin Regulation is that an EU country of first entry processes the asylum seekers’ requests. This means that, under Dublin, if a migrant reaches Italy first, Italy must handle his/her claims. However, what happened in 2015/16 was that the Dublin system failed. It was visible that Italy and Greece, for example, as countries of first entry for a large majority of migrants could not process their asylum claims adequately, thus causing thousands of people to be stranded on their territories under very stressful circumstances.
The Economist reported in March 2017 that, while the political situation on the EU-Turkey level is ameliorated by the deal, the situation has gone from a state of “intolerable dysfunction” to a state of “tolerable dysfunction”, thus indicating a crisis of relations, downplayed by a downward trend in migrant arrivals (The Economist 2017).

While the EU stresses the operationality of the deal and its positive effects on the state of play when it comes to the migration crisis, it often fails to substantively address criticism from various NGOs and human rights groups. Furthermore, it fails to address the concerns of Turkish officials who complain that the provisions of the deal are not working (such as the EU-Turkey Customs Union upgrade). These frustrations, concomitant with the tense political situation in Turkey and a tightening of power of the ruling party, have caused Turkish officials (the President in particular) to vocalize their disappointment and legitimate themselves as the “good guys” in the political struggle. For example, after being denied entrance to the Netherlands earlier this year, the Turkish Foreign Minister stated that Turkey will begin evaluating the refugee deal (Herszenhorn and Barigazzi 2017). This is just one statement amongst many others from President Erdoğan that state that Turkey will block the agreement if provisions such as visa liberalization are not implemented (The Guardian 2016), or that the Kapikule border (between Bulgaria and Turkey, where 50,000 people waited to cross at one point before the deal was signed) will be open to flood Europe (the construction of “flood” is used mainly by the European media) with migrants (Mortimer 2016), or that Europe and Turkey will go “their own ways” if the deal’s provisions are not met (in reaction to weak implementations of the deal and Europe’s ambivalence towards Turkey’s membership bid) (The Irish Times 2017). Moreover, President Erdoğan resorted to statements such as that Europe is the “fascist Europe of the WWII era” and that if Turkey is “mistreated” any further, Europeans will not walk safely on their own streets (Baker 2017).

Furthermore, in a series of statements during 2015 and 2016, Turkish officials emphasized the humanitarian character of Turkey’s acceptance of more than 3 million Syrian refugees (Okyay and Zaragoza-Cristiani 2016, 53). Okyay and Zaragoza argue that by constructing itself as an open state via its “open-door policy”, Turkey managed to leverage higher financial-aid provisions in the deal (Okyay and Zaragoza-Cristiani 2016, 54). All of this indicates a certain trend in Turkish politics which treats the deal as political-diplomatic leverage that protects Turkey’s position as a candidate state and as a partner in the migration crisis. However, it is also
utilized as a source of discursive pressure on Europe, its underlying logic to exploit the securitization of migrants to achieve diplomatic and political victories (or at least some level of status quo).

The European Union, on the other hand, has been criticized not only because its security policy was outsourced to Turkey but also because as a normative power, its reputation was damaged by the frenzied negotiations and provisions of the deal. The deal was not meant as a long-term solution to the migration problem; however, it appears that it will remain a permanent short-term mechanism for dealing with migration flows. This indicates further that the EU and Turkey’s relationship will not be able to move forward without the migration crisis being intertwined with it somehow (given that provisions of the deal touch upon the Customs Union and the accession chapters, this is highly likely). Furthermore, if one looks at it discursively, the EU’s response has been indicative of its position in the deal. Like a lukewarm partner, it seems that the EU is satisfied with the operationality of the deal and it emphasizes “steady readmissions”, slow but effective activity within the deal’s framework, and a commitment to preventing irregular migration flows (EU Commission 2017). On the other hand, what these statements obviate is the possibility of retorting by applying a humanitarian discourse; if the deal is working then the EU’s foreign policy goals have been achieved (and in an exigent state such as the migration crisis, it seems expedient to deliver quickly, regardless of consequences). With that in mind, Ulviyye Aydin writes:

Above all, the refugee crisis revealed divisions in the EU’s common foreign policy. The refugee crisis also showed that, as an international actor, the EU should take an active role in world politics and security issues. Closing Europe’s doors and applying strict Schengen rules is not enough to keep the EU secure. However, the most noteworthy point regarding Europe’s refugee crisis is the absence of any long-term policy or common voice between member states (Ulviyye 2016, 118).

It must be noted that the EU is truly trying to be a more active player with regards to security issues and world politics. For example, since the migration crisis started, the EU has upgraded Frontex from the status of agency to a full-fledged coast guard (European Border and Coast Guard) thereby indicating a strong move to stop the tragic events in the Mediterranean and control its borders. However, the problem with the EU migration policy is not that the EU is not willing to solve the issue of migration, rather that its foreign policy goals are not aligned with the need
to provide for a structural change on an EU-level with regards to asylum policy. What happens now is that the EU is considering bilateral treaties with neighbouring or candidate states (e.g. Libya and Turkey) instead of amassing a strong diplomatic push for a wholesome solution and the creation of a common European asylum policy.

There is a startling dynamic between the EU and Turkey in relation to the deal. On one hand, the deal indicates a political-diplomatic window of cooperation in an otherwise frail relationship. On the other, it indicates how security threats can hasten deal-making and consequently endanger its implementation. In the next sub-chapter, we briefly overview the process of deal-making with regards to the EU-Turkey Statement on the refugee crisis.

**Push and Pull: Turkey and the EU in the Face of the Refugee Crisis**

This subchapter deals with the complex negotiation process between Turkey and the EU pertaining to the refugee crisis of 2015. In that sense, it traces the motives and positions of both (especially the EU) during the negotiations and in their aftermath, paying considerable attention to the framework of the agreement itself and its efficiency.

In James Der Derian’s and Michael Shapiro’s International/Intertextual Relations, Richard Ashley writes that without the inscription of international dangers, there would be no notion of a well-bounded domestic social identity (Ashley 1989, 305). Although Ashley’s statement must be contextualized within the metatheoretical debate on poststructuralism and its contribution to international relations, for the purposes of this paper it signifies a more practical idea, that is- the importance of perceived danger from the “other” in policy-making. In that sense, when Ashley’s statement is applied to the refugee deal between the EU and Turkey, it uncovers a layer of panic or fear within the framework of the negotiations. With that in mind, the “push and pull” started in late 2015 when the first negotiations on the deal took place. The EU, shaken by the rise in populist backlash against the seemingly uncontrollable numbers of refugees and migrants on its external borders (and within), sought quick action to control the situation. Turkey, on the other hand, encouraged by the prospect of improving its relations with the EU was quick to act and negotiate conditions for closing its borders and cutting off the migrant/refugee flows into the EU (see below).
Before the deal was struck in March 2016, there were three essential conditions agreed by Turkey and the EU. These three conditions further elucidated the dire moment during the deal-making because they positioned Turkey (an EU candidate state) as a transaction partner (and not a candidate state) in the game of a) approaching the block and b) limiting the number of refugees/migrants causing panic in Europe (and beyond it). Therefore, as Haferlach and Kurban (2017) state, the concessions that the EU made towards Turkey (such as delaying the Commission’s Report on Turkey until after November 2015) indicate that Turkey had significant leverage in the negotiations and that EU’s main goal was to strike a deal, regardless of clear human rights neglections within the deal’s framework. The three conditions agreed in the deal are as follows: a prospect of visa liberalization regime for Turkey (pending Turkey’s satisfaction of certain criteria, see below), financial aid to Turkey to help it accommodate migrants/refugees, and the opening of further accession chapters. When the deal was struck in March 2016, Turkey and the EU were seemingly on the frontier of improved cooperation and stronger relations. The enthusiasm was evinced in President Tusk’s statement that the days of irregular migration into Europe are over (Haferlach and Kurban 2017, 85). However, none of the three agreed conditions have been met, even though the deal is operational. Before we assess this unexpected development, we need to look at the basic provisions of the deal to see how it works and to elucidate further the developments after March 2016.

The basic provisions of the deal, in addition to the three conditions which were incorporated in it, are as follows: the return of all new irregular migrants from Greece to Turkey after March 20, 2016 (Haferlach and Kurban 2017, 88). A mechanism of exchange was established wherein for every Syrian resettled from Greece to Turkey, another Syrian would be resettled to the EU, and the introduction of common activities to improve humanitarian conditions inside Syria was negotiated (Haferlach and Kurban 2017, 88). In addition to this, Turkey would have to take all measures necessary to prevent irregular migrant flows (by sea or land) from Turkey to the EU, the EU would speed up the disbursement of 3 billion Euros (through the Turkey Refugee Facility fund) while reserving 3 more to support refugee efforts in Turkey by the end of 2018 (European Commission 2016). Moreover, Turkey and the EU would work together to upgrade the Customs Union and that Chapter 33 of the accession process would be opened during the Dutch Presidency of the Council of the EU (European Commission, 2016).
The recent EU Commission report (November 2017) on the operational implementation of the EU-Turkey statement outlines the numbers in readmissions between the EU and Turkey, and vice versa. In that sense, it states that around 11,390 people were resettled from Turkey to the EU from April 6th, 2016 until November 8th, 2017 (European Commission 2017). Furthermore, 1,993 people were resettled from March 21st, 2017 to November 8th, 2017 (European Commission 2017, 1;2). Given that the Greek islands have capacity to hold around 5,576 spots run by the Greek Reception and Identification Service, the number of 13,372 migrants present on the Greek islands in the summer of 2017 indicates the slow operational developments (European Commission 2017, 7). From March 2016 to January 2017, only 777 people were returned to Turkey from Greece (Tunaboylu and Alpes 2017). Furthermore, only about 623 people were resettled from Greece to Turkey in the period between March 21st, 2017 until November 2017, thus confirming slow operational developments within Greece (European Commission 2017).

However, although this information indicates the steadiness of readmissions from Turkey to the EU, we must not ignore the significant issues on the ground when it comes to refugees’ and migrants’ conditions and we must acknowledge the significant amount of work still needed to be done to respect the deal and human rights. In addition, given that the EU expected more than 6,000 relocations per month when the deal was signed, the numbers above seem to be a disappointment (Toaldo 2016).

Tunaboylu and Alpes (2017) write that people detained under the deal’s framework lack humanitarian aid and legal protection. From the Greek side, there are four main ways people can be returned to Turkey: in the case of withdrawing or not applying for asylum, when they opt for an assisted return, when their application is rejected, and when the application is found inadmissible (that is, if Turkey is the first country of asylum and is considered a safe third country, thereby indicating that migrants who arrive there can stay there) (Tunaboylu and Alpes 2017, 84). These four readmission criteria are not problematic per se; however, if we contextualize them with the Turkish legal system, major problems are created. For example, considering Turkey as a safe country for readmission is highly problematic. This is due to Turkey’s partial recognition of the Refugee Convention from 1951, its legal treatment of non-European refugees constructs them as “guests” (that is, it applies a geographic limitation on the definition, considering refugees as refugees only if they come from Europe, this being a Cold War remnant as it referred to largely communist European states) (Tunaboylu and Alpes...
2017, 84). Consequently, this limits the rights of non-European migrants within Turkey, thereby making Turkey unsafe for them. In addition to these systemic issues, many of the refugees were never given the opportunity to even apply for asylum, with their rights being breached (e.g. Frontex officers confiscating their phones) regularly and with Turkey often deporting them back to Syria, contrary to the principles of non-refoulement (Tunaboylu and Alpes 2017, 84;85). Moreover, many returnees were promised identity cards and an opportunity to be integrated into the Turkish labour system, under new laws which offer “guests” more extensive rights than before; however, many refugees were forcefully detained, their access to lawyers and further information on their situation very limited (Tunaboylu and Alpes 2017, 86). Given the deal and the state of play between the EU and Turkey when it comes to readmissions, it appears that Turkey has become a buffer state for EU migration policy since most of the refugees/migrants (over 3 million at the time of writing this article), waiting for the slow bureaucratic process to end (if their asylum is rejected, they remain in Turkey, unless they are refouled back to their country) (UNHCR 2017). With that in mind, if we consider the history of Turkey-EU cooperation on migration wherein Turkey’s biggest worry was not to become a buffer state (see Toğral 2012), it seems that the Turkish foreign policy goals in this case were effectively undermined. Consequently, we can see why President Erdoğan and other Turkish political elites used securitization of the refugee issue in the aftermath of the deal to signify that by becoming a buffer state Turkey ostensibly gained discursive leverage over the EU (please see sub-chapter “After the Deal: Discourse and Othering”).

In April 2016, not long after the deal was signed, the then-PM Davutoğlu suddenly left his post, amidst reports that he did so because President Erdoğan forced him to, due to disagreements on internal and foreign policies. In the aftermath, we could see an escalation in negative rhetoric coming from the Turkish President towards the EU, aimed at increasing the public pressure to enforce the provisions of the deal such as the visa liberalization regime. The issue with the visa liberalization regime is that EU regulations require Turkish compliance with 72 benchmarks aimed at adjusting Turkey’s laws (i.e. on terrorism) with EU regulations. However, Turkish anti-terrorism laws are very broad, encompassing even popular dissent (a result of the 1980s Constitutions’ draconian anti-terrorist provisions, often instrumentalized against Kurds) (Human Rights Watch 2016). The stringent anti-terrorism laws are not there solely for the protection of Turkish citizens but rather because of their political convenience in helping the ruling party (AKP-Justice and Development Party) to tighten
its grip on the consolidation of power. Turkish officials, such as the Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu reaffirm Turkey’s commitment to its stringent laws and, despite EU Commission’s reports on a steady improvement on the deal implementation (EU Commission 2017), aim to create public pressure by saying that Turkey will leave the deal if the bloc fails to deliver on its promises (Reuters 2017). On the other hand, the EU’s increasingly securitized treatment of refugees and migrants, evident in the increasing conflation of terms such as refugee and security (Sarıkoç 2011), indicates not only the securitization of migrants, but also that both the EU and Turkey have ostensibly entrenched positions with regard to the deal and the role migrants play in their relationship.

Relationship on Ice: Turkey and the EU after the Deal

We argued hitherto that securitization played a significant role in agreeing the provisions of the deal (the “push and pull” and the hastiness of the negotiations). This became more visible, at least in public discourse, after the deal was signed in March 2016 because it provided leverage for Turkish officials to use the construction of migrants as security threats to legitimize their hold on power and to pressure the EU into making concessions with regard to the deal’s provisions.

However, another development arose having a direct impact on Turkey’s EU accession bid, that is - transactionalism. The diffusion of the construction of migrants as a security threat is not visible only in the hastiness of the negotiations and the pressure surrounding them but also in the fact that the EU deviated from its normative and its prescriptive regulations to strike the deal. In that sense, by agreeing to open chapters of negotiation and upgrade the Customs Union with Turkey, the EU essentially established Turkey as a border state and demonstrated that it does not view its candidacy status as credible. This is also demonstrated on the EU Commission’s website report on Turkey’s candidacy for membership wherein most of the page effectively deals with the developments during the migration crisis and its effects on the road to accession (EU Commission 2016).

Given these developments, the migrant deal came at a great cost for the relationship between the EU and Turkey (albeit one which both were willing to sustain). On one hand, the deal is linked to its provisions (such as the visa liberalization regime) which are at a standstill or a slow rate of fulfilment. On the other hand, it is linked to the relationship between the two and the migration flows into Europe. In addition, the subsequent
attempted coup d’état in Turkey in July of 2016 and the authoritarian grasp of power of AKP and President Erdoğan complicate the situation even more. President Erdoğan’s increased power in Turkey gives him the necessary public support, including his attempts at leveraging migrants for political purposes. In Europe, the shaky social situation (e.g. the rise of populism and Brexit) concomitant with the securitized public discourse, due to the migration crisis and terrorist attacks (e.g. Paris in November 2015) forces EU officials to sustain damage and micro-manage the crisis by signing bilateral treaties to curb migration. Initially, the deal was hailed as a positive development as it also stipulated the opening of further chapters on the road to accession (Chapter 33 was indeed open), but this is not significant given that 14 chapters (out of 35 in total) are blocked by EU member states such as France and Cyprus and only one out of 16 opened chapters is provisionally closed. The strain in the EU and Turkey relations was also confirmed by the recent non-binding declaration of the EU Parliament to suspend accession negotiations due to breaches of human rights on the part of the Turkish government’s crackdown on alleged coup plotters and political dissenter (EU Parliament 2017).

Conclusion

This paper overviewed the relationship between the EU and Turkey with a focus on the migrant deal signed in March 2016. This paper focused on the process of securitization of refugees which underpinned both the negotiations of the deal and its aftermath. In addition, this paper argued that the securitization process was one of the reasons why the EU approached the negotiations in a state of vulnerability and consequently reneged on its normative and prescriptive principles by transactionally binding Turkey’s EU membership bid to the migration crisis. Furthermore, this is viewed against a background of poorer relations between the two in the context of authoritarian changes in Turkish politics and a weakening state of the EU’s position due to internal political processes (e.g. the issue of Brexit). The EU’s foreign and security policy, therefore, was outsourced partially to Turkey while offering to reinvigorate negotiations on accession. This paper did not posit a cause and effect relationship between securitization and these developments; it rather contextualized securitization as one of the processes constituting the relations between the EU and Turkey. Finally, the prospect of improvement in EU-Turkey relations is truly low. The developments surrounding the deal slow them down, make them more complicated, and sediment them as transactional.
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SECURITY TRIANGLE IN THE BLACK SEA REGION: TURKEY, RUSSIA, UNITED STATES

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Introduction

The Black Sea region historically has been one of the principal elements in the European and Eurasian security architecture and a crucial factor for maintaining stability on the continent. Paradoxically, this region, rich in natural resources, with its strategically important energy corridors and transport routes, has always remained an area of contested interests and overlapping spheres of influence of all major powers but, until recently, has failed to become a strategic priority for any of them.

In 2004, Asmus and Jackson (2004, 1) called the Black Sea region “the Bermuda Triangle of Western strategic studies: lying at the crossroads of European, Eurasian, and Middle Eastern security spaces, it has been largely ignored by mainstream experts on all three regions. Geographically located at the edge of each, the region has not been at the centre of any”. After more than a decade, both the EU and the US still lack a coherent and well-articulated foreign and/or security policy vis-à-vis the region, often dealing with crises in this part of the world on an ad hoc basis. At the same time, for centuries the Black Sea basin has been regarded as a “Mare Nostrum” (“our sea”) by Russia and Turkey, whose primarily vital interests include control over the strategically important Straits, preserving fragile military balance in the region and guaranteeing energy supplies through the regional pipelines.

In the early 2000s, with NATO members Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey dominating the western and southern shores, Russia in the north and the “new democracies” of Ukraine and Georgia along the north and east, the region began to take its modern shape. It has undergone further transformations with the Kremlin’s recent attempts to revise the existing balance of power (and internationally recognized borders) in the region with the 2008 Russo-Georgian war, the 2014 illegal annexation of Crimea and on-going aggression in Ukraine, military intervention in Syria in
2015 and multiple examples of waging hybrid warfare against most of its neighbouring countries. Most recently, Turkey has come up as an emerging regional power claiming its ambitions to become an influential international actor with its own regional agenda often divergent from, if not contrary to, that of the US and NATO.

This article seeks to explain the current state of the Black Sea regional security environment dominated by the complex dynamics of conflicting interests and incentives for cooperation in the US-Russia-Turkey triangle.

The Black Sea region on the geopolitical world map

Obviously, the newly emerging regional security environment involves major stakeholders both from and outside the region, far overreaching the littoral states. This complicates the very definition of the Black Sea region as such, given that the scope and the list of the countries included in the “region” have more to do with the strategic interests of the defining party rather than the actual geographical position of the defined.

Strictly speaking, from a geographical point of view, the region should be limited to the six littoral states, which have direct access to the Black Sea basin. However, as D. Triantaphyllou (2009, 227) suggests, the “correlation of geography and politics, so clearly evident in the Black Sea, requires a geopolitical approach” where the Black Sea region is defined basically by “its emphasis on security threats as a key regional coagulant”. Furthermore, due to the numerous problems in the process of nation and state-building faced by the newly independent republics after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, as well as considerable differences among them often leading to political, ethnic or even military conflicts in the region, the Black Sea countries have not been able so far to elaborate a distinct self-aware regional identity. As a result, the attention of the regional states has been directed more outside the region than on the region itself or on interaction with their neighbours. European experts underline that even “when the focus of the regional heavyweights such as Russia and Turkey have been toward the region, their objective has been traditionally how this region could potentially become part of their respective spheres of influence” (Lynch 2003, 10) rather than how to promote the spirit of regional cooperation.
This vagueness in definitions, lack of regional unity as a consolidating power in the international relations and flexibility in “shifting” regional borders depending on the changing strategic objectives have created favourable grounds for the emergence of multiple interpretations both in political science and in public discourse, thus defining the region in accordance with the geopolitical calculations of the outside actors and often disregarding the inner dynamics.

Hence, in Russian political science, which traditionally looks back to the “good old days” of the former Moscow-centred empires in search of the justification of the Kremlin’s revisionist policies today, the region has been mainly referred to as a part of the “post-Soviet space”, “post-Soviet republics” or “CIS countries” at best. Therefore, this area, sometimes amorphously called “Prichernomorye”, is primarily regarded as an integral part of the Russian “near abroad” policy or the “Western flank” in Dugin-style Eurasionist concepts. Accordingly, the current state of affairs in the region is seen as a temporary stage in transition from the dissolution of the USSR (labelled by the Russian president Putin as the “biggest tragedy of the 20th century”) and its return to Moscow’s sphere of influence, this time within one of the modern integration projects in Eurasia (i.e., Eurasian Economic Union, Collective Security Treaty Organization, etc.).

From the European perspective, the Black Sea region gets a wider geographical reading while the importance of its location on the eastern borders of the EU is assessed not only in terms of deterring growing Russian military presence in the Black Sea basin, but also as being the last “frontiers of freedom” (Asmus and Jackson 2004) exposed to Moscow’s direct ideological and informational outreach. Since sharing common European values and promoting political, economic and social development are seen as key to securing a stable regional environment in all EU regional initiatives, including the 2007 Black Sea Synergy (Delcour 2011, 129), EU policy towards the Black Sea region is generally regarded through the lenses of the common Eastern Partnership vision. According to the European Commission’s official documents, “though Armenia, Azerbaijan, Moldova and Greece are not littoral states, history, proximity and close ties make them natural regional actors” in the Black Sea region (European Commission 2007).

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17 For instance, see Черноморье-Каспий (2011); Тезисы внешней политики РФ 2017-2024 (2017).
The term “Wider Black Sea region”, mainly adopted by American scholars and think-tanks, also has a more political than geographic connotation and is closely associated with the forging of a Western and Euro-Atlantic strategy for the region (Asmus 2006; Hamilton and Mahngott 2008; Konoplyov 2013). However, unlike in the EU’s case, it is not only about the “soft war for Europe’s east” (Jackson 2006) but mainly about securing US national interests and tackling security challenges stemming from this part of the world. These can be regarded in two dimensions. The first is diversification of energy supplies and guaranteeing security of the pipelines that run through the region, which automatically brings the Caspian basin into the focus of Washington’s attention in this area. The second is countering significant security threats for the United States, which are mainly associated with the global fight on terrorism, spread of radical Islam, illegal trade in weapons and human trafficking (including terrorists and refugees) as well as the efforts to contribute to the resolution of the “frozen” and “hot” conflicts throughout the region. These considerations put the Black Sea in a “wider” context, closely connecting it to the dynamics in the Caucasus – Caspian – Iran/Afghanistan framework and even the Middle Eastern security environment.

Last, but not least, for Turkey – a country that has always played the role of the main driving force in the regional processes and initiated the first regional organization based on ideas of economic integration back in 1992 – extending the “Black Sea area” to include all BSEC member countries (six littoral states, Moldova, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Greece, Albania and later – Serbia) gave it a rare opportunity to bring all twelve countries under the umbrella of the Ankara-backed and Ankara-led multilateral regional organization. Initially, this project was supposed to demonstrate Turkey’s leadership ambitions in the region with the newly emerging republics, which had just proclaimed their independence from Moscow. However, over time, membership in this organization of different regional states involved in protracted conflicts with each other has made BSEC a unique platform bringing together Armenia and Azerbaijan, Russia and Georgia, Russia and Ukraine, Albania and Serbia etc., contributing to Turkey’s long aspired image of mediator and peace-maker. When talking about Ankara’s foreign policy priorities in the region, according to some experts, such grouping of states clearly indicates “the absence of a conception of the Black Sea region – as a single entity of littoral states – in Turkey’s foreign policy thinking and strategic planning” (Petriashvili 2015). Instead, by bringing together countries from different geographies – from the Caucasus to the Balkans – Turkey prioritizes a more inclusive approach, which allows it to claim a leading role in a much broader and complex regional architecture.
Interests of the major stakeholders

Turkey

This quest for an increased regional role has become a dominant trend in Turkey’s post-Cold War foreign policy. As a long-term NATO member and a close ally of the West in various anti-terror coalitions, Ankara has made development of alternative tracks of bilateral and regional cooperation the main goal of its “new”, “proactive” and “multilateral” foreign policy. S. Sayari (2000, 179-180) argues that Turkey’s efforts to adjust to changes in the international system brought about by the end of the Cold War have enhanced its regional importance: “developments in the 1990s, ranging from the Gulf War to Caspian energy development, have shown that Turkey … can play an important role in numerous regions as well as in trans-regional issues such as energy security and weapons proliferation”.

Since the Justice and Development Party’s (JDP) coming to power in 2002, this idea has shaped Ankara’s foreign policy vision, which presented Turkey as a “central state with multiple regional identities”. According to the then-Foreign Minister A. Davutoglu, in terms of its area of interest Turkey is a “Middle Eastern, Balkan, Central Asian, Caucasus, Caspian, Mediterranean, Gulf and Black Sea country” (Davutoglu 2009, 79). And it is this regional activism in multiple neighbouring regions that was supposed to become a major advantage in Ankara’s dialogue with its traditional Western partners, adding to its strategic value and strengthening its position in the international arena. Thus, Turkey’s efforts to revive Pan-Turkic aspirations during the early Turgut Ozal presidency or to enhance its role in the Middle East under the JDP rule, though coming from different ideological backgrounds, basically have the same pragmatic explanation: they demonstrated Ankara’s efforts to “maintain its geostrategic importance in global politics, ensure regional stability, prevent ethnic conflicts from spilling over into its territory and gain new markets to fuel its strategy of export-based economic growth” (Sayari 2000, 180).

The projection of this vision on the Black Sea basin has, to a large extent, determined Ankara’s interests in this region. Hence, the first integration initiative suggested by Turkey – BSEC, which was aimed at promoting political dialogue and economic cooperation among the member states, but has also become the first step on the way to mapping an autonomous regional system of international relations. This helped Turkey achieve several goals. Being the second largest army in NATO
and bandwagoning with the United States on the major issues of global politics (such as fighting terrorism and radical Islam), Ankara has gained significant leverage to balance the rising influence of Russia in the region. On the other hand, the “regional issues for regional countries” approach, adopted by Turkey and very much welcomed by Moscow, was called into being to prevent the “militarization” and “internationalization” of the Black Sea basin and oppose the wider presence of the NATO/US fleet and/or military bases.

As Devlen (2014, 2) put it, “Turkey’s position in the Black Sea is based on defending the status quo, and the country opposes interference by outside powers, creating a de facto Turko-Russian condominium in the Black Sea. Very strict adherence to the Montreux Convention of 1936, which regulates the passage of naval warships from the Mediterranean to the Black Sea via the Turkish Straits, forms the basis of Turkish policy”. That is why, for instance, when in 2006 Washington introduced a proposal to expand NATO’s Operation Active Endeavour from the Mediterranean into the Black Sea, Turkey and Russia jointly vetoed it. Russia declared that more active US involvement in the region might be destabilizing. Turkey claimed that the presence of NATO warships in the Black Sea might threaten the Montreux Convention. Besides, from Turkey’s point of view, it would be redundant to the Black Sea Harmony, a Turkish national operation to patrol the Black Sea basin, which was later expanded to littoral states, and to BLACKSEAFOR, another regional initiative led by Turkey. TEPAV analyst S. Koru (2017) mentioned that “with most of these initiatives, Turkey was careful to work with regional countries only… Ankara wanted to create an institutional framework that would facilitate its leadership in the region. Initiatives by its Western allies would not only undermine the regional legitimacy of this kind of diplomacy, but also overshadow Turkey’s role”.

Today, with the changing dynamics in the regional security environment, Ankara’s main interest, and main challenge, is still in maintaining this smooth balance between the two poles: “opening” the region to the growing presence of US/NATO forces or letting Moscow convert the Black Sea into a “Russian lake”.

**Russian Federation**

Moscow’s struggle for access to the warm-water seas has determined its regional agenda since the times of the Russo-Ottoman wars. With the occupation of Crimea and recent rapprochement with Ankara, this dream seems closer than ever. Today, this desire to maintain control over the
Straits remains one of the main drivers behind Russian assertive policy in the Black Sea, both in terms of strengthening its geopolitical stance in this part of the world and enabling control over the energy and transport routes that pass through the region.

In a broader context, Russia’s growing military presence and political influence in different parts of the world gives it both a chance to challenge the West in multiple ways and an additional advantage in negotiating with global leaders. Today Russia is not an expansionist state with limited, however broad they might be, territorial claims. It is a revisionist state that seeks to recast a post-Cold War world order by bringing more chaos, instability and uncertainty into it – through meddling in elections, waging extensive propaganda campaigns, creating armies of trolls and bots, marginalizing liberal forces, supporting pariah regimes, financing far-right and far-left political parties throughout Europe, backing separatist movements and fuelling multiple local conflicts.

The proclamation of this revisionist policy was explicitly pronounced in Putin’s “Munich speech” back in 2007, when he stated that the current world order was obviously unfair and that Russia would seek for a better, well-deserved place in the post-Cold War international system. He also made an interesting observation that “the basic principle of security is its interdependence and impartiality” and cited the former American President Roosevelt as saying in the first days of WWII: “When peace has been broken anywhere, the peace of all countries everywhere is in danger” (Выступление..., 2007). That has become a vivid explanation of Russian foreign policy strategy in the years to follow.

Starting with the Russo-Georgian war in 2008, the illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014 and on-going Russian aggression in Eastern Ukraine, Moscow’s subsequent intervention to back Assad’s regime, financing Kurdish nationalistic forces in Northern Iraq and Syria, and maintaining a certain level of tensions in the already existing “frozen” conflicts throughout the Black Sea region (Transnistria, Nagorno-Karabakh, Southern Ossetia, Abkhazia), Russian regional strategy has been focused on creating a series of small-scale military campaigns, later converted into protracted low-intensity conflicts, which give the Kremlin a significant leverage to influence domestic politics through local proxies. In addition, with a number of on-going conflicts throughout the region Moscow has a possibility of changing the dynamics in each of them by playing all its cards at once, bargaining the prospects of resolution in one conflict at the expense
of the others and questioning the viability of liberal democracies in the post-Soviet countries and their commitment to Euro-Atlantic values. For the Russian Federation, to “lose the Black Sea” would mean to recognize its inability to suggest a viable alternative to the Western civilizational model, which is something that Moscow cannot afford.

United States

There seems to be an overall consensus among experts that the United States have always had interests but have never had a distinct strategy in the Black Sea region. As the Director of the Black Sea Security Program at Harvard University S. Konoplyov (2013, 198) put it, “the usefulness of the US policy in the region” was proved in the aftermath of the Cold War when “NATO became one of the major instruments in Westernizing the former socialist countries”. However, it hardly went any further beyond that. Partially that was due to a desire to maintain a delicate balance in the region, regarded by a resurgent Russia as its “near abroad”. Partially it was because in the early 1990s this region was still seen as “distant abroad” by Washington itself. This approach started to gradually change in the late 1990s, when Caspian energy resources drew US attention to the Black Sea shores. Subsequently, in 1997 the “Caspian and Black Sea region” was first proclaimed an area of American national interests, mostly as an oil source alternative to the Persian Gulf.

However it was only in 2001, after the 9/11 terror attacks, that U.S. interests in the region took on a particular significance, including fighting terrorism, preventing the spread of radical Islam, guaranteeing security of energy transport routes, contributing to maritime security, preventing illegal traffic in drugs, conventional weapons and people (Cohen 2006, 1). To quote M. Celikpala (2011), “It is since then that the American policy-makers started viewing the Black Sea area not as an isolated region formed by the littoral states, but as an integral part of the much wider security environment closely connected to the Balkans, Caucasus, Caspian, Eastern Mediterranean and Middle Eastern regions”.

Today, with the growing assertiveness and military build-up of the Russian Federation in the Black Sea basin, the focus of Washington's attention in the region has apparently shifted to the military conflicts in Ukraine and Syria. The “hybrid” warfare waged by Moscow on multiple parallel tracks included meddling in the 2016 US presidential elections, the Brexit vote, Catalonia's and Northern Kurdistan's independence referenda,
to name a few. Obviously, this makes it difficult to keep the Black Sea region high on Washington’s or even NATO’s agenda.

So far, it has been mainly up to the regional states to push for an elaboration of the Euro-Atlantic strategy in the Black Sea. Dr. Shelest (2016) points out that the United States has traditionally considered Black Sea security in a wider European context, by “emphasizing and enhancing security in the Baltics and at the Eastern flank, with the sea mostly left for the individual countries’ initiatives”. This has resulted in a situation where “having three member-states in the Black Sea, it has not turned in the NATO presence in the region” in terms of an effective security architecture that could deter Russia’s aggressive moves.

Experts argue that today it might be in Washington’s best interests to develop a well-defined strategy and adequate policy towards the region in the wider framework of countering the Russian threat. This strategy should obviously deal with the consequences of Russian military aggression in the region; resolution of the conflict in Crimea and Donbas; contributing to the resolution of the “frozen” conflicts; diversification of energy supplies to decrease the dependency of the regional states on Russian gas; securing a maritime patrol to deter illegal cross-border movement of foreign fighters and illegal migrants. However, with much attention paid to the current strategic environment and immediate steps taken to mitigate the direct impact of Russian aggressive moves, any comprehensive and sustainable regional strategy has to rely on the effective mechanisms that would deter growing Russian military build-up in the Black Sea and Eastern Mediterranean. This would include strengthening NATO’s south-eastern borders (Poland, Baltic states, Bulgaria, Romania) and ensuring its presence in the Black Sea basin (i.e., creating rapid reaction forces in the Black Sea, increasing the scope of joint military exercises and drills, etc.).

**Decomposing elements of the security triangle**

**US-RF Axis**

In July 2015 the Russian Federation revised its “Maritime Doctrine to 2020” (adopted in 2001) stating the reason for changes: “NATO enlargement and incorporation of Crimea and Sevastopol into the Russian Federation” (Shelest 2016). In practical terms, this meant deterring enlargement of NATO in the Black Sea region at any expense and creating a “belt of instability” in the states regarded as potential candidates for NATO/EU
As one Ukrainian diplomat has noticed, with this Russian imperial mindset fully in play in the Black Sea region, the GUAM (Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Moldova) organization, which was initially created as a regional “Organization for Democracy and Economic Development” has ended up as a “regional club of the victims of Russian aggression”.

While the Russian-Georgian war of 2008 has signalled a new and profound shift in Moscow’s policies towards the region, it has not significantly changed the existing political and military balance in the Black Sea basin. Later developments in Ukraine were outstanding as an international legal precedent. In fact, it rendered all previous political arrangements and security memoranda null and void due to the lack of proper military force to back them. The conflict also caused an important shift in the strategic landscape of the region.

As Stephen Flank wrote in his analysis for the Atlantic Council (2016), “by invading Ukraine and annexing Crimea, Russian President Vladimir Putin has transformed the security situation in the Black Sea. Upon capturing those territories, Moscow lost no time in seizing Ukrainian energy facilities in the Black Sea and accelerating its on-going military modernization there. As a result, Moscow has built a combined arms force of land, sea, air and electronic forces that NATO leaders admit is fully capable of denying access to NATO forces seeking to enter the Black Sea during a conflict”. According to various sources, in Crimea alone Russia has deployed between 30 and 45 thousand soldiers, hundreds of battle tanks, armoured vehicles, combat aircraft and helicopters, dozens of coastal missile systems (Ukraine Mission to UN, 2016). A particular danger is presented by deployment of nuclear warhead carriers, such as warships and combat aircraft, as well as by Russia’s intentions to convert some of the Soviet-era facilities on the peninsula to nuclear weapons storage.

After occupying the Crimean peninsula and increasing military presence in Syria, Moscow has started building a similar network of air defence capabilities against NATO, both in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Caucasus. It first tested the ground in the Mediterranean by sending cargo and warships from the Black Sea to conduct maritime exercises and support its military intervention in Syria. R. Gramer (2016) adds that Russia continued to expand its military reach in the region by firing ballistic missiles into Syria from submarines in the Mediterranean and from the Caspian Sea, dispatching bombers that fly to the Mediterranean through the Strait of Gibraltar, securing its presence in the port of Tartus.
and establishing an A2/AD zone in the Mediterranean, with crucial support from the Black Sea. The recent progress in the S-400 deal with Turkey also fits into this general picture.

Against the background of these intense military activities in the Mediterranean, Russia is also making attempts to revive and increase the size and scope of its Black Sea submarine fleet. According to the statements of the RF Ministry of Defence, the Russian submarine fleet has been strengthened by the inclusion of six new diesel-electric submarines based at the port of Novorossiysk on the Russian mainland and the port of Sevastopol, Crimea. These are arguably the quietest diesel submarines in the world and nearly impossible to detect acoustically (Bender 2015). On November 7, 2017 Chief of the Russian General Staff Valery Gerasimov gave a profound speech, where he commented on the state of implementation of the 2020 Plan of the Ministry of Defence. Assigning a considerable part of his presentation to the navy’s role in nuclear deterrence, he mentioned that the new Borei-class of nuclear submarines had finally become operative, and Russia has designated 102 ballistic missiles to them in order to improve the strategic power of Russia's submarine fleet (Gerasimov 2017).

Whether this is a new strategic reality in the Black Sea basin or another contribution to Russia's (dis)information campaign in its hybrid war against the West, the tendency towards further escalation of tensions between Moscow and Washington is obvious, and unlikely to reverse itself in the foreseeable future. So far, NATO and the US have maintained a low-profile presence in the region, focusing mostly on Russian military activities in the Baltic Sea and Eastern Europe, and “wilfully ignoring” its growing military build-up in the Black Sea (Gramer 2016). To some extent, this stance can be justified by Turkey’s sensitivities and Washington's reluctance to ramp up its military presence in the Black Sea unless there is a threat of going into direct conflict with Moscow. Deeply involved in the anti-ISIS fight and political process in Syria, with a number of major high-level positions in the State Department still vacant and the Trump Administration's focus on “America First”, the Black Sea region is apparently far from being even “the second” on the strategic agenda.

However, sporadic Russian military drills in the Black and Baltic Seas, airspace violations and provocative moves on the borders of NATO allies, low-level passes of Russian jets over US and NATO ships, e.g., the 2016 incident in which a Russian Su-24 made close-range passes over the USS Donald Cook during its patrol mission in the Black Sea, have gradually
raised awareness of the far-reaching consequences of the Kremlin’s attempts to redraw the Black Sea map and the necessity to bolster NATO’s deterrence capabilities in the region. The latest Warsaw NATO Summit was marked by the first concrete attempts to come up with a specific plan of NATO activities in the Black Sea basin.

**US-TR Axis**

It would be logical to suggest that Turkey, a NATO member since 1952 and a country that hosts NATO military forces and allegedly fifty American nuclear warheads at the Incirlik airbase, would have to take the lead in strengthening the Alliance’s position in the region. However, ironically, it is the question of NATO’s de facto presence in the Black Sea basin that has traditionally remained one of the major stumbling blocks in Turkey’s relations with the US, adding tensions to the political dialogue already strained over the Middle Eastern stalemate.

While Ankara is ready to cooperate within various multilateral forces to contribute to peace and stability in the region, it strongly opposes the efforts of any other non-regional country to bring its warships to the “neutral” Black Sea. Just as was the case with the veto on expanding the NATO Operation “Active Endeavour” into the Black Sea, this tendency to “deny access” to the region for extra-regional powers became even more evident during the Russo-Georgian war of 2008. At that time, a diplomatic scandal erupted between Ankara and Washington after Turkey’s denial of passage for American ships carrying humanitarian aid to Georgia, fearing a possible militarization of the Black Sea. At the same time, on August 11, 2008, four days after the war in South Ossetia had begun, Turkey’s then-Prime Minister Recep Erdogan proposed the idea of creating the “Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform”, a regional organization bringing together five regional states, (Turkey, Russia, Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan) to work on the settlement of the conflict. Turkish then-Foreign Minister Ali Babacan explained it by saying “Caucasus countries need to develop a functional method of finding solutions to their problems from within” (Babacan 2008), instead of waiting for help to come from outside. Since 2008 Turkey’s regional policy has been defined to a considerable extent by this conception of creating “regional solutions for regional problems”, contributing to Ankara’s image of an independent security actor playing a leading role in regional processes while minimizing the military and even at times the diplomatic presence of its traditional Western partners.
Washington policy-makers seem to be well aware of Turkey's concerns about losing its dominant position in the Black Sea basin to the growing presence of the US. Back in 2006, a report of the Heritage Foundation gave a recommendation “to conduct trilateral Bulgaria – Romania – Turkey military exchanges and consultations” to assuage Ankara's fears and promote further cooperation in data exchange and joint naval operations (Cohen and Irwin 2006). However, when in 2016 the Romanian President came up with the initiative of the so-called “Black Sea Fleet” which was supposed to include Romanian, Bulgarian, Turkish and, potentially, Ukrainian navy forces in order to develop interoperability between the units and conduct joint naval exercises, the idea was criticized by Ankara for bringing unnecessary tensions to the region, provoking further escalation with Russia and replicating the already existing NATO formats of naval cooperation.

Historically, one of the major concerns for Turkey has been to prevent the Black Sea from becoming “a new focal point of global rivalry and conflict” (Celikpala 2010), and in this regard any extension of naval power beyond the existing measures is regarded by Ankara as a dangerous move to change the status quo and, thus, destabilize the region. This is especially the case if the warships were to come from the US, the country that is viewed as the number one security threat for Turkey, according to all recent opinion polls (Daily Sabah 2017).

Many experts agree that today Turkey's relations with the US have reached a historical low. The extradition of Fethullah Gulen, who is believed to be a mastermind of the failed July 15 coup attempt in Turkey; Washington's close cooperation with the Kurdish groups PYD/YPG in Syria, which Ankara considers as terrorist organizations and direct affiliates of the PKK, which has been waging its fight against the Turkish government since the 1970s; legal suits in American courts against a number of Turkish citizens starting from the President's personal bodyguards to the former Minister of Economy Zafer Caglayan and Turkish businessman Reza Zarrab, convicted of violating US and UN sanctions on trade and energy cooperation with Iran, presumably with the knowledge of President Erdoğan himself; Washington's concerns over the massive arrests and violation of human rights and freedom of speech in Turkey; Ankara's harsh rhetoric blaming the White House for not understanding its national security sensitivities, insufficient contributions to the management of humanitarian crisis with more than four million Syrian and Iraqi refugees currently staying in Turkey; last but not least, the complicated procedures of voting...
on arms sales in the American Congress and suspension of deliveries of
certain types of armaments to Turkey while providing Kurds with military
equipment just across the Turkish border are only a few examples out of the
long list of problems, which have accumulated between the two “strategic
partners” over the recent years. Undoubtedly these unresolved issues have
not only had negative impact on the state of security cooperation in the
Black Sea basin, but have also created an atmosphere of deep distrust on the
official level and caused an unprecedented rise of anti-American sentiments
in Turkish society.

On the other hand, with all its foreign policy inconsistencies
and deteriorating domestic record, Turkey remains an important partner
of the West in its fight with ISIS, both in military cooperation and in
the negotiation process on the situation in Syria, the reconstruction of
Iraq and maintenance of a fragile balance in the Middle East. After the
illegal annexation of Crimea and Russian intervention in Syria, Turkey’s
strategic role has evolved in new ways. Any operation in the Black Sea and
Mediterranean would be impossible without Ankara’s consent to naval
passage through the Straits, which makes it an important player in any
efforts to deter Moscow’s military presence in the region.

Turkey has not recognized the illegal annexation of Crimea and,
while refraining from joining sanctions against Russia, has been quite vocal
in its support for Ukraine’s territorial integrity and condemnation of human
rights violations, e.g., the persecution of Crimean Tatars by the Russian
authorities on the occupied peninsula. Ankara remains an important
political and military ally of Ukraine in the region and has always paid
attention to sustaining its cooperation with Ukraine and Georgia, both
within the NATO framework and on a bilateral level. Recent years have
witnessed a significant intensification of defence and security cooperation
between Ankara and Kyiv, obviously in a desire to counterbalance Russian
influence in the region.

In 2016, the General Staffs of the Ukrainian and Turkish Armed
Forces signed a “road map” that envisages the direction and scope of
military cooperation between the two countries until 2020, the year, which
marks the deadline for completing a wide-scale reform of the Ukrainian
Army. In fact, this document is a detailed implementation plan of practical
measures on military cooperation, aimed at strengthening bilateral ties and
obtaining Turkish support in preparing the Ukrainian Army in accordance
with NATO standards.
At the same time, Turkey continues to put special emphasis on keeping its relations with Ukraine and Russia on two separate tracks and has been cautious to prevent a negative spill-over effect from contradictions around the Crimean issue on the generally positive dynamics in its dialogue with Russia. In Turkey, good relations with Russia are seen as key to maintaining stability in the Black Sea. This is very unlikely to change even though Ankara is closely following Russia’s growing military build-up on its borders to the north and south.

**TR-RF Axis**

Unlike relations with the United States, where strategic imperatives demand a strategic partnership but end up in a long list of unresolved problems, Turkish-Russian relations reflect quite the opposite.

Turkish political scientists pay attention to this security paradox, noting that the Ottoman Empire fought against Russia twelve times between the 18th and 20th centuries. This represents the largest number of wars conducted against any foe by the Ottomans. Most of them were lost to the Russian Empire (Devlen 2014). Turkey was on the other side of the Iron Curtain during the Cold War, defending NATO’s southern flank from the Soviet threat. After the end of the Cold War it tried to improve its relations with its neighbouring countries, diminish its dependence on its traditional Western allies and back the idea that stability in the region should be the responsibility of the regional countries. This concept worked rather well in times of concerted efforts with Russia to counterbalance US/NATO influence in the region. While it often made Ankara and Moscow tactical allies, it did not do much to strengthen mutual trust or contribute to the strategic partnership in the long run.

However successful the cooperation between the two countries might have been, both historically, strategically and even psychologically, they have always remained rivals for dominance in the Black Sea, control over the Straits and, ironically, better status in their dialogue with the West. On the social level, mutual distrust is rooted in the national mentality and reflected even in Turkish proverbs. One of them, “Ayıdan post, Moskoftan dost olmaz”, can be rendered “As you can never get a good skin of a bear, you can never get a true friend of a Muscovite”. The incident with the downing of a Russian jet in November 2015 and the unprecedented anti-Turkish campaign launched in Russian state media in its aftermath has shown the lack of strategic depth in these relations and, surprisingly for many Turks,
the prevalence of anti-Turkish and Islamophobic sentiments in Russian public opinion.

The reaction of the Turkish leadership to the incident was also quite telling. President Erdoğan and then-Prime Minister Davutoğlu called for an extraordinary meeting of the North Atlantic Council to coordinate its actions and seek support from the other NATO allies. This is completely in line with “Turkey’s traditional reflex – when faced with an assertive and revanchist Russia…, to move close to the West, as it did during the 19th century and after WWII” (Devlen 2014), and as it is doing now. The whole story of the Turkish-Russian cycles of cooperation in the long history of confrontation and wars resembles more an “axis of the excluded”, rather than a full-fledged strategic alliance or at least sustainable working relations. Analysing the impact of the 2003 Iraq crisis over Turkish-American relations, Omer Taspinar and Fiona Hill (2006, 81) wrote that Turkey and Russia form an odd pairing that seem to have “America looming behind them as the unspoken object of alignment”. “As states with histories of conflict, deep structural differences and divergent views [they] seem to have come together more out of frustration with the United States than a new strategic vision of world affairs. Turkish anger at US policy in Iraq dovetails with longer-term Russian disgruntlement over America’s encroachment on Moscow’s sphere of influence”. A decade later, the same explanation is still valid for Turkey’s close rapprochement with Russia following a deep row in relations with the US over Washington’s role in Syria and its support for the Syrian Kurds.

In fact, the current state of play between Ankara and Moscow is one of the best examples of how “strategic partnerships” can evolve in the international system under transition. In 2008 Russia occupied some parts of the Georgian territories and has recognized South Ossetia and Abkhazia as independent states, even to the point of establishing “high-priority relations” with them, as mentioned in the 2016 Foreign Policy Concept Paper of the Russian Federation (Корсунский 2017). Turkey has declared its support for the territorial integrity of Georgia, reflecting its own Kurdish minority at home struggling for independence. It has also aligned with the other NATO countries, though unwillingly and with many reservations, in allowing passage through the Straits to NATO vessels. Nevertheless, Ankara distanced itself from the US and spent significant diplomatic efforts to maintain dialogue with Russia, which was also demanded by the considerable Ossetian and Abkhazian diasporas in Turkey who were putting pressure on the Turkish government to support the self-proclaimed republics.
In 2014 Russia also occupied Crimea, which (unlike the Russo-Georgian war) invoked much stronger international reaction and was immediately condemned by Turkey. The diaspora factor has played an important role both in Turkey’s domestic politics and in shaping its foreign policy approach again. Thus, Ankara sided with Ukraine in defending the rights of its kin Tatar people and even became a co-sponsor of the UN Resolutions condemning Russian actions in Crimea. Nevertheless, strong economic ties with Moscow and Turkey’s dependence on Russia in terms of trade, tourism, the construction sector and, most importantly, energy supplies prevented Turkey from joining economic sanctions against Russia, applied by the EU, Canada, US and most Western countries. This time, in an attempt to ease increasing dependence on Russia, which was already imposing its limits on Turkey’s foreign policy choices, Ankara declared diversification of energy supplies and security partners as the main priority of its policy. So, while more than 55% of Turkish gas imports had already been provided by Russia, Turkey started to “diversify” its energy routes by going into joint venture with the Russian Gazprom to build the Turkish Stream (later renamed as TurkStream) pipeline which will bring to Turkey even more additional volumes of the same Russian gas. This project is also strongly opposed by Washington as competitive to TANAP, an alternative pipeline planned for the transportation of Azeri and Caspian gas to Europe. The TurkStream is also regarded as a Russian political project to “punish” Ukraine because it will bypass its territory and leave aside all major existing energy supply routes in the new regional transport infrastructure.

With this being said, it is interesting to note that officially, Turkey has relations of “strategic partnership” with all sides of the regional conflicts: Ukraine, Russia (itself a strategic partner of Ukraine until 2014), Georgia and the US. To make things worse, Russia is a strategic partner of Armenia, which has been in a long-time territorial dispute over Nagorno-Karabakh with Azerbaijan, which is, in its turn, a strategic partner and a “kin nation” of Turkey. At the same time, Ankara, which does not have diplomatic relations with Yerevan because of the unsettled status of the 1915 events, considers the Armenian Metsamor nuclear power plant built in Soviet times in close vicinity to its borders as a major threat to its national security. In spite of this, Turkey has made a deal with Russia to build the Akkuyu NPP in a tourist area in Mersin, Turkey, on a build-own-operate model using Russian fuel, Russian technologies and, most probably, Russian operators in the command and control posts.
Needless to say, the Bashar al-Assad regime in Syria is a strategic foe of Turkey and, at the same time, strategic partner of Russia in the Middle East. The United States, which together with Turkey is fighting in Syria against the forces of the Russian-backed Assad regime, is now under attack from the Turkish government for its tactical cooperation with the Kurds in Syria. Meanwhile, Turkey has become a part of a tripartite Astana platform (as an alternative to the Geneva talks backed by the US) and has been in intense political dialogue on Syria with Iran and Russia. At the same time, Russia has provided long-term strategic support to Kurdish parties inside Turkey and has been much milder in its assessments of the independence referendum in Iraqi Kurdistan than the US and most EU countries.

Last but not least, Russia has supplied the S-300 and S-400 air defence systems to Syria to defend the Assad regime from NATO aviation (including Turkey’s aircraft, since it is a NATO member and active contributor to the anti-ISIS coalition). At the same time, according to the official statements of the Turkish and Russian Presidents, a deal on S-400 supplies to Turkey has been finalized and, once the financial part is done, the first Russian air defence systems will be located in the south-eastern regions of Turkey to defend it from Syrian aviation (most probably, equipped with Russian missiles). Atlantic Council senior fellow Adrian Karatnycky commented on this situation with a joke on his Facebook account: “Russian Federation tells the whole world that it is afraid of being surrounded by NATO forces. At the same time it sells its advanced missile systems to a NATO member. Does this mean that Putin tries to intimidate himself with his own weapons?”

Turkish experts tend to assess this situation in a much more serious manner. With more questions than answers in mind they contemplate how the isolated, non-compatible with NATO architecture Russian systems will operate in Turkey and whether they will recognize the Iskander missiles, which potentially can be launched from Russian bases in Crimea and Latakia, as friend or foe. Military experts acknowledge that in the absence of a robust network of satellites, radars, early-warning aircraft, and sensors connected with a tactical data link, the “stand-alone” S-400 systems’ functional capacity would be very limited (Egeli 2017).

In this respect, another defence analyst mentioned that “the S-400 deal is a good example of political-military affairs in context”. Militarily, Turkey indeed needs to have strategic defensive weapon systems and capabilities to mitigate its vulnerabilities vis-à-vis burgeoning missile
inventories in the immediate neighbourhood. However, there is also a political side to the deal, where "the procurement of a multibillion USD non-NATO system marks Ankara’s uneasiness with its NATO Allies due to lack of cooperative defence industrial opportunities and on-going political strains" (Kasapoglu 2017, 2).

The fact is that the Russian “bear builds a new lair in the Black Sea and the Eastern Mediterranean” (Kurtdarcan and Kayaoglu 2017) has already raised concerns among Turkish experts. As one political analyst explained, Russia’s Black Sea and Syrian “A2/AD bubbles” matter to Turkey for several reasons: “they spell an end to the relative naval superiority that Ankara had established in the Black Sea, the Aegean Sea and the Eastern Mediterranean after the Cold War”. But they also mean that Turkey will have “to redirect resources away from its ambitious build-up of force-projection platforms toward developing strategies and weapons to counter the Russian military presence”. Kurtdarcan and Kayaoglu (2017) conclude “while Russian-Turkish relations appear better in recent months, the future is uncertain – if a crisis erupts similar to the November 2015 shooting down of a Russian Su-24 by a Turkish F-16, Ankara would face fearful odds against Moscow”. The biggest problem in this case would be to find oneself locked in a small regional “cave” with a big bear inside and without traditional Western allies behind to deter its aggressive moves.

Conclusion

The Black Sea region today presents a regional projection of the global transformation processes that emerged as a result of gradual dismantling of the foundations of the post-Cold War liberal world order and Russia’s desire to revise the existing balance of power in world politics.

While the United States has lacked a clear regional vision and well-elaborated security strategy to deter the influence of the resurgent Russia and manage the new “hybrid” threats coming from the region, Russian leadership has used this lack of political will, military capacity and diplomatic unity among the Western countries to frame the region by Russian Eurasianist concepts and fill this security gap with its growing military build-up in Eastern Europe, Crimea and Syria.

Turkey holds a special place in this new geopolitical landscape – both as a NATO member involved in close military and defence cooperation with Russia, and as an influential regional actor in the Black Sea, Mediterranean
and the Middle East. While Ankara gains significant benefits from this multiregional identity, it also has considerable vulnerabilities (first of all, the unresolved Kurdish question), which limit its space for manoeuvring on the international arena and provide its foreign partners with additional leverage of influence.

In this situation, Turkey finds itself in the position of a currently smooth, but potentially very dangerous balancing between the United States and Russian Federation, throwing its weight behind one or the other. However, while tactical balancing can and even should be performed to maintain the overall stability of the system, it is important to be fully aware of the fact that a wrong move in the long-term strategic choices, which would radically shift the “centre of mass” towards one of the vertices in this security triangle, can lead to a total collapse of this whole fragile construction.

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THE EU SECURITY POLICY IMPLICATIONS IN THE SOUTH CAUCASUS AND THE REGIONAL FACTORS

KRISTINE GASPARYAN

Introduction

Multilayered cooperation between the EU and Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine is best demonstrated through the Eastern Partnership (EaP) project, thus it should be regarded as the most prominent case in the discussions over the implications of the European Union’s security policy in the South Caucasus.

Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia form a subgroup among the EaP countries, the South Caucasus, being a conjunction crossroad of world geopolitical, trade and energy interests and the analytical focus of this paper. An analytical engagement with this region makes a possible enlargement of the EU security presence from the point of view of both the South Caucasus countries and the EU visible. Nonetheless, objective and subjective factors should be taken into account, among them, the existing regional conflicts, new and old links, relations and partnerships among the three countries of the region and other regional actors.

Past and present, local and international geopolitics are represented in the South Caucasus. The three countries of the region share extremely complex relations and a mutual past. At the same time, they are surrounded by countries like Turkey, Russia and Iran, each of which has its own specific geopolitical role in the development of both external and internal political situation and security matters of the three countries of the South Caucasus. As the mentioned three countries are immediate neighbours to the South Caucasus countries, this role is sometimes different and more vividly expressed than that of other world powers affecting the situation in the region. This adds to already existing regional tensions.

The classical concept of security as “a pursuit of freedom from threats” may be tricky in nowadays reality, when projected on the existing security environment in different parts of the world. The South Caucasus
region together with the existing regional conflicts, that happen to determine most of the internal and external policies of the three countries of the region, is also enormously affected by the role that neighbouring regional actors as Iran, Russia and Turkey played in the region.

It may be possible to consider the present and possible future role of the EU as a security actor in the region with a more global view of the regional security issues, taking into account that as a complex region the South Caucasus has its past and present. This being said, in order to understand a discussion of the engagement of the three regional countries Russia, Turkey and Iran towards the South Caucasus region will be carried out together with a projection of the present situation on the theory of securitisation, in order to understand the “do's and don'ts” of any global actor, in this case the EU, that would somehow wish to deepen engagement in the region, especially in security matters.

Hence the target of this work is to answer the question whether the shifting realities in the South Caucasus region and the EU’s security policy towards the region affect the understanding of securitization, more particularly Buzan’s “pursuit of freedom from threats”, considering the role played by the immediate neighbours of the South Caucasus countries- Turkey, Russia and Iran.18

The EU and the South Caucasus

The EU has been engaged with the region of the South Caucasus since the collapse of the Soviet Union. The cooperation entered an entirely new stage through the paradigm of the EaP, as a platform of relations between the EU and the countries of the policy. Nonetheless, very soon after the launch of the EaP in 2009, such problems as different pace, interests and security motifs of the partner countries arose. This caused various problems in the individual relations of the EU with the partners, as well as questioned the well-functioning of the EaP in general.

The initial idea of placing all six EaP countries under one policy and incentivising an even closer political and economic cooperation using

18 The South Caucasus region is presented as a whole. Rather than discussing each of the three countries’ politics, the paper aims at picturing the interests, influence and role played by the three immediate regional neighbours (Turkey, Russia and Iran) in the internal and external political and security situation of the South Caucasus.
a “more for more” principle with a final goal of signing of the Association Agreements (AA) and Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreements (DCFTA) as well as visa facilitation/liberalisation agreements with all six, transformed over the time. As it turned out, for some subjective and objective reasons, there were some issues with putting the six countries under one policy. In some cases, countries like Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine would like to have a security guarantee and a perspective of a formal EU membership (Bachmann, Stadtmüller, 2012). Lack of these points resulted in questioning the EU’s representation as an “identity hegemon” (Bachmann, Stadtmüller, 2012, 15). In other cases like the one with Armenia, the country always wanted close relations with the EU, while “staying true to its policy of complementarity”19 (Zolyan, 2015).

As a result of this imbalanced policy towards the six countries, after years of negotiations resulted in unexpected consequences. Concentrating on the cases of the three South Caucasus countries, the moods were diverse in all three of them. Armenia refused to sign the AA, announcing that for strategic reasons it will be joining the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU), thus an AA and DCFTA with the EU was no longer possible. Some of the Armenian experts argue that the security aspect was one of the main drivers for this turn (Iskandaryan, 2014; Giragosian and Kostanyan, 2016). Georgia on the contrary chose a complete western presence, rejecting any signs of cooperation with Russian: an AA and DCFTA with the EU and possible NATO membership, trying to become a Western political line country. Azerbaijan chose to keep neutrality towards both the EU and the EEU and refused the AA as well as any EEU membership talks.

These events of 2013 were said to have been caused by various reasons, both objective and subjective. Among these the reluctance from the EU to calculate the Soviet past of the EaP countries, its consequences and influence on the present way of life and mentality of the population from those countries. Russian influence not surprisingly persisted in most of these countries. Most importantly through the information space and the fact of populations mastering Russian language. This was backed by the main TV channels broadcast throughout the CIS space, the and similar and more specifically in Georgia the strong role of the Orthodox Church dominant even in political decision-making (Kobzovap, 2017, 78).

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19 Complementarity is a term used to describe Armenia’s balancing foreign policy between Russia and the West.
The whole concept of the ever closer relations of the EU with the EaP countries started as “we [the EU member states] will support these countries in implementing association agreements, including DCFTAs and we will also think creatively about deepening tailor-made partnerships further” (EEAS, 2016, 25), thus taking the fact of the agreements are already given reality, whilst they were still to be achieved. Nonetheless, the path towards these agreements was even harder taking into account the struggles of these countries.

After new rounds of negotiations with the countries, the EaP is back on track with a different approach. New agreements have been designed to fit the needs of the countries. In the case of Armenia, a new Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership Agreement document has been successfully negotiated in February 2017. The signing of this document, which was initialed, is based on the Association Agreement, and is scheduled for the November 2017 EaP summit in Brussels. Thus, the attempts for a multi-vector foreign policy by Armenia are still in place. The Armenia-EU case is unprecedented because the text of the agreement was made public days before the signing was foreseen (Armenian weekly, 2017). With this the idea of transparency, flexibility and meeting mutual interests was once again underlined. The agreement was signed by the sides during the 2017 November EaP Summit in Brussels (Gasparyan, 2017).

In case of Azerbaijan, negotiations over a new document, which would “offer a renewed basis for political dialogue and mutually beneficial cooperation between the EU and Azerbaijan” (EEAS, 2017) are scheduled to end before the EaP summit in Brussels, despite the existing issues, such as the political system and oppression of the opposition in the country, the Nagorno-Karabakh issue and adoption of laws and measures in business and economic spheres (Commonspace, 2017). The EC Report on EU-Azerbaijan relations in the framework of the revised ENP mentions the “EU’s Strategic Energy Partnership with Azerbaijan to improve energy security and the diversification of energy supplies by means of the ongoing implementation of the Southern Gas Corridor” (European Commission, 2017, 2), which is a major point of political leverage in the EU-Azerbaijan relations.

Both Armenia and Azerbaijan are eager to start the Visa liberalisation dialogues, which would be a considerable step forward in bilateral relations with the EU.
When talking about the EU security involvement in the region there are several dimensions and different authors name them differently, such as interposition (conflict management and mediation policies), imposition (norms, regimes, practices diffusion), axis (energy security) (Ditrych, 2011, 8). The existing regional conflicts comprise a cornerstone of all the mentioned policies or their possible existence, as well as of all the deals concluded in the South Caucasus. Russian-Georgian conflict over the regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia and the conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia over the Nagorno-Karabakh, are the main security derivatives. The new EU Global Strategy (EUGS) document of 2016 still leaves the South Caucasus states alone with their fears and expectations, but also gives room for a flexible interpretation and leverage. In the few words dedicated to the countries of the region the Global Strategy of the Union, states “the recommitment of countries of the Eastern Partnership and southern Mediterranean for stronger relations with the Union and “promises” to support the mentioned countries in implementing association agreements, including DCFTAs” (EEAS, 2016, 25). Here the role of deepening tailor-made partnerships is stressed out, referring to countries under the policy that refused the AAs and DCFTAs.

The Strategy also touches upon the issue of conflicts in the EaP region: “We [the EU member states] will invest in prevention, resolution and stabilisation, and European Union Global Strategy avoid premature disengagement when a new crisis erupts elsewhere. The EU will therefore engage further in the resolution of protracted conflicts in the Eastern Partnership countries.” (EEAS, 2016, 29).

In the aftermath of issues that arose around the Eastern Partnership policy in recent years, more specifically the refusal of Armenia to sign the AA, the Ukraine crisis and Azerbaijan’s refusal from the AAs at all, the new Global Strategy was expected with anticipation of giving answers to the questions regarding the future of relations with this countries, as EU’s neighbours, more specifically the South Caucasus countries. While not all of the questions were answered, the EU Global Strategy leaves room for interpretation, thus, also leaving a possibility for a flexible approach.

The discussion of EU’s security involvement in the South Caucasus is mainly about “‘civilian’, ‘normative’ or ‘soft power approach’” (Delcour, 2011, 10), which is said to ‘involve fundamental choices about the EU’s international identity’ (Smith, 2000, 11–28). According to Manners, the notion is interpreted “as being the centrality of economic power to achieve
national goals; the primacy of diplomatic co-operation to solve international problems; and the willingness to use legally-binding supranational institutions to achieve international progress” (Manners, 2002, 237). Through the years of engagement with the South Caucasus, the EU concentrated on the values and norms, which are diffused by the method of “contagion” (Manners, 2002, 235–58). In other words the EU enforced soft power tools, thus strengthening its position as a civilian or normative regional actor.

According to the EU ISS review under the scope of the European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI) the EaP countries cooperation scope fell under the following portrayal: “Bilateral, multi-country and cross-border cooperation programmes, covering inter alia human rights, good governance and the rule of law, institutional cooperation and capacity development, support to civil society actors and their role in reform processes and democratic transitions, sustainable and inclusive economic development, development of social sectors, in particular for the youth, trade and private-sector development, agriculture and rural development, sustainable management of natural resources, the energy sector, transport and infrastructure, education and skills development, mobility and migration management, confidence-building and other measures contributing to the prevention and settlement of conflicts” (EUISS, 2017, 57). The EU stressed the priority areas for implication of the EU’s policy in a detailed way. While for the mentioned countries, no matter how attractive this seemed, turned out to be quite dense: the countries having started an independent life only a quarter century ago, still having resolution of conflicts as their main priority, putting strategic and vital interests aside and opting for the path towards a democratic future with universal values.

The farthest the EU went, in some cases, like Georgia, was an EU monitoring mission (EUMM Georgia) under the CSDP missions and operations has been on place with a mandate ending in December 2018 (EUISS, 2017, 25). Deployment of the mission is to date the EU’s main visible military presence as a security actor in the South Caucasus.

After the conflicts sparked out in Georgia in 2008, the EU appointed an EU Special Representative for the South Caucasus and the crisis in Georgia (EUSR), which “promotes the EU’s policies and interests in certain regions and countries as well as issues of particular concern or interest for the EU” (Consilium, 2017).
Regional actors and their involvement in the region

The South Caucasus being a junction of interests of different parties remains fragile due to its unstable security situation. Interests of different global actors clash, which makes a common social or economic space in the foreseeable future unlikely. Thus, an essential role in understanding the security involvement of EU in the South Caucasus is played by consideration of neighbouring actors as Russia, Turkey and Iran and their influence in the region.

Russia and the historic partnership

The unquestioned involvement of Russia in security issues of the South Caucasus is a heritage of the Soviet times past. It is important to mention that this involvement strengthened in the light of the 2008 Russia-Georgia war and a stronger military establishment of Russia in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. This was also the time when Georgia voiced its NATO aspirations (Zguladze and Recean, 2017, 89) and got an informal rejection from the Alliance (Dempsey, 2015).

Thus, one of the biggest internal and external issues for the three states of the South Caucasus is the “mutually-exclusive strategic interests of the regional states on the one hand and the complete interdependence of their security systems” on the other (Novikova and Sargsyan, 2013, 9). This makes it impossible for progress to come in and establishes favourable conditions for stagnation of social, economic and political layers.

Because of, or despite, the Soviet past, the presence of Russia is still strong in the region. On the one hand, the 2008 war with Georgia eliminated any sign of possible partnership with Russia, at least in the mindset of the Georgians, to some extent treating the Russians as enemies and occupants, at least in the first years after the war. Although this is still the case, recently a greater cooperation with Russia rather than the EU is on the rise in Moldova and Georgia (Kobzova, 2017, 79).

On the other hand, there is the existing strong military cooperation with Armenia and the indispensable link between the Armenian security system and Russia.

The Armenian National Security Strategy states that “the traditional friendly links between the two nations, the level of trade and
economic relations, Russia’s role in the Nagorno-Karabakh mediation effort, as well as the presence of a significant Armenian community in Russia” (RA NSS, 2007, 13) are the main drivers of this partnership. The country’s strong energy dependence on Russia (RA NSS, 2007, 4) and the existing bilateral and multilateral treaties, that “serve as the main pillars of the Armenian security system” (RA NSS, 2007, 14) add up to the above said.

Such involvement of Russia in the regional security to some extent restrains the involvement of any other party or security actor.

Bringing up of a new union in the face of the Eurasian Economic Union was another card played by Russia towards the South Caucasus states and the global players in general. A political tool for restoration of “its sphere of influence” (Giragosian, 2017) is as well a security tool.

At the same time, Russia is involved in the resolution negotiations of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict as a co-chair of Organization for Security and Cooperation (OSCE) Minsk Group, together with France and the US. Thus, the issue between the EU and Russia is about “sharing” the shared neighbourhoods.

Iran and the South Caucasus

“Any military action against Iran also will directly affect the security systems of all state entities in the South Caucasus, especially those of Azerbaijan and Armenia” (Novikova and Sargsyan, 2013, 10). This said, Iran plays a significant role in the security policy of the South Caucasus.

Iran holds a neutral position towards the conflicts of the region. Having an interest in good relations with both Armenia and Azerbaijan, it does not interfere in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict resolution, having had several attempts to become a mediator back in 1992 and “which is equally important the regions around Nagorno-Karabakh remaining under Armenian control are a buffer zone between the Turkish-speaking regions of Iran and Azerbaijan” (Minasyan, 2012, 79). Officially, Tehran is equally neutral towards the conflicts in Georgia, although some authors argue that the country “does enjoy closer relations with Armenia than with any of its other neighbours” (Nixey, 2010, 137).

20 Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance and the Declaration on the Collaboration towards the 21st Century, a bilateral agreement on defense cooperation, including within the framework of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO).
What Iran is actually interested in the region is energy sources. Apart from the Iran-Armenia gas pipeline, “Armenia-Iran railway construction, a new transmission line between the two, the hydroelectric power plant and facilities on their border as well as a pipeline for transporting Iranian oil and other petroleum products to Armenia” (Minasyan, 2012, 80) comprise a big layer of bilateral cooperation with Armenia. All this gives Iran a considerable leverage in the region.

At the same time, the successful outcome of the Iran nuclear deal fostered the increase of the country’s role in world geopolitics, as well as intensification of its role in the region.

*Turkey as an influential regional security actor*

Turkey’s interests in the South Caucasus have been muted during the years of the Soviet Union and awakened in the first years of post-Soviet independence and the Karabakh war. Nowadays Turkey’s main ally in the region in Azerbaijan. Strong ties persist also with Georgia.

As a strategic partner for Azerbaijan, Turkey backed the country during the war and closed the border with Armenia, which turned out to be a closed border for Armenia-NATO. This still unresolved question adds hardships to any kind of NATO involvement in the South Caucasus.

Turkey carries the role of NATO representative country in the region - a strong leverage in the security issues of the region, while the three countries of the region have different links with NATO. Georgia has been seeking NATO membership for years now. Armenia being a CSTO member country, still seeks deeper cooperation with the block. Despite the frequent visits from NATO high-ranking officials to Armenia and the existing cooperation between the two sides, which is also being renewed from time to time (the fifth Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP) agreement) (NATO 2017) any possible further developments for Armenia-NATO relations are not visible. In case of Azerbaijan, Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP) as well as contribution to NATO-led operations is in place (NATO 2017) with NATO and the country has a strategic partnership with Turkey.
Securitisation and the South Caucasus

As we discussed the above 3 countries as neighbouring regional actors, they all have their own say and their specific involvement in the security policy of the three South Caucasus countries. The role of each of these actors is projected on the outcome and the shift in the security reality of the region. From the theoretical point of view the situation in the South Caucasus, the inner fights of the three countries in the region and the external factors affecting it, comprise a classical understanding of the theory of securitization by the Copenhagen school. However, it is important to note that for the Copenhagen School, “security should be seen as a negative, as a failure to deal with issues of normal politics” (Wæver, 1995, 29.)

Through the discussion of the previous chapters of the paper, it is obvious that security in the South Caucasus is a battlefield boiling pot of different interests. Both regional and non-regional actors are trying to have their say in the security policy of the region, especially considering the existing complex security situation in the region. It could be reminiscent of Buzan’s characteristic of “a set of units whose major processes of securitization and desecuritization both are so interlinked that their security problems cannot reasonably be analyzed or resolved apart from one another” (Buzan, Waever 2003, 44). The region of South Caucasus could fall under this definition, if only it was not as divided as it is now.

In reflection of the interpretation of the theory of securitisation in the South Caucasus today we will firstly discuss a securitisation theory classic Buzan with the concept of security as “a pursuit of freedom from threats” (Buzan, 1991, 432-433) and secondly Waever’s idea of security as “a speech of act” (Wæver, 2011, 465–480).

The EU is a major international security player and yet not a strong enough security actor for the neighbouring countries. “In the post-Cold War era after widening of the concept of security was changed to encompass non-military threats and skip border concepts” (Buzan and Hansen, 2009, 103) and with the formation of European communities in the post Second World War era in the first place (Bremberg, 2015, 674–692).

21 Copenhagen School of security studies describes a security issue as something posing an existential threat that needs to be dealt with immediately and with extraordinary measures. The main thought of the school is about survival. Among the theorists of the school were Barry Buzan, Ole Waever, Jaap de Wilde.
Regions like the South Caucasus somehow break the nowadays Western understanding that “non-military threats such as terrorist attacks and transboundary risks like natural and man-made disasters might be construed as threats to a security community, and might even be considered to be among the prime threats provided that inter-state wars are perceived to be declining” (Bremberg, 2015, 679). Thus, the concept of security is more than ever subjective.

The involvement and strong interests of other major players as Iran, Russia, Turkey witnessed in the region of the South Caucasus changes the security environment as well as the concept of security. Here we are witnessing arms race, conflicts that stay active despite ceasefires, short-term wars and shifting understanding of security. Thus, while the concept of security is understood subjectively in each countries of the region, the concept of security proposed by Buzan is more than ever relevant for the South Caucasus region. This understanding differs drastically from the paradigm of the security in the EU, where the prevalence of peace transforms the understanding of security threats to other dimensions. At the same time, the idea brought up by Waever in 1995 is valuable in regard to the security in the region. ‘I discuss security as a speech act’ he writes and argues that nothing is a security issue by itself, but only “when the elites declare it to be so” (Waever, 1998, 6). In the present realities of security being “controlled” by the heads of states and governments, other regional factors and external treats, the idea of security shifts from the existing threats to the ones “labeled as threats”.

In the South Caucasus, as we already discussed in the practical part “the security as the absence of threats” is relevant, which forms the basis for decisions of some countries in respect to political decisions. “The labeling something as a threat” persists in the relations between the authorities and the population. Societies, where the issue of security and maintenance of peace is an everyday matter, are easily manipulated by the authorities. As discussed above this kind of issues bring to unhealthy social conditions.

**Conclusion**

To conclude, the security is a complex issue in the South Caucasus region, as the region itself is. The understanding of security is subjective and is affected by the existing regional conflicts and by the security policies and involvement of regional players as Turkey, Iran and Russia. These actors are involved in and affect the security of each of the three regional countries.
differently. Being strategically close to Armenia, Russia has a conflict with Georgia and partners with Azerbaijan. A strategic partnership between Turkey and Azerbaijan resulted in a closed Turkish-Armenian border. And lastly, Iran keeps a neutral position, mostly acting upon its personal interest. Thus, the EU’s security implications in the region are yet to be enriched. With a consideration of these factors it will be successful, also having in mind the desire from the countries to be more engaged with the EU. The reviewed Global Security Strategy gives not much hope but some answers: a step forward is the statement of the idea of tailor-made partnerships. It leaves space for flexibility.

All this political situation adds up to a classical disposal of struggle and fight for survival, in other words the classical description of Copenhagen school of thought and Barry Buzan’s “pursuit of freedom from threats” as the driving force in the region. Sources of motivation for the three countries in the region, that are so extremely different from each other, are the national interests and the interests of other regional actors involved in the security of the region. At the same time, the interests of actors involved, are tools of manipulation of the societies with fragile security issues. In similar societies the theory of securitisation and more specifically Waever’s approach defines this with the idea of “a labeled threat”. The labeling of security will persist, as long as the vital need for security persists in the region.

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WAR OF HYBRID TYPE “MADE IN RUSSIA” (THE EXAMPLE OF AGGRESSION AGAINST UKRAINE)

MYKHAILO GONCHAR AND ANDRII CHUBYK

An aggression of hybrid type (abridged - hybression) is a complex of diverse influences on an enemy of regulated magnitude and combined character, which are used according to a variant algorithm, where military means are not dominant, their application is carefully masked and denied, and the act of aggression generates uncertainty that complicate its identification.

The deep essence of hybrid warfare is multidimensional directed polydestruction, that is destruction of one state by the other state with the integrated combined use of capabilities and means of military and non-military character in various dimensions (political, economic, military, humanitarian, etc.), but concentrated on a goal to destroy an enemy not only in military theatres, but rather by blasting its life potentials at certain activities through initiating a process of its self-destruction. In fact, this kind of technology is “cracking” (breakage) of the country when “cracking” is launched and implemented both internally and externally in order to obtain the resonance effect of destruction.

A hybrid war does not start with an act of open armed invasion, but an aggressor’s actions inside a victim state, aimed at its internal self-destruction. External influences are used as auxiliary. With the help of propaganda, this is disguised by an aggressor under a civil conflict in a country that has become an object of aggression. The strategic goal of informational propaganda advocacy is the generation of uncertainties. This allows misleading public opinion to impose profitable interpretations of what is happening as a continuation of a deep internal conflict (civil war). The external world and many citizens in a victim state, which are under the influence of hostile propaganda, perceive this interpretation. A vivid example is usage of the terms “Ukrainian crisis” and “conflict in Ukraine” instead of “Russian aggression” by international institutions and governments of the leading countries of the world.
Phasing of the hybrid war of the Russian model

Considered features of a hybrid war, one should consider certain phasing of its preparation, conduction and completion. Using the example of the Russian aggression of a hybrid type against Ukraine, it can be schematically illustrated as a sequence of energy transits 00 - 01 - 02.


2. Hybrid aggression:

01.1. Proxy phase: from August 14, 2013 to February 20, 2014 (Blockade of Ukrainian exports to the Russian Federation).

01.2. Diffuse intrusion of the Russian Armed Forces to the AR of Crimea and the East of Ukraine: from February 20 to April 12, 2014 (from the appearance of the “green men” in Crimea to the seizure of administrative buildings (offices of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and SBU) in Donbas by paramilitary groups – occupation of Slavyansk by the Girkin group).

01.3. Military phase: from April 12, 2014 to February 18, 2015 (Debaltseve).

01.3.1. Latent infiltration: from April 12 to July 11, 2014 (start of shooting the Ukrainian territory by MLRS (Multiple Launch Rocket System) from the Russian side).

01.3.2. Controlled escalation: from July 11, 2014 to February 18, 2015 (Ilovaisk, Minsk-1, Debaltseve, Minsk-2).

01.3.3. Controlled de-escalation: since February 18, 2015.

01.4. Intra phase (a combination of low-intensity fighting actions on the front with provoking political and economic destabilization of the enemy from the inside by proxy): post-Minsk-2.

01.5. Occupation under the guise of a “peace-making operation” or an annexation of the territory with the aim of “preventing a humanitarian catastrophe.”

3. Controlled transformation of the occupied territory
Crypto enforcement (hidden compulsion, implicit coercion - from the Greek κρυπτός and English enforcement) is a separate stage of unfriendly, implicit actions, which is not perceived as aggression. It is a phase that precedes hybrid aggression but is not a stage of the hybrid war. Crypto enforcement is a form of hidden, systematic and long-term exhaustion of the vital potentials of an enemy that lasts until the time when a decision on aggression of a classic or hybrid type is made. The mechanisms of designing and managing crypto enforcement are false-target programming, memetic weapons and the creation of external control circuits.

In its turn, the proxy phase is a part of the hybrid war. It is a peculiar culmination of non-military efforts preceding the phase of a hybrid invasion. The proxy phase, as a rule, is short-lived (several months) and a transition from crypto enforcement to hybrid-type aggression. This is a stage of intensive use of the non-military forces and means available to an aggressor against a victim state in order to obtain a cumulative effect of its defeat due to dysfunction of a state apparatus and collapse of the economy. If the proxy phase failed, then there is a phase of diffuse intrusion - aggression from the inside through the creation of seemingly independent pseudo-state actors, fuelled externally by an aggressor state. This and the next military phase are the main stages of the hybrid war. They should be fairly rapid (Blitzkrieg) if a conflicting potential of a victim state is well “warmed up” during the proxy phase, and before that, a victim was dismissed at the crypto enforcement phase. Russia’s Crimean campaign is a textbook example of success of such a hybrid war at the stage of diffuse intrusion. In its turn, the Novorossiya project is an example of a collapse when the Crimean campaign was automatically imposed on regions whose characteristics were different from Crimea. The diffuse intrusion is the next phase of the hybrid war with a limited use of a military component. A diffuse intrusion simultaneously generates and is accompanied by the emergence of internal centres of tension and conflicts, prepared in advance by agents’ efforts, as well as the emergence of separatist groups at the public level, formation of their detachments of “self-defence,” “people’s militia” under the covert guidance of specialists who have arrived from abroad: “tourists,” “volunteers,” “holiday-makers.”

If the diffuse intrusion and the use of the military component were not successful, then the “switching of phases” could take place. This happens in the case of collapse of the Blitzkrieg scenario. Actually, this happened in the East of Ukraine. The intra phase of the war is activated with parallel restoration of the proxy phase. In parallel, a certain peace process
is being launched or agreed upon, in which an aggressor positions itself as a third party, which does not participate in a “civil conflict” - between government forces and “people's militia”. In the case of Ukraine, this is the Minsk process, where Russia plays the role of an international mediator, constantly striving to persuade Ukraine to engage in direct dialogue with pseudo-state formations guided from Moscow. At this time, the military component is minimized, and non-military mechanisms are maximized for the destruction of the victim state both from outside and from inside. The main goal of the intra phase of the hybrid war is to open an internal front of destabilization. It must confirm the basic postulate on the existence of a civil conflict in a state that was launched by the aggressor's propaganda at the stage of diffuse intrusion.

The top of the art of hybrid war is to launch a mechanism of self-destruction of a state from inside, by using massive propaganda from outside and agents of influence and subversion from inside. In this case, nutritional energy has both an existing conflictogenic potential and an additionally created potential during hybression.

The Minsk agreements of dubious legal nature enabled Russia to launch the intra phase focused on both strengthening an internal conflict in Ukraine, because of Kiev’s mistakes and Moscow-led destabilization measures, and a creative approach during the events. The creative approach in the Ukrainian case is marked not only by the “Minsk agreements”. By using them, the aggressor tries to put into effect a probable algorithm: the “territorial integrity” of Ukraine (without Crimea) with its federalization. At the end of 2016 and at the beginning of 2017, attempts to throw in Ukraine and the U.S ideas of a “compromise settlement” of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict in order to end the war through the agents of influence were made. The essence of such ideas was recognition of the de facto Russian status of the Crimea, with the return of the toxic occupied districts of the Donetsk and Lugansk regions to Ukraine with guarantees of a special status to them that would ensure their legalization in the legal field of Ukraine. Extraordinary parliamentary elections, in which pro-Russian forces, according to the plan, would receive at least a “golden share,” for pushing a pro-Russian candidate to the position of head of government with subsequent cuts of powers of the head of state and revision of foreign policy with reorientation to Russia. As a result, Ukraine with a truncated territory (without Crimea) should be transformed into a formation like the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic 2.0 as it was before 1954. The destruction of the electronic correspondence of Vladislav Surkov by the Ukrainian “Cyber Alliance” in October 2016
and the documents received by the international intelligence community “InformNapalm” showed the high activity of the Russian structures in the development and organization of measures to destabilize the situation in the East of Ukraine, in particular, in Kharkiv (Kuznetsov and Burko 2016).

If such an algorithm fails, a parallel scenario within the framework of the intra phase is envisaged. This was the deployment of a contingent of the regular Armed Forces under the guise of a peacekeeping force (if the conceptual approach to continue the hybrid war remains). As in a victim state, according to the propaganda version of an aggressor state, an internal conflict continues and needs to be resolved, taking into account the duration of international decision-making procedures, the initiator of a “peacekeeping operation” may act more promptly for the sake of quick “achievement of peace”.

The final stage is the stabilization-transformation phase. This is a transitional stage when the goals of hybrid aggression have been achieved, and problems of the final stabilization of the situation in the occupied territory and its transformation into the most optimal form of existence within an occupying state in the form of a satellite territory or several territories with different status are being solved.

**False-target programming, memetic weapons, crypto enforcement**

The term “organizational weapons” (orgweapons) was used in the Soviet times by developers of organizational management Spartak Nikanorov and later Sergei Solntsev, but they were not its authors. They were engaged in practical research on the “organization of organizations,” “control over management systems”, “genetic design” of management systems in both the Soviet period and post-Soviet Russia. The essence of “organizational weapons” is the use of “systems of organizational (coordinated according to goals, place and time, intelligence, propaganda, psychological, informational, etc.) impact on an enemy, which force it to move in the desired direction to the other side line (Ovchinskiy and Sundiev, n.d. a).”

In one of the reports of the pro-Putin Izborsk Club, it is noted: “By using it, a policy of an enemy can be directed to a strategic deadlock, its economy can be exhausted by ineffective (weighty) programmes, the development of weapons can be slowed down, national fundamentals can be distorted, and a “fifth column” among part of population can be created. As a result, there is an environment of internal political, economic, and psychological chaos in the state (Ovchinskiy and Sundiev, n.d. b).”
For a long period of time, the works of S. Nikanorov and S. Solntsev for the Ministry of Defence and the General Staff of the Russian Federation have been considered the cornerstone of Russian conceptual approaches to understanding and developing a war of hybrid type, and especially the stage of crypto enforcement. The above-mentioned report of the Izborsk Club contains a comprehensive description of organizational weapons:

“In fact, organizational weapons are a way of activating a pathological system within a functional system of a target state, in which a pathological system absorbs resources of a target state for its own development. A characteristic feature of a pathological system (use of organizational weapons) is its influence on a functional system of society, in the first place, ‘from outside’, from the hierarchical ‘higher’ (power) level of the system organization. In addition, the use of organizational weapons is not always ‘visible’ for traditional forms of scientific observation and ‘incomprehensible’ within the traditional logic of everyday knowledge. Destruction, as an action of the organizational weapons, is aimed at achieving results that are in the ‘system of values’ of an initiator of the use of these weapons. One of the basic conditions for the use of organizational weapons is the replacement of the core values system of a target country with the values of an initiating country as the most promising.”

That is, the pathology which is unobtrusively introduced into the state body of a victim state by an aggressor state, disabling its immune system (national security system) and reprogramming its functioning under the algorithm when it does not identify a threat to the life of the organism and does not counter it.

Considering the above-mentioned points, the “orgweapons” can be given another name, which more adequately reflects its deep essence - false-target programming (FTP). An aggressor creates in advance and sets wrong programmed installations in its relations with a victim, the implementation of which leads to strengthening its positions and weakening then enemy’s positions. The enemy (future victim) does not perceive these programmed installations as dangerous for itself, because they look neutral or based on universal values.

An example of false-purpose programming of the international community is its misinformation about the “absence of Russian armed forces in Ukraine” (they are not there), “a civil war in Ukraine”, “protection of Russian people in Crimea from the Kiev junta”. This has been done
extremely unsuccessfully and controversially. In particular, on March 4, 2014 at a press conference, V. Putin refused to admit that Russian troops were involved in blocking objects of the Ukrainian Armed Forces in Crimea: “There were local self-defence forces (RIA Novosti 2014).” But in the next month, on April 17, after the so-called “Crimean referendum”, he refuted his words. During the “straight line”, while answering the question about “polite men” in Crimea, Putin then said: “Our servicemen stood behind the forces of self-defence in Crimea (VESTI.RU 2014).” Additionally, on October 24, 2014, while speaking at the meeting of the Valdai International Discussion Club, Putin stated quite otherwise: “Seeing how events unfolded, people in Crimea almost immediately took up arms and asked us to help them take those measures that they intended to carry out. I do not hide, we used our Armed Forces to block the Ukrainian military units stationed in Crimea... (Gazeta.Ru 2014).” And finally, on December 4, 2014, the Russian President played his cards in the annual “Address of the President to the Federal Assembly”: “Our people live in Crimea, and the territory itself is strategically important, because it is there where the spiritual spring of the formation of the multifaceted but monolithic Russian nation and the centralized Russian state is. It’s exactly here, in Crimea, in ancient Chersonese, or in Korsun, as the Rus’ chroniclers called it, Prince Volodymyr took the christening, and then he baptized all Rus’ <...> Crimea, ancient Korsun, Chersonese, Sevastopol have a huge civilization and sacred significance for Russia...( RF Presidential Executive Office 2014).”

Despite the obvious controversy in Putin’s statements at different times and the available data from Western media and intelligence services on the participation of the Russian Armed Forces in military operations on the territory of Ukraine, in the fourth year of Russian aggression against Ukraine there is still a large stratum of Western politicians who doubt that it exists. Under the influence of Russian propaganda and its own ignorance this stratum tends to think of a civil war in Ukraine, although it understands that Russia is anyhow present there, but it is said to be natural, because they are neighbours and there are a lot of Russians in Ukraine, especially in the East. A similar logic also signifies success of the false-target programming, contrary to the available evidence of the Russian invasion into Ukraine and waging the war against Ukraine in the Donbas by Russian regular and irregular forces.
Russian hybression against Ukraine. The authorship of the Russian version of hybrid war

Hybrid aggression (hybression) of the Russian Federation against Ukraine will be inextricably tied to the name of the Russian President in the archives of history. It is quite appropriate to define it as “Putin's hybression.”

Putin can be considered as a prime instigator of hybression. Some features of his public behaviour point to the dominance of “the force elements” in his character as a compensator of inferiority. It is worth noting his partiality to martial arts, including Sambo and Judo, which indicates a certain psychological inclination.

Vladimir Putin did not stand out among his peers with outstanding physical conditions and his children's absorption in Sambo and Judo in the environment of the criminalized Leningrad streets of the Soviet period and under the direction of the original coach “uncle Lyonia” (Putinism (blog) 2015a) left an imprint on his personality. In fact, you can build the logical chain from childhood to adulthood, in which the approaches inspired by his own understanding of the Sambo style – “aggression as self-defence,” “war without weapons” - and of Judo - “ease into confidence” with the following “throw” - were formed. Extrapolating Putin's sporting principles from the level of interpersonal to international relations, we can conclude that this is just a simple transfer and use of those principles as a guide to action. In this context, the assessment of another of Putin’s former coaches - Anatoly Rakhlin - looks quite logical, when noting: “Putin's character has healthy “impudence” (Putinism (blog) 2015b).

“Impudence” and the distorted understanding of the essence of Judo and Sambo generate a “false mirror” in Putin's mind, where actions of the West regarding Russia and the post-Soviet area (for example, the Eastern Partnership proposal for a number of countries of Eastern Europe and South Caucasus) are interpreted as manifestations of aggression, and Russian actions are counteractions and self-defence. Accordingly, the best principle of defence is a pre-emptive attack. Actually, Putin himself admitted this during the Valdai Forum in Sochi in 2015: “Yet 50 years ago, I was taught one rule on the Leningrad streets: if a fight is inevitable, you need to land the first punch (RF Presidential Executive Office 2015).” While this statement referred to the Syrian case, in fact Putin openly (consciously or unconsciously) expressed his strategic approach to international affairs – to land the first punch, act pre-emptively. Such an approach can be observed
both regarding Ukraine in 2014, and Georgia in 2008. Similarly, it is the same regarding the EU and NATO. The period of “ease into confidence” to the West, when Putin was called a “flawless Democrat” (G. Schroeder) and it was stated that he was the one with whom “you can have a deal” (George Bush), expired after September 2008.

But another person had a technological vision of implementation of the hybrid war concept. For the success of the “war-transformer” the approach of “war as a theatrical performance, battle ground as a spectacle” is needed. This approach is peculiar to the style of the main political consultant of the Kremlin, Vladislav Surkov, who has pronounced creative inclinations, diversified biography, who studied for some time in the field of “theatrical directing,” and even worked as the head of an amateur theatre. It is no coincidence that in the initial phase of hybrid aggression the leading role was assigned to the fan of theatrical historical reconstructions, Igor Girkin (Strelkov), an FSB officer.

The creative pseudonym of Putin’s consultant is Nathan Dubovitsky (derived from the name of his wife - Natalia Dubovitskaya). Some fragments of works and public interviews of Dubovitsky-Surkov-Dudayev are quite meaningful, as well as numerous, like his nicknames, the shells of his personality - “Matryoshka nesting doll.”

One of Surkov’s, as well as Dugin’s at some time, basic constants is that Putin was sent to Russia by God: “Yes, God. Yes, he called. To save Russia from hostile takeover. White Knight – and extremely timely (Kolesnikov 2013a).”

Another of his constants from the “theory of errors”: “Having passed the point of no return and suddenly realizing that you’re on the wrong way - do not flinch. Feel courage to go the wrong way... Columbus’ wrong way to India led him to America. Mistakes are well sold. They work (Kolesnikov 2013b).”

His story about the Fifth World War as the first non-linear war in which everybody is fighting against everybody, but allegorically it means talking about a war against the West: “We understood only “yes” and “no.” Only “black” and “white.” Nothing unclear. No undertones. No saving evasion. We could not lie... We founded the society. Prepared a revolt of simple two-dimensional people against complex and duplicitous ones. Against those who answer neither “Yes” nor “No.” Who do not say: “black,” “white.” Who know
the third word. Many, very many third words. Empty, false, those who confuse ways, overshadow the truth. In these darknesses and the spider webs, in these imaginary difficulties, all the abominations of the world are hiding and multiplying. They are the House of Satan. Money and bombs are produced there. They say: “here’s money for the benefit of honest, here are bombs to protect love.” We stand tomorrow. We will win. Or we’ll die. The third is not given (Dubovitskiy 2014a).”

Russian revenge [counter] offensive against the West, the reconquest of the world through the Crimea are figuratively embodied in the column of the magazine “Russian pioneer” from March 21, 2014 – in a month after the beginning of the Crimean campaign of Russia: “The lost Paradise, the Golden Age, Crimea will be returned... To come back is the highest human audacity. It means to act contrary to the second law of thermodynamics. Contrary to death... The cyclicity and periodicity are not only the foundation of the order, but also a revanche, reconquest, everlasting counter-offensive. The reconquest of the world captured by death (Dubovitskiy 2014b).”

In the definition of aggression of a hybrid type there is such a feature as the generation of uncertainties. “The uncertainty principle” is known in quantum mechanics as the Heisenberg principle. It describes the dual behaviour of elementary particles as a wave. A portrait of the German physicist is in Surkov’s office. And it is in somewhat interesting company. ‘Deciphering’ these hobbies can reveal some interesting features.

Nearby there are portraits of Benoit Mandelbrot, who was the creator of the theory of fractals, the researcher of objects and systems with a disorderly and chaotic structure, as well as of Ilya Prigozhin, who is the developer of the concept of synergy, the researcher of entropy and chaos.

The combination in Surkov’s mind of outcomes, which he stitched together in triad Heisenberg-Mandelbrot-Prigozhin along with cumulative applied use of their achievements, provides a basic 4-stroke algorithm of nonlinear processes, which are used for hybrid technologies of warfare:

1. false-target programming (FTP) of a partner or enemy through a “co-operation model” under cover of which a programme of its crypto-destruction is implemented
2. transformation of certainty and conditions into a set of uncertainties, chaotization of cause-effect chains

3. managing chaos through quick decisions, initiative actions and preventive measures towards other actors

4. organizing chaos, re-engineering of space, deriving a new reality through synergy.

The consequences of nonlinear processes are often unpredictable, arbitrary, self-organized. However, they are subject to management and engineering.

Let’s consider it on the example of the Crimean blitzkrieg of Russia. The status of Crimea as an autonomy within Ukraine is rapidly eroded by the forces of “local self-defence,” which arise “spontaneously” and, with the support of “polite people,” occupy key positions on the peninsula and capture administrative buildings. All this happens under the accompaniment of a propaganda campaign on the “Nazi” threat to the Crimea and its inhabitants as a result of the “coup” in Kiev, the seizure of power by the “junta,” which removed the legitimately elected president and sent the “Right Sector” troops to the peninsula. A temporarily uncertain status is created when the Crimea is still formally under Kiev administration, but in fact the Centre can no longer perform administrative functions due to obstructive position of the local authorities, which are supported by “self-defence” forces, various “Cossacks,” and “polite people” of unclear origin. A space of opportunities and several possible options-transitions arise: Crimea as one more formally independent, but in fact satellite Russian state; Crimea as a Russian-Ukrainian condominium with the dominant role of Russia; Crimea as part of Russia.

However, uncertainty has a clear clarity in one thing - the Crimea for Russia is no longer part of Ukraine. Military-political management of uncertainty on the peninsula after its occupation by “green men” through the mechanism of dubious referendum is aimed only at one of the possible options - the Crimea as part of Russia. Russia through the referendum gets a synergistic effect, expands its territory at the expense of the Crimea, and starts to re-engineer the post-Soviet space with an ambition on the geopolitical space of Europe after Yalta-1945. The history of the world after
the World War II began in the Crimea; in the Crimea it again, after 70 years, has the opportunity for a restart, and again on the conditions of the ruler of the Crimea, that is, of the Kremlin, and specifically - Vladimir Putin. According to the logic of the Kremlin, history has made a turn: through the chaos the Russian status of the Crimea has been returned and also order has been restored on the peninsula.


The hybrid-type aggression is a working mechanism for fragmentation and dispersion of existing definitions and statuses, for generating uncertainties and chaos, with their subsequent transformation into new realities in accordance with the Kremlin’s picture of the world and its vision of a new world order. The Kremlin is alone against the world and everyone is looking at it. Therefore, it is no coincidence that Tupak Shakur turned out on Surkov’s office pedestal. Perhaps this is due to his two albums with rather distinctive titles “Me Against the World” and “All Eyez on Me.”

If to decipher the Putin-Surkov synergy of co-authorship on the issues of the hybrid war, then it would briefly look like this: “The Saviour of Russia and the world is Putin. Alone against the world. Act decisively. Hit first. Possess the initiative. Do not be afraid of mistakes. We will win. We will take over the world.”

If Dugin is the general designer of the geopolitical reengineering of the Eurasian space, then Surkov is the chief technologist who develops “on the run” the technological process of reconstruction of the USSR and the transition from Pax Americana to Pax Putiniana without fear of mistakes on the way. Especially when false steps open up new opportunities. For example, when Western experts and politicians begin to talk about post-True, post-Order, post-West conditions and phenomena, this is nothing more than a transformation of certainty and conditions into a set of uncertainties, in accordance with the basic algorithm of nonlinear processes described above. Having such statements and passivity of the West, its inability to operate in conditions of chaos, a unique window of opportunity is created for Russia for managing chaos through a unique mechanism of change transsurfing. Russia itself, but not the West, turns out on the crest of
the waves of the ocean of the geopolitical and geo-economic chaotization, acting through the cyber space and making destructive strikes on Europe and the United States which they are unable to adequately conceive and act responsibly.

Deputy of the Russian State Duma and political exile Illya Ponomariov, well-informed about the Kremlin’s ruling Olympus, was coincident with the above description of Surkov’s role: “He is the most talented technologist. He has a reputation of an artist... And for Ukraine, a skilful player is needed. His role is the key one in the annexation of the Crimea. The Ministry of Defence and the GRU (Main Intelligence Directorate) of the RF were hands, but Surkov was an architect (Ponomariov 2016).”

As chief technologist, Surkov directly participates and controls the technological process of hybression on-site – in Ukraine. Starting from the summer of 2013 and by the end of the winter of 2014, his next 6 trips to Ukraine (which in one or another way became available publicly) were recorded (Koshkina 2015):

1. mid-August 2013 - Surkov was in Kiev; August, 13-14 - in Crimea (start of the proxy phase of hybrid war - blockade of Ukrainian exports);

2. January 20-21, 2014 - Surkov was in Kiev, in the administration of Viktor Yanukovych in the midst of preparations for the introduction of a state of emergency;

3. January 31-February 1 - Surkov with assistants (Rapoport, Chesnakov, Pavlov) were in Kiev;

4. February 11-12 - Surkov and Rapoport were in Donetsk and Crimea;

5. February 14-15 - Surkov was again in Kiev;

6. February 20-21 - Surkov, FSB General Beseda together with a group of security forces were in Kiev (engagement of the military component of the hybrid war - a diffuse invasion in the Crimea).
Despite serious theoretical and applied developments on non-conventional warfare, Putin’s hybression is a semi-finished product. It appears both at the macro and micro levels. Macro level: several occupied districts of the two eastern regions instead of 8-10 regions of the South and East Ukraine; micro level: the shortage of personnel for pseudo-state formations, for the command staff of their armed formations. In his October 2015 interview for the Novorossiya media group, Igor Girkin (Strelkov) clearly states: “...the Kremlin itself (in Surkov’s person) picked up, supported and directly pushed into power the worst (unprincipled, selfish, talentless and dysfunctional) persons who were in the ranks of the irregulars...(Strelkov 2015).”

The Russian version of the new generation war is somewhat unique, it is an exclusive product. Its duplication in its pure form is not possible, but any new version will be based on some basic constructs and templates.

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AZERBAIJAN’S TRILATERAL AND BILATERAL MILITARY COOPERATION WITH TURKEY AND GEORGIA: IMPORTANT FOR AZERBAIJAN’S SECURITY CALCULATIONS

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Introduction

The tripartite of Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey (AGT) first emerged following the signing of the “Contract of the Century” (1994) envisaging delivery of Azerbaijani oil via the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline. The ties were promoted with the launch of the trilateral meeting of their foreign ministers in Turkey, Georgia, and Azerbaijan. The military dimension of this cooperation was indoctrinated first in 2013 and was followed by further regular meetings of their defence ministers in Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey, paving the way for cooperation between their defence structures and armed forces on various fields of mutual military interests (Mod.gov.az 2017). But the 9/11 attack in the U.S. and the Russo-Georgia war in August 2008 was the main motivation for the functionality of the military dimension of the AGT format.

The negative impact of terrorism and separatism over the sovereignty of these countries necessitate pooling capabilities to confront potential threats and ensure the security of regional energy-transport projects (Mod.gov.az 2017). The cabinet reshuffles in the defence ministries of Azerbaijan (2013) and Georgia (2014, 2016) and Turkey (2016), and subsequently the reorganisation of their defence structures did not decline but boosted the importance of the trilateral cooperation. However, the preliminary focus of cooperation was merely on military preparedness for the protection of transport and energy infrastructures. Apart from the AGT format, Azerbaijan mainly cooperates with Turkey on a bilateral military basis, while the scope of similar bilateral cooperation with Georgia...
is limited. This paper will narrate the scope of the bilateral and trilateral cooperation of Azerbaijan with Turkey and Georgia, and analyse from Azerbaijan's perspective the imperatives of these formats for official Baku's security calculations, as well as the geopolitical reflections of that.

**Imperatives of the Military Tripartite**

The AGT tripartite is the only format in Azerbaijan's foreign policy that, unlike other formats, comprises a military dimension. Thus far, the three states have never signed a trilateral military agreement on countering security threats or an agreement binding them to commit to the collective defence and each other's security in the case of external aggression or threat posed to their territorial integrities and sovereignty.

Their military cooperation has not transformed into an institutional body, but was conducted on an intergovernmental basis. The intergovernmental nature implicates neither the integration of their military structures nor the establishment of a military alliance. It is merely a manifestation of the three countries' common will to protect themselves against [un]conventional threats (Valiyev 2015). The three countries have hitherto pooled their efforts for capacity-building through the exchange of military experience, defence consultations and joint military-tactical exercises (Mod.gov.az 2016). The regular meetings of AGT defence ministers to discuss the regional military-security situation and military cooperation ultimately serves the advancement of their armed forces and ensures regional stability.

AGT have never portrayed their trilateral military cooperation as an ‘institutionalized military alliance’ in order not to irritate the regional actors antagonizing the military presence of other powers. Creation of such an alliance is unlikely now, because of the different kind of bilateral relations of each of three countries with their neighbours. Despite Turkey's past enthusiasm of deeper engagement in the South Caucasus, Ankara is unlikely to be interested in confronting Moscow since they have already normalized their strained relations. Despite Azerbaijan and Turkey continuing to keep Armenia in isolation, and Armenia accommodating Russian military bases on its soil, Georgia would unlikely engage in an alliance that could harm its relations with Armenia. Azerbaijan traditionally remains loyal to its balancing foreign policy and pragmatic relations with neighbouring

23 Because of occupation of Azerbaijan's internationally-recognized territories the Nagorno-Karabakh region & surrounding seven territories.
Russia and Iran (Shiriyev 2016). The AGT’s military dimension neither stands against the bilateral military cooperation of the three countries with their neighbouring states, precisely with Iran and Russia in the case of Azerbaijan, and with Armenia in the case of Georgia (Valiyev 2015).

However, Azerbaijan’s neighbourhood is unstable, and three countries (each with different type of security perceptions) are directly involved in conflicts. The internationally recognized territories of both Azerbaijan and Georgia are under occupation, and Turkey is combating terrorism on its soil. All these render trilateral cooperation in the military domains inevitable (Mammadov 2017). Azerbaijan’s reliance on AGT’s military dimension, despite its growing military capacity, is rational. Because Azerbaijan’s membership of the Non-Aligned Movement that stipulates non-membership of any military blocs (either NATO or CSTO) does not ensure an external collective defence support. Therefore, the advancement of the trilateral military-strategic ties is very important to counterbalance the external threats in the light of military-geopolitical changes in the South Caucasus, such as Armenia’s militarization through Russia’s military assistance, the formation of the Russia-Armenia joint air defence system and armed units, Russia’s extended military bases in Armenia, and terrorist threats from the Middle East.

The benefits of trilateral cooperation are tremendous: Turkey with its NATO membership and Georgia with its advancing military profile supported by NATO ultimately cultivate Azerbaijan’s military experience in accordance with modern combat standards. The AGT’s military format appears for Georgia as an interim alternative to long-delayed NATO membership. Turkey played a substantial role in boosting the cooperation of both Georgia and Azerbaijan with the Euro-Atlantic structures (Çelikpala & Veliyev 2015).

Azerbaijan, in the framework of AGT, also benefits from training programmes provided by the NATO-Georgia Joint Training and Evaluation Centre (JTEC), and Defence Institutional Building School (DIBS) in Georgia (Civil.ge 2012, 2016). For instance, AGT hold joint computer-assisted command and staff training (Eternity) at the JTEC to exchange experience on the protection of energy infrastructures (Shirinov 2017). With joint trilateral field training (Caucasian Eagle), the AGT’s special forces advance knowledge and experience in conducting joint operations practicing practical shots, military engineering, parachute jumps, medical aid, etc. (Mod.gov.az, Azeri Defence 2017). These exercises increase mutual
interoperability, combat capabilities and readiness of the AGT armed forces for the protection of oil/gas pipelines. The combination of their military expertise grants a hybrid military capability to each country's defence structures and armed forces. This training should be also expanded to the domains of cyber security, air defence, military intelligence, etc.

Armenia is concerned about the trilateral military cooperation among these countries, because this consolidates Armenia's isolated status in the South Caucasus. Yerevan deems the military format (including trilateral drills in Georgia and a bilateral one in Nakhchivan, an autonomous exclave of Azerbaijan) as a “military belt” around the country from three fronts. Although Armenia has limited military cooperation with Georgia, former concerns that AGT’s military cooperation will hamper deepening its military ties with the latter which is Armenia's only northern operational transport access to the neighbourhood (Stratfor 2015).

Critical Infrastructure Protection

The motivating driver of the AGT format stemmed from (1) Turkey's energy demands, (2) Azerbaijan's energy capacity and (3) Georgia's transit location for secure transportation of Caspian hydrocarbon reserves to the European markets. These factors led to the successful realization of the BTC oil and BTE gas pipelines, and the Southern Gas Corridor (SGC). Turkey and Georgia granted Azerbaijan with a western flank for the diversification of the latter's oil and gas export beyond the Russian-controlled transit routes to the Western markets. In return, Ankara gained an alternative source of gas supply to diversify its imports from Russia and Iran. Meanwhile, Georgia was able to increase its geopolitical profile for the West as a transit country (Cecire 2013, 2015), and Azerbaijan as a reliable supplier country. Albeit Azerbaijan pursues hitherto a balanced foreign policy, its current energy policy remains pro-Western due to primary orientations of the oil/gas pipelines.

However, the existing challenges that all three countries are tackling, such as the occupation of Azerbaijan's and Georgia’s territories respectively by Armenia and Russia, and terrorist activities in Turkey, demonstrate that none of these states is immune to these problems. The oil/gas pipelines have been blasted several times by the PKK (Kurdish) terrorist organisation in Turkey. Georgia experienced a risk of bombing of pipelines (BTC and Baku-Supsa) during the Russo-Georgia war in 2008 and an illegal expansion of occupation lines from its breakaway territory South Ossetia.
(Tskhinvali Region), encompassing certain segments of the Baku-Supsa oil pipeline. Azerbaijan faced a rhetorical caveat from Armenian armed forces located in the occupied Nagorno-Karabakh region warning to shoot the former’s oil/gas infrastructures (Gurbanov 2016).

Therefore, the interaction and cooperation of AGT’s armed forces through tripartite exercises and consultations to enhance the combat capability for the protection of critical infrastructure (pipelines, railways and terminals) is significant, notably when the implementation of the SGC (which will increase the transit importance of both Turkey and Georgia) lies at the heart of priority regional projects. An integrated institutional arrangement might be formed through the establishment of a trilateral “rapid reaction battalion” in order to provide comprehensive security for the above-mentioned infrastructures (Cecire 2015). AGT should define whether their association against military/terrorist threats towards critical infrastructures will be merely a traditional military deterrence and retaliation-based approach through preparing a detailed military engagement plan and deployment of troops/patrols at the proximity of pipeline interconnections and compressor stations in order to minimize attacks and neutralize risks. The prospect of the cooperation lies in many directions (Gurbanov 2015) such as:

- Establishment of a common AGT air defence system enabling both Georgia and Azerbaijan to integrate their air defence with that of Turkey;

- Cooperation on intelligence information gathering/sharing and surveillance to access qualitative analyses, prognoses on security issues and have proper risk/threat assessments;

- Training the Elite Units in order to increase their capacity in conducting special operations to liquidate terrorists, and to prevent possible attacks on energy infrastructures. This can be realized either through country-specific training or within the formation of a “multinational brigade” of Turkey, Azerbaijan and Georgia, under the name of ‘TurAzGe’ composed of common conventional defence forces capable of deterring conflicts;

- Engagement with other relevant government structures that are tasked with and have certain capacities and resources
to protect energy infrastructures through regular patrolling, physical/technological monitoring of pipelines, terminals and compressor stations against political instabilities, conflicts and man-made attacks;

- Exchanging with these structures the best practices/expertise on security and protection of energy infrastructures, anti-terrorism policy, contingency planning, cyber security, damage assessments, disaster management and rapid restoration of energy supplies.

**Azerbaijan-Turkey Bilateral Military Cooperation**

In fact, the success of trilateral cooperation owes much to the solid bilateral military ties of Azerbaijan with Turkey and Georgia. The scope of Azerbaijan’s military cooperation with Turkey encompasses a wider range of areas than that with Georgia. The bilateral military ties date back to the 1990s, since when the two countries have established cooperation in the military-technical field, military education, joint training/exercises, military assistance, joint defence industry, scientific sphere, military intelligence (information exchange) and military flying (Mfa.gov.az 2018; Mod.gov.az 2016, 2017). The prospective areas of cooperation such as the joint fight against separatism and terrorism needs to be developed given their growing and immediate menace.

The bilateral military relations have gradually shifted from the military-technical sphere to the military-strategic level following the establishment of the “High Level Military Dialogue” (2007) and signing of the “Strategic Partnership and Mutual Assistance/SPMA” agreement (2010) (Shiriyev 2014). The SPMA agreement stipulates a mutual security commitment of the sides to provide reciprocal aid to each other by using all possibilities to eliminate threats to national security in the event of one of the sides suffering from armed attack/aggression from a third country. Although the agreement obliges the signatory states to mutual support, it does not imply direct military intervention of any of the sides without consultations held beforehand with each other. It neither envisages the installation of a Turkish military base in Azerbaijan. The agreement was also a legal codification for joint military operations, military exercises/training and military-technical cooperation (Abbasov 2011). The agreement was signed a few days before the Russia-Armenia agreement on the extension
of the period of the Russian military base (No.102) in Armenia (Shiriyev 2013), that is to say, it sought to neutralize Armenia’s military cooperation with Russia.

Moreover, for years, Turkey constituted a gateway for Baku to access NATO’s military experience in its military defence building process and expanding military ties with other Alliance members (Gurbanov 2017). The peacekeeping formation of Azerbaijan’s armed forces is currently serving in Afghanistan under the Turkish flag, i.e., within the Turkish military contingent in support of NATO’s Resolute Support Mission (Mod.gov.az 2017). Senior Turkish military commanders are evaluating the exercises of Azerbaijan’s armed forces within the framework of NATO’s Operational Capabilities Concept programme (Mod.gov.az 2017). Despite restructuration/reorganisation in the Turkish Ministry of Defence and General Staff after the failed military coup attempt in July 2016, the pragmatic spirit of military cooperation between Azerbaijan and Turkey has remained unaffected.

**Joint Interaction of Azerbaijani and Turkish Armed Forces:**

Azerbaijani and Turkish Air Forces regularly conduct joint flight exercises which promote their tactical interoperability, military pilots’ skills on joint combat missions and search and rescue operations, as well as create mutual interaction through the exchange of experience (Mod.gov.az 2017). Turkey’s practical experience of air assault operations will be to Azerbaijan’s benefit in case potential armed skirmishes erupt in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict zone. With joint exercises, Azerbaijan integrated its Soviet flight tactics with modern combat methods, adapted its aerodromes to new standards, and modernized the centralized management system of the Air Forces (Azeri Defence 2016; Report.az 2017). Azerbaijani pilots were mainly trained at the Azerbaijan Higher Military Pilot School, but they also attend courses in Turkey.

The various branches of the armed forces of Turkey and Azerbaijan, including the Combined Army of Nakhchivan (Autonomous Republic) regularly hold joint tactical fire military drills in both countries.

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24 Both in Azerbaijan or Turkey with involvement of their combat/transport aircrafts and helicopters.

25 With involvement of armoured vehicles, artillery and mortar systems, combat/transport helicopters, air defence and anti-aircraft missile units.
Through these drills they can examine the level of combat capabilities and coordination of military formations/troops, increase their operations skills, and achieve a coherence between their military units for conducting joint operations and joint-headquarter planning (Mod.gov.az 2016, 2017) in case of potential crisis in the region. The courses provided by Turkey help Azerbaijani officers to study comprehensive approaches in a number of military fields including battle-space experience. The mutual short-term military service at the tactical level pursued by senior military personnel of both countries boosts their experience of coordination of units, and combat readiness (Report.az 2016).

Azerbaijan’s armed forces also participate in multinational exercises in Turkey. These exercises train participating staff for planning/conducting combined joint operations in real war conditions; improving the interoperability between headquarters and forces for command-control and pilots’ skills for search and rescue operations (Azeri Defence, Azertag, Hurriyet Daily News, 2016). Moreover, Azerbaijan’s security services officers are trained in special sniper courses in Turkey (Agentstvo Anadolu 2017).

**Cooperation on Defence Industry and Purchase**

Azerbaijan’s Ministry of Defence Industry (MDI) is cooperating with Turkish defence companies to advance its military industry via joint manufacturing of defence products. A joint defence industry with Turkey has enabled Azerbaijan to achieve self-sufficiency in military needs and

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26 Military-civil relationships, protection of civilians during conflicts/peace operations, strategic communication, humanitarian/crisis response operations, armed conflict law, strategic analysis, naval security system, air-operations/management, command staff/unit management, computer-assisted commanding, cyber security, combating terrorism, commando skills, military engineering, medicine, defence-operational planning, protection from chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear weapons, military amphibian, etc.

27 “Efes” joint live-fire exercise; “Commando Ex” for special forces; “Anatolian Eagle” war simulation and “Ishik” search and rescue training.

28 Aselsan, Roketsan, Otokar, Tisaş, Makina-Kimya, Koza

29 Infantry weapons, ammunitions, mortars, other armaments (pistols, submachine guns, night-vision rifle scopes, armoured vehicles).
outsourcing Turkey’s experience. Azerbaijan’s domestic military production encouraged its Ministry of Defence Industry to expand the export potential of these products (Gurbanov 2018; Azeri Defence 2017).

Azerbaijan was the first foreign buyer of the Turkish Aselsan’s “Ihtar/Ihasavar” and Harp Arge’s “Savar” anti-drone systems30 (Azeri Defence 2017). Turkey’s Roketsan supplied the T-300 Kasirga and T-122 Sakarya MLRS artillery systems to Azerbaijan (Novosti VPK 2014; Voyennoye Obozreniye 2016). Azerbaijan and Turkey (Roketsan) developed a new air-to-surface and surface-to-surface anti-tank missile system Mizrak-U/UMTAS31 based on the BRDM-2 carrier vehicle (Defence Blog 2016). In 2013, Turkey was to supply Azerbaijan with “T-155 Firtina” self-propelled howitzers, however, Germany’s MTU refused to sell the howitzers’ engines, explaining that Baku is in a state of military conflict with Yerevan (Armstrade.org 2013). Therefore, Azerbaijan purchased “Msta-S 2S19” howitzers from Russia in 2012. Turkish Roketsan delivered SOM-B1 medium-range air-to-surface cruise missiles32 (Binnie 2018).

Speculations on Turkey’s Military Base in Azerbaijan

Azerbaijan, hitherto, has not authorized the deployment of a Turkish military base on its territories. Neither has Turkey ever voiced its will to establish a common air defence system with Azerbaijan similar to the one formed between Russia and Armenia “Combined Regional Air Defence System” envisaging Armenia’s access to Russia’s air defence/assault capabilities and all the air defence-related information available (Mid.ru 2015). Similar collaboration would contribute to Azerbaijan’s air defence/assault capacity. However, Turkey’s NATO membership might be an impediment to that in terms of information sharing and the technical incompatibility of the integration of the two systems.

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30 Designed to combat unmanned aerial vehicles by applying high-speed electromagnetic interference to disrupt communications between the drone and its control unit.

31 It has effective operational capability against armoured vehicles with precise firing on moving/hiding/stationary targets in day/night conditions.

32 It can destruct the enemy’s strategically important objects in the depth of complex geographical mountainous terrain of the occupied territories thanks to its integrated GPS and terrain-reference navigation system.
In 2016, Azerbaijan’s President Ilham Aliyev signed a decree approving the allocation of buildings and facilities of the “Gyzyl Sharg” military camp and a terminal at the aerodrome in the H.Z. Taghiyev village (near Baku) for the disposal of Turkish Armed Forces personnel (President. az 2016). The decree was interpreted as Azerbaijan’s embrace of deployment of a Turkish military base on its territories. These speculations were dismissed by Azerbaijan’s Defence Ministry saying that the aerodrome had been used since 1999 for the transportation of Azerbaijani servicemen for peacekeeping missions by Turkish Air Forces aircraft. The terminal therein is allocated as temporary accommodation for Turkish pilots and technical personnel; and handed back to Azerbaijan afterwards (Azertag, Interfax, TASS 2016). Although Turkish military personnel have already been using this aerodrome over the past years in a limited capacity for merely basing and supplying military aircraft participating in joint exercises and for accommodation purposes, the new decree however was supposed to strengthen the diplomatic status of the military camp (Medjid 2016).

Armenia is cautious about the possible establishment of a Turkish military base in Azerbaijan – especially in Nakhchivan (autonomous Azerbaijani exclave – sharing an 11-km border with Turkey and a 246-km border with Armenia). Nakhchivan’s Combined Army’s strategic posture has hitherto been consolidated through regular local and joint training and exercises (with Turkey’s 3rd Army Corps), as well as through technical assistance and mutual consultations with Turkey. As Nakhchivan is separated from mainland Azerbaijan,^3^ boosting the Combined Army’s operational/tactical and combat capabilities through the development of military ties with Turkey was important towards ensuring the immediate survival of that isolated Azerbaijani exclave (Gurbanov 2018).

In fact, Azerbaijan’s military doctrine (Article.29) excludes the installation of a foreign military base within the country with certain exceptions for the cases stipulated by international treaties and in the events of fundamental changes in the military-political situation (Azerbaijan National Library 2010). Therefore, it is still a moot point if Baku will ever authorize Turkish military personnel to access its military camps/aerodromes or if Azerbaijan can use Turkish aircraft in accordance with the SPMA agreement in the case of a large-scale military confrontation with Armenia, in order to uphold its air assault capability to repulse the

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^3^ When the historical Zengezur (now Syunik for Armenia) province was granted to Armenia soon after World War One; under the Treaty of Kars (1921) the autonomous territory came under Azerbaijani protection.
Armenian military aggression and other threats. Baku retains a sovereign right on that issue; however, emergence of the military facility of Turkey, a NATO member state, in Azerbaijan would also trigger reaction of the neighbouring countries.

**Bilateral Relations with Georgia**

Despite the Azerbaijan-Turkey agreement on mutual assistance, Azerbaijan-Georgia military defence cooperation does not contain such an agreement stipulating mutual security support in the case of military aggression from abroad. As there is an inherent difference between the ‘immediate threat’ perception of Baku and Tbilisi each, a similar agreement is unlikely for the time being. Neither is there a similar agreement between Turkey and Georgia. Turkey however has provided military-technical assistance to Georgia in modernizing the capacity of Georgian armed forces in accordance with NATO standards (Shiriyev 2016).

Over the past years, Azerbaijani and Turkish armed forces have established a long track record of joint exercises, but no such bilateral exercises were marked between Azerbaijani and Georgian armed forces. However, Georgia participates as an observer in Azerbaijani-Turkish military exercises (Mod.gov.az 2017), and Azerbaijani officers attend NATO trainings (mountain courses), Agile Spirit and Noble Partner multinational exercises held in Georgia, including those in NATO-Georgia JTEC, and Georgia’s DIBS. Although the military dimension is an important integral part of the AGT triangle, the three countries have never conducted joint tactical flight exercises, like those of Azerbaijan and Turkey (Gurbanov 2017).

Azerbaijan’s military cooperation with Georgia mostly encompasses cooperation in the areas of the military-technical sphere, military education, military medicine, trilateral exercises, and working meetings of command staff (Mod.gov.az 2018). Both sides can advance their cooperation in the defence industry via joint production of military equipment. Thus far, Georgia delivered to Azerbaijan several Su-25 modernized\(^\text{34}\) fighter jets and technologies for modernization (Barabanov 2012).

Azerbaijan and Turkey have achieved significant successes in the joint defence industry benefitting from the advanced potential of Turkish defence companies (Gurbanov 2018). This practice can be extended to the

\(^{34}\) From Tbilaviamsheni with Israel’s Elbit Systems.
trilateral level of the joint defence industry between AGT to benefit from the technical experience of Azerbaijan and Turkey.

**Conclusion**

In fact, all three countries managed to preserve the pragmatic spirit of their cooperation despite the changing political systems and domestic shuffles in these countries, as well as the external pressures and their evolving relations within their neighbourhood. The AGT tripartite has proven even more successful than other regional integration initiatives, though it was previously restrained to 'energy security' component only. The looming danger from abroad and the mutual interdependence among them have been translated into their actual political strength by manufacturing common positions for addressing their shared interests in the region. Trilateral cooperation has ultimately established a new balancing factor in the South Caucasus region in the light of the current insecurity situation.

Despite Turkey's depressed relations with the Western flank, it remains a vital strategic partner for both Azerbaijan and Georgia to link them to the western route of communication and transport of energy resources. Therefore, both Azerbaijan and Georgia should stand together with Turkey when the latter's relations experience a temporary depression with the West. On the strategic sense, the consolidation of bilateral military ties with Georgia is important from the point of view of ensuring the security and sustainability of energy and transport projects.

The AGT format and Azerbaijan's bilateral military ties with Turkey and Georgia enable Baku to diversify its military build-up away from Russia. The promotion of a joint military industry with Turkey fosters the harmonization of the military capacity of Azerbaijan and the modernization of its military equipment in accordance with contemporary army standards. However, instead of building the military dimension of cooperation on the energy security pillars only, the AGT format needs new types of joint military exercises in the field of military engineering, air defence, search and rescue operations, and cyber terrorism etc.
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ROLE OF THE OSCE IN THE POST-CRIMEAN SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

JURAJ NOSÁL

Introduction

The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) traces its origins to the Helsinki process of the 1970s and the creation of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE), which at the height of the Cold War served as a key multilateral forum for high-level political dialogue and negotiations between two blocks of the bipolar era. Despite a loose structure, the CSCE managed to bring together two antagonistic alliance systems into a framework of dialogue and cooperation and throughout its existence contributed significantly to the peaceful end of the Cold War.

After the fall of the Iron Curtain, the CSCE countries had to face new realities of the post-bipolar security environment. Challenges posed by the disintegration of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, eruption of intra-state armed conflicts in some parts of Europe, transformation processes in post-communist countries and the rise of inter-ethnic tensions threatened peace and stability in the whole Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian space. The CSCE soon transformed from a venue primarily for political dialogue into an organization equipped with permanent institutions and operational capacities and expanded significantly the scope of its activities into areas such as conflict prevention, crisis management and post-conflict rehabilitation. Initiated with the 1990 Charter of Paris for a New Europe, the process of CSCE institutionalization began and towards the end of 1994, the CSCE eventually turned into the OSCE.

Since then, the OSCE has played an important role as a key institution embodying a cooperative approach to security in the Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian space. Over time, the Organization has strived to

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35 Juraj Nosál works at the OSCE Secretariat in Vienna. The views expressed in this article are solely those of the author and do not represent the official position of the OSCE or any other organization.
adapt its unique comprehensive\textsuperscript{36} and multi-dimensional approach to security to an increasing number of challenges: from arms proliferation and the promotion of military transparency to the resolution of protracted conflicts, support to transition processes and democratic reforms and combatting transnational threats (Zannier 2016). But despite the OSCE's many practical achievements, its importance began to decline with the turn of the century. Most analysts attributed this gradual decrease in relevance to several reasons: competition in its areas of activity from other more powerful actors, primarily the EU; growing political paralysis due to the renewed East-West divide after the so-called “colour revolutions” in Georgia (2003), Ukraine (2004), and Kyrgyzstan (2005); and the OSCE's diffuse profile and low degree of visibility (Trachsler 2012). As Pál Dunay (2014: 17) put it: “the OSCE was important enough to exist but not important enough to play a leading role in the European security.”

The crisis in and around Ukraine that erupted in early 2014 has partially reversed this negative trend. Many analysts agree that the conflict has put the OSCE back in the international spotlight, raised its profile and reconfirmed the Organization’s political relevance and importance in the European security architecture (Lehne 2015, comp. Nülist & Svarin 2014). At the same time, it represents perhaps the greatest challenge the Organization has faced since the end of the Cold War. The annexation of Crimea and the ensuing hostilities in Eastern Ukraine have challenged the fundamental norms and principles of the international as well as European security order. While many heralded a rapid operational response of the OSCE to the crisis, the events in and around Ukraine have also underlined the long-term challenges that the Organization has been facing for many years (see Panel of Eminent Persons 2015a, Tanner 2016, Zellner 2017).

Since its eruption in early 2014, the conflict in Ukraine has had significant impact on the development of European security and the deterioration of relations between Russia and the West. The OSCE, being the main international actor involved in the management and resolution of this conflict since its beginning as well as the only pan-European security organization bridging the Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian regions, has been at the epicentre of the renewed confrontation and geopolitical rivalry. With the conflict in Ukraine entering slowly its fifth year, this article explores its impact on the role of the OSCE in the European security architecture.

\textsuperscript{36} The OSCE’s model of comprehensive approach to security includes three dimensions: politico-military, economic and environmental, and human dimension.
It outlines key areas of OSCE activities in the post-Cold War security environment and discusses how they have been influenced by the ongoing conflict as well as what future role the OSCE might play in the European security architecture.

**Role of the OSCE in the post-Cold War security environment**

The end of the Cold War marked a paradigmatic shift in the evolution of the international system. Threats and challenges posed by the new post-bipolar era triggered the institutionalization of the CSCE and its transformation into the OSCE. While aspirations of some countries to transfer the CSCE into a central institution of the post-Cold War European security order were not fulfilled (see Nünlist 2017a: 18-26), the CSCE/OSCE began assuming responsibilities in a number of areas crucial for security and stability in the wider pan-European space. These can be generally divided into several key categories.

First of all, the OSCE has continued serving as a platform for high-level political dialogue. Weekly meetings of the Permanent Council and Forum for Security Co-operation in Vienna, annual Ministerial Council meetings of foreign ministers, and occasional Summits of heads of states and governments have provided space for discussions of and negotiations on the most salient issues of security in the Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian regions. This was particularly important in the early years after the Cold War when there were still very few permanent forums where former adversaries could meet regularly face-to-face. This function was perhaps later somehow diminished with the expansion of both the EU and NATO eastward as well as Russia’s accession to the G7 in 1997 (which turned into the G8) and the establishment of other frameworks, namely the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council (later replaced by the NATO-Russia Council) or direct summits between Moscow and the EU.

But despite this, it can be argued that the OSCE has continued playing an important role in discussions on the wider pan-European security. It was under the auspices of this Organization where some of the key political documents have been adopted. In addition to ground-breaking arms control treaties (discussed further), this includes, in particular, the 1990 Charter of Paris for a New Europe, the 1999 Istanbul Charter for European Security and the 2010 Astana Commemorative Declaration. Several important political processes influencing the Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian security environment were also launched by the OSCE such as the
Corfu Process after the war between Russia and Georgia in summer 2008. However, most importantly, the OSCE has remained the only regional multilateral forum that brings together all the countries in the Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian space: member states of NATO and the EU as well as all post-Soviet and post-communist countries, including Russia and the Central Asian states.

Secondly, the OSCE has played a key role in negotiations on arms control, military confidence-building and risk reduction. With the adoption of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE Treaty) and the Vienna Document on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures (Vienna Document) in 1990, the Treaty on Open Skies in 1992, and the Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security in 1994, the CSCE/OSCE participating states managed to build the most advanced regime of arms control and military confidence-building measures in the world. Commitments and mechanisms set by these treaties include, for instance, limits on certain types of weaponry, annual exchange of military information, inspections and evaluation visits, notifications and observation of military activities, exchange of information about defence planning and budgets, and provisions constraining certain type of military activities. The Organization continued fulfilling this function also in the following years. With the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact in December 1991, provisions of the original CFE Treaty, which had been based on equal ceilings for two opposing military blocs, became quickly obsolete. A new adapted version of the Treaty with a system of national and regional ceilings was negotiated under the OSCE’s auspices and signed at the OSCE Summit in Istanbul in November 1999. Furthermore, the OSCE began working on addressing the growing threat posed by illicit small arms and light weapons as well as excess and unsafe stockpiles of conventional ammunition: the OSCE Document on Small Arms and Light Weapons was adopted in 2000 and the OSCE Document on Stockpiles of Conventional Ammunition in 2003.

The third crucial function of the OSCE includes conflict management and resolution. The Organization has been involved in almost all armed conflicts throughout the Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian space since

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37 Since then, the Vienna Document has been modernized twice: in 1999 and 2011.

38 However, this achievement was later diminished due to ratification problems in NATO member states and eventual withdrawal of the Russian Federation from the Treaty in 2007 (see Lachowski 2009).
the end of the Cold War. After the break-up of former Yugoslavia and the ensuing conflicts in the Balkans, the OSCE was one of main international actors on the ground. In December 1995, the OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina was established to fulfil tasks set out in the Dayton Peace Agreements (OSCE 1995a) and between October 1998 and March 1999, the OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission with the strength of approximately 1,500 personnel was rapidly deployed to verify compliance of all parties in Kosovo with UN Security Council Resolution 1199 (OSCE 1998). A few months later, the OSCE Mission in Kosovo was established (OSCE 1999c) and in the following years became the Organization’s largest field operation. In addition to the Balkans, the OSCE became actively engaged in other conflict areas as well. After a ceasefire was agreed in the Nagorno-Karabakh War in May 1994, the OSCE established the Minsk Group to mediate peace talks and find a political resolution to the conflict (OSCE 1995b). These activities became later known as the Minsk Process and continue until today. Between 1995 and 1998, the OSCE deployed the Assistance Group to Chechnya to help with addressing consequences of the First Chechen War (OSCE 2017a). Likewise, the 5+2 Talks, a negotiating framework for finding a peaceful resolution to the conflict in Transdniestria since 2006, was established under the OSCE’s auspices (Neukirch 2012). During the armed conflict between Russia and Georgia in summer 2008, the OSCE deployed military monitors to the conflict area and later became one of three parties, together with the UN and the EU, in the Geneva International Discussions (Stöber 2011). Last but not least, following the violent inter-ethnic clashes in southern Kyrgyzstan in summer 2010, the OSCE established the Community Security Initiative, a unique project, which deployed international civilian police advisers to assist local Kyrgyz police with addressing the fragile security situation, protecting human rights and promoting multi-ethnic policing (OSCE 2010b, OSCE 2012).

The next key area of OSCE activities includes providing direct assistance to its participating states in implementing OSCE commitments and strengthening their security across all three dimensions of the Organization’s work (i.e. politico-military, economic and environmental, and human dimension) through concrete projects and programmes on the ground. A wide network of field operations represents the Organization’s main tool in this regard. They have been deployed in almost all post-communist countries: the Baltic region (Estonia, Latvia), Eastern Europe (Belarus, Moldova, Ukraine), South-Eastern Europe (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia), Southern Caucasus (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia) and Central Asia (Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan) (OSCE 2017a). The Organization’s work in the field covers a wide range of issues, ranging from, for instance, disposal of dangerous rocket fuel and demining activities, on the one hand, to water management, good governance, police and judicial reform and the promotion of tolerance and non-discrimination, on the other. It can take various forms such as assistance and advisory activities, capacity-building programmes, training, seminars, workshops and conferences.

Last but not least, the OSCE has been providing a platform for cooperation in addressing transnational threats and challenges. Since the turn of the century, and especially after the September 11 terrorist attacks, transnational threats have been increasingly perceived as the main challenge to security and stability in the Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian space. The OSCE responded to this trend by adapting its programmatic activities and building up necessary operational capacities. The OSCE Strategy to Address Threats to Security and Stability in the Twenty-First Century was adopted in 2003 and in the early 2000s, the OSCE Secretariat established relevant operational structures. The Organization has gradually accumulated expertise in the areas such as countering terrorism and violent extremism, border security and management, combating human trafficking, fighting against organized crime and illicit trade, and police reform. The OSCE has also become active in the field of cybersecurity through its pioneering work on confidence-building measures to reduce the growing risks of conflicts stemming from the use of information and communication technologies (ICT). In 2013, the OSCE adopted an initial set of cyber/ICT security confidence measures, a first-ever measure of this kind in the world (OSCE 2013).

Impact of the conflict in Ukraine on the OSCE’s key activity areas

The annexation of Crimea and escalation of violence in Eastern Ukraine in early 2014 took many by surprise. The OSCE quickly responded to the emerging crisis and soon became the main international actor involved in its management and resolution. The Organization has deployed two field operations in response to the conflict and with over 1,000 staff members, of whom almost two thirds are based in eastern regions, represents the largest international presence in the country (OSCE 2017d). But how have these events influenced the different roles the OSCE has been playing in the European security architecture?
Firstly, looking at the OSCE’s role as a platform for high-level political dialogue, one can argue that it has not only been maintained, but it has gained a renewed importance and prominence. This is mostly due to the fact that the OSCE is the only multilateral forum where all sides with a vested interest in the conflict, namely Ukraine, the Russian Federation, the United States and the EU, sit behind one negotiating table as equal partners. A paralysis of political dialogue between Washington and Brussels on the one hand, and Moscow on the other, in particular after the introduction of sanctions against Russia and suspension of all practical civilian and military cooperation between NATO and Russia, including the NATO-Russia Council (NATO 2014), has only contributed to the importance of the OSCE as a venue for political dialogue. Since the conflict started, senior officials from various countries have repeatedly underlined the essential role of the OSCE in keeping communication channels among all actors involved open (see e.g. OSCE 2016a, OSCE 2017b).

Naturally, the conflict has had tremendous impact on the political dialogue within the OSCE itself, especially in its early stages. Regular as well as emergency meetings of the OSCE Permanent Council in Vienna often turned into heated debates filled with mutual accusations and Cold War-like rhetoric. Yet, despite these very difficult circumstances, dialogue between Russia, Ukraine and all other states has never stopped. The OSCE Permanent Council in Vienna managed to adopt by consensus mandates of two new field operations designed specifically to address the Ukraine conflict—the Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (OSCE 2014a) and Observer Mission at the Russian Checkpoints Gukovo and Donetsk (OSCE 2014b)—as well as a political declaration on the tragic shooting-down of the flight MH17 over Eastern Ukraine in June 2014 (OSCE 2014c). There have also been efforts to restart a larger political process on strategic issues of European security. In early 2015, the OSCE Troika, consisting back then of Germany, Switzerland, and Serbia, appointed an independent high-level expert panel to provide advice on how to rebuild trust and reconsolidate European security. The panel produced two reports by the end of 2015: an interim report on lessons learned for the OSCE from its engagement in Ukraine and a final report on the wider issues of European security (see Panel of Eminent Persons on European Security 2015a, b). Despite diametrically opposed positions, the OSCE participating states also managed to re-start a formal inter-governmental process on these issues by launching the Structured Dialogue on the Current and Future Challenges and Risks to Security in the OSCE Area in early 2017. The first meetings of the Structured Dialogue focused on topics such as threat perceptions,
recent developments in military doctrines and trends in military force postures (OSCE 2017c). While this process is still in its early stages and its outcomes cannot be prejudged, in the current climate of confrontation and deep mutual mistrust, such initiatives are crucial.

Turning to the OSCE’s role in the field of arms control, military confidence-building and risk reduction, there has not been much novelty since 2014. In fact, progress in this area had already been stagnating well before the events in Ukraine unfolded (Anthony 2014). Generally speaking, the management of existing regimes and functioning of their key mechanisms have been more or less maintained during the conflict. However, the events in Ukraine have clearly demonstrated the limits of the existing measures. While they improved the amount and quality of information about events on the ground, they did not significantly reduce levels of tensions in Eastern Ukraine (Anthony 2015). There is clearly a need for updating and modernizing existing documents in this area so that they better reflect new trends as well as recent qualitative and quantitative changes in modern warfare. The sharp deterioration in relations between the West and Russia after the annexation of Crimea and ensuing fighting in eastern Ukraine has so far prevented any progress in this area. However, there seems to be wide agreement that the OSCE remains a key platform for any future negotiations on these issues. This was underlined, for instance, by the final report of the Panel of Eminent Persons on European Security (2015b: 14-15), the initiative of the then German Foreign Minister, Frank-Walter Steinmeier, calling for re-launching of conventional arms control in Europe in summer 2016 (Steinmeier 2016) as well as discussions at the OSCE Security Days in Vienna in October 2016 (see OSCE 2016b, NATO 2016) and a high-level conference organized by the European Leadership Network in September 2017 (Kulesa 2017).

With regard to the function of the OSCE as one of the main platforms for conflict management and resolution in the Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian space, this role has been enhanced by the conflict in Ukraine. At the operational level, the Organization was able to respond rapidly to the crisis, which started as a popular movement against the then acting government but quickly turned into an open military confrontation. After the escalation of violence and the annexation of Crimea in mid-March 2014, the OSCE Permanent Council adopted on 21 March 2014 a decision on deploying a Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM) consisting of civilian international observers. The mission was tasked with a wide range of responsibilities with the aim of contributing towards reducing tensions
and fostering peace and security (OSCE 2014a). The first advance team arrived in Kiev already within 24 hours, and the first monitoring teams were trained and deployed to regions outside the capital only three days later (Neukirch 2015: 185). Currently, the mission has a total staff of over 1,000 personnel, of which over 600 are international monitors mostly based in eastern regions of Ukraine (OSCE 2017d). The mission had to adjust to the extremely fluid and unstable security situation; what started as mostly monitoring of demonstrations quickly turned into a sort of “peace-keeping” civilian operation monitoring a fragile ceasefire and the withdrawal of heavy weapons from the line of contact as well as brokering local ceasefires between battling forces (Zannier 2015; comp. Neukirch 2016). Additionally, in reaction to the Berlin Declaration of 2 July 2014, the OSCE deployed a second field operation, Observer Mission at two Russian Checkpoints of Gukovo and Donetsk, which monitors and reports on the movements across two border crossing points at the Russian-Ukrainian border (OSCE 2014b). While very limited in scope, the mission provides useful information on trends in the movement of persons and vehicles across the border and is the first OSCE presence in the Russian Federation since the early 2000s when the Assistance Group to Chechnya had to withdraw.

At the political level, the OSCE has been leading international efforts to resolve the conflict since the very beginning (Grau 2015: 27-28). Following the presidential election in Ukraine, a Trilateral Contact Group (TCG) was established in June 2014 between Ukraine, Russia and the OSCE, with representatives of the separatist groups in Eastern Ukraine associated with its meetings as well. The work of the TCG proved instrumental in securing access of OSCE monitors to the crash site of flight MH17 in July 2014, and later in negotiating and ultimately brokering a ceasefire agreement to halt fighting in Eastern Ukraine. The Minsk Protocol was signed on 5 September 2014 in the Belarusian capital by representatives of Ukraine, Russia, the OSCE and the so-called Donetsk and Luhansk “People’s Republics” (OSCE 2014d). This was followed on 19 September by the Minsk Memorandum that laid down concrete steps in the implementation of the Protocol (OSCE 2014e).39 After the upsurge of fighting in winter 2014-15 and collapse of the ceasefire, the TCG supported negotiations between leaders of Ukraine, Russia, France and Germany (the so-called Normandy Group) who agreed to the Package of Measures for the Implementation of

39 Both documents are commonly referred to as Minsk Agreements.
the Minsk Agreements on 12 February 2015 to revive the original ceasefire deal (OSCE 2015a). Despite continuing fighting in some areas, numerous violations of the ceasefire, and the generally sceptical view of many experts on the prospects of their implementation (Kimmage 2017; Dempsey 2017), the Minsk Agreements have contained violence in Eastern Ukraine and, at the moment, remain the only political framework for ending the conflict.

Turning to the OSCE’s field activities, it is clear that they remain a central element of the Organization’s work, with most of its staff and resources allocated to the field (OSCE 2017e: 104, 109). Especially due to robust deployment in Ukraine, the OSCE’s presence in the field is in certain areas much stronger than before. At the same time, two OSCE field operations have been closed down since 2014, in particular the OSCE Project Coordinator in Baku (OSCE 2015b) and the OSCE Office in Yerevan (OSCE 2017f). The OSCE was also forced to downgrade its field activities in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan (OSCE 2017g, h). However, all these changes resulted mostly from internal political processes in the countries concerned and were not related in any way to the events in Ukraine. In short, while OSCE field activities in some regions have expanded (Eastern Europe) or remained the same (Western Balkans), in others they have been scaled down (Central Asia) or significantly reduced (South Caucasus).

Finally, regarding the OSCE’s role in addressing transnational threats, it can be concluded that the conflict has not had any major impact in this regard. In fact, the OSCE has expanded its activities in addressing transnational threats over recent years and has been running a number of specific programmes and projects on topics such as preventing and combating terrorism and violent extremism, organized crime and border management. Likewise, the OSCE has been continuing its pioneering work in the field of cyber-security and has made a further progress by adopting the second set of confidence-building measures to reduce the risks of conflict stemming from the use of ICT in March 2016 (OSCE 2016e), extending the first one from 2013. Therefore, it seems that in areas of common interest, such as transnational threats, the OSCE participating states are able to

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40 Generally called Minsk II; however, it needs to be underlined that despite its name, the document does not represent a new ceasefire agreement but is a roadmap to revive the original ceasefire deal from September 2014.

41 For more details, see daily and spot reports by the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine available at http://www.osce.org/ukraine-smm/reports.
maintain limited pragmatic cooperation despite the existing tensions and mutual mistrust.

The future role of the OSCE in the European security architecture

The conflict in Ukraine is not the first in the post-Soviet space but it is definitely unique because it has been for the first time since the World War II when a territory of one European state has been annexed by another. Such actions represent a clear violation of international law and pose a direct challenge to the rules-based international order and multilateral institutions embodying it. Although political implications of Russian actions toward Ukraine have potentially global reach when it comes to issues such as nuclear non-proliferation, change of international borders or the use of force in international relations, they could have a profound impact especially on the OSCE, given the Organization’s unique position as a bridge between the Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian regions as well as its active engagement in most post-Soviet countries.

While causes of this conflict lie well beyond the realm of the OSCE (see e.g. Forsberg & Haukkala 2016), it is also true that the Organization was created with the aim of preventing exactly such events from happening at the first place. Blaming the OSCE for developments in Ukraine would be unjustified; however, it is clear that the conflict poses a direct challenge not only to the Organization’s activities and operations but also to its long-term legitimacy and its very existence. The longer it lasts, the more negative impact on the relations between Russia and the West can be expected. Given the position of the OSCE in this regard, it will be certainly affected by any further deterioration.

Generally speaking, there seem to be three possible scenarios. Firstly, the OSCE will play a similar role as during the Cold War and serve as a bridge-builder between Russia and the West. The Organization will be used by all parties to the conflict as a key platform for negotiations and eventual settlement of the conflict in Ukraine and its position in the European security architecture will be thus re-confirmed and strengthened in the long term. This can be considered a positive scenario. Secondly, the deterioration in relations between Russia and the West will continue and this will have a negative impact on the OSCE’s functioning and activities. Stagnation of security cooperation will spill over to all areas, the Organization’s relevance will gradually decline and in the long term, it will risk becoming irrelevant.
This is a negative scenario. Finally, there is a neutral scenario, in which not much will change and things will remain similar to the current situation. Russia will strengthen its hold on Crimea, which will continue to be considered illegal and illegitimate by most countries, and the conflict in Eastern Ukraine will become another protracted conflict in the OSCE area. This will hinder any meaningful progress in relations between Russia and the West and will have negative impact on international cooperation in some key areas, such as conventional arms control and military confidence-building. At the same time, a limited pragmatic cooperation in other areas, for instance addressing transnational threats, will continue. The OSCE will be balancing on the edge and will retain an important role in some fields, while in others its relevance will be questioned or decreasing.

It is too soon to say which of these scenarios may eventually play out and if and how the role of the OSCE in the European security architecture will change. There are calls for using the OSCE as a platform for a new robust diplomatic process that would attempt to re-discover a common understanding of existing norms and principles and re-establish European security on a cooperative basis (Panel of Eminent Persons 2015b, Tiilikainen et al. 2015). This would be in a certain sense a return to the original purpose of the CSCE as it was designed during the Cold War. If materialized, this could indicate a move in the direction of the positive scenario outlined above although the final assessment would still depend on an outcome of any such initiative. However, the views of experts on the feasibility of such a process under current conditions vary and scepticism seems to prevail (see Nünlist 2017b, OSCE 2016a, OSCE 2017b). While time might be not ripe for this yet, it is certainly not a “mission impossible”. After all, leaders who reached the agreement on the 1974 Helsinki Final Act, a founding document of the CSCE/OSCE, were divided by much more fundamental ideological differences than those existing between Russia and the West nowadays. There is no reason to believe that the current disputes cannot be resolved in a peaceful and civilized way at the end. The work within the Structured Dialogue Process launched by the OSCE in early 2017 is certainly a step in the right direction but more than that will be needed to overcome the current impasse. Serious compromises will be necessary on all sides to achieve any meaningful progress.

On the other hand, one can argue that the current international system is too different from the bipolar era and hopes that political compromises can be found because it was possible in the past are only wishful thinking. Finding a common ground in today’s multipolar
and heterogeneous international system which consists of a number of independent actors with their own interests and priorities might indeed prove much more difficult than during the time of the Cold War, especially in the framework of an organization such as the OSCE where decision-making is based on consensus. Although adversaries on both sides of the Iron Curtain were divided by deep ideological differences, they were also members of two more or less homogenous camps, each led by one superpower. This made reaching pragmatic compromises based on “Realpolitik” at the end easier. At the same time, fear of the enemy and the common interest in preventing a nuclear Armageddon limited potential internal disagreements and opposition within both blocs. The situation today is simply different and from this perspective, the neutral scenario seems to be much more likely than the positive one. In fact, developments since 2014 until now are pointing rather to this direction in the future.

Finally, regarding the negative scenario, it is hard to see how such a development could be in the interest of any actor in the Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian space. However, if events are allowed to run their own course and the main countries resign on efforts to find a resolution to the conflict in Ukraine, there will be a real danger that the negative scenario could also become a reality in the foreseeable future.

**Conclusion**

The role of the OSCE in the European security architecture has not significantly changed since the annexation of Crimea and the ensuing fighting in Eastern Ukraine in early 2014. The conflict has underlined some aspects of the Organization’s key activities, in particular its function as a platform for high-level political dialogue as well as conflict management and resolution. Other areas such as arms control and military confidence-building, project and programmatic activities in the field, or cooperation in addressing transnational threats, have not been significantly influenced so far. Although the OSCE’s profile and visibility has been temporarily increased due to its involvement in the events in Ukraine, it can be concluded that the Organization continues to play more or less the same role in the European security environment as it has over the past two and a half decades.

At the same time, if the conflict in Ukraine continues in its current form for a significantly longer period of time, it can have profound negative implications for the legitimacy and existence of the OSCE in the long
term. In general there are three possible scenarios for the future role of the Organization in the European security architecture. A positive scenario is that the OSCE will fulfil its original purpose as a bridge-builder and will serve as a key platform for negotiations and eventual settlement of the conflict in Ukraine. In a negative scenario, deterioration of relations between Russia and the West will continue, which will negatively impact the OSCE’s functioning and activities and will eventually lead to its gradual decline and irrelevance in the future. Finally, in a neutral scenario, the conflict in Ukraine will turn into another protracted conflict, which will hinder any meaningful progress in the mutual relations between Russia and the West but a limited pragmatic cooperation in certain areas of common interest will continue. In such a scenario, the OSCE will remain an important actor in certain areas while its relevance and role in others will be questioned or significantly diminished.

With the conflict in Ukraine entering slowly its fifth year, it is too early to say which of these three scenarios might eventually materialize and how the role of the OSCE in the European security architecture could change in the future. Developments and events so far suggest that the neutral scenario is the most likely at the moment although there are some positive signs of efforts in the direction of the positive scenario as well. The negative scenario is not in the interest of anybody but a danger that it could become a reality in the future cannot be ruled out either.

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Outlying regions
THE RISE OF NATIONALISM IN ASIA: THE CASE OF CHINA AND VIETNAM

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Introduction

Although Southeast Asia can serve as a model for successful international multilateral cooperation in the form of ASEAN, its member states are still incapable of satisfactorily addressing lingering territorial disputes that regularly mar their bilateral relations. These territorial disputes are caused by several factors, the most important being historical controversies and popular nationalism. Furthermore, historical controversies have been further aggravated by the fact that borders among Southeast Asian states were arbitrarily drawn by formal colonial powers, which did not take into consideration ethnic, religious, social or linguistic identities (Strašáková 2017, 111).

These inconsistencies, fuelled by intensive and emotional responses of the public, play an important role in escalating territorial disputes and make consequent resolution futile. Furthermore, as Park points out, depending on the leadership of the country, these conflicts can be controlled, subdued or on the other hand intensively politicized as most territorial conflicts are linked to national pride and prestige (Park 2010, 45). Probably the most mediated and imminent of these are the disputes between the PRC and Vietnam over the South China Sea (SCS), where it is legitimate to claim that populism is involved in its escalation. Furthermore, the spat can be considered as an interlocutor conflict that has not only a territorial and economic basis, but also above all symbolic meaning, because of the length of its duration (protracted and latent conflict) and the rhetoric (the politicization of the problem). Moreover, it periodically raises concerns about the outbreak of an open armed conflict between the two states.

Hence, the objective of this article is to shed light on the ongoing dispute over the SCS between the PRC and Vietnam, as well as the dichotomy of high-level diplomacy and media image of especially anti-Chinese moods in Vietnam, which, encouraged by “megaphone diplomacy”, contribute to
the escalation of public opinion in Vietnam. “Spontaneous manifestations of the wrongdoing” fill the streets and squares of Vietnamese cities and often cause considerable material damage (e.g. the demonstrations and looting of Chinese factories during the HYSY 981 incident of May 2014). Most of the anti-Chinese demonstrations (and other speeches of populist nationalism) are in many ways substandard: they are tolerated by the Vietnamese state, which is somewhat striking with the authoritarian regime, as other manifestations of “folk dissatisfaction” are nipped in the bud.

Similarly, this dichotomy is also discernable in the case of China, where the manifestations of “people’s anger” do not only have an anti-Vietnamese character, but are rather a manifestation of shared patriotism, which is also evident in the anti-Japanese demonstrations in connection with the disputes in the East China Sea. Populist nationalism, on the one hand, supports the ruling Communist Party of China (CPC), but on the other hand de facto does not allow a different solution than the preservation of the status quo. There are several reasons for this paradox. Firstly, it is the “national pride”, weakened by a “century of unequal treaties”, when China lost sovereignty over parts of its territory, which does not allow the ruling CPC to give up any small territory unless it wants to undermine its legitimacy to rule. Secondly, any violent conflict would also seriously damage the constructed image of China’s peaceful rise.

Therefore, this paper argues that in the case of the SCS dispute both Chinese and Vietnamese populist nationalism have the same roots. On the one hand, the manifestation of “popular” support for the territorial interests of the state is one of the pillars of the legitimacy of the ruling garnitures (and ruling communist parties), the mandates of which have significantly weakened as a result of economic change and the deepening of socio-economic differences. On the other hand, both parties cannot allow an armed military conflict to erupt given the fact that the image of an aggressor would aggravate their negotiating position in the SCS dispute. Hence, while both the Chinese and Vietnamese public express their populist nationalism either on online social forums or in the streets, the political leadership of both countries still relies on bilateral diplomatic talks to prevent the dispute from escalating and damaging mutual relations.

Nationalism in Southeast Asia

Nationalism, like democracy, is very difficult to define, as its connotations and manifestations have changed significantly with time. In addition, they
also differ depending on the region and the historical context. Talking about types and forms of nationalism would give rise to a considerably wide-ranging (predominantly political or sociological) study, which is not the aim of this text. According to Gellner (1993, 158), nationalism is essentially a construct, and nationalist ideologies are not natural. Anderson (2008, 276) also considers nationalism as a construct developed by the media.

The construct of nationalism was clearly a phenomenon associated with the Western tradition, the analogy of which we would look for in vain in the context of China and Southeast Asia until the 19th century. In East and Southeast Asia, political nationalism began to emerge more pronouncedly in the early 20th century, although its traces and origins can be found in the preceding century, particularly in connection with increased migration, industrialization and other aspects of colonial politics. Modongal (2016, 2) points out that until the confrontation with the West, China did not even have state symbolism (flag, emblem) nor any official name. Nationalism, as well as other “imports of Western ideas into a completely different historical and cultural context, made significant shifts” (Fürst 2000, 104), and not only in the Chinese and Vietnamese context. According to Townsend (2016) the original culturalism (in the Confucian understanding of the legitimacy of power common to both countries) reflected itself in imported nationalism, as evidenced by the territorial demands of all post-dynastic regimes, including the socialist system. Pye (1992, 6) also argues that such nationalism serves to divert attention from the crisis of the authority of the government that often arises “when the cultural and psychological bases for legitimacy of political power are radically undermined by the developmental process.”

In essence, there are two approaches to nationalism in both China and Vietnam: 1) bottom-up (as driven by the ordinary people); 2) top-down (i.e. as an expression of interests of the ruling elites). Yet, as Modongal (2016, 7) argues that such a strict division is not possible, as other external factors have also played a role, even if unintentional.

Both Vietnam and China have developed rapidly in the 20th century. Yet, the political and social development in both countries still lags behind the economic sphere. Contrary to the European context (the transformation of socialist regimes in Eastern and Central Europe at the turn of the 1980s and 1990s), this disparity has not lead to the downfall of the existing regimes, but only resulted in a partial reform of political institutions. The crisis of authority that the CPC and the CPV managed to overcome required, among other things, “the creation of the (new) myth of legitimacy” (Pye 1992, 7), for which the visible defence of national interests
(e.g. in the form of demonstrative firmness in territorial disputes) associated with the manifestation of popular support served well. The manifestations of “patriotic belonging” sanctioned by the ruling power at least externally drew attention from manifestations of disagreement with the governing authority and contributed to the strengthening of its legitimacy (regardless of the fact that these demonstrative actions did not resolve any of the territorial disputes).

While both countries succeeded in resolving their land border disputes, friction continues to persist especially regarding the SCS. Divergent claims over the Paracel and Spratly archipelagos between the PRC and Vietnam resurfaced after the end of the Cold War and the subsequent normalization of relations in 1991. Despite the fact that the two sides signed an agreement on the establishment of two working expert groups to resolve territorial disputes, tensions over the archipelagos have not eased so far. The contradicting claims culminated in May 2014 with the so-called HYSY 891 oil rig incident, which caused perhaps the most serious breach of bilateral relations between the two countries since 1991. The incident was triggered by the Chinese state oil company CNOOC, which, on May 2, 2014, moved its oil rig to the contested waters near the Paracel Islands. The incident also unleashed a heated debate in Vietnam, in which all circles of Vietnamese society addressed the question on how to escape from China’s orbit, and ways to “reduce reliance on China” (Truong-Minh Vu & Nguyen Thanh Trung 2014). Furthermore, the debate unleashed a wave of nationalist ire both in Vietnam and China, while the political leadership of both sides strove to overcome the differences through diplomatic talks.

**Anti-Vietnamese, Anti-Chinese Nationalism and the South China Sea**

*The Case of China*

While the HYSY 891 oil rig incident received extensive coverage in both official and media statements abroad, in China it received very little attention in official statements. Most of the official documents, reports and statements were brief, short and seemed to reiterate the Chinese position on the SCS. While the official places (as the State Council or Ministry of Foreign Affairs) remained cautious in their reactions towards Vietnam, Chinese state media widely broadcast contentious developments. Much of the attention focused first on boat collisions between Chinese and Vietnamese ships near the oil rig, which were branded as a “security threat for Chinese boats, facilities
and personnel as well as for regular navigation safety” (Loher 2017, 285). Despite being fervent, neither official statements nor media reports gave any offensive generalisations about Vietnam (Cotillon 2017, 65). However, at a Regular Press Conference on June 18, 2014, Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hua Chunying reiterated that China would take “all necessary measures to safeguard national sovereignty and maritime rights and interests” (MOFA PRC 2014). It is debatable whether this statement could be perceived as an indirect threat to Vietnam for its defiance in the matter. Such statements are often addressed rather to the “domestic audience” than to the side of the conflict. According to Cotillon (2017, 65) China was merely “prodding Vietnam to remind it of its claim, rather than using military force to coerce it into accepting China’s sovereignty over the disputed area”.

While China’s State Councillor Yang Jiechi stressed that both sides should resolve the problem through political and diplomatic means as soon as possible and refrain from aggravating, complicating and internationalizing relevant issues (MOFA PRC 2014), the Chinese public, just like the Vietnamese one took a much more hardline approach towards Vietnam. Chinese netizens, just like their Vietnamese counterparts, discussed the topic extensively on both social media platforms and online forums, such as on People’s Daily’s “Strong Nation Forum” or Sina Weibo, where emotions ran high and a strong anti-Vietnamese narrative was more than discernable (Cotillon 2017, 65). Many Chinese labelled the Vietnamese as “guizi”, which means “devil”, and called for China to “seize and punish the foreign devils who unlawfully infringe on or undermine China’s sovereignty over maritime territory” (Cotillon 2017, 65). Furthermore, Chinese netizens branded Vietnam as a “vassal state” and stressed its inferiority towards China as well as its lack of gratitude for “China’s military sacrifice for Vietnam” during the Vietnam War (Cotillon 2017, 66). Many users on Sina Weibo also invoked the Sino–Vietnamese war of 1979 and called for China to teach Vietnam “the lesson it deserves” (Huong Le Thu 2014).

Interestingly, despite nationalist fervour on social media and online forums, the Chinese public did not initiate any street protests over the issue, as is often the case with territorial disputes over the Senkaku Islands with Japan. As Cotillon (2017, 66) points out, it is not possible to discern whether these public demonstrations were prevented from happening by the authorities, or whether there was not enough public anger to initiate protests. It is, however, appropriate to ask why anti-Japanese sentiment is more intense than the anti-Vietnamese one, when maritime disputes are, to a degree, comparable given their material and strategic value. A partial
answer is offered by Womack’s thesis of asymmetry, where Chinese foreign policy does not perceive Vietnam as significant as Japan. In fact, Vietnam has always been a low risk punchbag for China. The same cannot be said about Japan, which China perceives as a historical rival (especially given both Sino-Japanese wars) as well as an ally and protégé of the United States, against whom China defines itself. Moreover, since the 1990s it has been Japan (and not Vietnam), who has been perceived as one of plotters of the “humiliation of China” in the 19th and 20th centuries and this nationalistic narrative has been dominating Chinese domestic and foreign policy.

The Case of Vietnam

While anti-Vietnamese sentiment has not been running high in China, anti-Chinese sentiment has long been present in Vietnam given the fact that it is the weaker side in the asymmetrical relationship. Hence, Vietnamese perceptions of China can be best characterized as “a particularly volatile cocktail, mixing the standard feelings of bitterness and resentment (…) with a nationalist narrative that champions centuries of resistance to Chinese aggression” (The Scholar’s Stage 2014).

Regarding the SCS disputes, anti-Chinese protests began to emerge more pronouncedly since January 2005, after Chinese coastguards had killed nine Vietnamese fishermen and several of them had been arrested in the waters of the Gulf of Tonkin. While Vietnamese politicians remained silent about the incident and filed a diplomatic complaint only six days later, the Vietnamese press took a more proactive role. Vietnamese newspapers published information on the incident, prompting a wave of protests, especially in the Vietnamese diaspora. In particular, Vietnamese students at foreign universities formed groups that condemned the brutality of China and expressed sympathy with their fellow citizens in Vietnam. The students also spontaneously organized donations for the families of the nine killed fishermen, rallied for signatures and sent letters to Chinese Embassies around the world, and last but not least, they also created websites to bring relevant information about the SCS conflict (Tuong Vu 2014, 41).

In the years to come, the diffusion of anti-Chinese sentiment in Vietnamese society was enabled primarily by the Internet, which for a short while represented a relatively free space for Vietnamese netizens to express their views on contemporary issues (Abuza 2015). These online activities enabled further mobilization of Vietnamese protesting against the actions of the PRC in the SCS at the turn of 2007/2008 (Tuong Vu 2014, 42).
Vietnamese public opinion was most outraged by China’s incorporation of the disputed Paracel and Spratly Islands as a separate administrative district of Sansha in November 2007. In addition, at the turn of 2007/2008, maritime conflicts between Vietnamese fishermen and Chinese coastguards began to increase. Anti-Chinese protests continued throughout 2008 in connection with the preparation of the Beijing Olympic Games. The Vietnamese government had previously pledged to China that it would not allow any riots during the proceeding ceremonies. However, on April 29, 2008, when 60 runners carried the Olympic torch through Ho Chi Minh City, brief anti-Chinese demonstrations were held in Hanoi, where Vietnamese activists were protesting and flying banners with anti-Chinese messages until the police intervened. Subsequently well-known bloggers, who participated in the incident, such as Dieu Cay (Nguyen Van Hai) and Anh Ba Saigon (Phan Thanh Hai), were arrested and some sentenced to several years in prison (Tuong Vu 2014, 43).

In connection with growing anti-Chinese (as well as anti-government) moods, the Vietnamese government tightened control over the content of the Internet. In 2008, it approved the Decree no. 72, which “prohibits the use of the Internet and online information to oppose the SRV”, threatening national security, social order and security; to sabotage “national solidarity”; “stimulating animosity between races and religions; opposing national traditions”, etc. (Abuza 2015). Since then, the Vietnamese government has also begun blocking sites dealing with the SCS. The Vietnamese public is highly critical of the Vietnamese government’s willingness to compromise with the PRC over the SCS, as this stance is perceived as a sign of servility and weakness (Phuc Thi Tran, Vysotskaya and Ferreira-Pereira 2013, 169-170). The main reason for suppressing anti-Chinese nationalism among Vietnamese citizens is the Vietnamese government’s fear of the Chinese reaction and its possible retaliatory action. Secondly, the repression was motivated by the fear that anti-Chinese demonstrations could change into anti-government protests (Vuving 2008, 389).

The unprecedented and hitherto largest anti-Chinese protests erupted in Vietnam in 2014 following the HYSY 891 oil rig incident, which caused perhaps the most serious breach of bilateral relations between the two countries since 1991. The incident was triggered by the Chinese state oil company CNOOC, which moved its HYSY 891 oil rig to the contested waters near the Paracel Islands also claimed by Vietnam. At the same time, Hainan Maritime Safety Administration announced on May 3 that the drilling would continue until August 15, 2014 (APDF 2014).
This step prompted a strong reaction from Vietnam. In a statement issued on May 5, Le Hai Binh, spokesperson of the MFA VSR, stressed that “any activities carried out by foreign countries in Vietnamese waters without its permission are illegal and void, with Vietnam resolutely rejecting these steps.” However, despite verbal protests, the Vietnamese leaders continued in their relatively peaceful attitude towards the PRC calling for diplomatic talks. Up to the end of May, Vietnamese politicians initiated almost thirty proposals for dialogue with the PRC, but all remained unanswered (Shoji 2014, 1). Since diplomatic talks seemed at a dead end since the beginning of the incident, the Vietnamese side sent 29 ships to the oil rig with the intention of interrupting its activities. On May 3rd and 4th, the first clash between the Chinese and Vietnamese Coast Guard ships took place, in which the Vietnamese side experienced considerable material damage. Crashes at sea continued until mid-June, with reports of these confrontations flooding the media in both countries and exciting emotions, especially in Vietnam. On May 13, demonstrations spiralled out of control when rioters vandalized hundreds of foreign-owned factories thought to belong to Chinese companies. Furthermore, at least six Chinese citizens were killed in the process, forcing Beijing to start evacuating Chinese nationals from Vietnam. Beijing also accused Hanoi of encouraging the riots, and issued travel warnings (Green et al. 2017). Many Vietnamese officials then began to worry that the protests would ultimately harm Vietnam more than the PRC itself. In order to calm the situation, the Vietnamese government actively discouraged citizens from protesting. Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung even appealed to citizens not to join the protests via text messages (Shoji 2014, 2).

In June 2014, China and Vietnam sought to smooth out their differences, however, with little results, and discussions culminated in a mutual blame-game, as the Chinese State Councillor Yang Jiechi accused the Vietnamese of “harassing the oil rig and “hyping” the issue”.

Tensions between the two countries lasted until July 15, when the PRC unexpectedly announced the withdrawal of the oil rig on the following day, i.e. a month prior to the original deadline (Truong-Minh Vu and Nguyen Thanh Trung, 2014). This has prompted considerable speculation among not only diplomats but also security analysts. According to the official standpoint and the Chinese government media, the platform was withdrawn because it succeeded in completing the drilling in advance. According to Xinhua news reports of July 16, the main reason for the withdrawal was Typhoon Rammasun, which hit the Philippines on July 16-
and was heading to Hainan and to the South China provinces and seaside areas of Northern Vietnam. This statement also provoked contradictory responses. According to some commentators, the platform was designed to resist the onslaught of weather, especially the typhoons that regularly afflict this area from July to September. For this reason, this explanation did not appear to be quite plausible. According to Thayer, a Chinese-Vietnamese relations expert, the reason for the withdrawal was not so much concern for the destruction of the platform, but rather the damage done to nearly a hundred Chinese ships guarding it (Diplomat 2014).

The withdrawal of the platform enabled a truce to be reached during the CPV official Le Hong Anh’s visit to China on August 26 - 27, 2014. In a three-point agreement that was released on this occasion both the sides pledged to: 1) further enhance their direct guidance on the development of their bilateral relations; 2) to strengthen intra-party communication as well as 3) to keep a consensus between the two parties and countries to maintain the overall situation of the Sino-Vietnamese relationship and peace and stability in the SCS (Truong-Minh Vu & Nguyen Thanh Trung 2014). While strategic trust may have been restored between the leadership of both countries since 2014, suspicions between the populations of both countries regarding the SCS have not subdued.

Conclusion

The aim of this chapter was to highlight the dichotomy of high diplomacy and media image (especially) of anti-Vietnamese and anti-Chinese sentiments that contribute to the escalation of the SCS dispute. The chapter argued that both Chinese and Vietnamese populist nationalism have similar roots. On one hand, the manifestation of “popular” support for the territorial interests of the state is one of the pillars of the legitimacy of the ruling garnitures (and ruling communist parties), the mandates of which have significantly weakened as a result of economic change and the deepening of socio-economic differences. China represents a “traditional” enemy of Vietnam; hence, any “victory” over China is seen as a proof of power and legitimacy to rule the country. Thus, the medialization of the SCS dispute with China can be expected also in the future. At the same time, these anti-Chinese sentiments must be confined into manageable bounds, so that they do not turn into anti-government protests as the Vietnamese public is highly sensitive to the Vietnamese governments’ willingness to compromise with China as this stance is perceived as a weakness and subservience to China. On the other hand, Vietnam is perceived as a low risk punchbag and albeit
a slightly problematic “vassal” by both Chinese politicians as well as the public. Therefore, it can be assumed that if official Vietnamese rhetoric remains moderate, anti-Vietnamese populism will not reach the same intensity as the anti-Japanese one. Escalation of the SCS dispute is possible if the Vietnamese respond emotionally (just as Philippine President Acquina did), and if Vietnam concludes a vital military alliance, for example with the US.

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In a string of swift offensives in summer 2017, the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) and Hezbollah's armed units ousted the jihadist groups loyal to the Islamic State (IS) or former Al-Qaeda affiliate Jabhat al-Nusra from the border areas of north-eastern Lebanon. While the campaign did not receive such widespread attention as the fighting in Syria, some images resonated beyond Lebanon. One of the widely circulated photos portrayed Hezbollah fighters who, after seizing a contested hilltop from the Al-Qaeda-affiliated militants, raised and saluted two flags - the yellow and green flag of their movement and right next to it, in a gesture symbolizing their double allegiance and complementarity of the LAF and Hezbollah, the Lebanese national flag (Alami 2017).

Following the election of its Christian ally Michel Aoun as the Lebanese president and the successful campaign against the Jihadist groups, Hezbollah seemed to be at the peak of its power in the country. Moreover, it established itself as the crucial military player in Syria and proved to be willing to fight ISIS and Al-Qaeda, which increased its acceptability. However, Hezbollah's position has always been fragile and contested by its domestic and international opponents. Being labelled as a 'penetrated state', where international, regional and domestic politics coalesce and feed into each other (Najem 2012), in the 2017 Lebanon and especially the issue of Hezbollah's weapons once again became one of the focal points of regional conflicts.
This paper aims to put this issue into the perspective of the longer political processes in Lebanon and relations between ‘the state’, Hezbollah and its domestic and international opponents. It will first review earlier debates and struggles over the role of the Shiite movement’s armed wing vis-a-vis the state and then turn to the recent issues connected to Hezbollah’s role in Lebanon, in particular with regard to its role in Syria, Lebanese national security and the current situation on the border with Israel. As the paper highlights, Hezbollah’s role in Lebanon should not be viewed outside of the internal Lebanese political arrangement, yet its increasing dominance in Lebanese politics poses distinct challenges for Lebanon in the form of sectarian tensions and the form of potential conflict with Israel.

Hezbollah and the Lebanese state

The origins of Hezbollah are commonly traced to the first half of the 1980s. Founded in the chaos of the Lebanese civil war as a loose alliance of Shiite clerics and armed factions with significant Iranian backing, Hezbollah only gradually emerged as a distinct organization. The Open Letter of 1985, which announced the establishment of the movement, represented Hezbollah as the Islamic Resistance aimed against foreign (in particular Western and Israeli) interventions in Lebanon. In the domestic scene, the Open Letter vowed to transform the Lebanese state and society according to the ideological inspirations provided by the Iranian Islamic revolution.

Following the end of the Lebanese civil war and re-establishment of the central government, Hezbollah was recognized as the ‘National Resistance’ also by the Lebanese state. While nearly all other militias of the civil war era were requested to surrender their weapons, Hezbollah was allowed to retain its armed capabilities in order to fight against the Israeli occupation of southern Lebanon. While the Lebanese army was primarily tasked with internal security, Hezbollah’s armed forces were mandated to confront the external enemies, which the army was not able or willing to fight on its own (Gade and Moussa 2017, 26). Following the withdrawal of the IDF from most of southern Lebanon in May 2000, Hezbollah cited the occupation of disputed border territories (the farms of Sheeba) as the reason why its ‘struggle’ against the Israeli occupation had not been concluded. The same reason was officially given also by the Lebanese government, which

43 There is a long-standing and unresolved debate over the proper ‘label’ which should be attached to Hezbollah and whether it should be referred to as a terrorist group, militia, political party, armed political movement, or something else.
claimed that, without Hezbollah, Lebanon would not be able to defend itself against Israel. The official acceptance of the movement’s armed wing by the state has also transformed Hezbollah itself. The party went through a process of ‘Lebanonization’ as it moderated its initial opposition to non-religious governmental authorities and included nationalistic discourses to its self-presentation. Since 1992 the movement started to participate in elections with a number of successes at both municipal and national level. Hezbollah has been widely popular among Shiites of the middle and lower classes, among other reasons also for its vast network of organizations and charities tasked with the provision of welfare and public services (Cammett 2014, 152–54). By the end of the 1990s, Hezbollah was able to establish itself as an important formal and informal authority by simultaneously adopting the role of protector of the Shiite community in Lebanon and the Lebanese state vis-a-vis its external enemies.

The role of Resistance contested (and retained)

Nevertheless, the acceptance of its armed wing by the Lebanese state should not be viewed outside the context of the post-civil war Syrian dominance (so-called ‘tutelage’ – wisaya) over Lebanese politics, as well as the broader international context of accommodative Western policy towards Syria and Iran (Osoegawa 2013, 110–11). The shift of US policy in the post 9/11 era elevated the issue of Hezbollah’s autonomous arms to the international agenda and framed it as a threat towards Lebanese democracy, sovereignty of its government and regional security. Such interpretation of the situation in Lebanon was articulated also by UN Security Council Resolution 1559 from September 2004, which demanded the withdrawal of foreign forces from Lebanon and disarmament of non-state armed militias.

Resolution 1559 escalated and radicalised the national debate on Hezbollah. While the pro-Syrian (Shiite and Christian) groups in Lebanon maintained that Hezbollah should continue to be treated as the Resistance, forming part of the national security system and pointed to Israel as the main security threat, the pro-Western (mainly Sunni and Christian) side called for immediate withdrawal of the Syrian army and disarmament of Hezbollah (Khayat 2007). Although the Syrian armed forces left Lebanon in April 2005, the political conflict between the pro-Syrian and anti-Syrian camps (dubbed March 8 in the pro-Syrian case and March 14 in the other) has defined Lebanese politics ever since.

44 Lebanon does not recognize Israel as a sovereign state and the southern border is officially only the UN-marked line of ceasefire (the Blue Line).
In July 2006 Hezbollah captured two Israeli soldiers and killed three others, officially in an attempt to secure the release of Lebanese prisoners held in Israel. Massive and unexpected Israeli retaliation (which came to be known as the Summer War) destroyed most of the Shiite-inhabited regions of Lebanon. Similarly to the operations against Hezbollah in the 1990s, Israeli military maintained the distinction between the state and Hezbollah and officially targeted only the latter. Yet, the goals of the operation went beyond the recovery of the kidnapped soldiers or punishing Hezbollah for the attack and echoed those of UN SC Resolution 1559 in their emphasis on disarmament of non-state armed groups. The limited interpretation of these demands became the basis of UN SC Resolution 1701 of August 2006, which put the southern regions of Lebanon under the oversight of the enhanced UN peacekeeping mission (UNIFIL – UN Interim Force in Lebanon) and called for deployment of the LAF to the area. Hezbollah eventually agreed to both conditions and mostly refrained from open display of weapons in the area under the UN authority (Newby 2016).

Whereas its autonomy was to a certain extent curbed, the exceptional position of Hezbollah in domestic politics was subsequently reaffirmed in the aftermath of the May 2008 clashes. The months following the war of 2006 were marked by political conflicts over the form of implementation of UN SC Resolutions 1559 and 1701 and possibility of the forced disarmament of the Shiite movement. The tensions escalated in May 2008, when the pro-Western government made a move against the autonomous Hezbollah-controlled communication network. Hezbollah in turn attacked and overpowered militias of the pro-Western political parties and after few days of fighting, it handed the control of the conquered territories to the LAF (Knudsen and Gade 2017, 14). Even though the conflict was brief, it represented the first time since the end of the civil war that the Shiite movement used its weapons primarily against its domestic political opponents. The event heightened the sense of humiliation and insecurity, which was felt especially among the Sunni community and paved the way for future conflicts.

Nevertheless, the clashes and subsequent Doha Agreement confirmed the autonomous existence of Hezbollah – the Resistance – side-by-side with the LAF in the form of an extension and ‘conceptual continuity’ of the army (Picard 2009, 266). The agreement further stipulated that any

At the same time, the transformation of the domestic conflict was facilitated also by the changes on the international scene and change of the US policy in Middle East after the election of Barack Obama as US president (Makdisi 2011).

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future disarmament of the Shiite movement needs to be mediated by the National Dialogue, where all the main parties (including Hezbollah) hold a power of veto (Salloukh 2017, 67).

**War in Syria and reinterpretation of the Resistance’s role**

The escalation of the war in Syria renewed the controversies on the relation between the state and the Resistance. The Lebanese government pursued officially on the basis of the 2012 Baabda Declaration the policy of neutrality and disassociation from the Syrian conflict (Salloukh 2017, 73–74). On the other hand, Hezbollah, in clear violation of the Declaration, actively intervened in Syria and supported the Syrian regime. By doing so, it interpreted its Resistance mission anew. The Syrian crisis and the increased attention of the international and regional powers on Lebanon also provided the Lebanese opponents of the Syrian regime with an opportunity to reverse the alleged Syrian-Shiite domination over the country (Salloukh 2017, 68).

Hezbollah has been present in Syria with smaller units and ‘military instructors’ already since 2012, yet it initially denied its involvement in larger combat operations. The primary reason of Hezbollah’s decision to support the Assad regime with significant armed force is a matter of debate, however many analysts point to the need to protect its logistical system and supply routes in Syria, which help to sustain the armed wing of the movement in Lebanon (Ranstorp 2016, 36–39). The fact that Hezbollah’s first larger autonomous operation took place in 2013 in the town of al-Qusayr, which is located close to the main routes connecting Lebanon with Damascus also points to the importance of this reason (Abboud 2015, 114–15). However, the operational success of the al-Qusayr campaign led to the broadening of Hezbollah’s role in Syria as it was more often tasked to support the Syrian army in direct combat further from the Lebanese borders.

Hezbollah has been well aware of the controversial nature of its armed involvement in Syria and it struggled to craft a narrative which would appeal to its supporters and the Lebanese public. Hezbollah’s mission in Syria was initially framed as support to fellow Shiite minorities in the country. Such justification was changed shortly before the al-Qusayr campaign as an increasing number of Hezbollah fighters were to be deployed to Syria. The Secretary General of Hezbollah, Hassan Nasrallah, framed in his April 2013 speech the uprising in Syria as being waged by international Jihadists with US and Israeli support. As such, the forces of Resistance have to support the Syrian military in order to protect Lebanon from future attacks of radical
Islamists and to retain the ability of the Resistance to defend Lebanon against Israel (Ranstorp 2016, 42–43).

The spillover of the Syrian conflict to Lebanon

The impact of al-Qusayr campaign was strongly polarizing in Lebanon. The fact that Hezbollah turned its weapons on fellow Muslims and in defence of the oppressive Assad regime fed into simmering political tensions and angered anti-Syrian and Sunni groups. The Shiite neighbourhoods in Beirut suffered a string of suicide attacks and Hezbollah, in response, enhanced its own security measures, which further strengthened its criticism as being an unaccountable state within a state (Salloukh 2017, 71). The tensions flared up in particular among marginalized Sunni communities. The heavy-handed reaction to the support which some Lebanese communities provided to the Syrian opposition, as well as the criminalization of those who joined armed rebel groups, deepened the sense of injustice felt by some Sunnis, who argued that Hezbollah’s fighters are treated differently than them. In some cases, such as in the speeches of the radical preacher Ahmad al-Assir, Hezbollah was openly labelled as the primary enemy that had hijacked the Lebanese state and which needed to be tackled by military means in order to win the state back for the Sunni community. Hezbollah officially stayed out of sensitive internal security operations, such as the LAF crackdown on al-Assir’s loyalists in Sidon in June 2013 and the LAF interventions into the conflict between Sunni and Alawite groups in Tripoli in 2014 (Zelin 2016, 53). The main area of the conflict then moved in August 2014 to north-eastern Lebanon. Jihadist militants loyal to the Islamic State and Jabhat al-Nusra, which were pushed to the region in result of the Al-Qusayr campaign, briefly captured the town of Arsal and were later ousted only by the joint offensive of the LAF, Hezbollah and the Syrian Army (both of the latter were active primarily on the Syrian side of the border) (Gade and Moussa 2017, 34–35). For the Shiite movement, the campaign was of eminent importance as it enabled it to strengthen its Resistance credentials among the Lebanese public and highlight its contribution to Lebanese national security.

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46 It should be noted that even many Shiites openly questioned the purpose and methods of justification of the Syrian campaign.
The final offensive in Arsal was conducted in the summer of 2017. While Hezbollah fighters attacked the Jihadists in the internationally medialized offensive, the LAF sealed the potential escape routes and protected the Lebanese towns and villages.\(^47\)

In order not to anger its Western backers, the LAF formally denied that there was any form of direct cooperation between Hezbollah and the official armed forces and it maintained that it liaised with Hezbollah in the same manner as with all the other relevant actors in the area (Nerguizian 2017). On the other hand, Hezbollah’s media cheered the achievements of the forces of Resistance and the Army and, in a version of the classic narrative on the relation with the LAF, stated that the movement would hand over captured territory to the Army, when it was ready to take it (The Daily Star 2017). For Hezbollah’s supporters, the campaign represented the essence of Hezbollah’s role as the defender of the Lebanese nation and its complementary position vis-a-vis the LAF enshrined in the motto stressing the unity of the People, the Army and the Resistance (Hezbollah). For its opponents, it manifested an unprecedented and dangerous acceptance of the movement’s armed units by the official structures of the state and its disregard for UN SC Resolutions 1559 and 1701 (Badran 2017).

Nevertheless, the contribution of Hezbollah to the liberation of Lebanese territory was broadly acknowledged, even by smaller Lebanese Christian political parties, which are usually opposed to Hezbollah’s armed endeavours. Furthermore, Michel Aoun, head of the main Christian party in Lebanon and an ally of Hezbollah, was in October 2016 elected Lebanese President and the government of national unity, with the participation of both the main Sunni party and Hezbollah, was established (Alami 2017). Hezbollah thus seemed to have the best relations with the state, as well as other political parties since at least the early 2000s. While such a position might benefit the party in the short term, it paradoxically stokes tensions with those who feel underrepresented in Lebanese politics and it raises the threat of war with Israel.

\(^47\) When the LAF subsequently attacked the remaining ISIS-affiliated group, Hezbollah brokered a deal with its leaders, which allowed them to pass to the ISIS-occupied part of Syria in exchange for captured Lebanese soldiers. According to some, the primary goal of the deal was to snatch the military success from the hands of the LAF and present Hezbollah as the most important actor of the campaign (Blanford 2017).
The Resistance and evolving conflict with Israel

Hezbollah’s involvement in Syria and its closer entanglement with the LAF have been perceived with growing unease by Israeli analysts and government officials. After the war in 2006 the new unwritten ‘rules of the game’, which guide the mutual deterrence between Hezbollah and Israel, were established and the UN with the LAF (which assumed the role of main formal authority in the area) managed to limit potential escalations of smaller conflicts. Hezbollah even quietly dropped the words that the Resistance should seek to liberate Palestine and Jerusalem from its manifesto and settled with the defensive role and liberation of the occupied Lebanese territory (Daher 2016, 166–67).

The conflict in Syria did not initially significantly impact the state of mutual deterrence on the southern border, even though Israelis were worried about the experience which Hezbollah fighters had gained in the conflict, the new Russian weapons they had become equipped with and the increased movement of Iranian arms to Lebanon. Israeli air raids regularly targeted alleged shipments of weapons, although mostly in Syria in order not to attack Hezbollah openly on its own soil (Murciano 2017). However, the situation in the south gradually changed when the Shiite movement deployed an increased number of troops to al-Qusayr and Israel became concerned that it might gain more ground in southern Syria. The situation escalated in January 2015 when an Israeli helicopter attacked a joint Iranian and Hezbollah reconnaissance patrol in the Golan Heights and killed the son of famous Hezbollah commander Imad Mungiyeh. Hezbollah responded by attacking an Israeli patrol in the disputed part of the border, but both rivals soon returned to the mutual deterrence marked with verbal and symbolic provocations from both sides (Sobelman 2017).

With the growing Iranian influence in (southern) Syria, new alleged arms shipments and a visibly heightened level of mutual cooperation between the LAF and Hezbollah in eastern Lebanon, Israeli politicians and defence analysts employed more aggressive rhetoric against Hezbollah and Lebanon as such. If in the 1990s the Israeli operations pursued with an aim to turn the state apparatus and other political groups against Hezbollah and the war in 2006 was oriented primarily at degrading Hezbollah’s armed capabilities as well as pushing the international community to be more active in disarming it, the current operational planning seems to equate Hezbollah with the Lebanese state and with Iranian influence in Lebanon and Syria (Catignani 2010; Murciano 2017). In other words, Israeli planners seem to treat Lebanon and (southern) Syria as a single front, united by their
concerns over Iranian and Hezbollah’s role in both. While direct military operations are so far limited to the Syrian side of the border, the potential next war would be even more destructive and indiscriminate as it would not differentiate between Hezbollah, civilians and the Lebanese state.

Conclusion

The issue of Hezbollah’s autonomous armed capabilities has always been subject to strong political pressures both from domestic and international opponents of the movement. The success of Hezbollah’s narrative on the unity between the Army and Resistance following the campaign in eastern Lebanon and (temporary) limitation of the internal political conflict paradoxically put Lebanon under a greater and different form of external threat. Israel seems to be ready to sooner or later target Hezbollah in Lebanon in order to limit its armed capabilities and prevent a potential attack on its own territory and, according to Israeli defence analysts, it seems that Israel sees the LAF as being closely collaborating with Hezbollah, if not more. While such interpretation is refuted by many in Western capitals, who continue to support the LAF and refuse to see it merely as a Hezbollah pawn, the election of Donald Trump as the US president in November 2016 and the assertive rise of Prince Mohammad bin Salman to power in Saudi Arabia reinvigorated the US and Saudi pressure on Iran and its allies and proxies. While it is unlikely that the US and Saudi alliance and their potential tacit or explicit green light to Israeli operation in Lebanon would gain wider support among the international community, Lebanon seems to be on the verge of another war between the Resistance and its external opponents.

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DEPLOYMENT OF AMERICAN THAAD IN SOUTH KOREA: A COMPARISON WITH THE UNREALIZED ANTI-MISSILE SYSTEM IN POLAND AND THE CZECH REPUBLIC

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Introduction

This article will compare the unrealized American ballistic missile defence (BMD) in Poland and the Czech Republic with the one currently being installed in South Korea. The aim is to find what makes the cases different and, consequently, what could be learned from the successful one. Both of these strategic projects faced difficulties through domestic and especially international opposition. The former was aimed against long-range Iranian missiles but the Russian Federation strongly objected, calling it a direct national security threat. The latter is aimed to protect South Korea from short- to mid-range North Korean ballistic missiles. Terminal High Altitude Area Defence (THAAD) faces major Chinese and Russian opposition mainly due to the dual use of its radar, which can monitor into the territories of both countries. To fulfill its goals this paper will firstly state a brief history of American BMD, followed by a comparison of the most important information of both projects. A conclusion will then be made from the American point of view to see why the two cases differed in their outcome.

History of American Ballistic Missile Defence

American BMD strategy stretches back to World War II when German V2 rockets targeted London. Washington saw their destructive potential, which further increased with the existence of nuclear weapons. It became evident that protective measures were needed as the Cold War unravelled. A direct threat against America’s own territory came in 1962 during the Cuban Missile Crisis when Soviet medium-range SS-4 nuclear-armed missiles were deployed. Under President Nixon, America materialized its plan for protection called Safeguard but this system was revoked shortly
upon completion because of its questionable effectiveness and associated costs. In 1969 the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) began, concluded in 1972 by signing the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM), which limited each side to two and later only one defensive complex. The ABM Treaty equalized the relative positions between the increasingly stronger US and USSR. Maintaining the status quo has remained at the core of Russian strategic thinking up to the present. By 1983 the Reagan administration had become wary that the Soviet Union might possess superior nuclear capabilities and started the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), better known as “Star Wars” (Giles and Monaghan 2014, 3-7). Moscow protested against this move, commencing a nuclear arms race, which later contributed to the bankruptcy of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War.

After the break-up of the Soviet Block Washington pursued a strategy of limited SDI deterrent, newly aimed against rogue states. From Moscow's perspective this is only a cover to continue containing Russia. Any moves in this respect generate fear and suspicion of endangering the Russian nuclear deterrent. Within Moscow’s strategic calculations this remains essential for the survival of the regime. In 2001 America pulled out of the ABM Treaty to pursue the so-called National Missile Defence (NMD), mainly to protect itself against Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBM). Relations between Washington and Moscow quickly deteriorated. Russians stated that, instead of seeking dialogue, Washington simply informed about finalized moves (Misher 2009, 2-14). Only a few years after withdrawing from the ABM Treaty, the United States finally set up their BMD systems by installing ground-based interceptors (GBI) and radars in Fort Greely, Alaska and Vandenberg Air Force Base, California. The Bush Jr. administration then began establishing Active Layered Theater Ballistic Missile Defence (ALTBMD), an integrated system that would provide protection to the United States and allied countries from any type of missile attack (Lindstrom 2016, 1-6). This strategic discourse, continued by Barack Obama and Donald Trump, was welcomed by allies but remains an irritant to some countries, especially Russia and China. Beijing holds a similar view as Moscow on the nuclear deterrent and perceives Washington as continually trying to encircle it in order to nullify its strike-back capability.

The United States carried on placing several missile interceptors and radar systems around the globe, on both land and sea, under the NMD and ALTBMD (Möckli 2007). Two of the systems raised a lot of concern from Russia and China. The first was an unrealized GBI in Poland and X-band radar in the Czech Republic. This was later supplemented by Aegis
in the Mediterranean Sea. Recently, a ground-based interceptor of this type was established in Romania, with additional ones planned (Pifer 2012, 10-14). The second is the currently deployed THAAD in South Korea. In both cases Washington has proclaimed that these systems are aimed against rogue states but neither Moscow nor Beijing believes such claims.

**Comparison of Systems in Central Europe and South Korea**

In 2002 Washington began talks with Poland and Czech Republic about placing a BMD system on their territory. Its purpose was to protect the United States and European allies against a potential attack by Iranian ICBMs (U.S. Department of Defense 2007). At first the Europeans did not feel there was an imminent threat but were gradually convinced (Paszewski 2013, 35-60). The BMD faced strong opposition from Moscow, known to side with Tehran. In response Russia threatened to place short-range Iskander missiles, capable of carrying nuclear warheads, in Kaliningrad Oblast. The main reasoning was that the BMD system could be aimed at Russia. This would put its nuclear deterrent at a disadvantage and weaken defences vis-à-vis NATO (Congressional Research Service 2009, 16-23). In addition, the argument was that a long-range interceptor would not be suitable, given Iran’s short- to medium-range capabilities (Sieg 2008). By 2009 Washington decided to cancel due to technical unreliability, after a number of failed tests, and associated high costs. (Webb 2007). America backed out saving face by stating that it was a goodwill step towards the reset of relations with Russia. For a while Moscow felt it had won the case until it learned that Washington was only buying time to come with a new plan. This was to set up a European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA), a 4-phased BMD deployment to protect the US homeland and European allies. The first phase was setting up seaborne Aegis interceptors in the Mediterranean Sea in 2011. Recently, a ground-based Aegis system was set up in Deveselu, Romania and an additional one is planned again in Poland (Sankaran 2015, 1-7).

Discussions on the deployment of THAAD in South Korea began in 2014. Seoul lies in a difficult middle position between Washington and Beijing. When it comes to trade, China is the most important partner, but in security matters it clings to the United States (Cha and Kim 2016, 101-121). Washington and Seoul jointly stated that the BMD’s purpose was to protect South Korea and American military forces stationed on its territory against North Korean ballistic missiles. Within Northeast Asia, America has already stationed two THAAD batteries in Japan. (Suh 2017,
Moreover, the Korean Peninsula is a place of tension where all the world’s superpowers meet (Beal 2016). Both China and Russia oppose the United States intruding into their vicinity and were angered upon learning of the new THAAD, especially China. Beijing sees the sole purpose of this BMD system as being aimed against its nuclear deterrent (Swaine 2017). The main issue is not the interceptors but the X-band radar, which can be configured to monitor Chinese ICBMs. Beijing feels that THAAD is part of Washington’s deliberate plan to contain China by strengthening its regional military alliances. It has already taken steps such as notably limiting the number of Chinese tourists travelling to South Korea. With respect to the Russian Far East, THAAD radar monitoring capability is limited due to distance (Beal 2016). Moscow has not taken concrete action like Beijing but remains sensitive to any build-up of American weaponry in its vicinity. Both Russia and China proclaimed that they may step up joint military exercises as percussion (Suh 2017, 1-4).

Attitudes towards establishing BMD differed in all three countries concerned. The Polish government and public were initially in favour of the system under the leadership of Jaroslaw Kaczynski but later, under Donald Tusk, started reversing while putting many additional demands on the United States. These included an American upgrade of Polish armed forces, investment into the defence industry, establishing a large NATO base on its territory and signing a bilateral treaty to become a formal ally of the United States. Warsaw used increasingly unfavourable public attitudes as a bargaining chip. In the light of the Russian invasion of Georgia in 2008, Poland viewed the system as a way of deterring Russia, whom it considered an actual threat, not Iran. As a result there was a feeling that the GBI would make Poland a high-profile Russian target. Eventually, Washington promised to supply additional Patriot missiles, to which Warsaw agreed, meaning the GBI could finally be established (Trník 2008, 10-23). From America’s perspective this was not a sign of goodwill but rather showing commitment to its European allies in light of the Russian invasion of Georgia.

The Czech Republic showed a different attitude towards the deployment. The governmental coalition was in favour and overrode the opposition, which paradoxically initiated the talks in 2002. There were only modest demands requested of Washington, such as the presence of Czech soldiers at the installation, working together in scientific research and local defence contractors getting a part of the deals. Public opinion showed to be a problem because perceptions were quite negative. This was
due, for example, to health concerns. The government was able to reverse the situation by offering special funding to surrounding areas, building new infrastructure and incorporating the system within NATO. The Czechs did not show much fear of Russia as they mostly thought that Moscow had no right to interfere in their domestic affairs (Trník 2008, 10-23).

In South Korea, since the beginning, President Park Geun-hye's administration was strongly in favour, nearly finishing the whole project before being impeached. The newly elected President Moon Jae-in took some time to reconsider the deployment. The reason for this was mostly international pressure from China and Russia, but the deal was quickly re-approved. Overall, a slight majority of public opinion was in favour of the BMD system, while about a third feared China's repercussions (Institute for Security & Policy Development 2016). The only real problem was with the deployment site, which had to be changed from the proposed town of Seongju, due to the local residents’ fear of radar radiation. The new site is nearby Mt. Dalma, further from residential areas (Choi 2016).

Considering the technicalities of both BMDs, Redzikowo in northern Poland was set to host a ground two-stage booster GBI which would be composed of 10 silo-based missiles able to intercept Iranian ICBMs. Up to 5 such missiles may need to be shot for intercepting 1 incoming missile (Misher 2009, 3-8). An X-band radar would be brought from the Kwajalein Atoll in the Marshall Islands and installed in the Brdy region, southwest of Prague, Czech Republic. It is a Ground-Based Radar Prototype (GBR-P), which needs support from satellites and other radars to be able to point its thin beam to find and track ballistic missiles after they have been fired. The GBR-P cannot be used to continually scan 360° (Postol and Lewis 2007, 4). What came as a concern to Moscow is the geographical fact that, if combined with other detection systems, the radar would have a larger cross-sectional ability to track Russian, rather than Iranian ballistic missiles (Misher 2009, 10-14).

THAAD is a mobile BMD that can intercept short- to medium-range missiles. It is composed of interceptor missiles, launch canisters, X-band AN/TPY-2 phased array radar, a fire-control unit and support equipment - power-generation and cooling units. A typical battery usually contains 48 interceptor missiles. Under test conditions a single THAAD interceptor has shown an 80% success rate (Elleman and Zagurek 2016). The controversial radar can be switched between two modes, which are Terminal Based Mode with effective detection of incoming missiles in the
range of 600 km and Forward Based Mode that can monitor as far as 3000 km (mostlymissiledefense 2016). Switching between modes takes about 8 hours and is detectable by the party being monitored (Tokola n.d.). THAAD does not need satellite support, or additional radars, and has an operational azimuth of 120°. (Institute for Security & Policy Development 2016).

When it comes to the BMD’s efficiency in countering the threats which they are deployed against, they differ. The Central European system would have been adequate for carrying out its mission to protect against incoming Iranian ICBMs (Sieg 2008), were the threat real. THAAD, on the other hand, is being put in place due to an imminent threat but gives only partial protection against North Korean ballistic missiles. It is being positioned to protect the area southward of Seoul, home to military reinforcements. Protecting the capital would be performed by the already deployed American Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3) interceptors. THAAD is unable to defend the country if attacked from the flank by submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM) (Institute for Security & Policy Development 2016). Additionally, this BMD has a limited ability of simultaneously tracking a maximum of 20 incoming missiles. In the event of a heavy North Korean attack it can be overloaded and let some of the ballistic missiles through (Elleman and Zagurek 2016). Additional THAAD batteries could lessen these problems.

Taking into account the alternative usage against Russian and/or Chinese ICBMs, both systems prove technically unable to shoot them down. It has been calculated that were ICBMs fired from western Russia towards the United States, the radar placed in the Czech Republic would not have sufficient time to detect them and convey information to the Polish GBI to fire interceptor missiles. Furthermore, the BMD could easily be overwhelmed by Russian ballistic missiles; given only that 10 interceptors would be available and up to 5 are needed to shoot down a single incoming missile (Postol and Lewis 2007, 7-8). THAAD likewise cannot shoot down Chinese ICBMs because it is designed to intercept missiles in their terminal phase at altitudes between 40–150 km, far below the approximately 1000 km needed. However, both systems are, to an extent, capable of tracking these types of ballistic missiles. The information can then be conveyed to other radar stations and interceptor sites so that the ICBMs can be targeted more accurately (Chung 2015). This ability may prove decisive in the event of a nuclear war, giving America and its allies a tactical advantage.
Conclusion

America and the respective host countries proclaimed that both BMDs are intended to provide protection against rogue states but they received a large portion of criticism from Russia and China respectively, who view them as a national security threat aimed against them. The Central European system and THAAD are in many ways similar but certain differences have led to only the latter being realized. Governmental and public attitudes played a major role in the implementations. In the case of THAAD both Seoul and the general population held an overall positive stance towards deployment throughout the talks. Attitudes in the Central European countries were changing, especially in the case of Poland, where they became negative. In addition, it remains questionable whether Iran actually posed a real ICBM threat. At the start of the talks Poland and Czech Republic were not convinced, but agreed with deployment to boost their security relations with the United States. In the eyes of Central Europeans, the original aim later changed into an anti-Russian issue. It is not so with South Korea, even though it has faced strong diplomatic pressure from China. There exists an imminent North Korean threat, affirmed by its latest nuclear and ballistic missile tests.

Technicalities also played a significant role and were one of the reasons why America withdrew from the proposed Central European BMD. The main issue was the GBI in Poland, which proved unreliable in intercepting incoming ballistic missiles. The limited number of silo-based missiles could theoretically counter only two incoming ICBMs. A THAAD battery can carry more interceptors, has higher reliability and is mobile. In addition, the included X-band radar can operate on its own, unlike the GBR-P. Cost-effectiveness is also in favour of the latter system, which costs approximately 4 times less than the former. Simply put, the originally proposed Central European BMD was outdated and inflexible to a changing security environment. This claim can be supported by the fact that the United States later substituted the system by sea- and ground-based Aegis.

In the end, both THAAD and the supplementary EPAA provide protection against the proclaimed threats, while on the sidelines bringing additional advantages for America and its allies. They can alternatively be used as a way to deter Russia or China, by monitoring their ICBMs. It is not to say that this alternative use stood at the core of both projects but comes as a premium, of which United States must have been aware. Washington
did not back down from establishing either BMD, and only modified the Central European one, upon revising its initial shortcomings. For America, the ultimate goal is establishing ALTBMD, while strengthening its global military position. In the long run, when it comes to broader strategic interests, Washington has proven to remain persistent.

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EUROPE AND AFRICA – TOWARDS ACHIEVING REAL PROGRESS IN THEIR PARTNERSHIP?

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The EU has declared 2017 as a defining year in its partnership with Africa as 2017 also marks ten years since the Joint Africa-EU Strategy (JAES) was adopted. The year culminates at the 5th Africa-EU Summit, with more than 70 African and European leaders, taking place in Abidjan in November 2017 and giving a new impetus to African-EU relations. Looking at the results of the JAES, it becomes obvious that, despite the fact that the ultimate goal of creating a partnership of equals tackling common concerns and challenges remains broadly valid, the geopolitical, development, social and economic challenges facing both continents have substantially changed. Reforms at the AU, coupled with the renegotiation of the Cotonou Agreement, mean that existing arrangements inevitably will change. There is political will on both sides to work together, and cooperation and coordination has improved in recent months. The Africa-EU summit represents an opportunity to bridge some differences. However, in order to be a true partnership, it has to be a dynamic relationship, meaning that it has to adapt to the current global realities and challenges.

The chapter therefore looks back into the history of the EU-Africa summits, takes stock of African-European relations in the light of the Summit, defines its key challenges and will answer the question whether a new format in the sense of EU-AU cooperation could revitalize and enrich the partnership. It also analyses the first AU strategy, the Agenda 2063, a long-term framework for social and economic development that can serve as a basis for setting up common priorities between the AU and EU and providing for concrete points of actions to be implemented. In conclusion, recommendations for the future relationship between the AU and EU will be provided.
An Overview of the EU-Africa Summits: Much Ado about Little Improvements?

Although the relations between African and European countries are deeply rooted in history, they were primarily focused on trade and development cooperation through the Yaoundé and subsequent Lomé partnership agreements between the EU and the Africa-Caribbean-Pacific (ACP) group of states. Meanwhile, EU-Africa relations are being increasingly politicized and securitized as was apparent in the two last Lomé agreements and their successor, the Cotonou Agreement, signed in 2000. In the 1990s, a political and security dimension was added. Nonetheless, it took until the year 2000 in order to have the first formal Africa-Europe Summit organised by the predecessor of the African Union, the Organization for African Unity (OAU) and the EU in Cairo on 3rd and 4th April 2000. It was the first meeting at the continental level between European and African leaders.

With the adoption of the so-called Cairo Declaration and its Action plan, the heads of states and governments expressed their commitment to foster cooperation in order to give a new strategic dimension to the global partnership between Africa and Europe, in a spirit of equality, respect, alliance and cooperation. The declaration defined four key areas of cooperation: regional economic cooperation and integration, integrating Africa into the world economy, human rights, democratic principles and institutions, good governance and rule of law as well as peace-building, conflict prevention, management and resolution. The Cairo agenda set the priorities along which the EU-Africa dialogue and partnership would develop. It translated into an increasing convergence of interests, despite differences between the EU and African states with regard to the primacy given to the identified priorities: Europeans by and large putting the accent particularly on peace and security issues, and Africans more on the trade and economic aspects of the partnership, including the need to address the debt problem. On the African side, many still consider that some of the issues set out in the Cairo agenda have not really been addressed or at least not had the attention that they deserved (e.g. the debt issue and the return of African cultural goods), and these are, to some extent, still a source of frustration (ECDPM, 2006, 2). Despite the 2000 meeting, it was only in December 2005 that the EU adopted its first common, coherent and comprehensive “EU Strategy for Africa”, setting out guidelines for a new Africa-Europe partnership.
Seven years after Cairo, the 2nd Africa-EU Summit took place in Lisbon on 9 December 2007. The Heads of State and Governments of Africa and the EU adopted the first ever Joint Africa-EU Strategy and an Action Plan for 2008-2010, with the aim of placing Africa-EU relations on a new and equal footing in order to address together the challenges and opportunities of common interest. However, the two continents failed to reach agreement on comprehensive trade deals – the so-called “Economic Partnership Agreements” – that the EU hoped to conclude with African nations before the end of the year. Furthermore, the Lisbon Summit was hailed as offering “a unique opportunity jointly to address the common contemporary challenges for our continents, in the year that we celebrate the 50th anniversary of the European integration and the 50th anniversary of the beginning of the independence of Africa”. This provided, the new Africa-EU partnership was presented as a “partnership of equals”, set to eliminate “the traditional donor-recipient relationship” between the two continents (Lisbon Declaration—EU Africa Summit, 2007). During the very same Portuguese EU Council presidency, the Treaty of Lisbon was also signed, setting a new framework for EU external action having a profound effect on how the EU views its responsibilities as an international actor.

Three years after Lisbon, the 3rd Africa-EU Summit moved back to African soil and took place on 29-30 November 2010 in Tripoli, Libya. The overall theme was “Investment, Economic Growth and Job Creation”. The Heads of State and Governments of Africa and the EU adopted the “Tripoli Declaration”, and an Action Plan for 2011-2013, (re) committing to seize together new opportunities for broader and mutually beneficial initiatives. The declaration reflected the determinacy to progress in the identified priority areas of cooperation and towards reaching the Millennium Development Goals in Africa. It also confirmed the Joint Africa EU Strategy (JAES) as the framework for future cooperation and adopted the Action Plan 2011-13 as a new commitment to the realisation of this Partnership. However, the Summit was very much characterized by the impact of the economic and financial crisis in European countries and thus a limited interest in really moving EU-Africa relations forward as the home front in many member states required more attention.

The 4th EU-Africa Summit was held on 2 and 3 April 2014 in Brussels, Belgium, under the theme “Investing in People, Prosperity and Peace”. The Heads of State and Governments of Africa and the EU adopted the so-called “Brussels Declaration” and a Roadmap for 2014-2017, with the objective of addressing common challenges and bringing concrete benefits
to citizens of both continents in accordance with the Joint Africa-EU Strategy (JAES). The conditions in the forefront of the Summit were far from being optimal as the European side was occupied with the consequences of the economic and financial crisis and thus many European states did not consider Africa as a key priority. Furthermore, it took place immediately before the new institutional set-up in the EU was to be decided by the European electorate (Kammel 2014, 306). The Summit was well attended on the European side as well as on the African side, apart from the withdrawal of South Africa’s Jacob Zuma and the non-issuing of a visa for the wife of Zimbabwe’s President Robert Mugabe, leading to discussion about whether the Summit was really about a meeting of equals (Ibid, 306).

The Summit produced three documents, i.e. a political declaration, a roadmap for 2014-2017, and a separate declaration on migration. In general, the Summit can be considered a break from the past in relations between Africa and Europe. The main rationale behind the summit underlined the intention to change the continental narrative away from crisis management and a donor/recipient relationship towards economic development and to put the partnership on a firmer and more equal footing (Suutarinen and Benlloch 2014, 1). The Summit’s focus was on peace and security as well as sustainable economic development whereas democracy, human rights and governance played a minor role. This might be considered as a shift towards a new realism in the relationship. It became evident that Africa-EU relations can more easily be based on key areas of cooperation such as peace and security but also can take new forms of cooperation among equals and include economic interests. (Kammel 2014, 308). However, again as a consequence of geopolitical developments on European soil, e.g. the Russian annexation of Crimea and the war in Eastern Ukraine, as well as the fact that due to the European Parliament elections in May 2014 the main European political leaders were already in their pre-election campaigns, the outcome was limited regarding concrete proposals of how to further deepen cooperation between the two continents.

In general, according to Laporte, it can be concluded that in the relatively short history of Africa-EU ‘Summitry’, both sides have skillfully avoided speaking openly about the controversial issues that divide both continents. The success of a Summit was not measured in the quality of the dialogue but on the number of participating Heads of State and how long it took to agree on a Joint Declaration (Laporte 2017).
10 Years of JAES – How to assure proper implementation?

As already stated, in December 2007, the second Africa-EU Summit took place in Lisbon adopting a landmark document “The Africa EU Strategic Partnership - A Joint Africa-EU Strategy” (JAES). The objective of the JAES and its first Action Plan (2008-2010) is the establishment of a much more overtly political relationship than had been the case through Lomé, Cotonou, or the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (Bach 2011: 40). The JAES was conceived as a vision for a long-term relationship between Africa and Europe in which the two should come together in a shared framework for stronger collaboration on a new strategic level. It aims at bringing Africa and the EU closer together through the strengthening of economic cooperation and the promotion of sustainable development, democracy, peace and security. The First Action Plan (2008-2010) and the Second Action Plan (2011-2013) for the implementation of the JAES were focused on eight priority areas of cooperation. The initiatives promoted in the JAES framework provided a balance between the issues of peace and security and development, considering them as two sides of the same coin. The current Roadmap 2014-2017 sets out concrete targets in a similar framework with a focus on five priority areas: peace and security; democracy, good governance and human rights; human development; sustainable and inclusive development and growth and continental integration; and global and emerging issues (Venturi 2016, 3).

Following the assessment of Ölund, the goal of the strategy is long-term, but to facilitate its implementation, short-term action plans are developed to specify what should be done in between summits. Yearly progress reports are also conducted by the European Commission and the Secretariat of the Council and the African Union Commission (Ölund 2012, 18). The operational plan is based on eight partnerships approved by both partners, including peace and security, democracy, trade, MDGs, energy, climate change and migration. For 2018-2020, the Road Map foresees stronger, deeper and more action-oriented strategic partnership for more prosperity and stability in the two continents.

However, the JAES has not met the expectations put on it so far. It has failed to transform EU-Africa relations along the lines of its stated goals of a partnership of equals going beyond institutions, but has established a framework for new forms of cooperation that marks rather a step than a great leap forward in EU-Africa relations (Sherriff and Kotsopoulos 2013, 313). This assessment was confirmed by a study conducted on behalf of the
European Parliament which also underlines that the JAES implementation framework is being too bureaucratic and cumbersome, but its use and its transformation by politically aware and motivated stakeholders has become effective and possible in conductive environments (European Parliament 2014, 34). The ambition of the JAES to “treat Africa as one”, namely to contribute towards overcoming the incoherencies resulting from the patchwork of European instruments and agreements focused on specific areas of the continent, however, could not be achieved so far. As Mangala pointed out, however, the JAES was “a strategy with Africa, rather than a strategy for Africa”, based on negotiations between the European Commission, the AU Commission and European and African member states (Mangala 2013, 19). Instead, “it did not make a qualitative leap because it simply reiterated existing commitments on aid and trade and was adopted with little consultation of the relevant stakeholders” (Carbone 2013, 7). Thus, ten years after the adoption of the JAES, time is more than ripe to develop together with Africa a joint strategy for Africa. In the meantime, the African Union itself started a new process of reflection on how to further develop the continent in the socio-economic transformation of the Continent, namely the Agenda 2063.

The Agenda 2063

In celebration of the Organisation of African Unity’s 50th anniversary, African Heads of State and Government gathered in Addis Ababa in January 2015 at the AU Assembly’s 24th Ordinary Session to adopt the so-called “Agenda 2063 – The Africa we want” as a collective charter to move the continent inexorably in the direction of enhanced growth and development over the next five decades. It is a charter that not only provides a vision but also a normative and strategic framework to transform Africa based on a programmatic logic of five ten-year operational plans (Le Pere 2016, 18). The document provides a strategic framework for the socioeconomic transformation of the continent over the next 50 years. It builds on, and seeks to accelerate the implementation of past and existing continental initiatives for growth and sustainable development. It was a very widely consulted and broadly inclusive process, which was drafted over a two-year period, endorsed by the African heads of states. In conjunction, the AU also adopted its first 10-year priority. Advancing and achieving those objectives and priorities is what the strategy is calling for from the AU and African leaders.
The document sets out seven aspirations linked to growth and development, political integration based on good governance and democracy, peace and security, culture and the full use of the African potential. The document also foresees that Africa by 2063 will have realized the fulfilment of the founders’ dream or vision of a United Africa, a union of a well-governed and democratic continent. The political unity of Africa should be the culmination of the integration process and the Agenda also aims at including the free movement of people, the establishment of continental institutions, and full economic integration (Agenda 2015, 4). The Agenda ends by calling upon the international community to respect Africa’s vision and aspirations and to align their partnerships appropriately. In this regard, it reaffirms the Rio principles of common, but differentiated responsibilities, the right to development and equity, mutual accountability and responsibility and policy space for nationally tailored policies and programmes on the continent.

Agenda 2063 is aimed at getting Africa to do things differently (people-centred), bigger (scaling and scoping up), and better (governance, performance outcomes, impact on citizens, etc.). As both a vision and an action plan, Agenda 2063 boldly calls for Africa’s “positive socioeconomic transformation” (DeGhetto et. al. 2016, 94).

The level of ambition raises certain questions about whether Agenda 2063 will be a solid building block for addressing and alleviating decades of poverty, misrule, and underdevelopment or whether it raises unfulfillable hopes for African citizens. Indeed, Agenda 2063’s vision of transformation and its aspirations reflect and draw on a long history and extensive experience of development philosophy, planning matrices, and strategic frameworks – all of which have the economic and political integration of Africa at their core (Le Pere 2016, 18). Thus, Agenda 2063 should be seen as a unique opportunity to recreate the African narrative through a process which appears to have taken care of the inherent weaknesses associated with the past plans particularly by involving the critical stakeholders, thereby addressing the issue of ownership and acceptance by the peoples of Africa. Implementation, however, remains a huge challenge. There is a need for strong institutions and processes that must be in the drivers’ seat.

**Time to reshape the AU-EU partnership**

The analysis so far has shown that the relationship between Africa and the
EU is, despite all the rhetoric, still a relationship between unequal partners, i.e. the donor-recipient that is further worsened by debates about the legacy of European colonisation. The EU is Africa’s main foreign investor, main trading partner, a key security provider and its primary source of development aid. However, the traditional framework of cooperation, the Cotonou Agreement between the EU and the ACP countries will end by 2020 and it is still unclear what the future of development cooperation will look like post-2020. So far, the EU facilitates over €20 billion of official development aid to Africa every year. The European Commission’s total official development aid to Africa will amount to €31 billion between 2014 and 2020. The EU is also one of the AU’s most significant peace and security partners; since 2004 it has provided more than €2 billion ($2.39 billion) in assistance. Moreover, despite economic growth in many African countries and positive trend indicators in other sectors, such as democracy, employment and institutional transitions and reform, the differences between the two continents are still huge. From the EU perspective, however, there is a clear wish to overcome this notion and to have a more balanced approach. The EU wants a greater say in when, where and how its money is spent, at least partly because it has less to spend and wants its contributions to be utilised more effectively. Europe also wants Africa to pay its “fair share” (ICG 2017).

Whereas the early years have been dominated by trade issues, the more recent years have shown a growing interest in the political and security political debate. The challenge posed by migration has also stressed the need for developing a common strategy of how to tackle this issue. However, it seems that although both continents need to strengthen their cooperation as a consequence of a common history, common challenges and geography, it becomes obvious that there is only limited trust on both sides. The relationship should be more pragmatic, with mutual interests rather than assertions of equality privileged. Both parties insist they want to work toward this but it will require the two institutions and their member states to be more explicit about what they want and need from each other (ICG 2017, 25). Thus, one key message of the summit must be to enhance the trust and to create a new momentum for the relationship. Europeans could back African initiatives and support parts of Agenda 2063 whereas the African countries could support the European vision of global governance as expressed in the EU Global Strategy of 2016. This document also states that “build[ing] stronger links between our trade, development and security policies in Africa, and blend development efforts with work on migration, health, education, energy and climate, science and technology,
notably to improve food security. We will continue to support peace and security efforts in Africa […]” (EUGS 2016, 36). However, implementation still remains somewhat vague and European efforts towards the African continent are difficult to put into practice because of the different competing interests among EU member states. There are differences related to questions, such as how much market access to African products should be provided and on the inclusion of development provisions in support of African market liberalization (Sicurelli 2016). Similar differences appear in the security domain of whether or not to foster a stronger EU engagement in African conflicts and crises.

Furthermore, it should be considered whether or not to rename the EU-Africa Summits into an EU-AU Summit and thus also acknowledging the growing institutionalisation and integration within the African continent. It would also give the AU a stronger weight as a credible regional organisation and allow the identification of concrete projects within the Agenda 2063 that could be supported by the European partners. This should be especially linked to security and development, as sustainable and inclusive growth and development must benefit both Africa and Europe and sustainable development can only occur in stable and secure societies. However, the AU’s authority is challenged by the changing nature of conflict in Africa. Moreover, migration and mobility need to be addressed by both sides, given the demographic pressure that Europe will have to deal with by 2050.

Finally, Economic Partnership Agreements (EPA) prove to be an unsatisfactory tool for regulating trade between the European Union and Africa as currently trade between the EU and one EPA region is cheaper than trade between that EPA region and other African countries. In other words, the Economic Partnership Agreements are no success story, neither for Africa nor for Europe. The African Union decided on the contrary to create a Continental Free Trade Area (CFTA) by 2017. The CFTA should bring together 54 African countries with a combined population of more than 1 billion people and a combined gross domestic product of more than 3.4 trillion. More trade between African countries is necessary to create deeper value change on the continent. An African Continental Free Trade Area in combination with a Customs Union should be the basis for future EU-Africa trade relations. More trade in Africa is in the best interest of both Europe and Africa. However, the ratification process is delayed as the minimum numbers of ratifications have not yet been met.
Year 2017 is thus a crucial year for reshaping the AU-EU partnership. With the re-entry of Morocco to the AU in January 2017 after 33 years outside, the AU for the first time comprises all 54 African states and Western Sahara, thus giving the AU stronger legitimacy to be the core player in the EU-AU partnership on the African side. On a more strategic level, both the EU Global Strategy as well as Agenda 2063 set out clear visions of the future development of the respective organisations and provide for a basis to identify common goals and objectives. In order to move this partnership forward, any future agenda needs to better take into consideration African desires and interests, but also include a debate on areas of disagreements as well as a clear commitment by the Africans of how they will contribute in order to strengthen the partnership. Thus, the partnership has to become more pragmatic and focus more on content and concrete action points than context, i.e. the policy of whom to invite to respective meetings and whether or not to put sanctions in place against certain African leaders. Thus it will be necessary to concentrate on issues such as demographic development (especially youth) and strongly linked migration, as well as stronger trade relations through enhanced Economic Partnership Agreements and security and set up a common agenda of how to best tackle challenges arising in those domains as the interdependent nature of the relationship will require even stronger consultation and cooperation in the future.

If the EU and the AU manage to create a positive future agenda, this could also help both in better and more mutually shaping an international agenda. In times of global insecurity and uncertainties and with all the challenges and opportunities ahead, a business as usual approach will not be sufficient or to put it in other words: more of the same will simply not be enough.

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MIGRATION AS A TOOL OF STATE’S FOREIGN POLICY: CASE STUDY – TURKEY

BARBORA OLEJÁROVÁ

Introduction

Foreign policy criteria have guided the migration policies of many countries in the past. However, the increasing size of cross-border human mobility in the last two decades; the migration crisis that hit the European Union (EU) in 2014 and the Turkish response to the issue in terms of its relations with the EU raised attention which Western diplomacy paid to the migration-foreign policy nexus. Pressure on the EU to exchange cooperation in the field of migration for the restart of accession negotiations with Turkey and for visa liberalisation; for non-interference into internal affairs concerning the illiberal turn in Turkish politics, the failed attempt of the army to seize civilian power in the country or political processes with the supposed supporters of Fethullah Gülen, as well as disputes about the possible return to the death penalty and similar developments contribute to the fact that migration is starting to be perceived as a tool of Turkish foreign policy and Turkey is commonly presented as a country misusing its geopolitical location on the main migration routes between Europe, Africa and Asia for the purpose of achieving its domestic and foreign political goals. In this regard, two main questions stand out. First, is it possible for a state to use migration movements for its own advantage? And second, in an international system determined by political realism characterised by Mearsheimer's five bedrock assumptions about anarchy as presented in The Tragedy of Great Power Politics and the consequent general patterns of state behaviour: fear, self-help and power maximization - can we treat the use of migration for the purpose of increasing the state's relative power and protecting the state's interests as condemnable behaviour, or simply as the manifestation of structural realism in practice? After introducing basic theoretical correlations between migration and the foreign policy, this paper will refer to the current crisis of people fleeing Syria in an attempt to search for international protection in Turkey and further in Europe; pointing to the fact that the geopolitical location of Turkey between Europe, Asia and Africa has turned migration to a feature of Turkish foreign policy.
Foreign policy and the migration nexus

From the perspective of the realistic school of thought in international relations, foreign policy is a means of realization of the national interest, raison d’État, defined as a “set of the most general needs of the state based on its geographic location, historical experience and relations to the other centres of power.” (Krejčí 2001, 260) In this context, Lidák (2000, 41) defines foreign policy as the “...activity of a state oriented towards creation of the most favourable conditions of its existence, in relation to the other states, but also to the other actors of the system of international relations, on behalf of its internal security and prosperity.” Similarly to foreign policy itself, there is no universal definition of the tools of the state's foreign policy. Creation of the most favourable conditions of the state's existence is therefore the basic variable taken into concern in the process of selection of the foreign policy tools. These include a wide variety of activities in the field of diplomacy, economics, geography, demography, culture and military and in the settings of a non-existing definition; tools of the foreign policy might comprehend any activity of the state influencing its relations with other actors of international relations - including management of migration movements.

The connection between international migration and foreign policy is a phenomenon that has been present in international politics for centuries and has to do with the worldwide establishment of the nation-state system and rapid increase in the human population in the world. Whereas Aristide Zolberg and some other analysts see deliberate action in regulating migration as an integral part of the nation-state's sovereignty, many others believe that large scale movements of people across borders are beyond the reach of state regulation. Teitelbaum (1984, 433-443) defines several dimensions of the migration-foreign policy nexus:

1. Foreign policy as a set of actions with unintentional effects on migration.

Firstly, nexus sees foreign policy as official activities of states, which stimulate international migration movements without an explicit intention to do so. This involves cases of:

a) Military interventions, which influence the creation and direction of migration movements of mostly asylum seekers from the target state abroad.
2) Political pressure, economic sanctions or on the contrary – the absence of engagement abroad in those cases where passivity contributes to economic recession, deterioration of living standards or the establishment of undemocratic regimes in the migrant-sending countries. This will eventually lead to mass migration to the same degree as a direct military intervention; with the cases of some European states before World War II. or Uganda at the time of Idi Amin’s regime provided as historical examples.

2. International migrations as tool of foreign policy.

Unlike the first dimension, in this case the foreign policy of states does not only unintentionally influence the migration waves, but the policymakers use and direct the movements of people for their own benefit. This is equally valid for the sending, transit and receiving countries.

a) Sending and transit countries most commonly trigger new migration movements or use existing ones with the aim of destabilizing the receiving country or of achieving political and economic set-offs – something that Teitelbaum refers to as “mass migration for unarmed conquest or assertion of sovereignty”. (Teitelbaum 1984, 437) Thus, military interventions are replaced by movements of people to the territory of another state supported by the government of the sending or transit country with the aim of establishing effective control over the targeted territory or of indirectly forcing the receiving country into political or economic cooperation with the coercer.

b) Receiving countries can use migration flows by means of selective admission of asylum seekers or migrants belonging to the political opposition to the adversarial sending state’s government with the aim of creating a reservoir of political opposition in the receiving country, which might be useful in the case of future conflicts or diplomatic negotiations with the migrants’ home country.

3. Foreign policy impacts of past migrations.

The last dimension is based on the general knowledge that the presence of a large number of foreign population of migrants, refugees or diasporas on the territory of the host country naturally affects the host country’s foreign
policy and besides, it can be intentionally mobilized by the sending state, which seeks to use “its expatriate population in support of its own position in dealings with the receiving country”. (Teitelbaum 1984, 441)

**Syrian migration crisis and the Turkish response**

The Syrian crisis beginning in 2011 was the result of the Syrian Civil War and generated 3,168,757 people seeking international protection only in Turkey as of September 2017. (UNHCR 2017, 1) Turkey’s response to the Syrian crisis has three different phases, and each of them is undermined by different foreign policy strategy of the Turkish government.

*Unilateralism and assertiveness*

The first phase lasted from 2011 to 2013 and is the period of open-door policy and assertive policy towards immigrants from Syria. (Aras and Mencütek 2016, 92) The numbers of Syrian migrants in the first years according to the UNHCR (2017, 1) (8000 in December 2011; 170,912 in December 2012; 560,129 in December 2013) were comparable to the two biggest migration crises Turkey has experienced in the past - the crisis of Iranian migrants in 1979, which followed after the regime change and overthrow of the Pahlavi dynasty with 500,000 – 1,5 million emigrants (the numbers vary according to the source); and the Iraqi crisis from 1988-1991, which was a result of the Iran-Iraq war and the Al-Anfal campaign against Iraqi Kurds generating over 500,000 mostly Kurdish emigrants. The similarity to the preceding mass migration movements made Turkey believe that it would handle the situation without any external help. This assertiveness and policy of opened borders was contrary to the traditional approach most state-actors apply towards refugees and foreign migrants - “restrictive policy of non-arrivals”; and can be explained by the orientation of Turkish foreign-policy in the first decade of the 21st century shaped by the ambition of becoming a regional hegemon in the Middle Eastern region, which appeared parallel to the AKP power takeover in 2002. Wohlforth defines several quantitative indicators of hegemony, including GDP, military expenditures and the Correlates of War Composite Index (COW, takes into account the size of the territory and population, military personnel and expenditures, energy resources); and qualitative indicators of hegemony, especially “comprehensiveness of the leaders’ overall power advantage in the system”, i.e. recognition of its power-position by other actors in the region. (Wohlforth 1999, 18) Putting theory into practice, the Turkish economy has recorded a significant increase over the last decade.
trans-nationalization of small and medium-sized enterprises and the emergence of the so-called Anatolian Tigers. In 2016, Turkey had the world’s 13th largest GDP by PPP and the largest GDP by PPP in the Middle East, followed by Saudi Arabia. (World Bank 2017, 1) From the military point of view, in 2017 Turkey was the 8th most powerful state in the world and the dominant state in the Middle Eastern region (followed by Egypt in 10th place and Israel in 15th place) regarding the Global Firepower ranking (GFP). GFP compares the relative military power of 133 states in the world, taking into account indicators such as military equipment (not only the total number of weapons, but also weapons diversity), manpower, geographical factors, natural resources, logistics and defence budget; yet excluding nuclear stockpiles, which are not taken into account but recognized (i.e. suspected nuclear powers receive a bonus). (GFP 2017, 1) Fulfilling quantitative indicators of becoming a regional hegemon in the Middle East, a shift from the traditional securitization-based approach towards migrants to unilateralism in the initial years of the Syrian crisis can be seen as an attempt to build up a more assertive foreign policy to demonstrate the state’s soft-power capabilities and reach qualitative recognition of Turkish hegemony in the region in accordance with Wohlforth’s theory.

**Period of internationalization**

The second phase of the Turkish response is characterized as the *period of internationalization* lasting from 2013-2015. After the numbers of people from Syria rose (1,622,839 in December 2014; 2,291,900 in December 2015), Turkey realized that it was not able to tackle the situation by itself. (UNHCR 2017, 1) As early as in 2011, Turkey started to support international initiatives for political solution to the crisis, such as UN Joint Special Envoy Annan’s plan and later also the Syria Regional Response Plan - RRP and the Syria Humanitarian Assistance Response Plan - SHARP. As relations with Assad’s government worsened, Turkey was not able to reach Syrian territory without infringing the territorial sovereignty of the country. Therefore, it launched the “zero-point delivery” system – humanitarian shipments to the Syrian borders in October 2012 and finally asked the UN Security Council for the creation of “no-fly zones” and “safe haven” – i.e. de facto camps within Syria; similarly to the situation in 1991-2003 in northern Iraq. However, this idea was not supported by international society as happened in the 1990s. (Aras and Mencütek 2016, 103) The change from assertiveness to the search for international support can be again explained by the foreign policy motivations of the Turkish government.
1. **Kurds, Rojava and the conflict spillover.** First of all, rising numbers of Syrian migrants combined with the increasing engagement of Kurdish fighters in the Syrian Civil War and in the conflict with Daesh undermined fears from the conflict spillover to Turkish territory. Since refugee numbers have expanded over the years of conflict, the Turkish border with Syria has become an important transit corridor for jihadist fighters, leading up to the construction of a barrier on the borderline in 2014 by Turkey. Not only Daesh fighters, but also radical PKK supporters used the open-door policy to enter Turkey from Syria. A fragile ceasefire between the Kurds in Turkey represented by the PKK and the government, which was established on 21 March, 2013, was abandoned in July 2015 and the Turkey-PKK conflict escalated again to the level of war in 2016 with regard to the alleged lack of engagement of the Turkish government to protect the Kurds in Turkey from Daesh attacks (bomb attack in Suruç on July 20 which killed 33 mainly Kurdish civilians). (UCDP 2017, 1) Therefore, Syrian Kurds coming to Turkey encouraged separatist ambitions of the most radical Turkish Kurds and boosted the PKK insurgency in Turkey. This was intensified by the establishment of the Kurdish de-facto independent region of Rojava (The Democratic Federation of Northern Syria) in northern Syria in 2012, whose westernmost part – the Afrin Canton - borders the Turkish province of Hatay.

2. **Hatay and geopolitical concerns.** Following the referendum on 29 June 1939, Hatay became a Turkish province. For more than 70 years, Syria has refused to recognize Hatay as part of Turkey. The region is geopolitically important due to its significance for water management in the region and the population comprises a large Syrian minority. In 2011, at the peak of Turkish-Syrian relations, the issue of Hatay was almost resolved when the countries agreed on the construction of a shared Friendship Dam on the Orontes River. However, the construction was halted after the outbreak of the Syrian Civil War. Becoming part of Turkey only in 1939, Hatay had avoided the 1930s' Kemalism campaign spreading nationalist consciousness around the state and rooting the Turkish language among non-Turkish groups. The population of Hatay comprises ethnic Turks, but also Alawites (co-religionists of the Assad regime), Sunni Arabs, Kurds, Circassians, Armenians, and Arab Christians. (Cagaptay 2013, 1) Paradoxically, most of the Turkish camps for Syrian migrants are located in the Hatay region due to its proximity to the Syrian border. This increases the proportion of the Syrian population in the area and gives Syria an advantage over the territorial issue. Besides, most of the Alawites in Hatay are at odds with the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) and support the country's
main opposition faction, the Republican People’s Party (CHP). As noted by Cagaptay (2013, 1): “After Ankara began providing safe haven to Syrian opposition groups and armed rebels in fall 2011, Hatay Alawites grew even more critical of the AKP’s policies. They have played a disproportionately large role in anti-AKP rallies, including a March 9 demonstration that drew two thousand people and a late-2012 protest attended by some eight thousand.” In order to ease the Alawite-Sunni tension, Turkey responded by transferring some Sunni refugees from Hatay province on the Syrian borders to other regions in September 2012.

**Opportunism and coercion**

The last period began in mid-2015, when Turkey adopted an opportunist approach based on bilateral cooperation with the European Union, opening the economization discourse and the issue of burden-sharing. (Aras and Mencütek 2016, 92) In 2015, there were over 1.82 million detections of irregular border crossings reported along the EU external borders – six times the number of detections in 2014. Most of the migrants at the time were using the Eastern Mediterranean route between Turkey and the Western Balkans, particularly Greece, Bulgaria and Cyprus with 885,386 irregular border crossings in 2015. (Frontex 2016, 16) The transcontinental character of migration movements means that the EU is forced to cooperate with the source and transit countries of migrants – particularly Turkey, to deal with the current situation. The EU-Turkey Statement from 18 March 2016 reduced the numbers of irregular migrants on the Eastern Mediterranean route from 10,006 daily arrivals on 20 October 2015 to 47 daily arrivals on 20 March 2016, with numbers being held at a constant level ever since. (European Commission 2017a, 2) The Statement is formulated as a quid-pro-quo agreement based on a mutually beneficial set of measures. Turkey agreed to engage in prevention of mixed flows crossing the EU external borders and readmission of third-countries’ nationals from EU member states for benefits such as visa liberalisation, financial support from the EU for the burden-share, as well as acceleration of accession negotiations with the EU. Table no. 1 describes the obligations of both the EU and Turkey under the Statement, as well as the level of implementation as of 13 June 2017.

Table no. 1 shows that success of this use of transmigration by Turkey is indeterminate. On one hand, Turkey managed to restart the accession process to the EU and the talks on the visa liberalisation; on the other hand, no real prospects for membership appear to be likely in the
future. Benefits of transit migration for Turkey are therefore not the explicit obligations of the EU as anchored in the Statement; but rather implicit consequences, such as the EU’s fear of denouncement of the Statement by Turkey, which keeps the Union away from any strict actions regarding the current internal development in Turkey.

Table 1: EU-Turkey Statement – Basic Principles and Level of Progress

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<th>ACTOR</th>
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<td>Turkey</td>
<td>Accept irregular migrants who came from Turkey to Greece after 20 March and did not apply for asylum in the EU, or applied for asylum, but in the asylum procedure, would be determined as arriving from a country where they had or could have claimed protection - a “safe third country” or “first country of asylum”. Readmission is based on the bilateral readmission agreement between Turkey and Greece that is to be succeeded by the EU-Turkey Readmission Agreement from 1 June 2016. (Turkey and the EU signed the Readmission Agreement on 16 December 2013, in force since 1 October 2016. According to Article 24(3) of the Agreement, Turkey was not obliged to readmit third-country nationals and stateless persons (Articles 4 and 6) until 1 October 2017 – the date which was changed by the EU-Turkey Statement to 1 June 2016.) 1,798 irregular migrants have been returned from Greece to Turkey. (Since 20 March 2016, there were 1,210 returns to Turkey under the EU-Turkey Statement and 588 returns under the Greece-Turkey bilateral protocol.)</td>
<td>For every irregular Syrian migrant returned to Turkey from Greece, the EU will resettle another Syrian migrant from Turkey into one of its member states, following the commitments of EU member states under the Council conclusions of 22 July 2015 of which 18,000 places for resettlement remain, as well as a Voluntary Humanitarian Admission Scheme. 6,254 Syrian refugees have been resettled from Turkey to EU member states.</td>
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6,254 Syrian refugees have been resettled from Turkey to EU member states.
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<th>ACTOR</th>
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| EU    | Acceleration of the Visa Liberalisation Roadmap with the aim of lifting the visa requirements for Turkish citizens by the end of June 2016 after Turkey fulfils all of the 72 conditions. | There are still seven benchmarks to be met:  
- issuing biometric travel documents compatible with EU standards;  
- adopting measures to prevent corruption;  
- concluding an operational cooperation agreement with Europol;  
- revising legislation and practices on terrorism in line with European standards;  
- aligning legislation on personal data protection with EU standards;  
- offering effective judicial cooperation in criminal matters to all EU member states;  
- implementing the EU - Turkey Readmission Agreement in all its provisions. |
| Restart of the Turkey accession process with Chapter 33 (Financial and Budgetary Provisions) to be opened during the Dutch Presidency of the Council of the EU. | 16 chapters have been opened so far (including Chapter 33) and one of these has been provisionally closed (Science and Research). |
| Disbursement of the EUR 3 billion allocated to Turkey under the Facility for Refugees in Turkey and mobilisation of another EUR 3 billion by the end of 2018. | Out of the EUR 3 billion for 2016 - 2017, the total allocated amount has reached EUR 2.9 billion. |

Source: European Commission 2016, 1; European Commission 2017b, 5-11
Conclusions

The aforementioned examples manifest that migration can be used as a tool to pursue Turkey’s foreign policy goals. In the case of the Syrian crisis, Turkey did use migration to gain foreign policy benefits twice. In the first phase of assertiveness, migration was used as a tool of soft power to fulfil Wohlforth’s qualitative conditions of becoming a regional hegemon. And in the third phase, Turkey was using transit migration to Europe to gain political and economic concessions from the EU. This implies that, despite the unpredictability of migration movements, states do have the possibility to regulate migration flows to a certain extent for their own advantage. Leaving the moral aspects of such actions aside, utilization of migration as part of the state’s foreign policy is wholly in line with the realistic school of thought and with the principle of using the state’s relative power for its own survival and power maximization. Therefore, it is crucial to be aware of this phenomenon and take it into consideration in the foreign policy decision-making process. Yet, effectiveness of using migration as a foreign policy tool remains questionable. In the case of Turkey, the attempt to strengthen the state’s hegemonic position in the region by promoting assertive unilateral migration policy in the first phase failed due to a revival of the Kurdish conflict and the geopolitical issues in Hatay, as well as illegal entry of Daesh fighters to the country. Similarly, agreement with the EU did not bring Turkey any closer to EU membership or visa liberalisation, and the financial support the country received covered just a slight percentage of the overall expenses Turkey needs to spend to deal with the Syrian “guests”. Thus, the other conclusion, apart from that states use migration as a foreign-policy tool, would be that the success of this activity is highly uncertain and short-lasting due to the unpredictability of migration movements in the world and their far-reaching effects that cannot be appraised in advance.

Reference list


STORIES ABOUT MIDDLE KINGDOM: CASE STUDY OF THE SLOVAK PERCEPTION OF CHINA AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR THE SECURITY POLICY

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Introduction

In April 2017, Slovakia passed the Strategy for the Development of Economic Relations with China 2017-2020. This is the first time Slovakia has adopted a strategic document pertaining to a single country only. Moreover, it is the only Central European country to have a specific China strategy (Turcsányi 2017b). Adoption of this strategic document came after five years of Prime Minister Fico’s government’s attempts to attract Chinese investments. However, even despite largely complacent policies towards China, Slovakia has so far failed to yield satisfactory results.

Should the Slovak government’s ambitions set out in the Strategy bear fruit, then we can expect intensification of Sino-Slovak relations. As provided in the Strategy, Slovakia wishes to benefit from the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) (Government of Slovakia 2017). However, there is growing evidence that at the same time as other countries embrace the BRI, Chinese influence in those countries is not limited purely to economic influence. Numerous countries have been targeted by the Chinese ‘soft power offensive’ with the aim to change the public perception of China. In changing the perception of China, media have been playing a pivotal role. In 2015 it came to light that China Radio International was covertly backing at least 33 foreign radio stations, which broadcasted positive news of China (The Economist 2017). In Nepal, Beijing has been relying on the Chinese TV and film industry to spread a positive image of China (Bhandari 2017). In the Czech Republic, a Chinese investor bought two local media. Since then,

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both the Barrandov TV station and Týden weekly have started to report only positive coverage of China since the Chinese investor came in (AMO 2017a). Even in the USA, the largest Chinese-language newspaper has been reporting on China-related topics in a manner echoing the discourse of the strictly regulated, mainland Chinese newspapers (Allen-Ebrahimian 2017).

Due to this evidence it is necessary to ask what impact the increased Chinese presence and intensified Sino-Slovak relations will have on Slovakia. To figure this out, it is necessary to understand what the current perception of China is, as well as to understand the specifics of the Slovak discourse on China. This can be determined by analyzing the media coverage of China in Slovakia. Hence this paper aims to answer primarily the question of how the Slovak media write about China. In order to answer the main research question three sub-questions need to be answered – what sentiment is present in the media discourse on China; what topics dominate the discourse; and whether the increasing ties with China lead to increased media coverage of the bilateral relations. This is followed by a comparison with other Central European countries’ perception of China and discussion of the possible security implications for Slovakia.

In order to answer the main research question and sub-questions, a sample of 2,603 media items spread across 25 media outlets (radio, TV, dailies, weeklies, online media) based on their popularity were analyzed. To map the discourse, the articles were coded for sentiment and keywords using the qualitative content analysis methodology. The articles were coded as either positive or negative if the overall tone of the article was such. In other words, the article was coded as positive or negative if it was clear that the author had a clear stance on China. If the article provided a mix of both positive and negative views of China, it was coded as neutral. Following the coding, the keywords were grouped into broader thematic clusters falling under three broader areas – economic, foreign, or domestic policy of China.

**Role of media in International Relations**

Traditionally, the media was thought of as neutral observers, which only report on the objective reality of interstate relations. However, such a positivist notion of what role the media play in international politics fails to take into account numerous evidence of the media catalyzing the changes within the international system, be it in accord or despite the wishes of the state actors involved. Increasing flows of information through the media has caused governments to lose the information monopoly related to
politics (Nye 2004, 53). The media act as pluralizing forces which mitigate the power's ability to influence and control others (Coban 2016, 47). Thus, domestic audiences are increasingly influenced by the information which may not be in line with the official views of their governments on what are the state interests and appropriate means of achieving them.

Chinese policymakers view the media as tools which they can use to channel Chinese soft power by reporting positive comments on contentious issues such as Chinese ethnic affairs, territorial conflicts, and other issues. For example, Zhao Lei of CPC Central Committee's Party School recognizes the need to use foreign media to spread the positive image of China abroad, as traditional tools of Chinese cultural diplomacy (e.g., Confucius Institutes) contributed only negligibly to the spreading and improvement of China's image. (Zhao 2015).

Due to the dynamics of threat formation, influencing others' perception of oneself is an important tool in the state's security policy. In objective terms, threat is defined as the nexus of an actor's capability and intention to threaten another actor. However, the element of perception influences whether a threat actually will be recognized as such and what the reactions of the threatened actor will be. (Rousseau and Garcia-Retamero 2007, 745; Stein 2013, 365). Since both threats and security are socially constructed realities, the same behaviour will be perceived differently based on our perception of the actor to whom we attribute the behaviour (Šimalčík 2017a, 53). This leads to the conclusion that security is a state in which not only objective threats are absent, but subjective fears and perceptions of danger as well (Brauch 2011, 61; Wolfers 1962). By supplying information, the media shapes the people's worldviews, and by doing so it shapes the in-group and out-group identity. As a result, our views about who are our allies and enemies are influenced (Coban 2016, 46).

By influencing the public perception, the media can influence the process of issue securitization, a process by which actors frame issues as threats to their survival (Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde 1998, 23–26). The success of securitization largely depends on the significant portion of the audience concurring with the views of the securitizing actor (Balzacq 2005, 177). By providing information to the audience, the media influences the outcome of the securitization attempt when it either echoes the securitizing actor's concerns or provides alternative opinions to the audience.
Slovak media discourse on China

Overall reflection of China in the Slovak media

In Slovak media, there is only small interest in China. The discourse on China in Slovak media is neither intensive, nor complex, and is predominantly neutral. Almost 70% of all the articles were deemed to be neutral, and only 26% were negative and 6% positive (see Figure 1). The low polarization of public discourse should allow for a constructive debate on China to occur. However, such a debate has not emerged so far. The prevalence of neutral media coverage was observed in all but one type of media. Only tabloid media deviate from this general observation as there was a higher share of negative coverage (47%) than neutral coverage (39%), with a comparatively higher portion of positive coverage as well (14%). While the tabloid discourse is much more polarized compared to the overall discourse, it accounts only for less than 2.5% of the total coverage volume.

This perception has been largely immune to the flow of time. Over the course of 6.5 years there have been only slight changes in the perception of China by the Slovak media. Nevertheless, each year the overall perception was slightly negative, and any recorded changes were usually concerned with the share of the neutral articles in the examined sample.

Overall, economic topics prevail in the media coverage over domestic and foreign policy related topics. Chinese economy was discussed...
1.7 times more often than Chinese foreign policy and 2.1 times more often than Chinese domestic policy. However, the economy related articles were of a low complexity. As many as half of these articles did not link economy to any domestic or foreign policy issue that China faces. The same applies to the coverage of Chinese domestic policy. Only Chinese foreign policy was covered more complexly with 68% of articles linking Chinese foreign policy to at least one economic or domestic policy issue. To further illustrate how the media discourse is skewed in favour of covering Chinese economy over other topics, a single economic thematic cluster – Chinese economic growth – has attracted more comparable attention from the media than all the foreign policy thematic clusters combined (42% and 41% respectively). Moreover, among the top five topics covered by the media, only a single topic is not related to economy but rather to domestic policy. Security related topics are seriously underrepresented in the media discourse. Less than 15% talk about rising Chinese power and influence. Specific security issues, such as espionage, are barely raised at all.

The reason for the thematic imbalance in the media coverage is connected to the composition of the actors involved in the media debate. Among the 21 most cited actors in China related articles, half of them come from an economic background and are employed either by banks or economic consultancies. Moreover, among these top agenda setters, only three of them come from a political background (President Kiska, PM Fico, and Foreign Minister Lajčák).

Disregarding the neutral articles, only three thematic clusters were covered in a slightly more positive fashion than negative, though they received only a small share of the overall coverage. These are Chinese culture and history, the BRI, and the 16+1 initiative.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Thematic cluster</th>
<th>Sentiment</th>
<th>Volume (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Culture &amp; history of China</td>
<td>0.111111</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belt and Road Initiative</td>
<td>0.089286</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16+1</td>
<td>0.045455</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign investments in China</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Research &amp; development</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Topic</td>
<td>Value</td>
<td>Score</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>--------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese investments</td>
<td>-0.01293</td>
<td>8.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sino-Czech relations</td>
<td>-0.13333</td>
<td>2.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade</td>
<td>-0.13636</td>
<td>15.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic growth</td>
<td>-0.13749</td>
<td>41.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sino-American relations</td>
<td>-0.15385</td>
<td>8.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese influence in the world</td>
<td>-0.15445</td>
<td>14.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign policy</td>
<td>-0.15576</td>
<td>12.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU-China relations</td>
<td>-0.15847</td>
<td>7.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic policy</td>
<td>-0.15982</td>
<td>33.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sino-Slovak relations</td>
<td>-0.17453</td>
<td>8.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State of Chinese economy</td>
<td>-0.20725</td>
<td>7.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese market</td>
<td>-0.22287</td>
<td>26.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environment</td>
<td>-0.24286</td>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family and social policy</td>
<td>-0.26923</td>
<td>8.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Territorial disputes</td>
<td>-0.28125</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taiwan</td>
<td>-0.28358</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic policy</td>
<td>-0.2891</td>
<td>16.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macao</td>
<td>-0.33333</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communism</td>
<td>-0.39544</td>
<td>10.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Espionage</td>
<td>-0.41379</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uighurs</td>
<td>-0.47059</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Two more topics, foreign investments in China and research and development, were covered in a balanced way. The remainder of the thematic clusters was covered with a different prevalence of negative coverage, with human rights related topics receiving the least favourable views (see Table 1).

Reflection of BRI and Chinese investments

There has been a steady increase over the last few years in the number of mentions of the BRI and Chinese investments in the Slovak media (see Figure 2). Since its announcement in 2013, the yearly coverage of the BRI has tripled as of 2016, and will most likely quadruple by the end of 2017. The same goes for the coverage of Chinese investments, which also almost tripled between 2013 and 2016.

The BRI is one of the three thematic clusters which are covered more positively than negatively. While in general the share of negative articles on China is almost 4.5 times higher than the share of positive articles, in the case of the BRI positive media mentions are 1.5 times more frequent than negative ones. When it comes to the individual media – two stand out with regard to their highly positive coverage of the BRI. The left-leaning Pravda and the economically oriented Hospodárske noviny both had more than 50% of articles showing positive sentiment towards China in their articles on the BRI. In Pravda, 57% of articles were positive, while in Hospodárske noviny this share was as high as 71%. Two media also stand out in their highly negative view of the BRI - Denník N and Týždeň. Both of

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Table 1: Sentiment values of thematic clusters

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<table>
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<tr>
<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Human rights</td>
<td>-0.5</td>
<td>8.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tibet</td>
<td>-0.50595</td>
<td>6.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hong Kongt</td>
<td>-0.56522</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

49 The sentiment value of each thematic cluster was calculated as an average of sentiment value of each article (-1 for negative, 0 for neutral, 1 for positive) belonging to the specific thematic cluster. The sentiment value of each thematic cluster was calculated as an average of sentiment value of each article (-1 for negative, 0 for neutral, 1 for positive) belonging to the specific thematic cluster.
these media had a 100% share of negative articles in the sample of examined articles. This is, however, not surprising, since in the overall sample of articles discussing China both of them had a larger share of negative articles than the share of neutral articles. However, prevalence of positive coverage over negative is not true for the coverage of Chinese investments as such. Nevertheless, the discourse on Chinese investments is still less negative than the overall China discourse as the share of both negative and positive mentions is almost equal (approximately 15% in both cases), yielding a highly balanced media coverage. Both the BRI and Chinese investments are thus viewed much more positively than China as such (see Figure 3).

Naturally, the BRI topic is most closely linked with Chinese investments. However, almost one third of the BRI mentions also linked the initiative to political issues. These articles examined the BRI in the context of rising Chinese power and global influence. A similar number of articles also linked Chinese investments to that issue. It should be noted that the topic of Chinese power is linked to the BRI and investments more frequently than to trade relations with China.

Figure 2: Number of media mentions of Chinese investments and the BRI
Reflection of Sino-Slovak relations

Coverage of the bilateral Sino-Slovak relations has been also rising since 2015. The reason for the sudden increase in media coverage of the topic appears to be twofold. Firstly, in 2015, the Shanghai Stock Exchange experienced massive turbulence in stock prices, which sparked a debate about the state of the Chinese economy and its slowing down, which could in turn threaten the Slovak automotive industry. Indeed, while during the whole examined period (2010-2017) Sino-Slovak relations were linked with the Chinese economy in 78% of cases, in 2015 it was an astounding 92% cases. Secondly, in 2016, the Dalai Lama visited Slovakia and met with President Andrej Kiska. The Tibet issue was linked with the bilateral ties in as many as 45% of articles.

Media perception of Sino-Slovak relations was slightly more negative than positive, with 28% of articles being negative (almost the same as the average perception) and 11% of positive articles (5 percentage points higher than the average). This suggests that when it comes to particularities of the bilateral ties, the perception of China is slightly more positive compared to the overall perception of China as such. Moreover, actual perception may be even more positive, as two-fifths of the negative articles were connected to a single event – the Dalai Lama’s visit to Slovakia, which caused a temporary rift in mutual relations with China and led to Li Keqiang’s cancellation of a meeting with PM Fico during the 2016 16+1 meeting in Riga (SITA 2016).
As over three-quarters of media outputs linked the theme of Sino-Slovak relations with themes related to the Chinese economy as such, the perception of China in these articles alone ought to be evaluated. However, the perception does not differ significantly from the overall perception of the bilateral relations. The share of negative coverage is only 4 percentage points lower, while the share of the positive coverage is only 1 percentage point higher (see Figure 4).

A high linkage of the two issues is problematic, as yielding such a high portion of media attention to economic affairs in the bilateral relations leaves other issues, such as political relations or security largely untouched, which restricts the development of a public debate on the costs and benefits of developing mutual relations between the two countries. Indeed, only 17% of articles on bilateral Sino-Slovak relations deal with rising Chinese power and influence.

![Figure 4: Media perception of Sino-Slovak relations (% of articles)](image)

**Media discourse in other V4 countries**

**Czech Republic**

The Czech media discourse is much more polarized and the media holds a highly negative outlook towards China. In the Czech Republic, there is an equal amount of published neutral and negative media items on China, 45% and 41% respectively. The remaining 14% are framing China in positive terms (Karášková 2017). Unlike in Slovakia, two media with Chinese ownership were operating in the Czech Republic from 2015 until
2017. In this timeframe, the two media presented an image of China which substantially deviated from the remainder of the media, as they published or broadcast only positive coverage of China (AMO 2017a).

This difference in the sentiment of the media coverage can be attributed to the difference in the topics covered by the Czech media. Economic topics are not the prime interest of Czech journalists. China’s foreign relations with other countries around the world, human rights and the CCP’s authoritarian rule gained more attention than the Chinese economy. Moreover, the public debate on China is not only polarized, but also highly politicized and stereotyped. At the same time, Czech media portray China as an opposite of the moral values and preferences of the Czechs, which suggests that an ongoing process of othering is taking place in the country. Nevertheless, the crucial topic of Chinese influence in the Czech Republic remains underreported (AMO 2017a; Karásková 2017).

The Czech media discourse on China is in stark contrast with the official position of the Czech government, which holds a very pragmatic, economic-benefit-seeking policy towards China without taking into account possible political or security implications. The media are resisting the official narrative that the Chinese market offers numerous possibilities for Czech businesses (Karásková 2017). While not a part of the broad media discourse, the security concerns stemming from the pragmatic China policy are being discussed in smaller media targeting niche audiences (policymakers, researchers) (Fürst 2016).

Hungary

The perception of China exhibited in the Hungarian media discourse is quite similar to the Slovak discourse. The share of neutral coverage of China is actually even higher in Hungary than in Slovakia, and accounts for as many as 85% of articles on China. The remainder of the Hungarian coverage offers 10% of negative articles and 5% of positive articles. With a large majority of neutral articles and higher share of negative than positive articles, the Hungarian discourse on China is similar in its sentimental composition to the Slovak one (AMO 2017b).

Even the topics covered by the Hungarian media are similar to those covered by the Slovak media. Hungarian media focus their coverage of China mainly on the Chinese economy and economic growth (40%). This is followed by issues related to world politics (30%). What is different,
however, is the much higher proportion of articles devoted to Sino-Hungarian relations. Occupying as much as 20% of the coverage volume, mutual relations are the third most often covered topic by the Hungarian media. This is more than double the share that mutual relations occupy in the Slovak discourse. Even though Sino-Hungarian relations receive plenty of coverage, a productive and useful debate on China and relations with it has not evolved in Hungary (AMO 2017b).

It should be noted that Hungary has been a recipient of several BRI projects since the initiative’s announcement. Nevertheless, the coverage of the BRI is quite low in the country. Reporting Sino-Hungarian relations almost never frames them in the context of the BRI. These relations are rather framed either as purely bilateral, or as conducted under the 16+1 framework (Matura 2016).

**Poland**

In the case of Poland, a dramatic change in the media discourse on China has happened in the past ten years. An analysis of articles on China published in the leading Polish newspapers around the time of the Beijing Olympics (held in August 2008) determined that as many as 60% of the published articles presented a negative view of China. However, the way China was portrayed in the Polish media in 2015-2016 was significantly more positive than at the time of the Beijing Olympics (Kanarek 2017; Mierzejewski 2009).

It is worth noting that Chinese investments are portrayed as a potential opportunity for Poland, even though Poland has experience with failed Chinese investment projects (Kanarek 2017). Furthermore, there is a growing trend in the coverage volume of China. Since 2013, Polish media were covering the BRI in increasing amounts, peaking in April-June 2016, when President Xi Jinping visited Poland (Turcsányi and Kachlikova n.d.). However, as some researchers note, the image built by the media is often incompatible with the realistic conditions of Sino-Polish relations, and creates a false perception of the extent of mutual relations (Bachulska 2017; Pendrakowska 2017).

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50 The failed project was a construction project for the Polish A2 motorway by China Overseas Engineering Group (COVEC), which was the first public works contract awarded by an EU member state to a Chinese company (Kanarek 2017).
While lacking more robust data on the overall thematic focus of the Polish media coverage of China, the data on the coverage of the BRI shows that the majority of articles focus on economic issues, infrastructure and political issues such as deepening of bilateral relations and 16+1 cooperation. These topics were discussed in a mostly positive framing. Only a small number of articles discussed the geopolitical and security implications of the BRI, which framed China in a negative discourse. The security implications, which were most notably linked to the BRI included terrorism, cyber attacks, and organized crime (Turcsányi and Kachlikova n.d.). Investments into specific sectors of the Polish economy, such as the energy sector, which is usually viewed as critical infrastructure, also received mostly positive coverage in the Polish media. Chinese investments into the energy sector are viewed as potentially helpful in increasing the efficiency of Polish coal-burning plants and reducing energy dependence on Russia and Germany (Turcsányi 2017a).

Security implications for Slovakia and the V4

The small proportion of the media coverage related to the security suggests that Chinese involvement with Slovakia has not undergone a securitization process yet. The lack of security-related debates on China is evident not only in the media, but also in official policy documents. The 2017 draft Security Strategy of Slovakia does not mention China even once. The same goes for the last several iterations of the Annual Report of both the civilian and military counterintelligence.

It appears that the Slovak public as well as policy makers have not been sensitized to Chinese actions in the same way that other European countries have been, or how they were sensitized towards Russia. The recent move by the Chinese conglomerate CEFC to purchase Markíza TV station has generated only infinitesimal coverage of what effect the Chinese investment can have on the quality of the TV’s reporting. The CEFC bid to buy Markíza was not the only case of possible foreign influence on Slovak media in 2017. Earlier that year, the public news agency TASR concluded a contract with the Russian news agency Sputnik, which has generated 2.5 times higher media coverage than CEFC’s purchase of Markíza. By buying the TV station with the highest viewership in Slovakia, China would gain a possible mouthpiece to influence the Slovak public’s perception of China. The Czech example shows us that this is a highly probable scenario (Šimalčík 2017b). Moreover, there have been reports of the CEFC having ties to the
Chinese military and intelligence, and being accused of corruption in Africa (Stevenson 2017; Hornby and Winland 2017). However, in connection with the purchase of Markíza, these security-related topics were raised only in 3 and 4 articles respectively.

The orchestration of the public perception of China carries further security ramifications. China prefers to deal with Slovakia and other CEE countries in the 16+1 format, an informal grouping of China and 16 post-communist CEE countries. Creating a positive image of China would only serve to reinforce the image of the 16+1 initiative. However, dealing with CEE countries in this format is eroding EU unity, undermining the forming of the EU’s common foreign and security policy, from which China is bound to benefit, as small CEE countries have less negotiating power vis-à-vis China compared to the united EU (Hallgren and Ghiasi 2017, 3; Auer and Stiegler 2018, 90-91).

Furthermore, having the ability to influence public opinion could lead to the distortion of public views on specific aspects of mutual relations. Be it downplaying the sensitivity of investments into certain crucial sectors such as energy, infrastructure, or even other media, or overselling the benefits of certain political decisions regardless of their actual benefit for the country, or even spreading reports on contentious issues (Tibet, Uighurs, South China Sea) which are in line with the official Chinese position, all of these scenarios carry their own risks.

This is not to say than any Chinese investment or initiative is to be a priori refused as threatening, but rather to show the necessity of starting a public debate between the different stakeholders, policy-makers, and analysts on what the Slovak aims are regarding relations with China, and what the red lines are which Slovakia is not willing to cross. In this regard, it should be welcomed that the Slovak government has passed a strategic document on the development of economic relations with China, which states Slovakia’s objectives in enhancing mutual relations (Government of Slovakia 2017). However, the document has the same bias as the overall public discourse on China. In its economic focus, the document ignores any possible security implications of intensifying mutual relations. Thus it serves to institutionalize the insensitivity to possible threats posed by China. It is only symptomatic that when the document was presented to other government agencies and the public for comments, the Defence
Ministry did not raise a single comment or objection.\textsuperscript{51} It is not only Slovakia which should pay attention to the public discourse on China. From the other V4 members, the media are sufficiently questioning the nature of Chinese behaviour only in the Czech Republic. However, in their negative outlook on China even they have distorted the public debate by offering mostly stereotyped views of China. In Slovakia and Hungary, with their large share of neutral coverage and low complexity of articles, the media serve to maintain the public's indifference towards China. Hungary is thus open to similar risks as Slovakia. The same goes for Poland, which has already undergone a significant change in the media discourse on China. To prevent these risks, it appears prudent to create rules on media ownership which would protect them from foreign ownership by persons from non-democratic countries.

Reference list


\textsuperscript{51} A list of objections to the Strategy for the Development of Economic Relations with China 2017-2020 is publicly available online at the official legal information portal Slov-Lex under the legislative process no. LP/2017/203.


Matura, Tamás. 2016. “Hungary: Along the New Silk Road across Central Europe.” In Europe and China’s New Silk Roads, edited by Frans-Paul van der Putten, John
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Introduction

This paper focuses on the attitude of the global Salafi-jihadist Islamist terrorist and militant group the Islamic State (IS) with regard to terrorism specifically targeting the energy sector as a political instrument of strategy in North Africa in 2014-2017. In this respect, the paper has two main goals. The first goal is to analyze the importance that the IS attributes to energy in general and, more specifically, to terrorist attacks targeting the energy industry and infrastructure within its strategy. The second goal of the article is to describe and analyze the forms, examples, goals and motives of terrorist attacks on the energy sector and the accompanying criminal activities conducted by the IS in one specific North Africa country - Libya, and their possible impact on energy security.

On the methodological level, the paper is based on the case study method, which is understood to mean a detailed analysis of the case that was chosen as the subject of research. Its aim is to provide a profound comprehension or causal explanation (Yin 2003). Its advantages are the depth of analysis it offers to every researcher and that it encompasses a relatively large amount of facts and endeavours to facilitate their complete evaluation. This treatise understands a “case” of a terrorist attack to mean a specific type and form of terrorist activity or a theoretical attack on the energy sector, with the condition that the case study then frames the overall terrorist activities and attacks targeting the energy industry and infrastructure together with the related criminal activities of the IS in Libya. The main sources for analysis of the terrorist attacks on the energy sector are the Global Terrorism Database (GTD), the Global Incident Map (GIM), and the set of research literature prepared by the Institute of International Relations Prague. The various forms of terrorist attacks targeting the energy industry and the related illegal activities perpetrated by the IS which are
described in the following text only represent a sample of such cases, with the aim of helping us to understand the goals and motives of the terrorist activities of the IS in Libya.

The paper has the following structure. The first section briefly describes and defines the problem of terrorist attacks targeting the energy industry as the main theoretical framework of the article. The second part briefly characterizes the IS before delving into a deeper analysis of the importance of the energy issue and terrorist activities targeting the energy industry and infrastructure in the strategy of the IS. Part three then provides specific examples of terrorist attacks aimed at the energy sector and illegal activities conducted by the IS in Libya. The fourth part analyzes possible impacts of the terrorist attacks targeting the energy sector in Libya on the energy security.

**Terrorist attacks targeting the energy sector**

In the early 1990s terrorism was still considered merely a risk, but not a threat. This perspective changed in the second half of the 1990s, after the first terrorist attacks in which dozens of people were killed and hundreds more were injured. The events of 9/11 were a major milestone in this development. From that time on, terrorism has been seen as a grave and pressing threat, and there has been much discussion on how to combat it. In our article, we consider terrorism, in full accordance with the UN Security Council Resolution 1566 (2004), as premeditated, politically motivated violence which is perpetrated specifically against non–combatant targets with the aim to influence the local or even an international audience (UNSC 2004).

The communicational aspect of terror represents a major tool for analysing the goals and motives of an individual attack or the threat thereof by the IS, which targets the energy sector together with related criminal activity. Every terrorist attack on the energy sector has a goal and a motive, and its implementation and realisation sends a clear message from the given terrorist organization both to the political functionaries of the afflicted state and to the political representatives of Western countries in general.

According to Ali Koknar (2009, 18-19) the concept of terrorism targeting the energy sector is not strictly limited merely to armed attacks on power plants, oil and gas infrastructure, or refineries. This concept also includes illegal activities aimed at such facilities, such as the theft of
oil or gas from pipelines, extortion, or the funding and support of groups that conduct the aforementioned attacks. In general, it may be said that energy terrorism is a criminal activity aimed at energy facilities that causes significant losses.

The basis of terrorism targeting the energy sector consists of attacks on the energy infrastructure and industry, such as power plants, power grids, refineries, and oil and gas fields, but it also includes illegal activities connected to these attacks, which aim to destabilize the government or the region (Giroux 2009). Apart from actually contributing to political and economic instability, attacks on the energy sector may be intended as a show of resistance to national governments and, last but not least, also as a means of putting pressure on foreign powers and international corporations that have a strategic interest in countries producing oil and gas. That is, terrorist attacks on the energy sector may in some cases be an important part of a terrorist organization’s strategy for fighting foreign powers (Steinhäusler et al. 2008). Furthermore, it is becoming increasingly frequent for terrorists to target pipelines as a means of obtaining economic resources to finance further terrorist operations, or as a means of increasing their influence among other groups vying for control (Makarenko 2003, 20).

Terrorist attacks targeting the energy sector present a great threat to energy security in any location that is or could be subject to such attacks, with the possible economic consequences potentially devastating with regard to the targets of these attacks, such as pipelines, depots, tankers, staff, refineries, LNG and oil terminals, etc. The vulnerability of this transport infrastructure means that any stoppage of supply or production can have a severe impact on economies that are dependent on energy resources (Koknar 2009, 18-19).

The importance of energy and terrorist attacks on the energy sector for the IS

The Islamic State (also known as the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant [ISIL] or the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria [ISIS]) is a militant jihadist group that originated in Iraq and has been led by Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi since 2010. On June 29, 2014, al-Baghdadi declared the establishment of a caliphate, or Islamic state, on the territories it controls in Iraq and Syria (McCants 2015).
Energy and attacks on the energy sector have a special place in the IS strategy, as the energy interests of the IS are, firstly, the effective use of currently existing oil and gas fields within Syria and Iraq and their expansion (for example, into Libya), secondly, an increase in oil and gas production to provide funding for the organization from the sale of the oil and gas, and, thirdly, taking control of new oil and gas fields and attacking the fuel transport infrastructure to punish and economically damage the West and enemies of the IS. In other words, the jihadists’ energy strategy sees oil and, to a limited degree, also natural gas as the main pillar for their vision of the IS. At the same time, the IS’s _shura_ (council) identified oil (and gas) as a key instrument for the survival of the uprising and, more importantly, as an instrument for financing its ambitions of creating and expanding a caliphate (McFate 2015).

The main interest of the energy strategy of the IS, which is trying to launch its own oil industry that would be similar to national and international oil corporations, is the endeavour to make the greatest possible use of the wealth of energy resources in its territories, which represent a stable and reliable source of income for the IS. This strategic vision was clear from the very start, when (initially) ISIS and later the IS began taking control of parts of Iraq and Syria and consequently gaining access to a number of Syrian and Iraqi oil deposits and gas fields. Over the course of 2014 the IS took control of approximately 20 oil fields with a total production capacity of about 80,000–120,000 barrels of oil per day. American government estimates claim that the oil transactions in that period generated about $2m–$4m per day, which suggests an annual profit of $730m–$1,460m for the IS from the sale of oil (Brisard and Martinez 2014).

Nonetheless, in 2015, air strikes by the U.S., Russia, and their allies on the energy industry of the captured territories, that is, on their oil and gas deposits, infrastructure, smuggling routes, and oil and gas facilities, together with advances made by Iraqi and Syrian forces on their respective territories, resulted in the recapturing of some of the oil and gas fields held by the IS and a reduction in the production of oil and gas. Despite this, however, the IS retained a number of gas and (mainly) oil fields in both Iraq and Syria in 2016, which still produce some 30,000–40,000 barrels of oil per day for the IS (Solomon et al 2016). Radicals from the IS thus earned about $1m–$1.5m per day from the sale of oil at the beginning of 2016, which comes to about $400m–$500m per year (Wintour 2016). The IS controls less than 10 oil fields with a total production capacity of about
20,000 to 25,000 barrels of oil per day, and financial revenues from oil sales decreased to $0.5 million per day in the second half of 2016 (Micallef 2016). Oil production and revenues from its sale fell sharply also in the first half of 2017. According to the U.K.-based security group IHS Markit (2017), the IS’s average monthly oil revenue in Iraq and Syria was down some 88% from 2015 to the first half of 2017.

The IS and terrorist attacks on the energy sector in Libya

Following up on the previous analysis of the strategy of the IS regarding energy and terrorist attacks, the next section will provide specific examples of such terrorist attacks and their accompanying criminal activities, and also discuss the main goals and motives of the IS in carrying out such attacks in Libya. The terrorism targeting the energy sector that is conducted by the IS in North Africa, mainly in Libya, is influenced by several factors. Firstly, the IS attempts to gain control of a part of the Libyan state’s territory. Secondly, Libya is a very oil- and gas-rich country, which holds 2.8% of the world oil reserves and 0.8% of the global gas reserves. Thirdly, the Libyan economy is highly dependent on exports and sales of minerals. Income from oil and gas exports constitutes 94.4% of its total exports, oil and gas exports constitute 28.1% of the Libyan GDP, and the raw energy materials sector represents approximately 93% of the government budget (EIA 2015). Fourthly, there was a military intervention in Libya in 2011 and there is currently a civil war, which creates a situation in which the IS can realize terrorist attacks targeting the energy sector more easily.

The Libyan branch of the IS – the so-called Libya Province (IS-LP, Wilayah Barqa), founded on November 13, 2014, is divided into three subsidiaries, or provinces: Cyrenaica in the east (the Barqa Province of the IS), Fezzan in the south (the Fezzan Province of the IS) and Tripolitania in the west (the Tripoli Province of the IS). In May 2017, the IS was present in the central part of northern Libya, in the area stretching west along the coast from the town of Bani Walid, which it partly controls, over Abu Grein and the area of Sirte, which the IS lost after a six-month offensive by militias backed by US air power in December 2016, to the town of Nawfaliyah in the east. At the same time, the IS controls some parts of the city of Benghazi, which represents its headquarters in Libya, and its operative cells are also in the town of Sabratha in the northwestern part of Libya (Widdershoven 2016). To date, three separate IS groups based in different parts of the Sahara have been identified, and they are striking at the country’s vulnerable oil and water infrastructure. One group is near the Mabrouk and Zalla oilfields.

The ISLAMIC STATE AND THE TERRORIST ATTACK ON THE ENERGY SECTOR IN NORTH AFRICA: CASE OF LIBYA
on the edge of the Sirte Basin, which is home to the bulk of Libya’s oil production. The second group operates around Girza, 170 km west of Sirte, near the town of Bani Walid. The third operates in Al-Uwaynat, close to the border with Algeria, where the IS and other groups, including Al Qaeda, have supply lines crossing into Chad and Niger (Pearson 2017).

The IS in Libya and its groups mainly focus on attacking the energy sector, and these attacks are often accompanied by criminal activities such as kidnapping foreign workers of energy companies. The attacks are carried out with the aim and motivation of damaging the energy industry in Libya and interrupting supplies to Western countries, while economically and politically destabilizing and discrediting the UN-recognized Libyan Government of National Accord (GNA) in Tripoli. Mastering the oil fields and their efficient use in the form of generating oil sales is currently a somewhat secondary and largely limited goal of the IS in Libya, but of course it does not give up in this pursuit. The main motivation is the effective exploitation of the extraction, production and sale of oil and natural gas to finance the activities of a terrorist organization.

Terrorist attacks and hostage-taking with the aim of destabilizing the enemy

Although IS fighters conducted limited attacks in Libya as early as 2014, the highest number of attacks occurred in 2015. In February of that year armed groups attacked several oil fields, and kidnapped at least seven foreign nationals. They conducted similar operations a month later, when they attacked two oil fields and damaged two oil pipelines that transported oil from the fields to As Sidr, which halted oil supplies to the port (The New Arab 2015). This was followed up on March 6, 2015, when radicals from the IS attacked the al-Ghani oil field, killed eleven guards, and kidnapped seven foreign workers (Faucon and Matt 2015). These and many other attacks resulted in the closure of at least 11 oil fields, stoppages of oil supplies, and the acquisition of a number of hostages by the IS.

In June 2015, gunmen from the IS announced that they had taken full control of the desert town of Nufaliya, which is just 50 km from the As Sidr terminal, which provides the largest amount of oil for Libya’s oil exports. At the same time, by controlling the city of Sirte and the coastal city of Harawa, which is strategically located between Sirte and As Sidr as a point on the central Libyan coastal highway, the IS paved the way for Libya’s Oil Crescent, which has a strategic importance. If the IS takes over the Oil Crescent, including the Libyan coastal province of Sirte, the IS would come to control up to 80% of all of Libya’s oil reserves (Markey and Elumani 2015).
Terrorist attacks that aim to damage the energy sector

To give an example of an IS attack in Libya, on January 6, 2016, armed groups of IS fighters made three assaults on two of the largest oil terminals in the Libyan ports of Ras Lanuf and As Sidr with an export capacity of 550,000 barrels per day, which had been out of operation since late 2014, when Libya was engulfed in a civil war. Compared to the previous attacks, this operation caused massive damage. Five oil silos were set on fire at the terminal in As Sidr, and another two storage tanks with oil were destroyed at the Ras Lanuf terminal, which is equipped with the necessary infrastructure for the refinement and export of oil. In total, 850,000 barrels of stored oil were destroyed (Deyr 2016). A week later, on January 14, IS radicals conducted further attacks on both oil terminals and also damaged the oil infrastructure leading to the port of Ras Lanuf (Lewis 2016). Earlier in April 2016, five members of the Petroleum Facilities Guard were killed in an attack by suspected IS militants near the Bayda field, about 250 km south of As Sidr and Ras Lanuf (Egypt Oil & Gas 2017).

The attacks on the energy sector by the IS continued at the beginning of 2017. For example, on February 10, 2017, the IS hit the pipelines of the Great Man-Made River, the network on which the capital Tripoli and many coastal towns depend for much of their water supply. Other IS attacks hit oil pipelines and electricity infrastructure. The IS destroyed more than 150 km of electricity pylons in the south between Jufra and Sabha and have worsened the power outages in the capital (Pearson 2017).

Terrorist attacks with the aim of taking control of the energy sector

Finally, the IS attacks on the energy sector in Libya are somewhat restricted, as they are committed in order for the IS to control the oil fields, and the main theme of these activities is the effective use of mining and oil sales to finance the activities of the organization. Unlike in Syria, where the geography allows for oil smuggling, central Libya’s remoteness makes oil smuggling much more difficult and far more vulnerable to possible attacks. The only way the IS can transport crude oil for resale is through a pipeline to the coast, where there are oil refineries, and the oil is refined for domestic and foreign markets, on which the oil industry in Libya is largely structured, as it is dependent on oil exports to the countries around the Mediterranean. Additionally, Libya has only five refineries, but these are either controlled by armed factions other than the IS or located far from the major oil fields. Thus the IS could realistically sell oil to particular local communities and other armed groups (Masi 2016).
On the other hand, the terrorist attacks of the IS aimed at controlling the Libyan oil and gas fields in an attempt to exploit the revenues from the sale of Libyan oil and gas for the financing of terrorist activities cannot be completely ruled out. Nevertheless, at present, the IS must fight for its decisive position as well as for the Libyan energy sector with various opposition groups, such as the Benghazi Defence Brigades and Libyan National Army led by Commander General Khalifa Haftar, but also with various rival Islamic groups, such as Al-Qaeda.

The IS terrorist attacks targeting the energy sector in Libya and energy security

As a result of the IS attacks on the energy sector, Libya’s oil infrastructure was damaged and oil production was paralyzed and deteriorated, falling to 325,000 barrels per day in 2016, compared to about 1.7 million barrels of oil per day before the Arab Spring in 2011 (Widdershoven 2016). Similarly, there has been a drop in gas and oil exports, for example, when the Libyan power company National Oil Corporation (NOC) in 2016 exported only around 260,000 barrels of oil per day and 100,000 barrels of oil per day lost due to the interruption of the oil fields of El Feel and Sharara. The damage caused by the attacks of the Islamic State is causing huge financial losses. For example, on January 26, 2016 Libya’s NOC stated that the country had lost $60 billion in production and export (Widdershoven 2016). Last but not least, there are no ideal future predictions. For example the new al-Sarraj Government will have to recover damaged oil and gas infrastructure, which will take at least 5-8 years. These facts are negatively affecting the Libyan economy, dependent on oil and gas exports, and at the same time jeopardizing the security of Libya, which has to cope with repeated electricity and gas outages for households and businesses in many cities, including Tripoli (Widdershoven 2016).

Besides the security of Libya, the situation in this strategically important country can also affect the energy security of the West, especially the EU. Through the struggles between the Western and Eastern governments disrupted, and through the attacks against the energy sector economically and politically destabilized Libya that is easily manageable, is the first step in the IS strategy for the final takeover of the entire country in the coming months. If the IS managed to control the whole of Libya, it would most likely stop all oil and gas supplies to the EU, which imports about 3.4% of oil and 2% of gas from Libya (EIA 2015). At the same time, the Libyan territory controlled by the IS could become the starting point
for terrorist attacks against southern European countries, including their energy infrastructure and industry. In addition, from the territory of Libya, the IS could carry out terrorist attacks to control or further strengthen its influence in surrounding, energy-rich African countries such as Algeria and Egypt, where the IS could, through its offshoots (Algerian Province and Sinai Province), further attack their energy sector, including the Suez Canal and the SUMED pipeline (Widdershoven 2016).

Conclusion

In the case of Libya, according the Global Terrorism Database (GTD n.d.), in the period from 1 January 2014 to 31 December 2016 various branches and offshoots of the IS carried out a total of 58 attacks on the business and utilities sector, more than half of which were aimed at the energy sector, and during the first half of 2017 several attacks (GIM n.d.) focused on oil and gas fields and transport infrastructure in order to harm the energy sector.

The main motives of these attacks are to suspend oil exports to the West, to raise oil prices, to weaken the oil-dependent economies of Western states and to cause a panic that would disrupt their energy security. At the same time the IS attacks on the energy sector and also the IS’s criminal activity pursue two objectives. The first goal is to cause economic damage to the internationally-acknowledged Libyan Government of National Accord, which has lost a significant part of its income from oil production because of the attacks, as oil is an important part of the revenue to the state budget, and because of the attacks, the government will not be able to secure stable supplies of gas and electricity to households. The motive for this is to create a deficit of public funds and social unrest in society. The second goal is to expose the political instability in the country and discredit the Fayez al-Sarraj Government of National Accord. The motive here is the idea that a long-term recurrence of similar attacks would have a negative impact on world oil markets on the one hand, and on the other hand it would harm Libya’s oil industry, which would come to be seen as an untrustworthy and unstable supplier of oil and gas. The somewhat limited goal of the IS terrorist attacks is to control the Libyan oil and gas fields which the IS does not give up.

The IS terrorist attacks have negative impact mainly on the Libyan economy and in jeopardizing Libya’s energy security, which must deal with repeated electricity and gas outages for households and businesses. At the same time, the IS terrorist attacks on the Libyan energy sector may have a rather limited impact on the energy security of the European Union and some member countries that import oil and gas from Libya.
Reference list


SECURITY IMPLICATIONS OF THE BELT AND ROAD INITIATIVE FOR SLOVAKIA

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Introduction

Slovakia and its neighbours in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) are observing an increase in Chinese presence. Globally, ‘China’s rise’ is no new phenomenon - China started its opening up and reforms at the end of the 1970s, and by the 1990s interactions with many parts of the world had dramatically increased. However, in Central Europe and Slovakia it was somewhat different. Although the two sides warmed to each other at the end of the 1980s, the anti-communist revolutions in Central Europe put a stop to this and each side took a significantly different political, economic, and international direction in the following years. It was only in the 2000s that trade between the two sides started to grow, mostly due to Chinese imports to the CEE.

In the second decade of the 21st century, Slovakia is experiencing its own moment of ‘China’s rise’. Or at least that is what the general perception holds. But is that really so? This paper focuses on two inter-related issues. Firstly, it discusses the extent of China’s presence in the country, especially in economic terms. Secondly, with the perception of a growing Chinese presence, the discussion moves quickly to potential security and political implications of an authoritarian China becoming too ‘influential’ in a newly democratic and still young country, which only recently joined the EU and NATO. Hence, the second part of the paper addresses the issue of what kind of security issues are put on the table together with the increasing economic presence of China.

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Chinese Foreign Policy and the Role of Slovakia

Let us begin with a brief discussion of Chinese politics and foreign policy in general. Former Chinese State Councillor Dai Bingguo offered what is still one of the best authoritative interpretations of China’s national interests (Dai 2010). According to him, there are three ‘core interests’ - regime security, national sovereignty and territorial integrity, and continuous social and economic development. Similarly, leading Chinese IR scholar Qin Yaqing defined domestic political security as the primary goal of the Chinese leadership, with economic development and national sovereignty being two basic cornerstones on which the regime security stands (Qin 2014).

According to these interpretations, Chinese foreign policy is an important means to achieve the final goal of the political leadership, but it is just that - ‘a means’. In other words, domestic political security should be seen as a more important and perhaps also a more burning issue than the international arena. That is well illustrated by the fact that China spends more on domestic security than on its military (Chin 2015) and (Turcsányi 2016a).

In recent years we have observed a shift in Chinese foreign policy. China is becoming more active - or assertive, as the international discourse calls it - and after decades of prioritising economic development it seems that political goals are again being put forefront (Turcsányi 2016c). Some of China’s international activity has been welcomed in Europe, such as the pledges in climate change, common operations against pirates near the Somali coasts, and the (so far mainly rhetoric) emphasis on free trade. However, much of China’s assertiveness is seen in Europe (and in the West) in a negative light, especially China’s approach towards the South China Sea or the Cross-Straits relations, and more recently the United Front work outside China or its heavy-handed approach in Xinjiang.

The growing international activity of China is closely linked to the global Belt and Road Initiative and also to the regional 16+1 platform (Turcsányi 2016d). The BRI advocates a growing interconnectivity between various areas of Eurasia, Africa, and Oceania (and even the Americas) in areas including trade, infrastructure, policy planning, people to people, etc. Although the 16+1 platform was initiated before the BRI was announced, it was later incorporated as a regional project in line with the broader BRI. In fact, the BRI does not seem to bring much novelty into the China-CEE cooperation besides a possibly higher political emphasis from the Chinese side. The CEE potential to become the ‘bridge to Europe’ for China was
recognized even before the BRI was announced, as for instance the early documents and commentaries on the 16+1 platform from the Budapest 2011, Warsaw 2012, and Bucharest 2013 summits show.

With perhaps not too much oversimplification it can be asserted that both initiatives promise Europe, including the CEE and Slovakia, (much) ‘more of the same’. We can observe new opportunities for political exchanges both at the highest level as well as at lower levels, combined with active state-driven people to people exchanges in various areas including universities, think tanks, media, culture, etc. Although both initiatives are primarily promising to reinvigorate economic interaction, we are not seeing many new happenings. Some of the projects, which are now labelled as BRI or 16+1, were initiated before these two initiatives were born, and they were included in them later on and rebranded. Elsewhere, CEE countries are still waiting for an increase in Chinese investments and the opportunity to export to China more, since these are the main motivations for most countries.

At the same time, most CEE countries do not really offer a significant number of investment opportunities to the Chinese. China, for the most part, is not searching for locations to base its own production, servicing, or research capacities. In the developed world, China attempts to gain access to top-notch technologies and brands; in the developing world, access to raw materials and infrastructure building projects. In Chinese eyes Central Europe stands somewhere in between the two, with an unclear potential and a little-known environment. Slovakia is by no means a foreign policy priority for China; it is actually the least important from among all its neighbours. At the same time, within the 16 CEE countries it still counts among the countries with the highest amount of economic interaction, which, however, says more about how small the trade and investment volumes in other countries are than about the importance of Slovakia.

From the three core interests defined by Dai Bingguo we can imply that the Chinese foreign policy towards various countries and regions depends on how they relate to China’s national security, economy, and symbolic factors with a possible impact on the legitimacy, and therefore regime security. Slovakia (and other CEE countries alike) does not play an overly important role in any of these areas.

53 This paragraph appeared previously in Turcsányi and Šimalčík (2018b).
From the national security perspective Slovakia is simply too far, too small, and too insignificant for China, with a little role to play even in the Eurasian transport corridors. Economically, the situation is not much different - Slovakia is just too small, without anything significant to offer to China either in terms of technologies and/or brands to acquire, natural resources, or (reasonably big scale) infrastructure to construct. The most important asset Slovakia possesses is its membership of the EU and NATO and the related (although obviously limited) influence on their decision-making. Furthermore, due to these memberships the country also holds the status of a European country and a member of the West, which enable it to be treated with a higher level of respect in China than would otherwise be the case.

All in all, it should be recognized that Slovakia will remain one of the marginal international partners for China and to change this should not be a goal of Slovak foreign policy. At the same time, this does not mean that China is not interested in developing relations with Slovakia. In fact, from the Slovak perspective China would still rank as one of the most influential diplomatic players – the Chinese Embassy in Bratislava underlines this point well, as the mission is one of the biggest that the Slovak capital hosts.

**China vs. Russia: Enemies of Democracy in Slovakia?**

China is often mentioned together with Russia as the two authoritarian powers of which Slovakia should be most watchful (Mesežníkov and Pleschová 2017). The fact is that China’s steps sometimes do take similar shapes as those of Russia. However, there are significant differences between the two in terms of their strategic goals and means of how they are trying to achieve them.

First of all, China’s foreign policy goals differ significantly from those of Russia, both globally and in relation to the CEE region. The story of China in the past 40 years has been one of a globalization success. Although it has by no means followed the path of democracy and free market, China has profited considerably from the current liberal international order. To be able to continue to profit in such a way, China needs a stable and open international system - that is why Chinese President Xi is currently one

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54 At the same time there is plenty of evidence that many in China treat the CEE region (as a whole) more as a part of the Global south, see for instance Bartosz Kowalski, Central and Eastern Europe as a part of China’s Global South narrative.
of the most outspoken defenders of globalization and free trade (Evans-Pritchard 2017) China has no interest in stirring up conflicts, which could affect this stability - such as the current developments in Ukraine, Georgia, Syria, etc.

China has also no interest in helping Russia to become too powerful and strong. Although the two countries’ diplomatic relations are currently among the best in their history, the two sides were on the verge of a nuclear war in the 1960s and many in China watch Russia with suspicion and a certain level of contempt. Moreover, it is also not in China’s interest to see Russia playing a dominant role in Central Asia, South Caucasus and elsewhere, where the two compete against each other.

Obviously, China is not entirely satisfied with its current position and status in the international order and wants to adjust it to its own liking. In this regard, China has talked for a long time about a ‘multipolar’ world order, meaning that the role of the US would be checked by other powers, notably China’s own, but also by Russia, the EU, and perhaps other emerging powers, such as India or Brazil. There is much scepticism in Europe towards often-repeated Chinese claims that they want to see Europe strong and united. These claims have appeared recently especially in relation to the 16+1 platform, which is seen by many in the western EU member countries as actually weakening EU unity (Dubravčíková et al. 2018). There is no reason why China would prefer Europe to be struggling economically, politically or security-wise, which in turn does not mean that China prefers Europe to be too powerful - here its preferences might not differ very much from those of the US.

Sometimes there are discussions about China’s main goals possibly being world domination or hegemony. However, even if China wanted to reach this status, it is highly unlikely it would ever be powerful enough to do so. In fact, it is far from clear whether China will ever become the regional hegemon in East Asia. To grasp the difficulty of achieving this, it is enough to compare China’s geopolitical situation with that of the US, a country located in a region, which it can dominate much more easily.55 China and Russia differ in terms of their abilities in the Central European region. On one hand, Russia is at an advantage due to its cultural and linguistic proximity and historical links, including instances which it can use for its own benefit such as the liberation in the World War II. There are

also ideational factors playing in Russia’s favour such as the long-standing tradition of pan-Slavism, ideas of Orthodox/Christian unity, or generally traditional values and discontent towards ‘Western decadency’. Russia is somewhat skilful in utilizing all of these to argue for its right to play an important role in the Central European region (Mesežnikov and Pleschová 2017).

On the other hand, although Russia has more experience with the region and understands it much better than China, its disadvantage is domestic socio-economic weakness. Here, China is in a different position thanks to its remarkable economic rise, which creates opportunities for others, allows it to use different amounts of resources, and also motivates others to mimic China’s success (sometimes called ‘Beijing consensus’).

A good case to study the approaches of China and Russia are the ‘alternative media’. There is plenty of evidence about Russian disinformation campaigns in the CEE region with the goal of destabilizing the region, undermining support for the EU, the US, the West, liberal ideas, or simply spreading fake news and public discontent (Smoleňová 2015, Šuplata and Nič 2018). When it comes to China, the situation is different - as was shown above, it is harder to see that China would have the same motivation as Russia, at least not in the CEE region.

Experience from the Czech Republic and some other countries shows that Chinese influence over the media also takes a different form than that of Russia. With China, the influence over mainstream media appears to be a bigger problem. When the Chinese company CEFC purchased a couple of Czech media, they have virtually started to report only positive coverage of China since (Karaskova et. al 2018). The same company aimed to buy the largest TV station in Slovakia – Markíza. Due to CEFC’s troubles (see below), the sale was called off. However, the Czech experience shows a scenario that would have been likely to happen also in the case of Markíza if the sale had gone through. This would have provided China with huge potential to spread pro-Chinese narratives in a mainstream TV station, which is actually in line with the Chinese ‘soft power’ strategy. Despite this, the potential acquisition of TV Markíza drew very little media attention compared to similar concerns related to Russia. This is largely due to much lower sensitization of the Slovak public and security community to China compared to Russia (Šimalčík 2017a, Šimalčík 2017b).
At the same time, China does appear sometimes in the ‘alternative media’ and there are some examples of Chinese propaganda messages, primarily related to Tibet (Slobodník 2016) In Slovakia, these news items appeared for example after the Slovak President met the Dalai Lama, after which the Chinese Embassy in Slovakia launched diplomatic protests and various PR activities both in cyber and real space (e.g. organizing exhibitions and seminars about Chinese Tibet). The Czech Republic, where pro-Tibetan sentiments are much stronger, has seen even more of such propaganda.

In reality, it is difficult to distinguish to what extent these steps are directed by Chinese policies or by local self-motivated individuals. In the case of other topics at least, there are clearly examples of the latter - people explicitly supporting China even though they are doing so with a message that is far from the official Chinese policy. Perhaps the best example here would be the MP for the SMER party Ľuboš Blaha, who is known for his extreme left-wing ideas and opposing the US, globalization, liberalism, and defending Marxism, the situation before the 1989, etc. Only recently, Blaha went to China to present his book ‘An Antiglobalist’ - the irony being that today’s China is a staunch supporter of globalization, hence, Blaha was going against the Chinese official line.

A similar case can be made also about Milan Uhrík, a member of parliament for the neo-Nazi party Kotleba – People’s Party Our Slovakia. In 2016, Uhrík visited China at the invitation of the Henan provincial government. In his Facebook posts from the visit, Uhrík praised the communist government of China, while at the same time denouncing the EU. Similarly to Blaha, Uhrík also made paradoxical statements in his praise of China. According to him there is virtually no corruption in the country, which runs contrary to the notoriously known anti-corruption campaign of Xi Jinping, which calls for stricter investigation of corruption within the Communist Party of China and state administration. Uhrík also praised Chinese state-owned enterprises and their efficiency, which in Uhrík’s words protects China from foreign colonizing and Chinese people from capitalistic pillage, despite the fact that the inefficiency of these enterprises has been repeatedly mentioned by the official state-owned media in China. To top it off, Uhrík also praised China’s Great Firewall (Uhrík 2016).

Critics of China often point towards the Chinese handling of Tibet, Xinjiang, Taiwan, Christians, the South and East China Seas, and a number of other problematic issues to argue that China is a threat to
Central European democracy. These voices should not be discarded, since Chinese approaches are indeed very different from what liberal democratic countries should see as acceptable. Even more, not to raise objections against some Chinese steps would be against not only European values and morality, but even against national interests of the West in general. At the same time, what this analysis argues is that China’s attitudes differ between horizontal places and concerning Slovakia and the CEE region the situation is not as dire as some other world countries would find themselves in. Moreover, the following section will show that the Chinese presence in Slovakia is somewhat limited and we do not see much clear evidence of Chinese influence in play.

The Slovak Approach to China and the Chinese Presence in Slovakia

Slovakia can be counted as one of the nations with the least developed relations with China in Central Europe and also the only one without a strategic partnership framework. In comparison, Poland established a strategic partnership with China in 2011 and is often regarded as the leader of the 16 CEE countries in their relations with China in the so-called 16+1 format (Szczudlik 2014). Hungary competes for the title and argues that it started its ‘Eastern opening’ much earlier. Hungary is also the host of the largest amount of Chinese FDI and Chinese diaspora in the region. The Czech Republic, for its part, has a much more turbulent history when it comes to China (Turcsányi and Furst 2014). Before 2012, the country was regarded as perhaps the strongest critique of China in Europe. Since then, the political reshuffling in the country has produced an almost perfect U-turn in its diplomatic relations with China and some Czech leaders now try to gain for themselves the position of being the Chinese bridge/gateway to Europe (Turcsányi and Bajerová 2016, Turcsányi 2015).

Slovakia follows a somewhat different path from its neighbours, fuelled less by high-level political support and more by a pragmatic push from the business sector and economic ministries. Even though it was one of the first countries to sign the Memorandum of Understanding on BRI with China, its high-level political support has been significantly lower than has been the case in Hungary, Poland, or the Czech Republic.

Interestingly, the country’s former Prime Minister Robert Fico (who, unlike the president, is the head of the government in the Slovak political system) was one of the first to initiate contacts with China. In
2007, during his official visit he painted a notion of China becoming a new source of investment and a new market for Slovak exports. However, in the following years he became much less active in this regard and was even one of the very few missing at the 16+1 summit in Suzhou in 2016. Slovakia also did not send any high-level delegation to the Belt and Road summit in Beijing in 2017 and the post of the Slovak Ambassador in Beijing was vacant for about a year in 2016. All in all, even though Prime Minister Fico and other Slovak diplomats rhetorically confirmed that they see China as an important partner, there has been relatively little activity from the Slovak side to prove that (Turcsányi 2016b).

Not much changed in these respects in 2017, although the country’s government approved a 37-page long ‘Strategy of Developing Economic Relations with China for 2017-2020’ and put forward an even longer ‘Action plan’ (The Government of Slovak Republic 2017a, The Government of Slovak Republic 2017b). The former seems to never have been taken seriously and the latter was never even approved by the government due to different views among the ministries. At the same time, some of the rumoured Chinese investments in Slovakia fell apart, especially the HeSteel acquisition of the US Steel and the CEFC acquisition of the TV Markíza - which each would have increased Chinese presence in the country considerably.

The only more significant Chinese deal has been the acquisition of the logistic park near Galanta, which - although the exact amount was not disclosed - could have ranked roughly around EUR 100-150 million, making it by far the biggest Chinese deal involving Slovakia. From the perspective of trade, Slovak exports to China peaked in 2013 and in 2017 were less than six years ago. Moreover, even Chinese exports to Slovakia have stagnated since the 16+1 platform was established in 2012.
Although Slovakia was among the first countries to sign a memorandum with China on the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in 2015, the involvement of Slovakia in the initiative has been minimal until now. Slovakia is also located outside the six main economic corridors planned by the Chinese side as the backbone of BRI. However, some Slovak experts and officials see the potential that a new transport corridor from China via Russia, Ukraine and entering Eastern Slovakia could be opened and serve as an alternative option to the Northern route going via Poland and the Southern route reaching Europe via Greece, Serbia and Hungary.

**Conclusion: What kind of China’s challenge in Slovakia?**

The Belt and Road Initiative and especially the 16+1 platform have met a somewhat sceptical reception in Western Europe and beyond. Focusing particularly on the latter, ever since its inception in 2012, the 16+1 platform has been criticized in Western Europe for undermining the unity of the EU. One of the most often heard pieces of evidence for this is that Hungary has vetoed some EU motions on China (e.g. on treatment of human rights lawyers or motions towards the Belt and Road Initiative) and Viktor Orbán famously said that he is willing to consider the Chinese model of “illiberal democracy”. Other often used evidence are also the comments of the Czech President, who labelled his own country a “Chinese unsinkable carrier” in Europe and during his visit in China said on Chinese State TV that he wants to learn from China how to stabilize society (Barboza, Santora and Stevenson 2018).

Arguably, in the two countries mentioned above China has become something different than an economic partner. In fact, economically, the two countries are not doing particularly well in their dealings with China. The volume of Hungarian trade with China is now smaller than it was six years ago and the country has not seen any considerable Chinese investment during the same scope of time, all the China-friendly gestures notwithstanding. As for the Czech Republic, although various ‘Chinese deals’ have appeared in many headlines, the amount of Chinese investments, which have actually arrived, are far below what was announced during Xi Jinping’s visit in 2016. Even those that did arrive have become subjects of significant criticism, especially after the Chinese company CEFC landed in trouble both at home and globally.

However, these pieces of argumentation are of a more symbolic nature. On the empirical side, there is existing research arguing that the CEE
countries’ voting behaviour within the EU does not prove the allegation that the countries have changed their overall behaviour towards more pro-China (Matura 2015). At the same time, even the Czech Republic shows that the country as such should not be seen as simply turning towards China – the Czech Ambassador in Beijing for instance signed a critical letter of China’s treatment of human right lawyers, as only one of eleven countries from all over the world (Cao 2017). This is hardly a gesture of a country which follows Chinese foreign policy preferences. Therefore, rather than seeing the ‘pro-China’ moves as results of ‘Chinese influence’, we should look elsewhere.

One explanation would be that they are attempts to attract Chinese investments. This, however, is not the best explanation after one looks at the apparent illogic argumentations of the two leaders in questions, the futility of their attempts, and especially the unwillingness to adjust the direction - as Robert Fico in Slovakia or the Polish leadership in recent years did after they probably realized that not enough economic outcomes would come out of their approach towards China.

A second explanation is that the two above-mentioned leaders (Zeman and Orban) are following a different logic, not the one focusing on (national) economic achievements. Here, a full spectrum of options is coming into play - with domestic politics probably playing a significant role in the Czech case, internal EU bargaining with Brussels scoring high in the Hungarian one, and the personal reasons of the two leaders being probably important in both countries.

In the Slovak case, however, the situation is different. Not only has the country not taken any considerable ‘pro-China’ steps, but no significant political force has spent much energy on developing more active and closer relations with China. Some notable exceptions include Luboš Blaha, a politician from the governing SMER, who defends the Chinese model and keeps a close relationship with the Chinese Embassy. The former Prime Minister Robert Fico used to comment on China from time to time, criticizing those who defend a tougher position due to human rights abuses or problematic Chinese foreign policy steps (such as President Kiska meeting with the Dalai Lama in 2016). At the same time, as was mentioned, Fico himself did little for developing relations with China after his 2007 visit, showing that perhaps he did not see much economic value there.
Besides the political circles there is similarly lacking a strong business interest in developing relations with China. Interestingly, a few Slovak businessmen have chosen to develop links with China via the Czech foreign policy and economic diplomacy - this is true for J&T, Penta, and Vladimír Soták (owner of Železiarne Podbrezová, a major steel and machinery company in Central Slovakia), who was present when Chinese President Xi Jinping visited Prague in 2016 (ČTK 2016). When the Slovak Vice-Premier travelled to Suzhou for the 16+1 summit (instead of the Prime Minister), according to media there were only a few businessmen accompanying him, while the Czech delegation travelled with two planes carrying large business and media delegations.

To conclude, the worries about the Chinese influence in Slovakia should not be overvalued, although a cautious and especially realistic approach is well suited. China's presence in the CEE - and especially in Slovakia - is still somewhat limited and it is not clear whether the coming years will bring any change to the current dynamics. In other words, it is not expected that China would radically increase its presence in Slovakia to a level that would give it sufficient leverage to be utilised as a political tool. Actually, what we are observing these days in some CEE countries (not so much in Slovakia as elsewhere) is that they conduct symbolic 'pro-China' steps in order to attract Chinese investments - and perhaps to achieve domestic political and other goals - rather than as a result of existing Chinese leverage.

Yet, there remain possible avenues that could be exploited by China if and when it decides to exercise stronger influence in the country. Media ownership is one such case. In the case of TV Markíza it might have been a coincidence that prevented the TV station from falling into Chinese hands, and thus serving as a tool for projecting Chinese discursive power in Slovakia. The current Slovak media laws provide some protection against this, since they do now allow cross-ownership of media. However the laws have several loopholes that can be exploited. Lack of regulation on online media is just one example.

Although Slovakia and the CEE in general should be ready that the Chinese presence (and with it also influence) will be growing, we are looking

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29 One beneficial owner cannot own both a nationwide print newspaper and a TV station, nationwide print newspaper and a radio station, or a TV station and a radio station. See Act no. 308/2000 Coll. on broadcasting and retransmission.
towards a steadier trend rather than a sudden increase. Furthermore, China should not be seen in black and white, neither as a one-dimensional security threat for the region, nor an economic saviour nor perhaps even a political model to follow - which are both extreme positions, to which many observers and even practitioners subscribe. Still, it is one of the most important global powers, which Slovakia and the CEE region cannot and should not ignore.

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IDEОLOGICAL ROOTS OF “ISLAMIC” TERRORISM

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Introduction

The term of Islamic terrorism provokes a general perception that Islam is the root cause of the terrorist threat and that Islamic religion itself is radical and violent. This assumption dominates in present day society despite several studies demonstrating exactly the opposite (Davis 2007; Esposito 2015; Hussain 2003; Shah 2013; Shah 2015; Jihad and the Islamic Law of War 2009). Through this article we would like to contribute to the contemporarily often discussed issue of Islamic terrorism and its relation to Islam. The aim of the article is to point to ideological sources that inspire today’s terrorists with a particular focus on the role of Islamic religion with regard to Islamic terrorism.

First of all, we stem from the fact that terrorism is a strategy used by radicalized persons aimed to achieve certain political goals, from which we deduce that its theoretical sources should be looked for in radical ideologies. For this reason, we will first analyze the radicalized branches that developed within Islam, namely Salafism, Wahhabism and Deobandism. After identification of the common features of these radicalized movements, we will outline the parallels between these features and the agenda of the contemporary jihadi networks, in particular al-Qaeda and ISIS. However, this does not yet answer the question whether Islam itself can be also regarded as radical and hence a source of terrorism? Therefore, the final part is based on the analysis of the Qur’an as the primary source of Islamic law. We will focus especially on those passages that are the most often quoted by radical ideologists such as al-Banna, Qutb and al-Wahhab, but also by terrorists including bin Laden, when they try to legitimize their radical stance and indiscriminate use of violence. We will confront their interpretation with the opinion of experts on Islam such as J. L. Esposito,
J. Hussain, N. A. Shah and J. K. Davis, who emphasize the peaceful and human nature of Islamic religion. One of the key publications in this part is the translation of the Qur'an into the Slovak language by A. Al-Sbenaty containing also explanation of single verses.

**Radical Islamic ideologies**

Islamic terrorism is a form of radicalism or extremism, hence, in order to understand the ideological background of terrorism, radical Islamic movements should be scrutinized at first. Various Islamic ideological movements or schools of thought have emerged throughout history as a reaction to specific events. Three of them in particular, Salafism, Wahhabism and Deobandism, are often linked to the ideology of terrorist groups. All of them represent reformist movements that emerged, first of all, in response to a decline in Islam's glory but also as a reaction to the spread of Western influence or the occupation of Muslim lands and a lack of respect for the cultural and religious specificities of Muslim society.

Salafism, Wahhabism and Deobandism can be labelled as fundamentalist as they seek to return to the fundamental principles of Islam purified from any foreign influence. They share a puritanical vision of religion and emphasize a literal interpretation of the Qur'an and the Sunna as the basic sources of Islam. From the socio-political point of view they praise the way of life of the first Muslim generations and they want to rebuild the Muslim community with social and political aspects that were peculiar to Muhammad's era. (Mendoza 2008; Filipec 2017) On the national level their partisans promote the establishment of an Islamic state in order to reduce Western influence while on the global scale they seek to restore the former glory of Islam, to liberate the territories that used to be part of the Caliphate and ultimately to re-unify the global Umma.

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57 Several events throughout history demonstrate the diminishing glory of Islam, including the expulsion of Muslims from the Iberian Peninsula in 1492, the defeat of the Ottoman army at Vienna in 1683, the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire after World War I, the subsequent creation of the secular Republic of Turkey and finally the abolition of the caliphate in 1924. (Davis, 2007, 8)

58 Islamic fundamentalism is a movement that seeks a return to the old concepts of Islam. (Hussain, 2003) As such it should not be automatically regarded as negative. The problem emerges when radical fundamentalists claim political objectives which they are willing to achieve also by means of violence.
Probably the most expanded with the major influence on extremists is the Salafi ideology. The word “Salaf” refers to early Muslims, hence Salafism strives to return to their practices and purify Islam from innovations and especially from Western elements that, according to Salafis, have caused the contamination of true Islam and its deviation from the right path. (Brtnický 2008) Its origins go back to Egypt, which was exposed to French engagement in the 18th century, and until the late 19th century the administration of the state was under British influence. Salafi radicalism developed from the ideas of two Egyptians in particular, Hassan al-Banna (1906-1949) and Sayyid Qutb (1906-1966). The former was irritated by the British presence in Egypt and its effort to enforce pro-Western oriented educational reform at the expense of Islamic teaching. In order to spread his ideas al-Banna founded the Muslim Brotherhood, which was later partially radicalized by his disciple Sayyid Qutb. Qutb was disillusioned especially with the American liberal lifestyle and excessive freedoms that he experienced in the USA. He criticized the society that, according to him, faced a crisis of values and spiritual bankruptcy. (Brtnický 2008) He feared that Western influence on Egyptian society would have devastating consequences for Islamic traditions. Therefore, he promoted an armed jihad in order to vanquish the British, whom he perceived as oppressors and a threat to Islamic values. (Davis 2007) Both ideologists praised Islam as a tool to provoke a social revolt and conquer Western influence.

Another Salafi ideologue was the Pakistani theologian Abu Ala Mawdudi (1903-1979). Until 1947 Pakistan was an integral part of British India, hence, it was directly exposed to Western influence. Mawdudi insisted that Muslims, in order to become emancipated from the subjection to Western powers, should follow the example of Muhammad and his immediate successors. He perceived the use of violence as an acceptable means of spreading Islam towards the lands of non-believers. Like Qutb he emphasized the need to fight against non-Islamic governments also by means of armed jihad in order to restore Sharia and sovereignty of Allah. The ideas of all the mentioned scholars are revolutionary, as they seek to challenge the existing social system by means of offensive violence and revolution with the ultimate aim of establishing a universal Islamic state. Radical Salafis in general claim that the Islamic state can be established only when Muslims return to the principles of true Islam, and violence is permitted in order to achieve this end.

The second major ideological stream is Wahhabism, which is a form of the Salafi school of thought founded on the Arabian Peninsula from
where it has spread to a broader region. Wahhabism is an ultra-conservative ideology based on strict interpretation of Islamic law and restricted freedoms of women. At the same time, it embraces the features of military extremism. As a result, Wahhabs are more susceptible to use violence not only against Westerners but also against Sufis and Shiites who Wahhabis do not recognize as Muslims. Radical Wahhabis label all those who do not follow their version of Islam as apostates, trying thus to legitimize the use of force against them. (Netton 2008) Given its austerity and confrontational standpoint C. Hellmich (2011, 68) refers to Wahhabism as “an extreme and intolerant Islamo-Fascist sect”. Just like the other ideologies Wahhabism also reacted to the declining power of Muslim rulers. To reverse this trend, it suggested eliminating all alien elements from the Muslim world, confronting and killing infidels, enforcing strict interpretation of Islamic law and finally restoring Islamic governance over the territories formerly subjugated to Islamic rule. (Davis 2007, 9; ISCA 2017)

The Wahhabi movement was founded in the 18th century by Saudi scholar Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab (1703-1792) and since then it has become the official ideology of Saudi Arabia. Ibn Abd al-Wahhab himself was inspired by the medieval scholar Ibn Taymiyya (1263-1328) who called for jihad in order to defend Muslim lands against the Tatars. He introduced a vision of the world comprised of two hostile spheres: the land of Islam and the land of unbelief, which he referred to as the land of war. Moreover, Ibn Taymiyya labelled heretics all those who contested his ideas, as well as all Muslim rulers who applied foreign laws instead of Sharia. According to him it was a religious duty to punish such apostates and heretics by death. (Hellmich 2011, 70)

Among radicalized Islamic ideologies, Deobandism plays a crucial role on the Indian subcontinent, where it emerged in the late 19th century as an opposition movement to British colonialism. Its prime aim was to revive Islamic tradition in order to conquer Western and Hindu influences. (Byman 2015) Deobandism is a movement of moral purification searching for inspiration in the Prophetic era. (Netton 2008) Its partisans believe that only strict obedience to the social norms peculiar to Muhammad's times would assure social welfare because, according to them, these norms are the perfect guidance of Muslims' way of life. Deobandism was taught especially in madrassas in Pakistan, where later jihadists from Afghanistan and Kashmir recruited new fighters and where Taliban members were trained in the 1990s. (Alvi 2014) Today, Deobandi Islam appeals in particular to those Muslims struggling with social changes resulting from deepening globalization.
From the above analysis it stems that radicalized Islamic ideologies have emerged first of all as a direct response to the crisis caused by the exposure of Muslim societies to the influence of Western imperial colonizers. Muslims perceived Western expansion as the reason for the declining power of Islam, thus the West became the primary enemy of these radical ideologies. Besides anti-Westernism, the second feature of these movements is ultra-conservatism. According to the radical Islamic ideologues, Western influence can be eliminated by purifying Islam hence they emphasize a puritanical interpretation of Islamic texts and a return to the fundamental principles of religion. The third aspect of radicalism is increasing militarization. Radical Islamists argue that the fight against un-Islamic governments should take place in the form of armed jihad and it should lead to the restoration of the Islamic rule based on Sharia. The ultimate goal of radical ideologues is the re-establishment of the universal Caliphate and hence the re-emergence of the prestige of Islam. It can be thus argued that radical Islamic ideologies adopted the notions of offensive armed jihad, pan-Islamism, ultra-conservatism and anti-Westernism, which were later implemented into practice by terrorist groups.

Parallels with contemporary terrorist groups

The main principles of the ideologies analysed above can be observed in the agenda of today's Islamic terrorist groups, especially al-Qaeda and the Islamic State. These groups emerged in similar conditions as the above-analysed movements in particular, as a reaction to the occupation of Muslim lands by foreign forces. At first, the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan contributed to the emergence of al-Qaeda. However, its objectives in terms of enemy changed after the end of the Cold War when the U.S. presence on Saudi soil, the invasion to Iraq and Afghanistan, the U.S. attempt to maintain influence in the Persian Gulf and its support for Israel provoked rage and suspicion against the interests of the USA and the West in general. Moreover, the invasion of Iraq in 2003 led to the emergence of al-Qaeda in Iraq, the predecessor of today's terrorist organization – the Islamic State. Islamic radicals in Iraq opposed the presence of the Western army on the Muslim land and they did not recognize the predominantly Shiite government installed after the fall of Saddam Hussein as they considered it to be the puppet of the West. (Hashim 2014) Under these conditions, Muslims felt exposed to foreign influence and the dangers of globalization with the U.S. as its driving force. Many Muslims, frustrated by the threat to their identity, radicalized and they found inspiration on how to resolve this unfavourable situation in ideologies calling for armed jihad against the
West in order to vanquish foreign influence and to restore Islamic rule and the power of Islam.

One of the major figures in terms of jihadi terrorism was Usama bin Laden. He found the ideological basis for the radical agenda of al-Qaeda in Wahhabism and Salafism, which inspired him especially by the ideas of armed jihad, anti-Westernism, anti-imperialism and pan-Islamism. Bin Laden adopted Qutb's idea of violent jihad which he promoted in the fight against the soviet occupation of Afghanistan and later against the USA. In the late 1990s bin Laden issued two fatwas calling all Muslims to join the jihad and kill Americans and their allies wherever they were found. The ideas of anti-imperialism and pan-Islamism continue to be present in the ideology of al-Qaeda also under the leadership of Ayman al-Zawahiri, bin Laden's successor. According to him, the objective of jihad is to install an Islamic state incorporating all Muslim lands, hence to re-establish the Caliphate, and finally to revive the lost glory of Islam. (Mozaffari 2007, 30) Pan-Islamism was implemented and partially realized by the terrorist group of the Islamic State when, in 2014, its leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi proclaimed a Caliphate on the occupied territories of Syria and Iraq. He declared himself the caliph of all Muslims although the legitimacy of this act was contested even within the Muslim community. The ultimate aim of the Islamic State is to expand towards lands formerly under Islamic rule. The Caliphate as envisioned by its partisans should include not only the Middle East, but also parts of Europe, North and sub-Saharan Africa, as well as a significant part of central and South Asia. It would symbolize Islamic unity, glory and social justice which they feel were undermined by Western involvement in Muslim countries. At the same time, the Islamic State requires rigid obedience to the rules enforced on the territory under its control. However, these rules are based on the strict interpretation of Islam with brutal implications on civilians, especially non-Muslims who face either forced conversion or death.

Another common feature embraced by both al-Qaeda and the Islamic State is the idea of enmity towards non-Muslims and secular governments as was promoted also by the above-mentioned radical ideologists. In this context, both groups distinguish between the near and far enemy. The former is represented by secular monarchies and governments in Muslim countries often propped up by the U.S. which itself represents

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59 Bin Laden's influence by Wahhabism results also from the fact that he was raised in Saudi Arabia where he came into contact with the teachings of Ibn Abd al-Wahhab.
the far enemy. According to global jihadi terrorist groups the U.S. need to be destroyed in order to install an Islamic regime in Muslim countries. In their opinion the destruction of the far enemy would enable the near enemy to be conquered. In addition, the Islamic State expanded the enmity to include also Shiites who are considered to be heretics, and hence have become victims of mass atrocities.

It can be thus alleged that the terrorist groups have adopted several ideas of radical ideologues, especially in terms of anti-Westernism, anti-imperialism, pan-Islamism and ultra-conservatism. They operate on the basis of radical Islamic ideologies that provide them a certain kind of legitimacy for their agenda. However, several academics evoke that this legitimacy does not stem from Islam itself and instead is the result of distorted and misused Islamic norms. Therefore, to provide a complete image about the ideological roots of terrorism, the relation between radical ideologies and Islamic principles needs to be further analysed.

The role of the Qur’an in regard to radical ideologies

Terrorists and Islamic radicals try to justify their actions in religious terms by quoting the Qur’an as the main source of Islamic law. However, the Qur’an is a complex text and its verses should be understood in specific historical context. The complexity of the Qur’an in combination with the absence of a single authority that would oversee its interpretation enables radicals to use verses selectively and irrespective of their context so that it serves their predetermined objectives. Selectivity and misinterpretation may be observed in reference to several issues promoted by radical ideologues and terrorists.

First of all, Islamic terrorists often legitimize their violent actions by designating them as jihad. They focus exclusively on its armed form despite the fact that this kind of armed struggle is perceived by the Qur’an as a lesser jihad, minor to its non-violent forms. Two main problems can be identified in the issue of jihad proclaimed by terrorists. First of all, armed jihad as a duty for every Muslim must be proclaimed by the appropriate authority – the righteous and pious ruler, which the leaders of terrorist groups are not. Secondly, even if armed jihad were proclaimed, its conduct would have to conform to the regulations of armed conflict that are included in the verses of the Qur’an and the Sunna. These guiding principles are indeed humane and compatible with the essence of international humanitarian law. (Shah 2015) For instance, the Islamic law of war prescribes the behaviour towards
prisoners as well as non-combatants, women, children, old persons or monks who are illegitimate targets of violence and hence they have to be protected from being harmed or killed. (Hussain 2003) The protection concerns also cities, cultural heritage and the environment.

Despite these regulations, terrorists often declare jihad without pertinent legitimacy. Moreover, they do not distinguish between combatants and civilians, or women, children and other vulnerable categories of the population that often become victims of armed attacks. In fact, sometimes it is even not possible to make such a distinction because of the strategy used by contemporary terrorists including suicide bombings that provoke mass causalities to civilians. Furthermore, in spite of prohibition, their actions cause serious damage to cities and monuments, as has been recently witnessed in the historical city of Palmyra, inscribed on the UNESCO World Heritage List, which was destroyed by fighters of the Islamic State.

Another problematic matter is suicide bombing and so-called martyrdom, which is often misused by those who claim that Islam is violent. Stemming from Islamic law, martyrdom should be regarded as an act committed for national sake and a martyr is a person who sacrifices his life in defence of his country. Yet terrorists prefer another more religion-related definition of martyr and according to them it is first of all “the fighter for the cause of Allah” (Davis 2007, 23). Hence, martyrdom is misused by terrorists in order to justify suicide attacks, neglecting the fact that Islam forbids suicide.

One of the major issues of extremists’ agenda is the perception of “us versus them”, based on the hatred against non-Muslims, especially Jews and Christians. To support their claims, extremists quote the Qur’anic verse 5.5160 which serves to incite hatred and prevent Muslims to side with either Jews or Christians. However, as J. K. Davis (2007) and J. L. Esposito (2015) suggest, Qur’anic verses need to be interpreted with regard to the specific historical context, which gives to the meaning different nuances when compared to their literal interpretation. The verse 5:51 was revealed because several Muslims whose faith was not yet strong enough revealed classified information to their Christian or Jewish friends. But this knowledge could have been used afterwards against Muslims on the battlefield. Hence, the objective of this verse was to disable Muslims from revealing secret and

60 “O you who have believed, do not take the Jews and the Christians as friends. They are friends of each other. And whoever amongst you takes them for a friend – then surely, he is one of them.” (The Qur’an 5:51)
strategic information to disbelievers, which is different from what today’s extremists claim.

Moreover, J. K. Davis (2007) reminds that the Qur’an refers to both Jews and Christians as to the Peoples of the Book and acknowledges their prophets. In fact, the verses 60:8\(^{61}\) - 9\(^{62}\) urge towards maintaining friendly relations with all people regardless of their belief. Moreover, jihad is often promoted by extremists to convert non-believers by force despite the explicit prohibition of forced conversion by the Qur’an.\(^{63}\) (Hussain 2003) Today terrorists also often incite intra-Muslim violence against those who are perceived as apostates only because they do not practice their radicalized form of religion. For instance, moderate Sufis and Shiites suffer serious injustice in Iraq and Syria committed by fighters from the Islamic State. However, this intra-Muslim violence is widely criticized and rejected also within the Muslim community.

The Royal Ahl al-Bayt Institute for Islamic Thought points out that in the Mecca times the use of violence was completely prohibited and during the Medina period it was allowed for Muslims to take up arms exclusively for defence purposes. The verses permitting Muslims to counter their persecutors by force were revealed only after their forced emigration from Mecca to Medina. (Al-Sbenaty 2008b) The purpose of those verses was to enable Muslims to protect themselves against their enemies who persecuted, murdered or tortured them. The resort to force by the early Muslims is thus interpreted as a right cause and a just action which was done in defence against injustice committed on Muslims. (Jihad and the Islamic Law of War 2009) The verse legitimizing such behaviour states: “Permission is given to those who are fought because they have been wronged”. (The Qur’an 22:39) However, this verse is often employed by terrorists who portray Westerners as oppressors in the attempt to justify the right to take up arms against

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61 ‘Allah does not forbid you from those who do not fight you because of religion and do not expel you from your homes - from being righteous toward them and acting justly toward them. Indeed, Allah loves those who act justly.” (The Qur’an 60:8)

62 ‘Allah only forbids you from those who fight you because of religion and expel you from your homes and aid in your expulsion - that you make allies of them. And whoever makes allies of them, then it is those who are the wrong-doers.” (The Qur’an 60:9)

63 Qur’anic verse 2:256 states: “Let there be no compulsion in the religion.”
them. From this logic it stems that instead of religious identity it is first and foremost injustice and aggression committed against Muslims that justifies the use of force.

The discrepancies enumerated above between the principles of Islam and the agenda of terrorists who claim to act in the name of Islam are often explained by the so-called principle of necessity or functionality. It claims that certain prohibitions such as suicide may be violated in the case that it is the only possible way how to efficiently repel a stronger conqueror. (Hussain 2003) Terrorists try to apply this principle in the jihad against the US and other Western powers that are depicted as better equipped occupiers seeking to invade Muslim countries and endanger Islamic values and lifestyle.

Yet probably the most quoted and the most disputed is the “sword verse” which states: "When the sacred months have passed, kill the polytheists wherever you find them, capture them and besiege them, and lie in wait for them at every ambush. But if they repent, and perform the Prayer and give Alms, then let them alone. Indeed God is forgiving, merciful."

(The Qur’an 9:5) “Polytheists” in the first part of the verse refers to non-Muslims of Arabia and not specifically to Jews and Christians. It does not legitimize the fight against non-believers because of their faith, but again the fight is the result of injustice that polytheists or non-believers caused to the Muslims or because they severely violated agreements concluded with Muslims. In fact, every time the Qur’an appeals to kill non-believers, it is conditional upon their behaviour towards Muslims and not simply because of their belief. (Shah 2013, 350) However, the meaning of this verse was later distorted in order to justify imperial wars against all non-believers and its misinterpreted version serves today’s terrorists to legitimize unconditional warfare against non-Muslims or apostates. Critics point to this verse in order to demonstrate the violent nature of Islam which, according to them, obliges Muslims to kill disbelievers. They neglect the fact that Muslims in the times of the Prophet were allowed to fight only in defence. Furthermore, the continuation of that same verse reveals that they had to end hostilities as soon as the opponent stopped the aggression. (Esposito 2015, 1070) Moreover, the verse 2:190 states “fight for the cause of God with those who fight you, but do not be aggressive: God does not like aggressors”, which clearly supports the thesis about the non-violent character of Islam. In this context, the Royal Ahl al-Bayt Institute for Islamic Thought points to the problem of deliberate misinformation when it states in its publication that
“it is one thing to hunt for quotes which serve a predetermined purpose, and quite another to understand a text in its proper context and in light of the tradition that has dwelt upon it for over 1400 years”. (Jihad and the Islamic Law of War 2009, 34)

It can be concluded that enmity and violence adopted by terrorists against non-believers cannot be justified by religious principles. Instead, terrorists base their radical agenda on distorted and selectively chosen passages from Islamic texts in the attempt to promote their claims in religious terms and hence achieve legitimacy for otherwise illegitimate acts.

**Conclusion**

From the ideological perspective, Islamic terrorism is based on the principles proclaimed by radical ideologies, in particular Salafism, Wahhabism and Deobandism, which have emerged, just like terrorism, in specific circumstances related to perceived injustice committed against Muslims. However, it has been pointed out that radicalism in this case is based not only on revisionism, ultra-conservatism and radical fundamentalism, but also on purposive interpretation of Islamic texts. Misinterpretation or literal interpretation of single verses deprived of the pertinent historical context change their meaning, enabling radicals to misuse religion to justify hatred, violence and armed jihad against the West, non-believers and apostates. Terrorists misuse especially the perceived oppression of Muslims as a result of political and cultural subjugation to foreign powers, in order to portray their acts as strictly defensive. However, the armed jihad as waged by the terrorists and excessive and indiscriminate violence is in violation of the Islamic law of war, which is in its essence humane and comparable to international humanitarian law.

Therefore, Islam itself should not be blamed for the austere actions of terrorists because they are based on deliberate misinterpretation of Islamic texts. Islam and the Qur’an are thus misused by terrorist groups as a tool of propaganda to gain support for radical ideas and legitimize the use of violence in a way that is indeed incompatible with Islamic law. In other words, Islam, or more specifically the Qur’an, does not provide ideological justification for terrorism, but it is its distorted version that enables extremists to legitimate their acts (at least from their perspective). To conclude, there is no direct relation between Islam and terrorism, yet misinterpretation of Islamic law – as promoted by radical ideologies – enters to this proclaimed nexus and leads to the phenomenon of so-called
Islamic terrorism.

Reference list


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