THEORIZING SECURITY IN THE EASTERN EUROPEAN NEIGHBOURHOOD

ISSUES AND APPROACHES
THEORIZING SECURITY IN THE EASTERN EUROPEAN NEIGHBOURHOOD: ISSUES AND APPROACHES

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INTRODUCTION

SECURITY CONCEPT, SECURITY STUDIES AND SECURITY POLICIES IN THE EASTERN EUROPEAN NEIGHBOURHOOD

Richard Q. Turcsányi

“Power in international politics is like the weather. Everyone talks about it, but few understand it.” (Nye 1990)

This is how Joseph Nye started his famous article on soft power back in 1990. Indeed, although it was almost 30 years ago, one may still agree today that even though power is a central concept of political science and related disciplines, its definition, conceptualization, and operationalization can be still seen today as far from sufficient. In other words, we do not know very well what power means and how we can use it to explain the real world development.

When it comes to the concept of security, the situation is different, but not so much. On the one hand, similarly to power, security can be seen as an ‘essentially contested’ concept (Gallie 1955-1956). Hence, there will most probably never be a universally accepted definition, conceptualization, and operationalization of security. On the other hand, this should not be seen as a problem in itself. The goal of conceptual analysis within social sciences/studies should not be to reach a universally accepted understanding of theoretical concepts, rather than to offer guidance on how to explain complex reality using certain simplified patterns. It is then only natural that these patterns will most of the times compete among themselves for they will argue what the important features of reality are that we need to focus on. These competition and arguments are at the very core of scientific progress in the context of (social) reality.

The goal of this introductory chapter is primarily to set the stage for the remaining parts of the book which in itself wants to present the reader with a combination of theoretical and practical insights into security, particularly in the Eastern European neighbourhood. To do so, we will, firstly, look into security studies as a specific scientific approach and we will explain how and
under what conditions it emerged and how it has developed until the present. Following that, secondly, we will focus on the concept of security itself. The attempt here will not be to offer a single binding definition, rather than to present the concept in a pluralistic framework. This is highly important and practically relevant for various understandings of security lead to quite different security policies and broader political responses. Thirdly, subsequent chapters of this book will be summed up and put in context to form a logical narrative of security approaches that the editors of this volume found to be most relevant in the Eastern European neighbourhood, which can be seen as one security complex (Buzan and Waever 2003).

The discipline of Security studies

Security studies as a specific scientific approach to study more or less everything related to security is generally seen as being part of political science. Although not everyone would agree, Richard Betts (1997) presented one of the easiest delineations of the position of the discipline of security studies with his concentric circles. He sees security studies as a broader discipline to the strategic studies (which focus on how states use military means for achieving their goals), and within strategic studies, he identifies military studies (dealing specifically with the tactical use of force). Although Betts did not do so, we may continue with these circles in an outward direction as well to present security studies as part of international relations (comprising, besides security issues, also economic and other areas), which in turn is part of political science which is a universally accepted stand-alone discipline within social sciences.

Security studies as a discipline started to develop (to some extent) independently after the Second World War in the West, mainly in the U.S. Obviously, there had been much relevant thinking and writing before then, but this was the first time when systematic focus started to be directed towards the concept of security, rather than war, defence, etc. Part of the reason why that was the case was the developing bipolar reality of the Cold War fuelled by the existence of nuclear weapons, which made all-out war between the major powers unacceptable to all (Buzan and Hansen 2009).

The discipline reached its ‘golden period’ in the 1950s and 1960s, when the academic researchers were able to provide policy makers with useful knowledge to understand and navigate international reality (Williams 2013). Some of the classical concepts were born in this era, including the ‘deterrent
theory’ and ‘mutually assured destruction’ doctrine with the appropriate acronym MAD, meaning that both sides are capable of destroying the other even after being attacked first (Wohlstetter 1958). In the U.S., this development was epitomised by Robert McNamara, who was the Secretary of Defence in the Kennedy and Johnston administrations. Indeed, it was civilian experts who became responsible for preserving security, rather than the military, which took up a more limited role, in line with Richard Betts’ (1997) circles presented before.

Important changes within security studies started from the 1970s. This was the time of so-called detente and the lowering of tensions between the two superpowers. To some extent, security studies with their traditional strategic concepts took second place, as deterrence became less the programme of the day, instead of developing contacts with the other side (Buzan and Hansen 2009). At the same time, criticism of the positivist approach of the traditional security studies came for instance from the ‘strategic culture’ concept. Researchers working within this new approach were arguing that it is futile to expect every state to behave in the same way - clearly, there are some different patterns in the U.S. and the Soviet Union which must be taken into account (Snyder 1977; Gray 1971; Both 1979). Another criticism was mentioned after it became known how close the world was to a nuclear disaster during the Cuban Missile Crisis, with McNamara, after stepping down from official positions, himself criticising many of the concepts he helped to established before.

Although the 1980s saw a reverse shift towards tensions between superpowers and with that also renewed interest in the classical concepts of security studies, new approaches were now competing with them with their attempts towards the ‘broadening and deepening’ of security studies. Their agenda, which was consequently moved to the centre of the attention with the end of the Cold War, was to expand the reference objects besides states to non-state actors, various social groups, and individuals (deepening); and to extend the type of threats considered from military only to a long list of non-military ones (broadening). These two processes led to new approaches to security, previously mainly limited to national security, but now counting much more including economic security, intrastate security, environmental security, food security, health security, all the way to the concept of human security (Buzan and Hansen 2009).

This (extremely) brief overview of the development of security studies can already demonstrate one important feature of the discipline - and that is
what driving forces have been behind this dynamic process. Barry Buzan and Lene Hansen (2009) identify five factors: great power politics, events, technology, academic debate, and institutionalization of the discipline. It makes sense to discuss them briefly from the historical perspective to understand how they are influencing the direction of security studies currently.

Great power politics stood at the very beginning of security studies as a discipline, as it created the bipolar context for the foundation of security studies. The distribution of power and relations between superpowers have continued to play a crucial role ever since - with the end of the Cold War and the rise of China being perhaps the most important recent developments.

It is evident that technology breakthroughs have important security implications; in fact, security and military are often the driving forces behind technological development. Starting from nuclear weapons and finishing with IT and artificial intelligence, technological development is one of the most important driving forces behind any thinking about security, and it will remain so.

The importance of academic debate and institutionalization (of the discipline) may play a less obvious role in driving security considerations, but they do influence general directions quite importantly. It was not only the end of the Cold War, for instance, which led security studies away from the traditional military and state avenues, general development in philosophy and social sciences fuel this process to a considerable extent. In a similar vein, the institutionalization of the discipline plays a more hidden role and can be seen as having a more long-term impact. In reality, once a particular direction is institutionalized (for example by having a dedicated department, academic positions, endowments, research projects, think tanks, etc.), the research tradition will continue and work to preserve itself.

Although much of previous development can be labelled an ‘event’, there are some watershed moments which entirely change the way how we look at security - Hiroshima nuclear bombing, 9/11 terrorist attacks, or Crimea annexation being just some of the most obvious examples.

**The concept of security**

Once we know how the approach to study security developed, it is appropriate to turn our attention to the very concept itself. Our ‘map’ of the concept of
security will follow the work of David Baldwin (1997), for it arguably can engage with most of the understandings and approaches to security, while keeping them logically organized in a single analytical framework.

Baldwin defines security as a “low probability of damage to acquired values”, in a conscious adjustment of the classic definition of security by Wolfers (1952) which saw it as a “the absence of threats to acquired values”. Note that the differences between the two can be understood by how the discipline of security studies broadened and deepened its scope since the heydays of the Cold War, when strategic studies ruled and when deterrence was seen as one of the prime goals how to achieve security. Baldwin’s definition, contrary to the one of Wolfers, opens opportunities for other security policies and events, not only those of unconventional warfare but even natural disasters and like, which cannot be ‘deterred’ but the goal of security policy can minimalize inflicted damage.

What makes Baldwin’s approach to security so universal are the security dimensions he identifies. The first two dimensions can be seen as essential for any definition of security, while the remaining five serve the purpose of further specification.

1. Security for whom?
2. Security for which values?
3. How much security?
4. From what threats?
5. By what means?
6. At what cost?
7. In what time period?

To establish a reference object (security for whom) must be one of the first steps of any discussion of security. Potential answers may be ‘state’ (most traditional one), but also the international system, political ideology or specific regime, an ethnic group or minority based on whatever characteristics. A reference object can also be each and every individual, which is what the human security approach does. Clarifying a reference object states for whom we are going to provide security.

The second essential dimension needs to establish which values we are going to protect within the reference object. The traditional answer here is ‘sovereignty’, but other possibilities may be property or wealth, physical safety of people, certain ethnic or other (for instance religious or
ideological) composition of society. In other words, for every reference object we choose we may have various options of ‘values’ to protect. Answering these two questions therefore gives us basic guidance of what kind of security we have in mind and we may end up with a ‘state-sovereignty’ answer (traditional realist approach) as well as, for instance, ‘all individuals/physical safety’ (coming close to liberal approach) or ‘ethnicity/ethnic homogeneity’ (racist understanding).

Even before introducing the remaining five security dimensions of Baldwin, it should be clear how this framework can open up numerous analytical and practical avenues.

The third dimension opens up a question which may be surprising for some who see security as the most important goal about which we never compromise. In reality, it is likely different, and we do have to ‘compromise’. The point is that security is not a binary category - there are many shades between the two extreme conditions of being in absolute security (which is perhaps unattainable) and absolute insecurity (which is, in turn, difficult to imagine what it should stand for). It is, therefore, necessary to discuss how much security is needed.

The fourth important dimension deals with what threats are taken into account. While traditional approaches to security consider firstly military threats, other threats may include economic, demographic, ideological, natural and many others.

The fifth dimension builds on the previous one and answers what means are employed to prevent the threat (fourth dimension) to corrupt our chosen value (second dimension). One might be provoked to say that every threat must be met with the same tool, this is not a truth, at least theoretically, but there is much practical evidence as well. Take, for instance, a military threat. While obviously, a standard response would be military, one may also use economic (pay an invading army to retreat), legal (initiate international ruling), ideological (perhaps try to engage with the enemy in a discussion) and other tools. Naturally, every threat needs to be met with an appropriate response if security is to be preserved, but the scale of available tools is broader than most would think.

The sixth dimension expands on what was stated when we presented the third dimension (how much security) and it discusses what costs are we going to give up to achieve the intended degree of security. To simplify somewhat,
more security needs to be paid for with money and/or other qualities such as freedom, which is often seen as a contradictory quality to security. To put it differently, striving for more security will require more money to be paid but will result in less freedom.

To put together the lessons of the third and sixth dimensions, security may be seen similarly to how economy sees the concept of the law of diminishing marginal utility - every further degree of security will cost more and bring less satisfaction. In practice, in an extremely insecure environment (think of a raging war) one will benefit greatly from every additional ‘unit’ of security increase. On the other hand, in a relatively secure environment (think of standard democratic countries in Western Europe as an example), attempting to improve security, say vis-a-vis possible lone-wolf terrorist attacks, will be extremely costly (in terms of money and sacrificed freedom) and will result in relatively minor immediate increases insecurity for the general public. Hence, one needs to answer how much security is needed (third dimension) and what is its cost (sixth dimension).

Finally, the seventh dimension suggests that there may be differences within the time frames. While we may be acting to preserve security in the short term, the very same activity may be undermining our long-term security. A classic example here may be the U.S. support for jihadist Islamic fighters in the 1980s in Afghanistan to fight the Soviet invasion. While at the time this served a very important strategic goal in the given context of the bipolar struggle in the Cold War, two decades later the same forces which regrouped into a terrorist Al Qaida became one of the biggest threats for U.S. post-Cold War security. This is not to argue that the American policy in the 1980s was wrong, but to realize that its short-term effects were entirely different from the long-term ones even from the American perspective.

It is appropriate to finish this part of what security is with pointing at what it is not. As was already touched upon, the novelty of security studies is not that it comes to totally uncharted territory, but that it focuses on the concept of security, instead of other related concepts. Buzan and Hansen (2009) mention three groups of such concepts: complementary, parallel, and oppositional concepts. The first group consists, for instance, of strategy, deterrent, containment and we can see them as reinforcing the focus on security as a central concept. Secondly, parallel concepts are those which offer an alternative to the emphasis on security at a different level - power or sovereignty being the best examples. Thirdly, oppositional concepts are those which suggest replacing of the central concept for peace or risk.
Goals and the structure of the book

The goal of this book is to offer a comprehensive text which can be used as introductory reading for everyone interested in the theory and practise of security. The added value of this particular volume is that it targets readers interested in the Eastern European neighbourhood. The authors of the following chapters, all respected experts and professionals, were hence asked to introduce given theoretical concepts and use examples relevant for the Eastern European region which have specific characteristics which make it different from other regions and subregions.

The choice of the topics included in this volume follow a few patterns. The idea of the editors was to strike a balance between being comprehensive and general, as well and specific in themes and relevant regional insights. Hence, the book does not overlook traditional security issues such as the basic theory of interstate military conflicts but then moves towards modern constructivist approaches to human security and securitization. More particular chapters focus on some security issues which have become hugely important for the region in question, namely energy security, terrorism and hybrid warfare, and organized crime. From the more practical regional issues, the book includes discussion about the role of the European Union as well as the issue of separatism and territorial disputes, mainly focusing on the case of Ukraine.

The chapters are logically ordered roughly from the traditional approaches, mainly focusing on military threats and state sovereignty, towards more ‘modern’ approaches which are ‘broader and deeper’ in the sense as explained already in this chapter. Let us now briefly sum up the chapters included in the book.

Following these opening remarks, Tamás CsikiVarga discusses the classical topic of conventional military conflicts. While it is true also from this introductory discussion of the concept of security and the development of security studies that the whole discipline has moved to a great many other areas besides the traditional military core, understanding of conventional threats and concepts can be still seen as an absolutely necessary starting point for anyone seriously interested in security. Moreover, it is also far from just an intellectual stepping stone - the option of all-out conflict is still an existing solution of last resort in a conflict between states. Eastern Europe is one of those regions, where this kind of thinking - or even acting - is very much present on a daily basis.
Sergii Glebov discusses one of the most troubling aspects of the post-Soviet space - ‘Separatism and Disputed Territories’. Territorial conflicts are, on the one hand, notoriously some of the most difficult ones to resolve and they are inherently linked to the notion of the sovereignty of nation states, which is a stepping stone of the current international order. On the other hand, however, territorial conflicts are driven by ideational aspirations of certain territories and peoples which want to break rank from their original homelands. In the post-Soviet space, separatism has been most often linked to Russia, which has used it as part of its great game to preserve its position in the region which it sees as ‘Near Abroad’. Glebov discusses the most recent such case taking place in Ukraine, pointing out how similar patterns have been in play in other parts of post-Soviet space including Georgia, Moldova and Azerbaijan.

Andrey Makarychev in his conceptual contribution discusses the implications which social constructivism has had on our understanding of security. He ends up his tour with the approach of human security which he focuses on most thoroughly. Moreover, his chapter also analyzes how Russia understands and utilizes these concepts. What he argues is that it is not interested so much with individuals’ well-being, rather that it focuses on supporting certain groups such as orthodox communities, Russian speakers and Russian citizens in disputed territories (who had received their passports in a carefully staged political process with certain goals in mind) and so on. These observations are incredibly timely, and they demonstrate that both traditional and modern security concepts can be used with very different political goals in mind.

Aliaksei Kazharski and Clarissa do Nascimento Tabosa in their text further zoom in on the concept of securitization, which has become one of the most popular approaches to analyze interactions between political and security processes, especially within national contexts. This approach builds on the constructivist position claiming that security threats do not exist ‘out there’ objectively, but need to be socially constructed to be perceived as threats. Realizing this allows analysts to study how and when something is securitized, who conducts the process with what aims and whether the securitization is successful (something is accepted as a threat) or not. Some of the most relevant examples of securitization discussed in the chapter are the bilateral securitization of each other between the Soviet Union and Capitalist West, as well as securitization of Russia in more recent years, or securitization of refugees in the Visegrad countries.

In one of the more practically oriented chapters of the book, Péter Balázs
Richard Q. Turcsányi offers his explanation of how the EU conditionality developed throughout the years until today and what security context it has helped to create. Particularly during the 1990s and 2000s, the EU has been seen as contributing significantly to the development of the regions who strived to join the club. The EU’s influence has been mostly conducted via what is termed ‘normative power’ - the promise of membership has served as a driver for necessary reforms to take place. What Balázs, however, notes in his chapter is that since the most prominent enlargements took place in the 2000s, this power of the EU has been considerably diminished, and it is now facing challenges both externally in its immediate neighbourhood (most notably from Russia but also Turkey and perhaps others), and internally within its non-complying members.

Andrej Nosko discusses one of the most critical areas of security related to the Eastern European neighbourhood - energy security. Conceptually speaking, energy security is sometimes seen as being on the borders between traditional and modern approaches, combining a focus on state sovereignty with the economy and market forces. As Nosko points out, there are a number of ways how energy security can be understood and practised and, again, EU-Russia relations and the position of Eastern European neighbourhood is a good case underlining these theoretical differences and their very concrete practical implications.

Yuliya Zabyelina opens up a question which is as modern as traditional - transnational organized crime. At the time, and similarly to the issue of energy security, having its primary drivers in the economic sphere, it has not been always accepted that organized crime should be seen as a security issue. Within the context of capitalist globalized economy, the Eastern European neighbourhood has become one of the world regions perhaps most heavily influenced by the issue of organized crime. Zabyelina explains at length how the EU has been trying to use its ‘normative power’ (to use the concept from Balázs’ chapter) to address this issue in its neighbourhood.

Ryszard M. Machnikowski addresses in his chapter what is not an easy issue - he focuses on two extremely important concepts of terrorism and hybrid war, and he manages to balance between being theoretical and conceptual on the one hand, and practical with the specific Eastern European region in mind on the other. Terrorism and hybrid warfare are obviously not unified, but they do share conceptual ambiguity, which once and again, lead to some very concrete practical consequences. Quoting a well-known statement (which, however, not everyone would agree with) suffices to demonstrate it here: “One person’s terrorist is another person’s freedom fighter.”
Finally, last, but certainly not least, the ultimate chapter of the book, written by Botond Feledy, discusses one of the most notorious topics of today - cyber security. As with other chapters included here, Feledy offers an excellent theoretical explanation of the concept while at the same time demonstrating its practical relevance in the Eastern European neighbourhood (and beyond). Cyber space is obviously a newly created area of contention with some very specific characteristics, such as the difficulties of knowing who is conducting an enemy operation, where it comes from, and overall virtual feature of the interaction (but with possible genuine physical consequences). At the same time, the development within cyber space is not happening isolated from other areas and, in a way, this topic underlines the importance of all previous approaches discussed in the book, starting with conventional military operations, based on the understanding of securitization and human security approaches, interlinkage between economic and political forces, and its inherent part of the hybrid operations using all available technical means.

Let us conclude here and open the floor for the chapters to talk on their own with one more observation. Modern security threats are of an extraordinarily complex and interlinked nature, and while there are many competing ways how to understand and practise security, one needs to be aware of most of them to be able to grasp the real development and conduct viable security policies.

REFERENCES
CONVENTIONAL MILITARY CONFLICTS

Tamás Csiki Varga

An introduction to the study of military conflicts

Conflict and violence are as old societal phenomena as humankind itself, and the issue of warfighting has played a central role throughout recorded history due to the resulting substantial human and material loss. The desire to gain a better understanding of these phenomena originally approached from the point of observing wars, asking the questions, “How to fight wars successfully? What makes a good commander in war? How to prepare for warfighting to have the best possible chances of winning an armed conflict?” (Sun Tzu [5th c. B.C.] 2003, Thucydides[431 B.C.] 1972) The question of achieving lasting peace accompanied philosophical work and then scholarly studies somewhat later (Locke [1689]1690, Kant [1795] 1897) and these two basic approaches also paved the way for contemporary peace and conflict studies in international relations (IR), supported by a rich and complex array of research areas, such as strategic studies and international security studies.

The desire – also possibility and need – to gain a systemic understanding of war appeared with the evolution of more advanced political formations, the first premodern civilizations (river valley societies, city states, empires) – at least these were the ones that already possessed the skill and knowledge to do so, and had a ‘documented’ impact on subsequent military thinking, as well as on philosophical thought. As societies developed and political formations – as well as the ways and means of military conflict – evolved, the formalized regulation of warfighting also became an important aim.

On the one hand, as the modern system of (nation) states and subsequently internationalized relations (international community and world order) emerged throughout the 16-17th centuries, and then these basic structures of the international system spread across the globe, war became the subject of (international) law: *jus ad bellum*, the right of fighting a war (e.g. self-help, declaration of war, formal end of hostilities) was developed and codified. The rightful (and ‘human’) way of fighting a war, *jus in bello*, (e.g. the regulations aimed at protecting civilians, the distinction between combatants and non-combatants) was developed throughout the 19-20th centuries as wars became more modern with more deadly means, bearing more suffering.
On the other hand, wars remained fundamental elements of intercommunal-international relations and important tools of changing power relations and strengthening the authority of various actors. As warfare and its means evolved, scholarly and political attention turned towards limiting the suffering of those directly involved in armed conflicts and protecting civilians more effectively, thus a set of restrictions and armament regulations (e.g. on the development and use of chemical, biological and nuclear weapons) was adopted and humanitarian law gained more ground.

Not only the classical but also the modern study of war (fare) and armed conflict thus predates the birth of the discipline of international relations and of strategic studies, gaining preeminence after World War II. Throughout the past decades both the complexity of war and of the study of war have indicated that research aiming at understanding the causes of war needs to rely on many disciplines, among which political science has a preeminent role. As a starting point for further discussion, therefore a working definition of war that ‘can accommodate not all, but at least more than one discipline’ (Vasquez 1993, 23) is to be used in a wide sense based on Hedley Bull: ‘War is organized violence carried on by political units against each other.’ (1977, 184)

The evolution of the study of war also reflects the evolution of strategy – herein understood as the depletion of the military force of an adversary in the military sense and the means of achieving pre-defined aims in the political sense. The fundamental work of Carl von Clausewitz, “On War”, in this regard offers us a clarification on the relation of politics and military conflict by defining war as ‘the continuation of political intercourse carried on with other means’ (Clausewitz [1832] 1984, 87.) Therefore, the overview of IR theories offering explanations for the occurrence of military conflict in the international realm, will follow the logic of political leadership of rational actors carefully weighing their actions on a cost-benefit balance.

At this point it is worth briefly mentioning the ‘generations of warfare’ approach, according to which four generations of warfare can be distinguished through time. (Lind et al. 1989) These are important not only because studying and theorizing wars had to reflect on these developments, but also because the modern evolution of warfare blurs the line between war and peace more and more – but still does not change the primacy of politics to the military, determining the political aim that the use of military means are set to achieve through war.
As we can observe, for understandable reasons, conflict has become one of the foci and orientation points in the evolving theories of international relations, which is what this chapter will be overviewing. First, the conceptual foundations for examining the dichotomy of conflict and cooperation in international relations will be clarified, then the founding principles of IR theory will be outlined with regards to this dichotomy. In doing so, the main approaches to theorizing the reasons for wars will be introduced primarily based on Kenneth Waltz’ approach of three analytical levels (“images”): systemic, state and individual (Waltz 1959), which should be understood – as Keohane & Nye argued (2000) – as complementary levels of analysis. In addition, Waltz’ model will be complemented by dyadic level theories that offer useful tools for explaining interstate wars by combining organizational and individual drivers and motives (Levy 2011).

However, this brief chapter has considerable limitations. When introducing conflict and war (military conflict) it will not be including typologies and trends of military conflict and will only focus on theorizing interstate conflicts (leaving out intrastate civil wars for example), and on conventional conflicts (neglecting the vast literature on nuclear conflicts). Furthermore, despite the rich scholarly work on international relations theory aimed at explaining the causal relations leading to, sustaining and ending wars, only the fundamental concepts are to be introduced (while Socialist theories, relations of gender and war, green theory, post-structuralism etc. are left out). The highlighted IR paradigms will not be meticulously assessed, tested nor criticized.

1 First generation warfare reflects tactics of the era of the smoothbore musket, the tactics of line and column. ... Second generation warfare was a response to the rifled musket, breechloaders, barbed wire, the machinegun, and indirect fire. ... Third generation warfare was also a response to the increase in battlefield firepower. However, the driving force was primarily ideas. Based on manoeuvre rather than attrition, third generation tactics were the first truly nonlinear tactics. ... The fourth generation battlefield is likely to include the whole of the enemy’s society.... Second is decreasing dependence on centralized logistics. ... The third is more emphasis on manoeuvre.... The fourth is a goal of collapsing the enemy internally rather than physically destroying him... [where] the distinction between “civilian” and “military” may disappear. (Lind et al. 1989) The first generation lasted until about the Napoleonic Wars, the second until World War II., the third until the 1990s, while the fourth theoretically has been going on ever since – though not all, but modern interstate wars have been fought along these standards. Most recently, some raise the possibility of defining a fifth generation to warfare, moving beyond state actors and conventional militaries fighting conflicts in real space, and involving non-state actors, relying on cyberspace, targeting civilian societies and using massive disruptions as tools of fighting conflicts and forcing the adversary to its knees without the direct clash of traditional armed forces. (Coerr 2009) This leads us towards asymmetrical conflicts such as terrorism and hybrid warfare – both addressed in detail in other chapters of this Handbook.

2 Waltz also provides us an important methodological reference point, as while ancient scholarly work on the causes of war had been examining experience from the particular (single military conflicts) and tried to offer generalized explanations (inductive approach), Waltz and contemporary scholars turned their research around and started developing explanatory theories from the systemic level, and based on the general characteristics applied a deductive approach to draw conclusions for individual cases. Also, the combination of quantitative and qualitative methodologies gained prominence in modern research as complex conflict databases (such as the Uppsala Conflict Data Program, the Correlates of War Project and the Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research’s Conflict Barometer) have been developed.
The basic premises of realism, liberalism and constructivism regarding conflict and cooperation

Both major traditional IR schools, realism and liberalism, consider states to be the primary building blocks of the international system. Furthermore, both agree that states exist among the conditions of anarchy, lacking any higher authority (such as a world government) that would impose restraint on states or efficiently regulate their relationship: therefore they strive to find ways to ensure their survival. The rational behaviour of human beings is also a shared viewpoint.

Despite these commonalities, the fundamental view of human nature of the two schools significantly differs, thus leading to different explanations of the functioning of international relations, such as the main goals of states in this anarchical structure, the role that power plays in their relations and how they acquire power to reach their goals, the relevance of international institutions, as well as morality.

On the one hand, the basic moral assumption of realism is the central position of self-interest (‘selfishness’ of people) that limits the opportunities for cooperation and progress, while state behaviour is primarily driven by survival. Since there is no higher authority, the realist worldview indicates that states are the only actors that matter and the sole guarantors of their own security (and sovereignty) through self-help, looking for relative gains in international rivalries. As Walt (1985) pointed out, states rely on two means to ensure their survival: either on developing their own power capabilities (internal balancing) or building soft and hard alliances (external balancing). ‘Power’ in the realist understanding is primarily military.

On the other hand, liberalism is more idealistic and progressive, taking the position that people are inherently good and ready to cooperate to achieve change and progress, while also ensuring survival at the same time. The liberalist conception of the international system also includes other actors besides states, such as international organizations, transnational institutions, or groups and individuals that are ready to cooperate to ensure their survival, acquire power and reach progress through absolute (mutual) gains. The core liberal argument is that the various actors in the international system are dependent on each other and this interdependence, as well as higher degrees of integration moderates conflict. ‘Power’ in the liberal understanding is to a large extent economic, besides military capabilities.
Norms and values, as well as ideas, are also weighed differently in these two fundamental approaches, with liberalism attributing moral duties to states, for example to promote and when necessary, defend order, liberty, justice and human rights, possibly through multilateral settlements (e.g. via international institutions). Meanwhile, realism follows a ‘dual moral standard’ as Dunne and Schmidt describe (2008, 93.), developing a commitment to these on the individual level within a state only and not in the international arena. Defending norms and values via military conflict is out of question from the realist point of view.

Social constructions, such as norms, values and culture stand at the centre of constructivism. The third major school of IR claims that important aspects of international relations are socially constructed and not the consequences of human nature or the structure and characteristics of the international system. Putting emphasis on context, content and non-structural characteristics, constructivism challenges many elements of realist and liberal conceptions, most importantly their state-centred worldview, arguing that state authority is more and more challenged both from above and below. (Wendt 1992) This approach gives more room for assessing individual cases including sub-state (public opinion) and individual (political leaders’ personality) level causes of war.

**Concepts describing the causes of military conflict and the possibilities of mitigation**

Thus, our conceptual starting point for identifying the possible causes of military conflict is an anarchic world, where state actors’ top priority is ensuring their survival – either through cooperation or conflicts. States pursue their national interest and compete for power (Morgenthau 1948), and in doing so, they are driven by fear from other actors’ power, as coined in John Herz’ concept of the security dilemma: “Groups and individuals who live alongside each other without being organized into a higher unity … must be … concerned about their security from being attacked, subjected, dominated or annihilated by other groups and individuals. Striving to attain security from

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1As these concepts evolved, ideas of neo-realism and neo-liberalism mutually adopted some elements from each other. Neo-realism, for example, acknowledges that cooperation among states is possible and frequent, but also emphasizes that it is only happening until relative gains are higher than those of the other parties involved. Also, the role economy plays in international relations gains importance for neo-realists if it provides relative gains. Neo-liberalism is less idealistic than classical liberalism, arguing that cooperation is more a need to ensure survival than an ideal for progress only. The role of economy here also gains in significance as it is defined as the main tool for achieving security amidst the set of complex interdependences.
such attacks, they are driven to acquire more and more power in order to escape the effects of power of others. This, in turn, renders the others more insecure and compels them to prepare for the worst. Because no state can ever feel entirely secure in such a world of competing units, power competition ensues, and the vicious circle of security and power accumulation is on.” (1951, 157.)

Later, Robert Jervis (1978) further elaborated upon the security dilemma, distinguishing between four scenarios based on whether one or the other party had an advantage (offence-defence balance) (Jervis, 187-194) and offensive and defensive behaviour were distinguishable (offence-defence differentiation) (Jervis, 199-206). He pointed out that the security dilemma is more acute when offensive and defensive behaviour is not distinguishable, but offence has an advantage, because in such a situation status quo states behave in an aggressive manner to maintain their security, thus arms races become more intense and wars become more likely. State behaviour among such circumstances can be described as a security-seeking spiral, where ‘the interaction between states that are seeking only security can fuel competition and strain political relations.’ (Glaser 1997, 171)

In such situations, where states can never be certain about others’ intentions, theory distinguishes between ‘power maximizers’ following offensive realist ideals (Mearsheimer 2001), and ‘security maximizers’ who rely on defensive realist ideals (Waltz 1979). Power maximizers are ready to ensure their security through increasing their military power and even territorial expansion, while security maximizers are more moderate in their aims and more defensive in their approach, aiming to maintain their position in the international system (status quo powers). Following upon the liberal tradition, Russett and Oneal (2001, 15-42) argued that the three ‘Kantian principles’ – the type of regime of that state, whether it was democratic or not (see democratic peace theory below), the interdependence caused by free trade between states (see capitalist peace theory below) and participation in international institutions that create shared norms and foster cooperation – may alleviate the security dilemma.

Jervis’ offence-defence balance also suggests that the defensive side can achieve a more advantageous position (e.g. because of its geographical position, second-strike capability, etc.), while Morgenthau (1948) argued that states react to others’ hegemonic attempts by counterbalancing, for example by forming alliances (Snyder 1997). Depending on the relative power capabilities of states and the overall distribution of power within the international system, states can choose from various survival strategies,
including internal and external balancing (as noted above), appeasement\(^1\), bandwagoning\(^2\), buck-passing\(^3\), preventive and preemptive war\(^4\), etc. (Walt 1987, Mearsheimer 2001, Levy 2008) We can also observe that more powerful states can act as security providers for others within alliances – also raising doubts of possible free-riding by less capable states (security consumers) when the economic and military burden of defence is borne disproportionately by some alliance members while others mostly enjoy the benefits of cooperation.

In sum, we can conclude that the permissive causes of war are two fundamental structural elements of the international system: anarchy and the distribution of power, based on which conditions of uncertainty about other states’ intentions lead to recurring security dilemmas. The following subchapter outlines the fundamental theoretical models on the causes of wars amidst such conditions.

**Modelling the causes of war: systemic, dyadic, state and individual level theories**

As briefly outlined above, Kenneth Waltz’ structural realist approach (neorealism) gives us the clues for the most prominent system-level explanations of war, building on the security dilemma described by Herz and Jervis. One such fundamental theory is balance of power, which in general argues that states try to prevent one powerful actor, a hegemon from emerging, as it could threaten their security the most, therefore they aim at creating an equilibrium of power through balancing. (Morgenthau 1948, Waltz 1979) Great powers in such situation can attempt military build-up or form counterbalancing

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1. Appeasement is the policy of making political or material concessions to an aggressive adversary in order to avoid conflict, as it has been exemplified by European great power politics between the two World Wars, with France and the United Kingdom trying to accommodate resurgent Germany.

2. Coined by Quincy Wright (1942) and refined by Waltz (1979), bandwagoning is the opposite strategy to external balancing, followed by weak states when facing a stronger adversary. Upon measuring costs and benefits of potential conflict and cooperation, the weaker state aligns with the stronger upon the recognition that the stronger could take what it wanted by force if conflict erupted. However, as a form of appeasement, this is a dangerous strategy as it allows a more powerful state to have the upper hand. Examples are Italian and Romanian alliances with Entente powers in World War I.

3. As John Mearsheimer (2001) pointed out, buck-passing occurs when one state tries to get another state to fight an aggressor, thus possibly avoiding conflict itself. The politics of the United Kingdom and France practiced this with signing the Munich Agreement in 1938, trying to shift conflict towards the Soviet Union, then the Soviet Union with signing the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact in 1939, temporarily avoiding direct military confrontation with the Third Reich and passing the task of facing Germany to Western powers.

4. A preventive war might take place when a state perceives the shifting balance of power in favour of an adversary, thus triggering an attack sooner rather than later when the adversary will be in an even more advantageous position. A preventive war might be triggered to stop a potential hegemon from ascending. A preemptive war is more directly linked to the preparations of an adversary to attack and is fought to directly prevent an imminent attack from happening and to gain the advantage of first move.
alliances, while weaker states are more likely either to bandwagon or to join the most powerful block rather than balance against it.  

Power transition theory, on the contrary, argues that hegemony is a common phenomenon that is conducive to peace as it stabilizes the conditions of power imbalance where the disadvantaged cannot challenge the hegemonic power – for a while. (Organski 1958) Leading to a conclusion on the cyclical nature of war, power transition theory stipulates that differential rates of growth lead to the rise and fall of great powers (e.g. the hegemonic transformation between Spain, Portugal, the Netherlands, Great Britain and France in Europe throughout the 15-20th centuries), where the probability of war increases the most when the hegemon starts to decline and the rising challenger is dissatisfied with the status quo. (Levy 2011, 18.)

Deductive system-level theories, however, are not able to explain the outbreak of wars on a case-by-case basis. Jack Levy highlights that ‘quantitative researchers have been able to explain more of the variation in war and peace between states at the dyadic level than at the system level’, for example demonstrating that democratic states rarely if ever go to war with each other; that most wars occur between contiguous states and that territorial disputes are far more likely to escalate to war than disputes over other issues. (Levy 2011, 19.) Therefore, at the dyadic level the bargaining model of war and deterrence theory are worth exploring.

The bargaining model of war, formalized by James Fearon (1995), rests upon the argument that war is an inefficient means of resolving conflicts of interest, since the resources consumed and destroyed by militaries could otherwise be distributed among the belligerent parties – still, wars do occur. Fearon identified three psychological mechanisms that may lead to war, despite the costs of an inefficient war. ‘In the first mechanism, rational leaders may be unable to locate a mutually preferable negotiated settlement due to private information about relative capabilities or resolve and incentives to misrepresented such information. … Given these incentives, communication may not allow rational leaders to clarify relative power or resolve without generating a real risk of war.’ (Fearon 1995, 381) ‘Second, rationally led states

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1 Considering counter-hegemonic balancing the question remains unanswered why no coalition has formed against the United States after the end of the Cold War. Some possible explanations include, as Jack S. Levy summarized: ‘(1) the United States is a benign hegemon that does not threaten most other states (Walt 2005); (2) offshore balancers like the US do not provoke balancing coalitions (Mearsheimer 2001); (3) the US is too strong and balancing is too risky (Brooks and Wohlforth 2008); and (4) state balance against threats of land-based hegemonies in continental systems like Europe but not against threats of hegemony in the global maritime system (Levy and Thompson 2010).’ (Levy 2011, 17-18.)
may be unable to arrange a settlement that both would prefer to war due to a *commitment problem*, situations in which mutually preferable bargains are unattainable because one or more states would have an incentive to renege on the terms.’ (Ibid.) Third, ‘states might be unable to locate a peaceful settlement both prefer due to *issue indivisibilities*.’ (Ibid.) Such mutually exclusive claims might relate to political succession, religious issues, and sometimes territorial debates as well.

Also, on the dyadic level, deterrence can be a feasible strategy to prevent war, if one state can pose credible threats to an adversary that convinces it to refrain from initiating some course of action. (Huth 1999, 26.) In this context direct deterrence refers to preventing an armed attack against a country’s own territory, while extended deterrence refers to preventing such an attack against another country (an ally). As a counterpoint to deterrence, Thomas Schelling (1966) outlined the theory of coercion in international politics as an active means to force the adversary to act for the benefit of the state concerned (either to do or reverse something), later further developed and refined by others. (Byman and Waxman 2002, Nye 2011)

State and societal-level theories have an explanatory role when causal factors internal to states are brought to the focus of research. The concepts of democratic peace and capitalist peace, both drawing from Immanuel Kant’s philosophical work, are the most prominent of these. Arguments for democracies not waging wars against each other include that ‘democratic political culture and norms’ in societies inherently develop aversion to war, while citizens themselves would not vote for sending them to war either. (Levy 2011, 22.) Another argument is that the practice of democratic political competition and the peaceful resolution of disputes is extended to the interstate relations (with other democracies) as well. (Ibid.) A third argument emphasizes that institutional constraints, namely electoral accountability of governments and the institutional checks and balances within democratic systems prevent political leaders from undertaking unilateral military action. (Levy 2011, 23.) Capitalist peace theory at the same time argues that economic interdependence advances peace due to the high opportunity costs of war, while trade in a peaceful environment generates economic gains. (Gartzke 2007)

Last but not least, the individual-level theories about the possible causes of war – such as prospects theory (Levy 1992), groupthink (Janis 1972) and other decision-making models—largely build on psychological models and are often embedded in organizational models. These, however, are rather suitable
for explaining individual cases of military conflict, as the decisions under scrutiny depend on numerous variables like the political socialization, belief systems and psychological processes of decision-makers that are often difficult to operationalize and assess.

Conclusions

Military conflict, as one of the most ancient phenomena in human societies has been at the focus of extended multidisciplinary research not only after World War II. with the evolution of studies in international relations, but since the early ages of mankind. Starting from the desire to understand what makes a good commander and strategist and moving on towards the more thorough understanding of the causes of war and then the possibilities of preventing military conflicts, such research – partially overviewed in this chapter – has produced notable results. Systemic, dyadic, state-level, group and individual-level theories vary in explanatory power and complexity in this field, modelling the lessons learnt from millennia of armed conflicts.

However, three factors will certainly stand at the heart of this research problem in the (near) future as well: the anarchic characteristic of the international system lacking an effective world government regulating the relations of states; the changing distribution of power among state actors whose primary aim is ensuring their survival; and the uncertainty about the intentions of other actors that gives birth to new security dilemmas and keeps the possibility of armed conflicts alive.

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SEPARATISM AND DISPUTED TERRITORIES (THE CASE OF UKRAINE)

Sergii Glebov

Both the annexation of Crimea in 2014 and a hybrid war in Donbas is a quintessence of the post-imperial history of the post-Soviet space. In its core there are Russian imperial ambitions, which were openly expressed during the military aggression against Georgia and later against Ukraine. In both cases Russia used a set of similar secessionist techniques, even though of different nature. Whether we like it or not, the post-Soviet space has been always associated with the notion Russia and “the rest” where Moscow was successful in making enemies, but not friends. Ukraine did not learn any lessons from the Five-Day war on the way to constructing a European identity and defending its own territory after 2013. Thus, it, as the only state from the Organization for Democracy and Economic Development – GUAM (Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova) which before 2014 had no post-bipolar history of any war on its territory and of an accomplished act of an externally imposed separatism, joined the ranks of its regional neighbours such as Georgia, Azerbaijan and Moldova.

All these three countries bear the burden of cruel confrontation for different reasons which had certain internal grounds because they dated back to the history of common statehood, ethno-national and religious imbalances, and territorial dissatisfaction. In this regard, the Crimean and the Donbas cases could also be partly imagined as the case on separatism and disputed territories. Theoretically speaking, it could be so to some extent, even though from the Realpolitik point of view this is not that obvious, taking into account some stereotypical preferences inside Ukraine. Simplifyingly, there was a powerful stereotype that Western Ukraine supported the pro-European vector, while Eastern Ukraine supported the pro-Russian, which had been speculated by internal political forces and external powers for years. Thus, taking the Ukrainian case of 2014 there is a strong methodological need to tie up both the theory and practice of international relations in order to understand the reality of the problem. To take the Kremlin’s intentions seriously, Ukraine, which nowadays has been passing through a test of preserving sovereignty and statehood by responding to military aggression, had to learn lessons from Russia’s strategy in the post-Soviet space in a timely manner in order to adapt its strategic culture with the aim of defending its citizens, borders, territory, and other national interests.
In general, when starting theoretical research of a practical case we usually face the temptation to find a “right” theory which allows us to understand at least the key features of the subject in the best way - in this case separatism in connection to disputed territories. In this regard, in most cases, the researcher in social sciences finds out in the end that there were not many chances to escape the necessity to use not just one, but rather interdisciplinary and multi-theoretical framework in the process of exploration. Paradoxically, even this complex instrumentalism does not guarantee the final result in getting “the truth” known, especially in the era of the “post-truth” when everything tends to be securitized. As Boyle and Englebert (2006) admit, “there is no well established theory of secessionism despite the fact that many states, not least the United States of America, were born of secessions.” We may argue that in any case separatism is unique in its roots and sources, but nevertheless, we may also admit that there are some certain common features which explain the nature of secessionism at least partly.

The central one among them is a debate on the supremacy of the territorial integrity of a state against the principle of self-determination. As Horowitz (1982) suggested, the powerful ideology of self-determination helps explain the emergence of a political environment hospitable to territorially divisive claims, but it cannot explain which groups will take up the cause. There was an attempt to go through another important debate to check the security balance between nation-state and the power of nationalism in facilitating separatist moods of the national minorities. As Huysseune (2006) assumes, policies defending the rights of minorities, recognizing their identities, respectful of claims of groups to acquire a public voice, and providing for the overcoming of unequal access to political power and economic imbalances may contribute to pacify nationalism. A solution in a policy of giving extended autonomy could work for a while, but a risk for further claims of freedom from the side of a minority could create an opposite reaction from a majority, however.

Any discourse on integrity and secessionism is a discourse about peace, where speculations on nationalism play a central role. Nationalism, which Benjamin R. Barber, the author of “Jihad vs. McWorld” after Ortega y Gasset called “nothing but a mania”, “has left the post-Cold War world smoldering with hot wars... The aim of many of these small-scale wars is to redraw boundaries, to implode states and resecure parochial identities: to escape McWorld’s dully insistent imperatives. The mood is that of Jihad: war not as an instrument of policy but as an emblem of identity, an expression of community, an end in itself. Even where there is no shooting war, there
is fractiousness, secession, and the quest for ever smaller communities”. (Barber 1992)

In all cases the parties involved had to face a security dilemma in pursuing their interests: whether to keep searching for a new balanced status quo peacefully, or to ruin the peaceful fragility between national centre and nationalistic periphery by asymmetric application of administrative or even military power. As Stothart (2014) points out, “the role of the nation-state is to provide political or public goods and services to people living within its borders. State viability is judged by how well these goods and services are provided to its citizenry. Security is the most important of these goods and services and is defined in the broadest sense of the term.” In our context, such securitization of the role of the nation-state discards formal division between title majority and national minorities while concentrating on the common citizenry. The interest to keep peace in a state and society in a whole by all means could become a major platform to start negotiating in order to preserve internal stability. Alongside the factor of nationalism and security concerns, there is a widespread range of competing hypotheses revolving around economic, cultural and political factors. To go through all of them could be a tough objective, especially in a situation where “empirical assessments of these hypotheses have so far lacked a systematic effort at comparing them, however, and have suffered from various methodological flaws”. (Boyle and Englebert 2006) As Boyle and Englebert (2006) develop further, “most theories of separatism focus on the behaviour of groups or, occasionally, their leaders. They typically identify conditions which would either precipitate a desire by sub-national groups to leave the country, or facilitate the implementation of such a decision; they assume, therefore, a cost-benefit decision structure, whereby groups and their leaders weigh the costs and benefits of exit with those of remaining within the state. These hypotheses fall into one of four broad categories: economic, cultural, political, and other facilitating factors.”

Such internal factors are really crucial in understanding the reasons for which any agent of separatism inside the state would break up with it. These agents are cultures, not countries; parts, not wholes; sects, not religions; rebellious factions and dissenting minorities at war, not just with globalism, but with the traditional nation-state. Kurds, Basques, Puerto Ricans, Ossetians, East Timoreans, Quebecois, the Catholics of Northern Ireland, Abkhazians, Kurile Islander Japanese, the Inkatha Zulus, Catalans, Tamils, and, of course, Palestinians - people without countries, inhabiting nations not their own, seeking smaller worlds within borders that will seal them off
from modernity. (Barber 1992) In our situation, it is important to go through particular cases which have emerged in the post-Soviet space while establishing an arch of instability from Nagorno-Karabakh in Azerbaijan, through breakaway regions in the Caucasus such as South Ossetia and Abkhazia in Georgia, including Ichkeria in Russia towards Transnistria in Moldova, and since 2014 via Crimea and the Donbas region of Ukraine. In this context another important methodological question inevitably emerges: to what extent does an influence from outside construct an internal environment which pushes locals towards territorial divisive claims? This is not an unexpected question in the post-bipolar era, especially when certain local internal conflicts were used by two superpowers already in the times of bipolarity. Ukraine since early 2014 represents exactly the case where ideas of secessionism were brought inside the country from abroad and imposed on the Ukrainian political reality for the sake of the geopolitical (and imperial) ambitions of Russia when annexing Crimea. Moreover, in its attempts to blow up the situation in the rest of Ukraine Russia developed the image of the ongoing civil war, trying to present its hybrid aggression in Eastern Ukraine as an internal Ukrainian “armed conflict” which resulted from an “anti-constitutional coup” ([National Security Strategy of Russian Federation] 2015). In this regard, artificially designed separatism and enforced discourse over the so-called disputed territories on the temporarily occupied areas of Ukraine has a specific dimension for analysis and explanation of why the Ukrainian case of separatism differs from the rest in the post-Soviet space.

It could partly be explained, for example, by an odour of the post-Soviet strategic culture which has a common centre of ignition both in Russia and in some ex-Soviet republics. If to depart from an assumption that strategic culture can be defined as a set of beliefs, attitudes and norms towards the use of military force, often moulded according to historical experience (Chappell 2009, 419), the post-Soviet space with its set of military conflicts appeared to be a textbook case of deconstructing previously constructed common identities. This process of dislocating a post-bipolar reality from the common totalitarian past has been bloody and painful for most of the former Soviet republics. It continues to cause pain as with any surgery without anesthesia, when the remnants of the former Soviet collective memory in such countries such as Ukraine are being used with the purpose to revive them by soft- and hard-security instruments, namely by the “Russian world” ideology and military power. Thus, Russia took its chance at the very dramatic moment of Ukrainian in pendence when
refusal to sign the Association Agreement with the EU in Vilnius in November 2013 triggered the protest in Ukraine. It turned out that the interest of the power and of the state confronted the interests of the Ukrainian nation. The Euromaidan in Ukraine and the dramatic events of January-February 2014 in Kyiv pushed the Kremlin to start a war against Ukraine by capturing part of its territory. At the same time, aggression against Ukraine was not only just about Crimea, or opposing NATO, it was about having Ukraine cloven with the Russian Spring and Novorossia project in South-Eastern Ukraine. The expectation of success was quite obvious: to use the post-Soviet identity of those Russian speaking Ukrainians who directly or indirectly sought to reappear in the USSR in the ideological frame of the Greatness of its successor under the slogan “Putin pridi!” (Putin come!).

Needless to say, Russian aggressiveness in the post-Soviet space is partly based on the remnants of the common Soviet identity. Such “an emblem” of the post-Soviet identity goes well alongside social constructivism, which treats spatial reconfigurations as a kind of social reflection based on perceptions that dominate at the moment (even though also able to mutate under the influence of mutual adaptation) about the identity and sense of territorial community (Makarychev 2002). When the Kremlin is trying to construct the “Russian world”, it exercises the common identity from the Soviet past quite well and uses it above any rationality. As the chief editor of the Russian journal “Russia in Global Politics” Fedor Lykianov outlined in 2008, though disputably, “Ukrainian-Russian relations are more relevant to the field of unconsciousness – collective and individual, than to the sphere of rational analysis. There are too many similarities in history and socio-political mentality which make both Russia and Ukraine unable to perceive one another as two foreign powers for each other” (Lykianov 2008).

This approach reflects the long-continued methodological discourse on the interpretation of “space” and society which is located in this space. As Jones (2005) points out, “there are two readings of space: realistic and idealistic, and they are often combined by those who work outside philosophy, which can lead to the problem of interpretation and the correct disposal of interpretations. For realists, the true understanding of space is determined through facts about material objects and the ways of their connection, which can cause detailed and diverse empirical observations and abstractions from reality. In contrast, for idealists, the true understanding of space is defined through facts about the human mind and/or types of sensory perception. In this case, we ourselves determine what things can and should be.” In this context, idealism echoes the postmodern approach which is based on the
fact that many existing communities of people (political, religious, cultural, ethnic, professional) operate on a scale that surpasses even the largest state entities. Hence - the spread of extra-regional, extra-state and extraterritorial forms of self-structuring of political, economic, social, cultural, ethno-confessional and other processes (Makarychev 2002). That means that the pragmatic and cynical Kremlin tried to use this idealistic, to some extent postmodern approach to influence the nostalgic human minds of those Ukrainians who sensitively perceive Russia still as their homeland. As noted by Ukrainian sociologist Ilya Kononov, “the problem of space in sociology is formulated exclusively as a problem of social space, understood as a moment of social structure. Such a space society produces and reproduces. It is created by society and is neither physical nor geographical. On the geographical space, the social space is thrown by the practitioners of power”. (Kononov 2004) Thus it was not accidental that Putin’s regime treated Crimea as its own territory and space for many years; after the attempted annexation of Crimea, Russia initiated an attempt to impose a social space of the “Russian world” over the geographical space of the Novorossia project in Ukraine. Paradoxically, such Russian reading of the “idealistic/constructivist/postmodern” approach led to a tragic irony, when in principle socially constructed strategies were brutally imposed on the citizens of a foreign country by a state which, without remorse, used both instruments of the information war and military tools against the lives of the people.

As a result of these aggressive expectations, both the military supported annexation of Crimea in 2014 and a hybrid war in Donbas after appeared to be a quintessence of the post-imperial history of the post-totalitarian space. This history produced a dangerous post-Soviet arc of instability in the North-Eastern part of the Black Sea region. In its core there were located Russian imperial ambitions, which were expressed firstly in Transnistria and Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia and South Ossetia, later in its own territory, and finally during the open aggression against sovereign Georgia and Ukraine. The bloody history of the modern armed conflicts in the last 25 years in Eastern Europe only confirms the thesis that dissolution of the USSR did not take place immediately and came to an end in December 1991. This process of dissolution stretches from the times of Perestroika until now. It has also become evident that Russia’s unwillingness to take this fact for granted has been accompanied by the global competition between West and East and is still acute even 27 years since the breakup of the USSR.

By doing this, Russia challenged the whole world and actually actualized its
claims for designing a new world order through constructing the “Russian order” a-la “Russian global world”. By the way, as the US Secretary of State Rex Tillerson said on December 7, 2017 in front of the Russian Foreign Minister at the OSCE meeting in Vienna, “We will never accept Russia’s occupation and attempted annexation of Crimea” (US Department of State 2017). There is a special need to point out a conceptual vision of Russia’s temporary occupation of Crimea as an “attempted annexation” which has not come to an end and there was a clear call that the US and its allies will not tolerate it now or in the future for many reasons. In this respect, by constructing an atmosphere of separatism in Crimea and the Eastern part of Ukraine, the Kremlin was trying to separate Ukraine from Western democratic civilization, firstly by pressing Ukraine to give up its European and Euro-Atlantic expectations and to join the Tashkent Pact and Customs Union, later by urging President Yanukovych not to sign the Association Agreement with the EU, and finally by splitting Ukraine, capturing its territory and keeping chaos inside it.

From such a perspective, by waging a “hybrid war” against Ukraine and the rest of the world, Russia was trying to use Ukrainian territory not only just as a political space, but what Jan Helmig and Oliver Kessler from the University of Bielefeld called “a socially constructed factor of human interactions”. (Helmig and Kessler 2007, 253) As they observe (2007, 240-256), the world order is based on the idea of dividing the world into several spaces in which a nation or a society inhabits one part of the space and opposes another; in this respect, the policy has been identified through the collision of spaces and societies. From a sociological point of view, space in international relations is understood not simply as a reality established by the powers, but as a phenomenon that produces, creates and changes as a result of the interaction of spaces and powers. Thus, political relations start to be relevant already in the course of the process of creating space. In this regard, the issues of global governance, the transformation of the state, the emergence of new transnational, regional and supranational spaces are associated with ideas of social differentiation. The concept of “society” appears to be not connected to a specific space anymore. Jan Helmig and Oliver Kessler believe that at this stage this approach does not give unequivocal answers to the challenges of the time, but a step forward in the discourse related to such parameters of the international system as the “world order”, “state”, “society”, “borders.” In this connection, the conclusion is drawn that borders are established not by territories, but by communications, which leads to a collision of norms and spaces; and the meaning of space is the subject of constant negotiations, the subject of a struggle between systems
and their own goals, as a result of which space is the subject of constant political action. This is what exactly Russian propaganda was trying to do when justifying the illegal annexation of Crimea while trying to convince the world that there was a “Russian world” which Ukrainians, at least Russian speakers, are part of and not because of the military force, but because of their own choice. Anyway, objectivity for, Ukraine’s multiple identities – both Soviet and post-Soviet – shaped by history and geopolitical neighbourhood made Ukraine vulnerable vis-à-vis Russia’s military aggression, propaganda, and informational war.

In general, the history of separatists’ movements in the world and in the post-Soviet space particularly after the end of the Cold War falls inside the debate around globalization and fragmentation which was initiated precisely at the turn of the 1980s-1990s. It was that starting point when these two processes only accumulated the potential for a post-bipolar push. In such conditions, Kalevi Holsti rightly warned against underestimating such factors as separatism, nationalism, and disintegration and came to the conclusion that those two parallel processes are interrelated. (Holsti 1991, 61) He saw this relationship in the following: “In some cases, disintegration and fragmentation are the answers to asymmetric integration and certain types of interaction in dependent and interdependent relationships. These are the answers of those who see in greater interdependence no more opportunities or advantages, but an unfair redistribution of remuneration or the emergence of threats to national, ethnic, linguistic or religious identity. In short, a “shrinking world” can lead not to greater consensus and internationalism, but to increased nationalism, which leads to the expansion or protection of autonomy”. (Holsti 1991, 62)

Of course, globalization can be perceived as an identical concept of denationalization and desovereignization. This approach well explains the relationship between globalization and sub-national regionalization: both processes deprive the state of a part of its traditional sovereignty, and borders are their strictly separative, protectionist functions (Makarychev 2002). Moreover, in itself this fact provoked the appearance of the notion that regionalism bears a threat to state centralization and national unity. The internal complexity of the regional mechanism of the “harmonious combination” of national and international in the state was noted by Mezhevich: “An appearance of territorial subjects and regions in the international level caused the emergence of a form of international regionalism. Interstate regionalism is viewed from various points of view. As a rule, it is regarded as an element of modernization and progress. At
the same time, regionalism is often recognized as a threat to the state, which carries the danger of fragmentation and separatism. In fact, regionalism differs in character, as well as in strength, and it is impossible to create a single model (or theory) that explains all options”. (Mezhevikich 2005)

In a particular case, as Schrijver (2006) notes, if we recognize the existence of a conflict between sub-national regionalism and the unity of the state, then the assumption that regional autonomy leads to the death of regionalism and separatism coincides with warnings that it puts the country on a “slippery path” which leads to “fragmentation and posing a threat to state unity.” At the domestic level, this thesis, at least in theory, seemed to be relevant for Ukraine, when strengthening of the regional autonomy of Eastern or Western Ukraine could be viewed through the prism of fragmentation and federalization. At the same time, as could be judged now, it was an external involvement, but not decentralization aimed at strengthening local communities with self-government authorities at the unitary state, which led to a split of the country.

Besides, if to go deeper into the language provocative theme, we should admit that the so-called “language issue” appeared to be a cornerstone of Russian manipulation inside Ukraine a long time ago. It was always speculated internally and externally for both political and geopolitical reasons. This issue is quite complicated and vulnerable in a de facto bilingual country, where almost everything that is linked to a social life is highly politicized. Naturally, the “language issue” in Ukraine has always been directly connected to its constitutional building as a sovereign, independent, and democratic state. When Ukraine entered a new historical phase as a newly independent state in 1991, the issue of language became central in state-building and was one of the core elements in national and statehood identity throughout the period of transition. Originally, the language dilemma for Ukraine was based on the ethno-linguistic preferences of Ukrainian citizens and was shaped by the legacy of their historical memories: Western regions of Ukraine usually were characterized as users of the Ukrainian language with Ukrainian Greek-Catholic identity and the symbolic anti-Soviet (anti-Russian, “anti-russification”) struggle of the past; while the inhabitants of South-Eastern parts of Ukraine (the majority) were usually accepted as Russian-language speakers in every-day life, sympathizing with Russian culture and history of Russian statehood. But such a view of the Ukrainian ethno-linguistic and cultural map is somewhat primitive, subjectively simplified and consisting of a number of national stereotypes and myths, although it still serves as a real mechanism for political intrigues and manipulations. In doing this, Ukrainian
politicians have, consciously or unconsciously, developed an undisputed political tool to further their power struggle in Ukraine: political parties, seeking to promote Russian political and economic support, found fertile electoral soil in the South-East of Ukraine, including Crimea; while those using political rhetoric for pro-European and nationalistic slogans started to rely on the Western parts of Ukraine.

The following political cycles in Ukraine, especially in the first decade of the 2000s such as the presidential elections of 2004 and 2010 and the parliamentary elections in 2007, only served to confirm the above-mentioned territorial split across the middle of the Dnipro river with relation to political sympathies and voting preferences: both Ukrainian-speaking and Russian-speaking Ukrainians were artificially played off against each other by political rivalries. Therefore, the “language issue”, with its implicit perspective to make Russian the second state language, naturally appeared on the political agenda and split Ukrainians. For example, one of the most controversial questions revolved around NATO in the period 2005-2010, when “pro-European” political forces led by the “pro-American” President Yushchenko campaigned to join NATO, while their political opponents led by President Yanukovych vehemently opposed this, motivated by pro-Russian aims. The “NATO issue”, as well as the “language issue”, has been used by all sides to gain support from voters, the core electorate groups, in both the East and the West. Many Ukrainians, particularly in the country’s West, saw language as a critical part of Ukraine’s identity and a buffer against Russian influence in culture and politics. Russia has for years pushed to elevate the status of the Russian language in Ukraine, claiming that the rights of Russian speakers are being violated. Finally, there was another hidden threat when speculating on the language issue in Ukraine: a threat of using the Ukrainian language question as a political tool for realigning the political preferences of Ukraine towards reintegration with Russia and not towards the EU. Thus it was not accidental that the Kremlin put a stake on those sootechestvenniki (compatriots) who were ready to tolerate applying formally external power including military force against their actual co-citizens in their underdeveloped, still post-Soviet culture to achieve strategic goals. An attempt to use such a deluded group of Ukrainians failed, at least within the Novorossiya Project.

There was another issue, which surfaced a long time ago reflecting the humanitarian interests of Russians in the post-Soviet space. It appeared to be extremely practical during and right after the Five-Day war. This issue had both military and civil dimensions and reflected the reaction on the
official Russian explanation of its military actions in Georgia. This is the dual citizenship problem which had emerged as a possible reason to use force against other states. While defending Russian citizens in South Ossetia, Russia had dramatically influenced Ukrainian authorities to check whether or not Ukrainian citizens had citizenship of the Russian Federation. The Ukrainian authorities had a normative right to worry: according to Ukrainian law it was and still is prohibited to have dual citizenship for Ukrainian citizens. Even at that time it was obvious that the weakest space of the Ukrainian territory was Crimea as a potential knot of the conflict between Russia and Ukraine. In Ukraine there was a fear that Russia, in explaining its ephemeral at that time military attack against Ukraine, would use the curtain of defending Russian citizens in Crimea from “anti-Russian” authorities in Kyiv. The scenario which was used for Georgia worked out for Ukraine as well and the events of 2013-2014 only confirmed such risks.

In the end, Russia’s aggressive foreign policy towards its “near abroad” since 1991 as a continuation of the traditions of the Russian/Soviet empire to keep their provinces under domination by force, pushed directly or indirectly such countries as Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova to experience the burden of separatism. During the process of overcoming the “elder brother” syndrome on the way to constructing a values oriented European identity (in the case of Ukraine by the heroic replication of the Kozak/Cossak historical memento as a cultural phenomenon to the rebirth of the Ukrainian nation and as a symbolic basis to justify the revival of European statehood), all four countries in different periods of their state-building have faced the tough challenge of dealing with their breakaway regions.

**Conclusion**

Challenges such as separatism incited from outside in times of globalization, regionalization, and fragmentation posed an existential choice for post-Soviet societies to choose the most appropriate direction to follow in order to survive as independent and sovereign states at least *de jure*; even if they had no chance to become such in the Realpolitik world *de facto*. Sovereignty and territorial integrity can be already *de facto* satisfactory validation of one’s status in the international system as opposed to “failed state”. This could be even enough in a short-term perspective for those small or mid-size states which had just gained political independence and were put under certain restrictive conditions from the very beginning. Ukraine as a mid-size state
faced such challenges and question marks concerning its ability to take independent decisions to correlate the interests of the whole nation and all regions. It has not been doing well, because local political elites are still selfish if not pure post-Soviet, though some minor positive changes are on the way and Ukraine in general has been on the right track since the Revolution of Dignity. Russia was eager to ban Ukrainian European and Euro-Atlantic aspirations by initiating and preserving a bleeding hotspot at least in Donbas to keep Ukraine out of Europe and in the post-Soviet space under its domination; while a successful, democratic and Europeanized Ukraine in the future could pose a danger to Russia.

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HUMAN (IN)SECURITY: 
SOCIAL AND CULTURAL FRAMEWORKS 
OF ANALYSIS

Andrey Makarychev

Security Studies: A Concise Overview

In the traditional understanding of security, this concept is basically seen as “hard” – military force-based, with strong territorial (geopolitical) underpinnings, and state-centric in the sense that states are regarded as key security providers able to legitimately resort to exceptional measures beyond “normal politics” defined by norms and rules. Therefore, in the extant theoretical literature, the concept of security is often deployed beyond the normal course of events, and denotes exceptional circumstances that justify the application of unusual and extraordinary measures. This is harmonious with the distinction, widely accepted among security authors, between “the logic of routine” and “the logic of exception”, with the latter being characterized as “binary” (Bourbeau 2014, 190): in many national contexts security is constructed in a dichotomic form “as a black-and-white, life-and-death matter” (Kuus 2002, 408).

This explanatory framework envisages the distinction between three analytical categories:

- “Normal” life necessitating mainly legal instruments of governance;
- Political issues revolving around identity and Self – Other distinctions;
- Security matters, where risks, dangers and threats necessitate emergency measures.

Obviously, security is not a static concept, and is always in the making. In academic terms security may be approached from different angles – as a peculiar type of discourse that delivers certain messages to different audiences; as a cultural phenomenon (security imagery), and as a set of policy practices of governance, including surveillance and control. Security is a volatile and sometimes fuzzy concept, merging with other concepts,
such as sovereignty, which might bring controversial effects in situations of dispersion of sovereignty as an effect of globalization and transnationalization. Politically and instrumentally, the security–sovereignty nexus opens possibilities for deploying domestic protests and opposition forces in a security context, which is a ubiquitous practice in illiberal types of regime.

Not less problematic is the grounding of security in the issues of identity, a concept open to multiple interpretations. This makes it possible to speak in security terms about a broad variety of issues pertaining to culture, mentality, language, religion, ethnicity, and worldviews. This explains the flexibility of relations of friendship and enmity among nations whose roles and identities are not necessarily well established.

In this chapter we explicate how security can be approached from the social constructivist position, and introduce the concept of securitization which is central to this approach. We discuss why identity is an important component of security analysis, and how contemporary security debates produced and articulated the idea of human security.

Security and Securitization as Social Constructs

Countries tend to over- and under-securitize, as well as de-securitize each other. Some security experts raised an important question of whether “security can mean everything” (Ciuta 2009, 301-326), and tend to answer it affirmatively, implying that each element of social and physical reality can be securitized, from water supply to the use of language. The constantly changing and inherently fluid nature of security-making is reflected in the concept of securitization widely known among academic experts due to the Copenhagen School that made a strong case for inextricably relating security with the production of self and other.

In this chapter by securitization we shall understand “an articulated assemblage of practices whereby heuristic artefacts (metaphors, policy tools, image repertoires, analogies, stereotypes, emotions, etc.) that are contextually mobilized by a securitizing actor, who works to prompt an audience to build a coherent network of implications (feelings, sensations, thoughts and intuitions) about the critical vulnerability of a referent object” (Balzacq 2011, 3). What this broad and complex definition implies is that there are four most important elements in the securitization process.
First, this process is initiated by securitizing actors, which in many cases are states, but not always and not necessarily. For example, many governments are confronted by a variety of non-state securitizing actors such as terrorist groups operating on a global scale, or extremist groupings that profit from over-dramatizing political issues (for example, immigration).

Second, there should be a referent object of security discourse, i.e. something that is viewed as being in mortal danger. The strongest cases of securitization usually imply threats to one’s collective identity. “Concepts of security are intimately connected to conceptions of identity and the limits of political community in different contexts” (Browning and McDonald 2011, 249). This may help us explain the idea of “ontological (in)security” that “refers to the need to experience oneself as a whole… the subjective sense of who one is, which enables and motivates action and choice” (Mitzen 2006, 344), as opposed to protecting against material harm and physical deprivation. Ontological security is correlative with “cognitive and behavioral certainty” (Mitzen 2006, 342). By the same token, “even a harmful or self-defeating relationship can provide ontological security, which means states can become attached to conflict” (Mitzen 2006, 342) and derive their identities from these conflicts (Armenia – Turkey, Armenia – Azerbaijan, Turkey – Greece, etc.). This approach elucidates a linkage between unsettled identities and high probability of the ensuing conflictuality potentially generated by existentially insecure actors.

Third, speech acts of securitizing actors ought to be addressed to a specific audience that is the key for the social acceptance and legitimacy of actors’ security standpoints. Since securitization is an inter-subjective practice of persuading target audiences in the immanence and authenticity of threats, “securitizing moves in popular, elite, technocratic, and scientific settings are markedly different – they operate according to different constitutions of actor and audience” (Balzacq 2011, 7). The audience plays a crucial role in this respect, since security articulations are often used for legitimizing political regimes, which explains why it is of immense importance to expand the circle of interlocutors and partners in communication. By the same token, one should bear in mind that the perlocutionary effects of security discourses (i.e. those that require persuasion of target groups (Stritzel 2011, 349) are different for a domestic audience (where the key issue is threat construction and mobilization of public opinion) and international society (where the chief problem is gaining stronger legitimacy for its security posture).
Fourth, securitization is articulated by a variety of discursive and communicative tools, and does not necessarily grow out of a rational design. Critical security scholars deem that “the semantic repertoire of security is a combination of textual meaning – knowledge of the concept acquired through language (written and spoken) – and cultural meanings – knowledge historically gained through previous interactions and situations” (Balzacq 2005, 185). Security discourse is largely about (re)framing key conceptions and (re)defining their meanings (Layton 2014, 25-45). It would be also fair to claim that in producing security meanings “the speaker has to tune his/her language to the audience’s experience… and employ terms that resonate with the hearer’s language by speech, gesture, tonality, order, image, attitude, idea” (Balzacq 2005, 184). This is what substantiates that “security is persistently present in contexts – different anarchic subsystems, or different cultures of security – with profoundly different attributes, structures of meanings and logic of action” (Ciuta 2009, 325).

Thus, the sphere of security can be approached as a space where security-related meanings are constantly (re)produced through the practices of (re)signification, or meaning-making, by means of different types of signs, both textual and non-textual. Language games are an important component of security interaction. Since security practices are usually results “of struggles among agents to define reality” (Pouliot 2010, 45), much depends upon vocabularies (rhetorical frames, storylines, and discursive tools such as analogies, metaphors, emotions, stereotypes), communication strategies, as well as contexts which could be proximate (specific situations in which a security issue is embedded) and distal (socio-cultural milieu). In the next section we zoom in on the concept of identity as a key societal element in debating security.

In this context one may refer to Roland Bleiker’s (2001) concept of aesthetic turn in international and security studies and Janice Mattern’s interpretation of soft power as “representational force”: when it comes to communication strategies in times of military crises, the discursive representation – and therefore the social construction – of reality aims to leave little choice to others (adversaries or interlocutors), and “no room to refuse” or contest the policies produced by the power holder (Mattern 2005, 602). This is achieved through de-humanization of enemies, since non-human others (terrorists, brutal and cynical invaders, etc.) can and should be legitimately destroyed (Wenman 2003, 60).
Of course, securitization functions differently in liberal and illiberal types of political regimes. In illiberal democracies and non-democracies security-making represents a self-referential, or auto-communicative practice, as opposed to an inter-subjective one (Balzacq 2005, 177-179). In other words, non-democratic countries are inclined to practice “autocommunication… by repeating political mantras or codes” (Vuori 2008, 71). The inability to reach beyond a narrow domestic set of doctrinal meanings may strengthen the self-referential character of security discourses in illiberal democracies, of which Russia might be an example: the Kremlin is portrayed “as the mechanism through which a ‘junta’, ‘fascists’ and ‘Banderites’ are supported, giving the virtual illusion that Russia’s struggle with NATO is akin to that of Nazi Germany and that Russia will emerge once again victorious” (Forsberg and Graeme 2015, 55).

The Identity – Security Nexus and Security Cultures

According to the key premise of constructivist scholarship, the sphere of security can be treated as generative of meanings constitutive for international actors’ identities. It is through discourses and images that different conceptualizations of security are constantly (re)constructed and applied to various policy issues (McDonald 2008, 570). The cultural approach makes sense as soon as it comes to the concept of ontological (in)security in which identity plays the first fiddle.

Cultural contributions to security studies are particularly meaningful when it comes to the concept of securitization and the contemporary debates on ontological (in)security, as related to the vulnerabilities of collective identities.

Firstly, the debate on the discursive nature of security construction initiated by the Copenhagen School has been extended to the sphere of imageries and visuals. The role of performative practices in the security domain can be explained by “the boundaries of articulation: there is a growing understanding of the inability to express certain feelings (of trauma, pain, loss, etc.) through language; therefore these visceral feelings are “translated into recognizable emotional signifiers” (Van Rythoven 2015, 5).

Secondly, cultural approaches might be productive for identifying voices of (in)security beyond the group of power holders. Opening up the sphere of security politics to a variety of cultural actors, cultural studies can be
instrumental in explaining the roles of cultural actors (managers, producers, performers, authors, artists, etc.) in shaping the public agenda that defines perceptions of security.

Thirdly, cultural studies elucidate the centrality of communication for security relations and are critical to taking the audience of security discourses as pre-established and well-structured social groups. It is through the process of verbal interaction between “producers” and “consumers” of security narratives that both groups discursively construct their role identities and subjectivities (McDonald 2008, 563-587). In particular, cultural and security studies can find a common language in exploring perceptions and remembrances of traumatic experiences as an important element of the discursive making of security.

One may treat security as a concept that is embedded in different types of political cultures that are matters of social construction through discourses, narratives and imageries. For Mary Kaldor (Kaldor 2018), several of them are of utmost importance.

Liberal peace culture is part of the global governance paradigm that is associated with the dramatic increase in multilateral interventions since the end of the Cold War. Liberal peace is a combination of post-Cold War international co-operation and public outcry about the humanitarian crises resulting from ‘new wars’ (Bosnia, Rwanda, etc.). Its key is preoccupation with collective – as opposed to individual – stability, not the defeat of enemies. Its tools are international agencies, peacekeeping forces, NGOs, private security contractors, and tactics range from peacekeeping to state-building, from Responsibility to Protect to humanitarian interventions. Of course, the liberal peace paradigm can be contested by those who deem the Western liberal peace discourse as allegedly hypocritical and deceptive when it comes to US or NATO-led military operations in Serbia, Iraq, Libya, or Syria.

War on terror is another type of security culture for which 9/11 played a foundational role. In this security agenda enemies are global networks of non-state actors as sources of ‘asymmetric threats’ (terrorists, insurgents, suicide bombers, small military units) that defy any rules and norms, resort to violence against civilians, and are sponsored by war-related and/or criminal groups. The war on terror - as a “new” type of war - unleashes a debate on how the growing security concerns can be reconciled and harmonized with maintaining basic democratic freedoms and human rights.
in Western societies badly affected by terrorism (Purnell 2014, 271-286).

*Geopolitics* is usually associated with the nation-state that manages such tools as deployment and use of regular military forces, economic sanctions and state-to-state diplomacy. The objective is national security, the protection of national territory and spheres of influence. Geopolitics remains the dominant way of thinking and way of structuring capabilities among the major states and accounts for most defence spending. The geopolitical security culture is expressed through spheres-of-influence and balance-of-power discourses that, at a certain point, tend to “normalize” territorial reshuffling and draw a principled distinction between major powers and small countries which need to make their geopolitical choices in favour of one of the dominant military blocs with relatively little space for multi-vector policies.

*People-centric security* is a bunch of concepts - with the idea of human security at its core - that appeared as part of both political and academic vocabularies quite recently, and that is usually approached from political, cultural and discursive perspectives. Many security authors approach the ramifications of the global war on terror through the prism of its effects on human bodies and their sufferings, which opens research space for “corporeal international relations” (Väyrynen and Puumala 2015, 238). In the next section we take a closer look at the concept of human security as an emerging way of conceptualizing the people-centric approach gaining prominence in contemporary security studies.

**Human Security: a Nascent Biopolitical Paradigm**

Mary Kaldor, one of the central figures in the human security debate, claims that the concept implies security of individuals and their communities (as opposed to states); along with impartiality and neutrality (no sides are to be taken in protecting people’s lives). Human security can include ‘hard’ / force-based components, and is feasible within a framework of global governance structures legitimizing *humanitarian assistance* (“Doctors without Borders”, World Health Organization), as well as *humanitarian interventions*.

The human security debate steers countries towards the adoption of higher international standards in its security policies and peace-making operations. A human interpretation of security thus implies:
• *Change of the object* – from territorial state to (groups of) population. It is in this context that such concepts as food security (Nally 2016, 558-582) and health security (Elbe 2014, 924) came to force;

• *Change of methods* – from controlling territories and resources to a set of administrative and managerial techniques of making life safer and more rationally manageable (for example, through biometric control techniques) (Homolar 2015, 843-863);

• *Changes in the referent objects* of security policies: as seen from this prism, these objects are always in flux and transformation, and might be (re)constructed, from protecting national borders and jurisdictions to saving peoples’ lives regardless of their political, religious or ethnic identities.

This is what makes human security part of the current discourses on biopolitics and biopower (Dillon 2007, 41-47). The centrality of the human body and the safety / security of life become key justifications for biopolitical regulation in times of crises (Dillon 2007, 7-28), but also for biopolitical mobilization and consensus-building. Following the logic of the French political philosopher Michel Foucault, the central referent object of biopolitics is the population rather than territory. Thus, biopolitics is not about geopolitically controlling lands; instead, it is more concerned about protecting and salvaging people’s lives, which strongly resonates with the concept of human security (Smith 1999, 84). The concept is of particular significance in situations described by the Italian political philosopher Giorgio Agamben dubbed as “bare life”, a metaphor that designates life without any mediating role of public institutions or legal mechanisms (for example, in post-conflict areas).

An important landmark for biopolitical interpretation of security was the eruption of the refugee crisis that added new security colours to the debate due to a drastically increased quantity of people living on the territories of European countries without possessing clear legal status, including citizenship. The more complex and entangled constellation of territorial and people-centric dynamics caused a profound effect upon key political notions, first of all the concepts of sovereignty and nation states. Following the logic of Giorgio Agamben, the very phenomenon of the refugee challenges the contours of the existing political communities and threatens the very foundation of nation-state-based territoriality (Agamben 1995, 114-119). To follow up on this logic, one may claim that the refugee crisis widened the gap between what is known as “politically qualified life” (*bios*) that includes protection and liabilities through the institution of
citizenship, and “bare life”, “life as it is” (zoe). The function of sovereign power has shifted from establishing and defending territorial borders to distinguishing between “ours” and “aliens”, “citizens” and “irregular migrants”, between saving lives and racial othering / Orientalizing the “strangers” (Little and Vaughan-Williams 2017, 533-556). Hence, one many speak about “different sovereignty regimes” (Beurskens and Miggelbrink 2017, 749-756) that, in fact, imply different regimes of “biopolitical care” that engender new lines of distinctions, divisions, and partitions, and the ensuing effects for bordering and de-bordering constituting the core of the political. The changing nature of sovereignty and nation state has important consequences for the security debate, generating new discourses and imageries that reshuffled the extant political and cultural conceptualization of Europe – from the ideas of humanitarian emergency governance (Ilcan and Rygiel 2015, 333-351) to greater emphasis on discourses of nationalism and social conservatism that securitize refugees, asylum seekers, and other categories of immigrants (Laine 2016, 465-482).

From the literature it is known that “there is no biopolitics which is not simultaneously also a security apparatus” (Dillon 2015, 46). Yet how exactly is this nexus between biopolitics and security to be conceptualized? There are two dominant approaches to this question, one exemplified by the doctrine of protecting “our people” (of which the Russian World would be the most illustrative example), while another approach puts at its centre the concept of human security. Therefore, what we see here is a clash of two perspectives: human security as a global policy of protection of all threatened lives, regardless of ethnic, religious and other backgrounds / affiliations, on the one hand, and protection of “our lives” and “our bodies” that matter the most, a rhetoric widely employed by “illiberal democracies”, on the other. In the remaining part of the chapter we dwell upon this distinction in more detail.

**Human security: liberal interpretations**

The key target of authors developing the human security paradigm appears to be the concept of hard security and the consequent hard/soft security distinction. Human security authors (Christou 2014, 364-381) claim that hard security strategy owes its obsolescence to the way in which it is grounded in the concept of sovereignty, thereby fomenting an inevitable search for external foes as transgressors and sources of threats. To contravene this approach, Beebe and Kaldor (Beebe and Kaldor 2010) adduce two chief arguments that deserve our utmost attention.
Firstly, they claim that the concept of sovereignty is itself undergoing a profound - yet still underestimated by many – process of transformation. Seen from the vantage point of the human security perspective, sovereignty is increasingly conditional on the respect for human rights, and presupposes states’ self-constraint. Indeed, most traditional sovereignty tools, when they are applied against new security challenges, fail to work, such as deterrence against terrorists or rogue states for example. This logic implies that questions regarding the status of territories (whether Yugoslavia remained one state or became six states or eight states or more, or whether South Ossetia and Abkhazia ought to be recognized as separate states) have to be subordinated to the much more important principle of human rights.

Arguably, this approach could be a useful extension of Michel Foucault’s theorizing of the evolution of Europe’s power instruments from the sovereign right to kill to the obligation of empowering and enabling one’s citizenry, and also protecting their lives. What one may see at this juncture is a distinction being drawn between the protection of any life, regardless of nationality, ethnicity or religious beliefs, as opposed to its being restricted to those that Giorgio Agamben refers to as “politically qualified lives”. The latter are defined through their belonging to a specific political (religious, cultural, ethnic, etc.) community. Yet what for Agamben is a biopolitical function of sovereign power, for Beebe and Kaldor is a global norm-in-the-making that does not need to be grounded in sovereign will.

Secondly, one may venture to ask: what if no clear-cut enemies exist in certain security situations? Examples might be mass-scale forest fires or technological disasters. This idea of human security is able to properly embrace security situations which are not about defeating a visible and identifiable enemy, but rather about protecting people from a much more complex mix of threats. Health and food security, malnutrition, oil spills, epidemics and infectious diseases – all these misfortunes are an integral part of the human security agenda.

What is worth noting is that by stating that “absolute state sovereignty, war mentality, territorial inviolability, and aspects of superpower rivalry are remnants of the industrial and imperial age” (Beebe and Kaldor 2010, 168), human security authors introduce us to a sort of temporal continuum of different types of security thinking. These gradually move from ‘Westphalian’ hard security strategies to allegedly post-industrial, post-imperial, post-sovereign and post-(inter)national forms of security. What follows from this logic is that some countries are in the vanguard of
promoting a “new security language”, while others lag behind or may be
taking transient advantage of artificially constructed relations of enmity.
It is in this context that one has to comprehend the supposition that “it is
helpful for Iran, China, and Russia to have a Western enemy” (Beebe and
Kaldor 2010, 169). The concept of regime change in Iran and North Korea
is a logical political addition to what otherwise represents an academic
theory.

If hard security thinking is believed to be outdated, it follows that the hard/
soft security distinction is equally dysfunctional and even misleading due to
the fact that there are global threats - like terrorism - that appear to belong
to both security domains. Besides, what may be considered a ‘hard’ (military
and state-centric) security problem contains a great deal of ‘soft’ (non-
military/non-material and more societal) dimensions. In this vein, one may
argue, the significance of military power lies not in the inevitability of its
physical application, but mainly in its ability to shape the communicative,
perceptual and discursive terrains of world politics. ‘Hard security’,
therefore, simply does not exist without meaningful soft elements.

However, the approaches articulated by human security thinkers raise a
number of questions for further debate. Firstly, while the human security
concept perfectly fits situations where threats lack clearly identifiable
insecurity perpetrators, in the meantime, human security mechanisms are
also supposed to work when violence (such as mass-scale protests or
revolutionary movements) is the source of conflict. That is why there exists
a military interpretation of human security exemplified, for instance, by
different strategies of counter-insurgency. And in this case is hard security
thinking in retreat? Not necessarily. Arguably, “energy security has an
unfortunate tendency of strengthening hard security aspects” (Beebe and
Kaldor 2010, 163), which is also quite revealing in this regard.

Secondly, since human security focuses on population rather than on
territories, it may be regarded as an aterritorial type of security, viewed
as part of global normative structures. Yet in the meantime, human security
can be still be territorially bounded, since it has to be reified in a world
composed of states, including those non-western ones to which the West is
expected to ‘export’/project the normative principles of human security.
One of the key questions stemming from this is whether human security is
achievable in a state-based system or whether it depends upon a more
cosmopolitan milieu? In other words, is human security an agenda offered
for today or mostly for a distant tomorrow? And, therefore, what are the
biggest challenges for its implementation – is it weak states, or the national basis of politics?

Many authors assume that the concept of human security is feasible in what might be dubbed a ‘single human community’ in which “all human lives are considered equal” (Beebe and Kaldor 2010, 199). Another name for this “world community” - a notion used, in particular, by Barry Buzan - is a “humanitarian space” (Beebe and Kaldor 2010, 179). Within it war constitutes only a deplorable exception, and “the threat or use of nuclear weapons should be treated as a war crime or a crime against humanity and should be included in the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court” (Beebe and Kaldor 2010, 179). As we shall see from the analysis below, there are governments in the world that don’t share this perspective.

**Russian version of human security**

According to the logic of protecting a particular group of the population, biopower “created elaborate systems of surveillance to control the body in pursuit of securitizing culture” (Vigo 2015). In other words, “there exists a form of power which refrains from killing but which nevertheless is capable of directing people’s lives… the care of individual life paves the way for mass slaughters… sovereign power and bio-power are reconciled within the modern state, which legitimates killing by bio-political arguments” (Ojakangas 2005, 26).

It is at this point that the implications of human security conceptualization for the Russia World doctrine ought to be discussed. The difference between the human security approach proposed by Western authors, on the one hand, and Russian foreign policy discourse, on the other, is stark. While Beebe and Kaldor stick to a “human community” perspective, Putin’s governance adheres to a much more state-centric worldview that the human security concept denies.

A couple of examples can illustrate this. Look at Russia’s relations with a number of non-recognized territories that Russia supports either militarily (South Ossetia and Abkhazia) or politically (Transnistria). Unfortunately, what is not a priority for Russia are the living standards in these breakaway enclaves and their human conditions. Russia pays little attention to the way the secessionist territories are governed, and that ethnic minorities are tackled. The implementation of a human security agenda in the case of
Russia’s relations with South Ossetia and Abkhazia would necessitate two basic responses - all the displaced persons would have to be allowed to return and receive compensation, and an international presence should be installed to guarantee their human rights. The first condition is simply not a priority for Moscow, while the second one will be unacceptable for political reasons.

Another example of how far removed Russia’s official policies are in their perceptions from the ideas of proponents of human security - may be found in their very different interpretation of the essence of energy security. In Beebe’s and Kaldor’s view, energy security has to incorporate human security, along with energy diversification, the transparency of oil revenues, and the universal access to energy. But all these dispositions are in conflict with the logic of the Kremlin, which is not interested in the diversification of energy supplies, is critical of international standards of transparency in the extractive industries, and is eager to treat energy products as commercial merchandise and not as “public goods”.

More specifically, Russia’s version of human security as exemplified by the compatriot policy in the so-called “near abroad”, includes:

- practices of passportization and citizenship in break-away territories of Transnistria, Abkhazia, and South Ossetia, including the exemption of eastern Ukrainians from the normal procedure of citizenship application,

- bestowing special rights to particular groups in the labour market (for example, citizens of Armenia),

- religious diplomacy aimed at including in the sphere of Russian normative counter-project Georgian, Ukrainian and Moldovan citizens who share Orthodox values constitutive for Putin’s ideology.

These policy measures reveal imperial qualities of Russia’s integrationist project manifested in developing mechanisms of managing and controlling large social groups rather than territories. In particular, the distribution of Russian passports among residents of break-away territories is a key driver for blurring the lines between the domestic and the external, the inside and the outside, which is one of the characteristics of imperial behaviour. By the same token, with passportization, Russia was no longer an outside actor – it could now claim biopolitical sovereignty over a significant portion of Georgia’s de jure population. In Estonia – a country which feels its national
security as being directly affected by the conflictual relations with Russia - the cultural intermingling with the Russian World is a security-generating factor, since a significant part of the Russian speaking population sympathizes with the idea of a “great Russia” able to protect its compatriots living abroad.

In the meantime, people-centric approaches to tackle security issues can be practiced by small countries such as, for example, Georgia. Its policy of reconciliation includes providing medical services for residents of Abkhazia and South Ossetia and supplying them with low-priced medicaments; free education for students from secessionist territories in Georgian Universities; and issuing ID cards “of neutral status” for residents of separatist regions to facilitate their travel to a number of countries that recognize these documents (including the US, Japan, etc.).

**Implications for Russian-Ukrainian relations**

The most troublesome example of the Russian World is Kremlin’s compatriot policy of constructing a transborder community of people allegedly unified by a common language (the minimum condition), culture, historical memories traditions, and even values, which entailed harsh security consequences in Ukraine.

Russia’s Ukraine policy can be approached from geopolitical thinking as including cultural nostalgia and Soviet and imperial connotations. This policy is largely based on such realist concepts as “normalization” of annexations and territorial reshuffling, and the distinction between great powers and smaller countries that are ultimately required to make their geopolitical choices. In Russia’s geopolitical imagery, not much space is left for multi-vector policies or ‘in-between solutions’.

There are several social and cultural conditions that securitized Russia’s policy in its “near abroad”. One is the post-1991 trauma of the fall of the Soviet Union, and another one of the inability to meet high Western standards, which led to the self-imposed victimization and utopic / mythical concepts such as “spiritual bonds”, or “historical borders of Russia”. The basic problem is that Russia builds its identity on sovereignty, a concept that is existentially insecure in the 21st century. It is the prioritization of sovereignty that determines Russia’s ontological insecurity, which is a fertile ground for obsession with multiple conspiracy theories and the constant search for external enemies. The feeling of an insecure Russian collective
Self is grounded in a lack of clear understanding of what Russia is: a nation state? A state-corporation? A state–civilization? (Eurasianist version)? A home to all Russian speakers (the Russian world concept), or a “holy Russia”, a religious community?

In the meantime, Russia’s geopolitical reasoning incorporates strong biopolitical / people-centric connotations. Russian biopolitics (to be understood as a policy of protecting and taking care of the population, with the Russian World mythology at its core) contains strong religious, civilizational and linguistic components, without directly appealing to land grabs or direct control over territories. Russia’s representations of Ukraine are framed in family-style / gender analogies, with issues of kinship (“close relatives”, “the elder brother – the junior sister”) at its core.

The security–biopolitics nexus in the case of Russia has several dimensions. One is militarization and thus securitization of the Russian World as a biopolitical construct (Makarychev 2015). Yet for most Ukrainians the Russian world is “a language of aggressor” (Irisova 2015), which only widens the gap between the two neighbouring Slavic countries. Investigative journalists unveiled networks of Russian gunmen in Belarus that call themselves “warriors of the Russian world” (Ivashin 20015), which attests to proliferation of a securitized version of the Russian world doctrine beyond Russia’s borders.

Another biopolitical element of Russia’s security policy is related to passportization policies towards break-away territories. After the annexation of Crimea, Russia facilitated the procedure of obtaining Russian citizenship for residents of Transnistria, thus counter-balancing their “possible acquisition of Romanian, Ukrainian or Bulgarian citizenship” (NewsMaker). In 2015 Russia started distributing Russian passports in Donbas (Chalenko 2015), and in the meantime severed conditions for staying in its territory of holders of Ukrainian passports (Novoe Vremia 2015). As previous research shows, passportization is one of the biopolitical instruments that allow Russia to construct “Russian spaces” beyond national jurisdiction and thus blur the inside – outside border (Artman 2013, 682-704), as many empires do. One may claim that the Kremlin as the locus of sovereign power through “states of emergency” intentionally draws a line between “politically qualified life” (which in this respect is tantamount to protected population) and “the bare life of homo sacer” (Vaughan-Williams 2009, 746), or unprotected people who are deployed in a zone of “biopolitical abandonment” (Selmeczi 2009, 525-538).
Conclusion

In this chapter we pointed to different facets of the concept of security, including policy practices (defence, surveillance, control, deterrence, protection, etc.), language (different articulations of security as speech acts), and cultural forms and representations. As seen from the perspective of securitization, security implies various assessments and communications of risks, threats and menaces from the vantage point of the dominant relations of power, which is usually conducive to the escalation of rhetoric, expansion of the space of possible extra-legal measures, and the broad possibilities for constructing the relations of enmity. This is particularly the case when ontological security is at stake, sustained by the references to historical traumas, victimization (even if self-imposed), utopias, myths, and conspiracy theories.

Against this background, the idea of human security emerges as an innovative alternative to the conflict-ridden view of international relations as an arena in which the primordial criteria of survival – and therefore the matter of life and death – is the belonging to certain political, ethnic, religious, or clan-like entities, with the ensuing lines of distinctions between “ours” and “aliens”. The human security philosophy – largely supported by a biopolitical scholarship – tries to radically change priorities in security thinking, making a shift from the dominant state-centric vista to a still nascent and underdeveloped human-based perspective grounded in prioritizing human life as such, regardless of any possible political affiliations, loyalties or allegiances. It is in this capacity that human security conceptualizations and the subsequent policy practices they instigate ought to be discussed as a legitimate part of the ongoing security debates.

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NEW PATTERNS OF SECURITIZATION IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE

Aliaksei Kazharski and Clarissa do Nascimento Tabosa

Introduction: the boy who cried wolf?

This chapter talks about the concept of securitization. Securitization is a term used by constructivist security scholars to refer to the process of social construction of threats. How is that possible? How can a threat be a “social construct” and, indeed, what does it mean for something to be socially constructed?

We all know the story of the boy who cried wolf. The little shepherd, bored on his duty, decided to entertain himself, by pretending the wolf was there to eat the sheep. The villagers, concerned for the safety of the flock, naturally rushed to the rescue. When they saw no sign of the wolf, they returned to the village. In no time, the shepherd boy was feeling bored again and cried ‘Wolf!’ summoning the villagers. Again, they abandoned their daily work and rushed to the rescue. After he had played the trick several times, the villagers naturally stopped answering the call. Sadly, for the little shepherd, a day came when the wolf finally decided to visit for lunch, but crying for help was no longer of any avail.

The story thus has a tragic ending. So, why did the villagers not answer the call? Obviously, they no longer believed in the reality of the threat. They stopped taking the boy’s words seriously. Note, that this does not in any way deny the “objective” existence of the wolf as a material object throughout the whole story. On the contrary, the irony of the fable hinges on the fact that, one day, the wolf actually makes his appearance and eats the boy, as well as the sheep that belong to the villagers. We see, however, that how the villagers acted ultimately depended not only on the “objective” existence of the wolf, but on how they collectively perceived and interpreted the threat in a particular context of action. The threat thus had a socially constructed nature.

For something to be socially constructed it does not suffice to have material existence. It (that object or process) also has to be part of a collective or shared perception. In our example, the perception of a threat, represented by the wolf, is shared - or not – by a group of people, the villagers, who
in turn represent society. The fact that a belief or an idea is shared by many individuals at the same time makes it *intersubjective*. Consequently, threats can be understood as being intersubjective rather than simply objective, in other words, as socially constructed in nature.

The term *securitization* refers to the process of a threat being socially constructed. How does securitization take place? When is it possible and owing to what circumstances? Who can perform securitization, or, in other words, become a “securitizing actor”? In our story, the boy managed to “produce” the threat by crying “Wolf! Wolf!” For securitization theory, his cries would correspond to what is known as “speech acts” or “securitization moves”. A speech act is something that is able to change the intersubjective (shared) reality, and, consequently, lead to a particular course of action. The villagers, who share the feeling that there is an immediate danger of the wolf eating the sheep, rush to the rescue.

Not every speech act is successful, however. As we see from the story, the shepherd boy eventually discredited himself as a “securitizing actor”. The villagers simply stopped believing him. What are the conditions of a successful speech act in a securitization move? Why did the villagers believe the boy in the first place? Some of that certainly has to do with the pre-existing socially shared knowledge of the wolf as a material object being somewhere “out there”. The villagers knew that the wolf roamed the woods and, at least in theory, could visit their pasture. However, they were not certain as to how immediate or how close the danger was. So, for some time, they relied on the shepherd boy to interpret the threat for them. The boy, until he discredited himself, was thus in a seemingly sovereign position, allowing him to undertake “securitization moves” and to make the threat an intersubjective reality through a mere speech act. However, this relationship is mutually constitutive, and it is also true that he could only do that, as long as the villagers (i.e. society) placed him in this position, agreeing collectively that he was a credible source of judgement about the presence of a threat. When that part of the intersubjective reality changed, the story came to its tragic end.

When treated analytically, the social construction of threats is thus a complex process that is shaped by multiple factors and begs many questions. What is the situation of a successful securitization? Who are the securitizing actors? Why do some objects and processes become securitized and others *desecuritized*? What are the effects and implications of securitization for the political order of a society and its day-to-day life?
Examining those questions is an empirical task to which critical security scholars devote themselves. Theoretically, the main tenets of the securitization approach overlap with the more generally understood constructivist scholarship of international relations (IR). In this chapter, we start with a brief overview of the traditional approaches to IR and explain the context in which new approaches emerged, among them the Copenhagen School of security studies which developed the concept of securitization. We then examine what securitization is and apply it to two specific cases: the migration and refugee crisis in Europe, and the case of Russian-Ukrainian relations.

A New Framework for Analysis

The traditional approaches to IR, mainly the realist and liberal currents of thought, try to explain world politics in objective terms. Both recognize the anarchical character of the international system but they see the world and the possibilities for cooperation in different ways. For realists, concepts such as war, the use of force, and the understanding of the states as central actors in international relations are predominant. Cooperation is only possible to the extent that it fulfills national interests. Liberals still see states as relevant actors but place much greater importance to other actors such as international institutions which create a context and an environment for genuine cooperation to occur. International institutions and the existence of transnational interests can help to overcome the anarchical character of the system, believe the liberals. Constructivists see the world in a different way. They emphasize the importance of ideas, cultures, and norms in shaping reality and political discourses. They suggest that concepts such as nation, sovereignty and also security are socially constructed; they are concepts that are not “out there”, but are created and re-created based on identities and preferences determined by it (Barnett 2005).

The development of International Relations’ (IR) theories has always been connected to the changes in the historical context at the international level. The debates in IR “witnessed a major broadening and sophistication in the 1980s, further spurred by the end of the Cold War” (Guzzini and Jung 2004, 2) and new theoretical approaches emerged in order to explain what the traditional approaches were unable to predict. In the apex of the Cold War, security studies emphasized the centrality of the State and the military and strategic aspects of the conflicts. The Realist current of thought in IR seemed to provide, until a certain period of the conflict, the appropriate
lenses through which we could look at security issues. The new debates that arose in the late 1980s and throughout the 1990s allowed for the advancement of different theoretical lines: the traditionalist on one side and those who sought to expand and reinterpret the concept of security on the other side. The latter was named by Buzan and Hansen (2009) wideners-deepeners and included mainly the Copenhagen School and the Frankfurt School (Critical Security Studies), and even though they saw security from a different perspective they all believed that the traditionalist understanding of security was “analytically, politically, and normatively problematic” (Buzan and Hansen 2009, 187). Criticisms addressed at a military and state-centered approach to security were not a novelty, however what was new was the fact that the works produced by both wideners and deepeners became recognized as Security Studies and differed from the traditional view of security grounded in traditional political-military terms, which they now rather called Strategic Studies (Buzan et al 1998; Buzan and Hansen 2009).

Four major works were produced by the Copenhagen School (Wæver et al 1989; Buzan et al 1990; Buzan 1991; Wæver et al 1993) until they synthesized their new framework for analysis into a single book – *Security: a New Framework for Analysis* (Buzan et al 1998). It is in *Security: a New Framework for Analysis* that the School introduces the concept of securitization, adopts a social constructivist perspective to Security Studies, and expands the agenda by addressing security not only in military and political terms, but they also add three other sectors for security analysis: economic, societal, and environmental (Buzan et al 1998). The five sectors identify “specific types of interaction” (Buzan et al 1998, 7) and are divided as such in order to facilitate analysis. However, the aim is to reassemble the sectors in order to address security in a more holistic and comprehensive manner due to the fact that security is itself multi-sectoral. By framing security in these five sectors, the new framework for analysis that the School developed throughout almost a decade incorporates the traditionalist position but also expands the agenda. Hence, what is new about this approach? What is securitization and how does it differ from the traditional understandings of security? How is securitization put in place and how can we study it? What are some of the most relevant cases of securitization facing Central and Eastern Europe nowadays? This will be our focus throughout the next sections.

The term security itself cannot, at least for the proponents of the Copenhagen School, be totally detached from the traditional political-military spectrum. Security has been traditionally understood as a matter of survival in the international system – it is the ultimate *raison d’État*. We talk about security “when an issue is presented as posing an existential threat to a designated referent object” (Buzan et al 1998, 21) and it justifies the use of force and other measures that go beyond the normal political procedures in order to deal with such threats.

The wider approach to security put forward by the Copenhagen School goes beyond that and sees security, not as a given, something that is out there, but as something that is socially constructed – by someone, for someone, with some purpose. In this practice of shaping an issue as a security threat with a character of urgency “security is thus a self-reinforcing practice because it is in this practice that the issue becomes a security issue” (Buzan et al 1998, 24). This is where we can begin to understand the concept of securitization, with the suffix – *ion* that in words of Latin origin denotes action or condition.

Hence, securitization occurs when through a speech act “the issue is presented as an existential threat, requiring emergency measures and justifying actions outside the normal bounds of political procedure” (Buzan et al. 1998, 23-24). The issue is portrayed as a security issue not because it may indeed pose a threat to a referent object but because it is presented as such. Furthermore, within its wider approach, the referent object does not necessarily need to be the state – it is anything that can be framed as being “existentially threatened and that has a legitimate claim to survival” (Buzan et al 1998, 36). Another important element of securitization is its priority and character of urgency. Threats to security are seen as issues that have to be urgently placed at the top of the agenda, justifying the use of extraordinary means because if we do not tackle these issues the referent object may cease to exist.

Nevertheless, not all issues presented as a threat lead to securitization. Securitization is a dual process. It means that those who produce the speech acts will only securitize an issue if the audience accepts that a particular referent object is under existential threat. If the audience does not accept an issue portrayed as a threat to be in fact a threat, this is a securitizing move, but it is not securitization itself (Buzan et al 1998). Successful securitization entails three important elements: i) framing
something as an existential threat, that ii) requires urgent action, and iii) justifies the use of extraordinary measures “by breaking free of rules” (Buzan et al 1998, 26).

Methodologically speaking, it becomes clearer now that the way to study securitization is to study discourses by understanding the process of framing an issue as an existential threat to a referent object. The first step is to understand the particularities of securitization as a different type of practice, followed by the identification of the security units (what is potentially under threat - the referent object? Who are the securitizing actors?), and, lastly, to identify patterns “of mutual references among units – the security complex” (Buzan et al 1998, 169).

It is also important to mention that for the scholars of the Copenhagen School security is not a positive instance – it is rather the opposite. Once we have to deal with security issues, it means we failed to conduct politics through the normal set of accepted rules and have to resort to extraordinary measures. The optimal situation is, therefore, a situation of desecuritization where we move issues “out of this threat-defence sequence and into the ordinary public sphere” (Buzan et al 1998, 29). While securitization implies moving away from ordinary politics, what in fact constitutes the “normal” instance of politics is not a given, nor is it very well explored by the Copenhagen School. The strategies of turning an issue back into the ordinary public sphere will vary from case to case, depending on what constitute normal politics in the particular case.

Before we move to the empirical cases we chose to analyze in order to show how securitization is produced (by whom, on what, for whom, why, and under which conditions) we need to discuss one more element important for our analysis: the security complex theory. The Security Complex theory was first presented by Buzan in the first edition of his book *People, State and Fear* which came out in 1983 and was re-edited in 1991. The core idea here is that states are immersed in a “web of security interdependency” (Buzan et al 1998, 11) but the majority of political and military threats can only spread to a limited distance. In this way, “insecurity is often associated with proximity” (Buzan et al 1998, 11). Later on, when Buzan formally switched to a social constructivist approach and by introducing other issues beyond the political-military sphere he defines security complexes as.

A set of units whose major processes of securitization, desecuritization, or both are so interlinked that the security problems cannot reasonably be
analyzed or resolved apart from one another (Buzan 2003, 141).

In the Regional Security Complex theory, the factors that have to be taken into consideration are whether an issue is mobile in the sense that it can trespass across boundaries and if the threats generated by these issues are heavily shaped by distance or not. Therefore, not all groups of states situated geographically close can be considered to form a regional security complex, but there has to be a different pattern of security interdependence that differentiates a member of a security complex from other neighbouring countries (Buzan 2003). We will be able to observe in the empirical part dealing with securitization of migration in the Visegrad countries that security complexes are very easily built in relation to issues that have themselves a transnational character and that are strongly shaped by distance, such as migration.

**Securitization of Migration and the Visegrad Four: Tackling an Inexistent Issue in a Security Complex?**

Against this scenario, our theoretical framework in the following sections is shaped by the Copenhagen School, which not only provided a broader framework for analysis in security studies by widening the agenda and introducing the concept of securitization but also framed security issues within a social constructivist perspective (Buzan et al 1998). As we saw in our previous section, securitization is a reciprocal process and the securitizing actors have to convince an audience that a certain issue is posing a threat to the survival of one or more referent objects. The securitizing actors may vary in particular cases. It is common that securitization is done by the main political elites, but securitization is not restricted to an act by political elites but may include a broader range of actors such as non-governmental organizations or international organizations (see Elbe 2006; Kelle 2007). It becomes easier for the securitizing actors to frame migration and other processes connected to it as a threat because different issues connected to migration can be simultaneously presented as a threat to different referent objects and because the threats are not only constrained to one unit but trespass across borders, forming a security complex.

In the case of securitization of migration in the Visegrad countries (V4), we can argue that the **securitizing actors** are the main ruling elites in these countries. At the moment, the most influential political elites in the V4 seem to have similar positions in relation to how the temporary relocation system
proposed by the European Union (EU) threatens the sovereignty of these states, and how these migrants pose a threat to national security (by linking immigrants to terrorism and diseases), to “us”, in identitarian terms, based on the fear of Islamization of “our society”, and to a lesser extent to the economy and social systems of these states. The audience, then, is clearly the citizens in each of the V4 countries, and we will observe later in this section how citizens in the four countries now increasingly perceive immigration as an issue (in negative terms) for both their countries and the EU.

The solution found to address the crisis emerged at the EU level and it involved, among other measures, the adoption of a temporary asylum-seeker relocation system. In September 2015, the Union proposed to relocate 120,000 asylum seekers from the most affected countries to other EU member states based on a quota system that took into consideration a series of factors such as the Gross Domestic Product (GDP), unemployment rate, size of the population, and number of asylum seekers spontaneously accepted between 2010 and 2014 by each country. After many discussions and disagreements, the relocation system was approved by a qualified majority, even though Romania, Slovakia, Hungary, and the Czech Republic strongly opposed the proposed measure. Poland was initially in favour of the relocation system and accepted the receipt of 7,000 asylum seekers. However, new elections were held and the new government aligned its position with the other three Visegrad countries. This also reflects the fact that the securitizing actors in these cases are the main political elites in these countries such as (but not only) Robert Fico, Beata Szydło, Viktor Orbán and Bohuslav Sobotka.

In these countries, migration and the EU measures put in place in order to deal with the high influx of people arriving at once epitomized by the temporary relocation system, is portrayed as a threat to the states’ sovereignty because a supranational level is “dictating” what they have to do in regard to an issue that for a very long time has been seen as a matter of sovereign states to decide upon: who, when, and how foreigners are allowed to enter and stay in their territories. The main political elites\(^1\) in the four countries have at consecutive times stated the relocation system is a “dictate” from the EU and that it poses a direct threat to their sovereignty. Hungary went further and in 2016 they held

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\(^1\)Sobotka has at consecutive times stated that the Czech Republic will not accept that someone “dictates how they should relocate migrants” (Sobotka in Aktualne.sk 2016). Fico (in Zamborský 2015) has claimed “I would rather breach the laws than we should respect this dictate, which was carried out by a majority that was unable to reach a consensus within the EU”. Orbán (in Kovács 2017) follows the same line and claimed “we don’t think it belongs to the question of solidarity to give up a nation’s constitutional rules and national sovereignty (…) Brussels, on the other hand, thinks that whatever they declare solidarity, that’s solidarity (…) This is a dictate.”
a national referendum that addressed the relocation system. The referendum included questions such as “Do you want the European Union to be able to mandate the obligatory resettlement of non-Hungarian citizens into Hungary even without the approval of the National Assembly?” (BBC 2016) which clearly touch upon matters of sovereignty. Szydło (in Sobszak 2017) speaks not only in the name of Poland but also as the Visegrad group, for instance, by claiming “Poland and the Visegrad Group will never agree to this blackmail or to such conditions to be dictated”. These speech acts frame the relocation system as a threat to states’ sovereignty and legitimize extraordinary measures that would not otherwise be implemented – such as breaching EU law by not receiving their quota of asylum seekers.

Although securitization of migration works, in this case, based on framing the relocation system as a threat to states’ sovereignty, to the ability to decide upon important political and security issues without having external influence in domestic affairs, it is important to stress that challenging the idea of European integration as such “remains largely unthinkable in the V4” and the discursive strategies seem to lead more to a situation in which only “partial identification” with the West and its institutions occur (Kazharski 2017, 16-17). We do not see a securitizing act that aims at a total break with the European project. The idea of exiting the European project, especially a ‘Slovaxit’ due to the fact that this country is further attached to the Union in its monetary policies, remains rather a securitizing move – that is not internalized by the audience and “is bound to remain on the margins of political discourse” (Kazharski 2017, 17).

Framing the relocation system, and the idea of opening “European Union’s doors” to the people arriving in Europe irregularly, especially through the Mediterranean, as a threat to states’ sovereignty is just the first among other securitizing acts by the main political elites in the V4. Accepting these migrants with a different religion and culture is framed also as a threat to “national and regional security”, to “our identity”, and to “our economy”. Immigrants are portrayed as potential threats to national security because through speech acts they are connected to a number of terrorist attacks that have happened in Europe since 2016 and to other threats such as diseases. Orbán (In Kaminski 2011) claimed “the factual point is that all terrorists are basically migrants”, while Kaczyński (In Ciensky 2015) the leader of the Law and Justice party in Poland claimed immigrants carry “very dangerous diseases long absent from Europe”.

Moreover, immigrants are also portrayed as a threat to “us”, in identitarian
terms – they have a different religion and different customs that are fundamentally incompatible with our culture. This serves as a basis for justifying measures such as building fences, as Hungary did and received support from a joint Visegrad police unit to assist in the task of protecting its external borders, justified by the discourse against mass migration from African and Middle East countries that, in Orbán’s words, poses threats to the European identity and culture, based on Christianism (Gorondi 2017). Moreover, in a survey carried out by the Chatham House Royal Institute of International Affairs, 10,000 citizens of ten European states were asked to answer to what extent they agree or disagree with the statement “All further migration from mainly Muslim countries should be stopped”. Among the V4 countries, only Poland was included in the survey; the country ranked in the top position with 71% of the respondents agreeing with the statement (Goodwin et al 2017). Lastly, immigrants are framed as a threat to the economy and social systems of the V4 (and Europe in general) when they are claimed to be a majority of economic migrants that will put a heavy burden and may jeopardize the social systems of these countries.

We could so far see that the main securitizing actors in the V4 are the main political elites that may be either in government or members of the opposition but seem to share the same strategies of securitization in relation to immigration. We can also observe that migration and processes connected to it have been securitized in different sectors, in relation to different referent objects (as a threat to national and regional security - in traditional security terms, to states’ sovereignty, to the national economy, and to our nation), but that all these sectors are interconnected. This helps us to explain the success of the securitizing acts in the V4.

Up to this point, the reader may be questioning whether the cases mentioned throughout this section are indeed cases of securitization or whether they are instead just securitizing moves that have not undergone the process of acceptance by the audiences. We argue that in the case of the migration and refugee crisis the speech acts by the securitizing actors transformed issues into threats and the audience in these countries accept them as such. A good indication of that can be found in the past Eurobarometer Surveys that map public opinion on different topics throughout the EU member states and

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1 Robert Fico: “Refugees have different cultural habits and other religions. There is a high security risk that we have to talk about.” (In HNonline.sk 2015).

2 Fico claims up to 95% of the migrants arriving in Europe are economic migrants. Orbán claims the overwhelming majority of people arriving are not fleeing from persecution, according to the 1951 Refugee Convention, but people looking for a better life in Europe (The Economist 2015).
candidate countries. When asked “What do you think are the two most important issues facing the EU at the moment?” we can see a major increase in the number of citizens who perceive *immigration* as a main issue facing the Union nowadays.

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(European Commission, Eurobarometer Surveys 82 – 86, adapted by the authors)

Since 2015 (Eurobarometer Surveys 83, 84, 85, and 86) immigration was perceived by citizens from all four countries as the main issue facing the EU nowadays. By autumn 2016, it became perceived as the most relevant issue facing EU member states for citizens in all countries, with the exception of Spain, where it ranked as the second most relevant issue, and Portugal where it was the third most frequently mentioned item. When asked about the main issue facing *their countries*, there is also an increase in the number of respondents who chose immigration as a major issue:

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(European Commission, Eurobarometer Surveys 82 – 86, adapted by the authors)

Until spring 2015, immigration was not perceived as a major issue facing their countries by citizens of the four countries. Since the autumn of 2015, it became the most frequently mentioned issue in the Czech Republic, the second in Hungary, and the third in Slovakia. By spring and autumn 2016, it continued to be seen as a major issue, among the three most frequently
mentioned, in the Czech Republic and Hungary. It is important to stress that in these questions “issue” is framed in negative terms, in terms of main “concerns”; respondents could choose among unemployment, rising prices/inflation, terrorism, and crime, among other issues.

Securitization in the context of the Visegrad countries has a particularly interesting feature. Through discourse, we may be seeing a break with the normative identification of these four countries with the “West”. Kazharski (2017) has developed this argument and he points out that in the past, the quest for recognition of the Visegrad countries as part of the West had an intellectual and discursive construct associated with a policy dimension, the latter emanated from the duty to accept the *acquis communautaire* as a pre-condition for accession to the EU. These countries have a history of compliance with measures emanating from the EU level. He argues that with the migration and refugee crisis, other political issues the Visegrad Four have proceeded from normative conformity with the West (…) to a partial identification, whereby only some Western principles and norms are accepted unconditionally, while other ones are subverted and resignified in the political discourse. (2017, 2)

In the past, we could see the quest for recognition had both a discursive and a policy dimension. Nowadays we see a partial identification of these countries to the West (Kazharski 2017) but this seems not to be followed by a policy dimension because these countries are so institutionally and legally tied to the EU that they cannot on their own, or as a group of four, produce a big impact in terms of policy change (Tabosa, forthcoming). In this context, these countries continue to be policy takers rather than policy makers in the EU – a good indication of that is the fact the European Court of Justice dismissed the case brought by Hungary and Slovakia and decided that the European Council acted in a lawful manner and under its mandate when it put in place the relocation system and the Commission is starting a formal complaint against Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic for not taking any asylum seeker as part of the relocation system (Tabosa, forthcoming). Studying processes of securitization in these countries becomes extremely relevant because this seems to be the most powerful tool these countries have in their hands to produce some kind of impact in their political relations.

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1 Slovakia accepted a total of twelve asylumseekers according to the relocation system, and for this reason it will not, initially, be included in the Commission’s complaint.
Buzan et al (1998) point out that security is not a positive stage; it is rather an instance in which there was a failure in conducting politics through normal means. The optimal situation is desecuritization – a process in which an issue is moved out of the context of threat and is brought back to the normal public sphere. Therefore, more than arguing these countries are becoming policy makers on their own (Geddes and Scholten 2016), separately or as a group, and legitimizing their securitizing discourse, researchers can focus on examining the discourse of the political elites in these countries but showing how legally and institutionally constrained they are and these countries have gone through a process of Europeanization from above that does not allow them to effectively put into practice policies that are not in conformity with EU laws and regulations.

**Ukraine and Russia**

As we pointed out earlier, the constructivist turn in security studies emancipated security from the narrow, state-centric understandings that dominated the field. The notion of military security was expanded to a much broader set of agendas, thus putting forth the vision of a “multi-sectoral” security.

One implication of this change in perspective is that new and unexpected referent objects may now be in focus. Those referent objects would hardly qualify as “security” under the traditional, realist inspired approaches. From a radical social constructivist point of view virtually anything can be securitized and become an intersubjectively perceived threat. On the other hand, blurring the lines completely would render the term security analytically useless. If anything can become security, then the concept becomes overstretched to the point of being meaningless; it means, at the same time, everything and nothing. The middle ground between the two extremes is sticking to the minimal, formal definition of a security situation we introduced earlier, i.e. an existential threat to the referent object that demands urgent and extraordinary measures. Thus, in the “boy who cried wolf” story everyone in the village immediately abandons their routine tasks and rushes to the rescue, because they feel there is an imminent danger of losing the whole flock of sheep.

The following section of the chapter uses the triangle of recent Ukraine-Russia-EU relations to analyze discursive securitization moves that fall under the non-conventional, broader understanding of security. It shows
how, somewhat counterintuitively, issues of gender and social values can form a nexus with geopolitical thinking, in order to produce a securitizing discourse aimed at portraying certain countries and institutions as a threat, which in turn helps legitimize certain policy steps as extraordinary measures.

Russia, as Gaufman reminds us in her recent comprehensive study, has a long and well-studied tradition of securitizing neighbouring countries based on ideological grounds. The tradition goes back to the medieval period of history and the Muscovite perception of the “heretic” Latin West as a potentially dangerous influence on the Orthodox people. It has been argued that the later Soviet outlook that divided the world into the capitalist and the Communist camps easily took root in Russia, because it reproduced a familiar narrative structure about a permanent cultural threat coming from the Western Other (Gaufman, 2017).

The securitization of the capitalist West in Soviet Russia fulfilled an important legitimizing function. The Soviet totalitarian regime had to invoke a security argument in order to justify the policy of comprehensive control over every aspect of the lives of its subjects, including, of course, restrictions on the freedom of movement. The “corrupting influence” was attributed not only to Western political ideologies and economic models but also to culture in the broader sense, including attributes of popular culture, such as music, film and fashion. (The apocryphal cliché “today he dances to the jazz, and tomorrow he will sell his Motherland, segodnya on tanzujet jazz a zavtra Rodinu prodast” may have never been part of the official propaganda discourse, but it illustrates the logic well enough). The nexus between security and culture and values was thus taken to its extreme.

Post-Soviet Russia arose from a collapsed Communist project, but had, nevertheless, never come to terms with its imperial identity. President Putin famously expressed his regret at the collapse of the USSR by calling it the “greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the 20th century”.

However, the attempts to restore Russia’s imperial influence in the post-Soviet area which intensified under Putin lacked a clear ideological alternative to the West. In the post-Soviet period of its history Russia was busy borrowing and experimenting with various Western norms and ideas, but failed to produce a consistent doctrine of its own. Prior to the 2014 Ukraine crisis, the Kremlin entered into what was dubbed regional rivalry with the European Union over the countries of the Eastern Partnership (EaP). Russia’s strategic problem was, on the whole, that although it proposed...
its own project of Eurasian economic regionalism, which on paper looked rather similar to European integration, it failed to be equally attractive to EaP countries such as Ukraine.

This failure can be explained in terms of multiple reasons. When compared to Western countries, Russia looked increasingly corrupt, authoritarian and lagging behind economically and technologically. Combined with the difficult legacy of conflict between Ukrainian and Russian nationalisms, all that had probably doomed the policy of attracting Ukraine into a future Eurasian Union from the very start. Being unable to win in a fair competition between European and Eurasian regional integration projects, Russia reverted to a particular kind of securitizing moves.

Competition of political and economic models embedded in regional integration projects is arguably based on a rational cost and benefit analysis. That is to say, as rational individuals we choose that model which we feel will better enhance our economic welfare and individual freedoms. From this perspective, most would probably favour the European bid over the Eurasian one. However, security may also function as a sort of trump card that suspends routine commonsensical reasoning by portraying attractive things as dangerous. The Communist regime tried to securitize various attractive elements of the Western lifestyle such as popular culture, consumption goods and freedom of movement, by branding them “capitalist” or “bourgeois” and thus threatening the moral and political integrity of Soviet society.

In the absence of Communist ideology, new ideological grounds for securitizing moves had to be found in Putin’s Russia. Russia’s new conservative ideology of “traditional values” operated in a nexus with the discourse about Eurasian economic integration (see Kazharski, forthcoming). By creating a narrative of “Gayrope” (see Riabov & Riabova 2014), i.e. a “gay Europe”, a Europe that has abandoned its traditional Christian values and descended into moral degeneration, Russian discourse thus rationalized the choice of Eurasian over European integration. The threat to traditional values was also portrayed as an existential one: choosing the European way would allegedly lead to moral collapse and eventually to physical extinction as the “traditional family” would be destroyed and forcefully replaced with promiscuity, incest, paedophilia and gay marriages.

A rhymed article title published in 2013 by the Komsomolskaya Pravda tabloid portrayed Ukraine’s choice as a choice between “common home”
and “the EuroSodom” (Ukraine vybirayet: v obshiy s Rossiyei dom ili v EvroSodom). A similar article, published the same year, cited an Armenian politician explaining why Armenia prefers Russia to the EU: “Gender equality, which the EU is imposing on us, is when mother enters her bedroom and sees her husband with her daughter in bed. This is how it will end – with incest and paedophilia”, says member of the Armenian parliament Artashes Gegamyan in a shivering voice”.

Further down, two Armenian officers are portrayed as having a dialogue, captioned “we can cure a bribe-taking man but not a gay one”: “I was drinking vodka with a customs officer. <..> After one bottle he became ardent and started saying: ‘we need to head for progressive Europe. There is progress there. Civilization. And in Russia there is corruption. We do not need that.’ Then I ask him: tell me honestly, do you take bribes at the customs? He wavered for a long time and then confessed: ‘yes, I do’. And then I say to him: “Look, you are such vermin, bribe-taker - and still I am sitting here and drinking vodka with you. And we are feeling good. Why? Because we can re-educate you. There is hope. You are not a doomed man. Or prison may re-educate you. And could I be sitting and drinking vodka with a gay man? No! I feel sorry for him as a cripple, but a leopard cannot change his spots (‘gorbatogo mogila ispravit’). And there is nothing to talk to him about. A gender man is not an Armenian man’. The customs officer ponders, has a shot of vodka, and says: “You are right, brother. The European way is not for us”. (Translation adopted from Kazharski, forthcoming).

As seen even from these mini-case studies the referent object here is a rather different one compared to the traditional understanding of security. In Russian discourse about the European Union and Ukraine securitization moves fused geopolitics and gender issues in order to produce a new/old nexus of security and identity. This fusion is part of the broader practices of building a new Russian identity, which intensified after Russia became generally disappointed with Western-style liberalism. These attempts to construct a new identity increasingly portray the globalized liberal West as a danger to Russian traditional values and the Russian “spirituality”. As a sign of those changing perceptions, the term “spiritual security” (duchovnaya bezopasnost’) actually entered the discourse of the ruling establishment and was even successfully smuggled into academic jargon as a topic for dissertational research (see Kazharski, forthcoming). This link between identity and security in Russia parallels the case of the V4 which we discussed earlier. In Eastern European countries such as Poland or Hungary migrants were also securitized as a threat to the integrity of local cultural identities.
If the referent objects of securitization are the traditional values and culture, who are the audience of these securitizing moves? The Russian speakers in Ukraine seem to be the primary target of these discourses, although one can also assume that the population of Russia itself is also an audience. Considering the close societal links between the two countries and the attention that Ukraine traditionally receives with the Russian public, it also seems necessary for the Kremlin and its supporters to rationalize why Russia had to be left behind if Ukraine were to establish close ties with the EU or even join it.

Finally, who are the securitizing actors here? In securitization theory, a securitizing actor is someone with enough authority to convince the audience that the referent object is threatened. In Russia securitizing moves went far beyond the discourse of the official establishment. As Gaufman argues for example, much of the debate around the Ukraine crisis took place on social networks, where “the battle for the hearts and minds was fought” (Gaufman 2015). There is a methodological problem here. While securitization theory operates with the category of speech act which allows us to identify the speakers and their social roles, the category of discourse is more impersonal. However, the relationship between the official and the unofficial discourses in our case can, in fact, be seen as complementary. Though when we speak about securitization we may primarily think of official actors like the government, as the founders of critical security studies indicate the role of the media or “the CNN factor” should not be underestimated (Buzan et al. 1998, 149). Consequently, in the Russian case tabloids and social networks often reproduce and amplify those ideas that Russian officials express in a more tacit and toned-down way (see Kazharski, forthcoming)

Moreover, Russian attempts to securitize Ukraine have not been limited to the gender and family agenda. Another “threat narrative” has been that of the Euromaidan as a rise of “fascism” or “neo-Nazism”. The use of these labels is not coincidental, nor is it completely arbitrary. The Copenhagen School has discussed the so-called “facilitating conditions” of securitization, i.e. “conditions under which the speech act works, in contrast to cases in which the act misfires”. These conditions are broadly grouped into two categories, the internal or linguistic and the external contextual and social, thus making every successful speech act “a combination of language and society” (Buzan et al 1998, 31-33). From that it follows that every securitization move is historically contextualized, and depends for its success not only on the social position of the securitizing actor but also on the collective experience and memories of the audience. The centrality of the
narrative on the Great Patriotic War and the fight against German Nazism for post-Soviet Russian identity facilitated the social construction of the neo-Nazi threat.

The presence of far-right groups in Ukraine, as well as elements of a more general anti-Russian nationalism are an empirical fact. The Russian establishment used this fact as a pretext to amplify the threat multiple times over and to construct a narrative of an existential threat. The ethnically Russian and Russian speaking populations in Ukraine thus functioned as a referent object, which justified the extraordinary measures of annexing Crimea, in violation of international law and to the detriment of Russian-Ukrainian relations (Gaufman 2015). As with the securitization of European integration, the audience here should probably be seen as a mixed one. The threat narrative was addressed to people living in Crimea and the Eastern regions of Ukraine as well as to the Russians themselves, who eventually had to suffer the economic consequences of international sanctions against Russia.

As the Ukraine crisis unfolded Russia also tried to securitize Ukraine in the eyes of the international community, which allows us to identify yet another audience of securitizing moves. The already familiar narrative of a “neo-Nazi coup in Kyiv” was channelled through books published by Russia’s Public Diplomacy Foundation in English and other languages. These books imitated the academic genre and, as of 2015, were available for purchase on Amazon.com alongside scholarship on Ukraine, which indicates a sophisticated complex of securitization measures undertaken by Russia. In 2014-2015 Russia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs also published several reports targeting “human rights violations” and the dangerous “rehabilitation of Nazism” in Ukraine. The reports were part of a strategy to portray Ukraine as a failed political community that was sliding into “fascism” as a result of the 2014 “unconstitutional coup” and as a failing state, which presents a security issue for the international community. (For a more in-detail examination see Kazharski 2016). Here, the Russian narrative failed to dominate Western public opinion, as there had been ample proof of Russia’s direct involvement in the conflict, and therefore Ukraine could not be securitized as a “failed state”. Thus, in conceptual terms, this was largely an unsuccessful securitization attempt as Russia’s securitization moves did not resonate with the pre-existing perceptions of threat in the West.
Conclusion

Throughout the chapter we have given a brief overview of the development of new approaches to IR, and to security studies, focusing on the Copenhagen School and its concept of securitization. For proponents of the Copenhagen School, security is still about political-military issues, but its agenda has been expanded to include also other issues such as societal, environmental and economic issues. Another important contribution of the school to Security Studies is that they move away from the traditional understanding of security (both of liberals and realists alike) in objective terms, as givens. By adopting a social constructivist perspective to security, they take it as something that is socially constructed – by someone, for someone, with some purpose. The concept of security complexes, which can be both of amity and enmity, was also introduced. It is based on the assumption that some threats can only spread to a limited distance and, therefore, processes of securitization and desecuritization tend to be interlinked in geographical clusters.

In the case of the Visegrad Four, we have seen that the main political elites in the four countries have been using speech acts to securitize migration and processes connected to it in different sectors: as a threat to national and regional security, as a threat to the state’s sovereignty and its ability to decide upon immigration policies, as a threat to national economy and as a threat to “us”, in identitarian terms. In the case of Russian-Ukrainian relations we could observe that issues of gender and social values have been connected to geopolitical thinking in order to produce a discourse based on framing certain countries and institutions as threats. This, in turn, justifies the adoption of extraordinary measures. Though the two cases refer us to rather different issue areas (or “sectors”), they can both be explained in terms of the broader notion of security, understood from a social constructivist perspective, and thus studied using the analytical toolkit of securitization theory.

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NEW ASPECTS OF EU CONDITIONALITY: THE SECURITY CONTEXT

Péter Balázs

Subsequent EU enlargements increased and extended welfare and security in ever-larger circles in and around Europe. However, at the beginning of the 21st century, following the biggest wave of enlargement, this process came to a halt, also reducing the EU’s normative influence on third countries. In the EU’s neighbourhood, hard security aspects have come to the fore, replacing traditional technical conditionality. The reserves for further EU expansion have temporarily been exhausted. The main obstacle to EU enlargement is the high number of ‘unfinished states’ among the successors to two former federal structures, namely Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union. At the same time, new regional power centres have emerged in the EU’s close neighbourhood which do not intend to subordinate their economic and political orientation to the EU’s expansive interests as expressed by its normativity and conditionality. Two important neighbours, Russia and Turkey, have taken an anti-Western turn and are nourishing bold expansive regional ambitions of their own. Their new positions and mutual rapprochement mark a frontier for the EU’s efforts to extend its influence as a ‘soft power’. Internal non-compliance with EU norms on the part of some member states also opens the way for the penetration of external security threats.

EU normativity and conditionality

The EU is a strong normative power, and one of the world’s most influential setters and disseminators of norms. The notion of ‘normativity’ was coined by Manners (Gordon and Prado, 2014, 416-427). Contemporary European normativity is primarily attached to the external influence of the European Union (EU). In this context, the modern European idea of normativity expresses the creative regulatory spirit of the European Union, complemented by its efforts to propagate and spread European standards and practices throughout the World. Manners identifies six different mechanisms for diffusing European norms, including the example of regional integration, as well as various ways and means of diffusion (informational, procedural, overt). Apart from passive or neutral methods, like showing a good example or informing partners of the successful implementation of norms, the EU’s
most efficient active tool is conditionality. According to this concept, the EU attaches promises or threats to the application or non-application of its norms by third parties. In case a third party follows the EU’s example, a promise becomes a reward; if it refuses, a threat can materialize as a punishment. The real content of both, rewards and punishments, takes the form mainly of trade and aid facilities or their withdrawal on behalf of the EU.

EU conditionality can legally be framed by bilateral and multilateral agreements. In this context, conditionality is a particularly important element of the various forms of EU association agreement, and constitutes the backbone of EU accession treaties. Association agreements establish a close relationship between, on the one hand, a partner’s compliance with EU norms, and, on the other, its compensation in the form of trade facilities, cooperation programmes or advantageous credits and grants. Accession treaties contain the greatest reward for following the EU’s normative example and applying its rules: EU membership. Even in the pre-accession phase, the credible promise of impending EU accession produces a strong stimulation effect for introducing EU norms.

Efficient conditionality can generate transformative power for third parties if the overall effect of introducing EU rules results in noticeable changes, primarily in market regulations (Forsberg, 2011, 1153–1378). The voluntary and peaceful transfer of EU norms to third countries has inspired the concept of describing the EU as a ‘soft power’ (Nye, 2005). The opposite model is ‘hard power’: applying military force to achieve one’s objectives. ‘Soft power’, on the other hand, applies methods of persuasion, the power of example, and the use of political as well as economic rewards. The EU’s role as a model has been based on the historical expansion of European capitalism in the World as a modernisation objective. Indeed, European normativity has deep historical roots connected to a ‘European universalism’ which postulates that Europe is the depository of the innovative spirit that has driven human progress. Of course, Europe has no monopoly on originality in general, but at a certain point in the past was able to gain undoubted advantage in the world. By producing efficient weapons and developing navigation – both the construction of vessels and the instruments of orientation – the way was paved for European powers to discover and conquer other continents and colonise their inhabitants. European colonialism served as the basis for a ‘European World’ in the 18th-19th centuries. As a consequence, the European (British, French, Dutch etc.) examples exerted a deep impact on the industrialisation patterns of other continents. The competing younger
American prototype emerged only in the first half of the 20th century, later to be followed by attractive Asian versions.

In parallel with rival models, the original European modernisation standard still prevails in the sphere of influence of the Western European welfare zone. The economic and political centre of gravity of this appealing area is the industrialised core of Europe, framed by the expanding EU. In its broader neighbourhood, the EU has become the legal and institutional archetype of a successful ‘modernity’ composed of pluralistic parliamentary democracy and a market economy. In its narrower European neighbourhood, EU accession has become the synonym for a catch-up path leading to welfare and modernity. In a broader sphere, beyond the strict geographic limits of Europe, where membership of the exclusive ‘European’ club is not permitted by Article 49 TEU, association and other agreements serve as mediators of EU conditionality. Voluntary adaptation of EU norms is also motivated by “the fear of exclusion from its markets” or – in a positive approach – by the will to join the great European trade and investment area and its economic processes, namely the borderless circulation of goods, services, labour and capital in the Single Market (Forsberg, 2011, 1153–1378).

The hidden security dimensions of EU expansion

EU conditionality has notable security effects, too – mainly on the European periphery and in the closer neighbourhood area of Europe. This assessment is in apparent contradiction with the definition of the EU as a ‘civilian’ or ‘soft’ power. According to some analysts, the categorisation of the EU as ‘civilian’ is intended to hide the obvious military weakness of the organisation (Del Sarto, 2016, 215-232). Indeed, in the special and rather unique case of the European Communities (EC), the integration of defence was not part of the structure, as NATO assured the protection of the territories of the EC’s member states. Under the NATO security shelter, the EC/EU was able to focus more on economic cooperation, and to ignore, for a long period, any direct (military) aspect of security. In fact, European integration was born in the 1950s with no military arm but with considerable security content: the European Coal and Steel Community united the most important war industries of the last war, while the European Atomic Energy Community laid down the foundations for cooperation in producing the armaments for a potential next major military conflict. In parallel with its industrial objectives, the European Communities contained other classical elements of the war economy: self-sufficiency
in food production and centralised control of trade.

In international relations, Western European integration has, since the second half of the 20th century, appeared as a new kind of actor. The EU’s enlargement pattern has also shown obvious differences compared to historical examples of expansive empires. The EU’s successful expansion was possible without applying or referring to military power. The empirical evidence of this is a clear rebuttal of any attempt to conceive of the EU as a post-modern ‘empire’. Undoubtedly, the EU displays some of the attributes of classical empires, like unified legislation, centralised institutions, common symbols, the regulated use of national languages and, not least, its strong expansive character. At the same time, it has no central power or military force exerting pressure on third countries, principally on direct neighbours, as classical empires have always done (Zielonka, 2006). The sphere of potential future member states was identified in the basic Treaty in a very ambitious way: “all European states … may apply” (Article 49 TEU). But the target countries for EU expansion were not occupied by the expansively growing multinational structure by using military force; on the contrary, they insisted, one after the other, on being admitted as full members of the Union. The strong and direct motivation of the applicants was driven by their wish to maximise welfare by being included in one of the most prosperous economic zones in the world. And yet, behind this obvious endeavour, security considerations have also played a major role.

In the Cold War period, in the circumstances of bipolar confrontation, the EC/EU was evidently constructed as the economic arm of NATO. The formal division of labour between the two organisations and the partly different composition of their memberships did not disguise this obvious interconnection. Until the collapse of the Soviet Union, the EC (with the sole exception of Ireland) consisted of NATO members constituting a massive European pillar of the trans-Atlantic family, in balance with North America (US and Canada), and complemented by the ‘guardians of the European peripheries’ (Norway, Iceland, Turkey). For the 11 ‘double members’ of the two trans-Atlantic organisations,1 parallel membership of NATO and the EC collected their security and economic interests together under the protective shield of mutual nuclear deterrence. After the end of the bipolar system, however, new security considerations and risks emerged on all sides (Ikenberry, 2018, 7-23). EU enlargement speeded up and included, in a first

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1 The number of double NATO-EC members grew from the original 6 to a total of 11, after EC enlargements that included the United Kingdom, Denmark and Greece, and finally the entry of Spain and Portugal in 1986.
wave, neutral Western European states\(^2\) that had previously been excluded from the EC’s ‘NATO club’ and created, as a second best solution, the free trade zone of EFTA. In its next move, the EU stepped over the East-West demarcation line of the former Iron Curtain and began to take on board previous members of the opposing military alliance, the former Warsaw Pact, even including some former Soviet republics.\(^3\) In the first phase of Western expansion to the East, NATO admission preceded EU membership,\(^4\) but the two trans-Atlantic organisations would soon begin to compete with each other in terms of their eastern extension programme. The rapid parallel growth and further enlargement plans of the EU and NATO have awakened Russia’s dormant security reflexes.

**Entering Russia’s security zone**

In the 1990s Russia made a clear distinction between the nature and objectives of the two organisations, NATO and the EU. NATO was still considered in Moscow as the heir to the adversary military bloc in the Cold War conflict, while the EU was regarded as an attractive neighbouring ‘welfare zone’. For this reason, Russia did not oppose EU enlargement in general, whereas it bluntly refused NATO expansion and judged it a threat to Russian security. In this sense Moscow took a mixed but realistic position on the trans-Atlantic world and accepted the consequences of the ‘big’ EU enlargement wave which started in one movement by 1998 and finally resulted in two subsequent accessions in 2004 and 2007. At the same time Russia did not welcome the NATO accession of the same countries. EU expansion into the Balkans was not opposed by Moscow, but when potential EU enlargement touched the territory of Russia’s ‘near abroad’, the first overt conflict broke out concerning the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement in 2013. From that moment, as the result of a sharp anti-Western turn, Russian foreign policy perceived EU enlargement as an unfriendly move, threatening its security interests and paving the way for subsequent NATO expansion. At this point EU conditionality took on a new meaning, as its ponderous security impact overshadowed the many ‘civilian’ technical details. In the security context some fundamental entry conditions contained in Article 49 TEU would become a political hurdle for European

\(^2\)The 1995 EU enlargement included Austria, Sweden and Finland.

\(^3\)From the former Warsaw Pact, seven new members (Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania) joined the EU in 2004; two others (Romania and Bulgaria) joined in 2007.

\(^4\)Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary joined NATO in 1999, five years ahead of their EU accession.
states in the Western Balkans, and even more so for those located within the Russian sphere of interest. This zone is defined by Moscow as its ‘near abroad’ and includes the nebulous concept of the ‘Russian World’ (Lyne, 2015, 2-13).

Article 49 TEU stipulates that “any European state” may apply to become a member of the European Union. Let us take a closer look at both components that define the set of eligible candidates: ‘European state’. The interpretation and concrete geographical scope of the adjective ‘European’ was, for a long time in the past, a serious topic of discussion. Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, however, the demarcation line between ‘Europe’ and ‘Asia’, which had previously been “somewhere in the Soviet Union”, has turned out to be clearer and could be defined with the help of new state borders. Apart from the three Baltic republics, six post-Soviet states along the eastern frontiers of the EU have been considered as ‘Europeans’.1 This politico-geographical recognition of their European character has also been expressed by establishing the EU’s Eastern Partnership framework programme. At the same time, the second part of the criterion – ‘state’ – has become a more controversial condition of EU accession. EU treaties do not contain a precise interpretation of the concept of statehood, but the whole process of EU accession presupposes that a candidate is a fully recognised state, with integral territory, clear border lines and working political institutions.

International recognition should be general (expressed by UN membership) and also particular (recognition by all EU member states). The questionable or incomplete integrity of a state is an obvious obstacle to its full and final international recognition. Consequently, by undermining the territorial integrity of several post-Soviet states, the current revanchist drive of Russian foreign policy has been able to hit two birds with one stone: it has prevented their further western rapprochement, on the one hand, and made the consolidation of their final status dependent on Russia, on the other. In the post-Soviet area the origins and the history of the individual ‘frozen conflict’ cases, as well as international attempts at their solutions, are different, but the political result is the same: unfinished and unrecognised international status. The side-effects are even more important: holding up the eastern expansion of Western-based organisations, principally EU and NATO, which have successfully penetrated into the Russian zone of security interests in the quarter of a century following the collapse of the former Soviet Union. At the same time, incomplete statehood would not be

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1Ukraine, Belarus, Moldavia, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan.
an obstacle to joining any ‘Eurasian’ initiative launched by Russia. Thanks to this situation, the international room for manoeuvre of several post-Soviet states has been reduced: they find themselves locked in a one-way street leading back to the Russian sphere of interest, while any further rapprochement to the West is prevented by their incomplete statehood.

The security aspects of ‘unfinished states’

Of the six countries framed by the EU’s Eastern Partnership programme, one single state is free of any grievances questioning its full and finished statehood, and would consequently be eligible for EU membership if it wanted it (but it doesn’t want it): Belarus. The other five European post-Soviet countries are, in some way, incomplete states blemished by problems of occupied or disputed territories. Such circumstances not only render their EU eligibility deficient, but represent serious security threats for Europe. It is at this point that traditional EU conditionality acquires a new and important security dimension.

In the Western Balkans, similar cases can also be identified, interconnecting the problems of statehood and security. From the statehood aspect – apart from the two countries pursuing EU accession negotiations, Serbia and Montenegro¹ – one more state could, as things stand, be considered eligible for EU membership: Albania. For different reasons, the other three countries are still in the ‘unfinished’ category.² However, compared to the post-Soviet area, an important difference exists in the Western Balkans: no single major power is competing with the EU for influence and control. Notwithstanding the serious efforts made, from a certain distance, by Russia and Turkey, in order to maintain – and possibly increase – their historical ties with this region: Russia in Serbia and Montenegro, and Turkey in countries and regions with an Ottoman past and Islamic traditions (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Albania, Kosovo and the western regions of Macedonia).

As we have pointed out, European integration has always had an important security dimension. In the beginning (1951-1972) it forged together six NATO states (and former enemies in the two World Wars) into a coherent

¹Montenegro started EU accession negotiations in 2012 and Serbia in 2014.
²For Macedonia the name of the state is still an open question, for Kosovo the full international recognition of the new state is missing including five EU member states, in Bosnia and Herzegovina the internal structure of a sovereign and independent state is incomplete.
organisation of economic and political cooperation in the industrialised centre of Western Europe. In a next phase (1973-2007), the EU extended its borders by accepting several new members, enlarging not only the European welfare zone, but also the region of peace, security and cooperation. The European centre attracted a growing external periphery, in the form of a neighbourhood with which the EU could partially share the benefits of economic well-being and security. In the current phase, not only has the expansion of the Western welfare and security zone stopped, but the positive process of cooperation has turned into a dangerous spiral of confrontations. Further EU enlargement has come near to its limits, alongside a new internal EU phenomenon, namely the UK’s exit process; the segmentation of the external European periphery has also begun. This segmentation can be analysed at the level of potential further EU enlargements and of association agreements with the EU.

As far as future enlargement is concerned, the camp of potential EU candidates has shrunk to a minimum. The three Western European states outside the EU are not willing to join the Union in the foreseeable future, for different reasons. This small group will probably be complemented by the UK soon (if Brexit is achieved). On the eastern side of the EU, three candidates are pursuing accession negotiations, but their outlook is, for the time being, less than encouraging. Apart from the aforementioned six eligible states, ten European countries remain as the final reserves for EU enlargement: four in the Western Balkans, and six in the direct eastern neighbourhood framed by the Eastern Partnership programme. As was pointed out above, only one country from each region could be considered as in a position to start accession talks, namely Albania and Belarus, but only one of the two shows the willingness to do so. This imbalance of EU enlargement perspectives is not the result of the EU applying the highly sophisticated technical norms of classical conditionality, but rather comes from attaching great importance to the additional precondition of the security aspects of unfinished statehood.

Two major neighbours with security risks: Russia and Turkey

On the outer edge of the potential EU enlargement sphere, two specific cases demonstrate the decreasing importance of technical conditionality and the growing influence of security considerations: Turkey and Russia. Their geographical locations between Europe and Asia are rather similar, but in the

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1 Switzerland, Norway and Iceland, not counting the mini states.
2 Serbia and Montenegro (see footnote 14 above) as well as Turkey since 2005.
past political considerations meant that Turkey (as a NATO member) was classified in the ‘Western European’ category, while Russia (and its predecessor, the Soviet Union) constituted the military adversary in ‘Eastern Europe’. In addition, Turkey applied for EU membership, while Russia tried to build up a special form of equal partnership with the EU. Turkey was among the first to acquire privileged association status in EU external relations (1963), later asserted with a customs union (1996), and started accession negotiations with the EU (2005), negotiations which have progressed at an extremely slow pace so far. For Russia there was a period with the prospect of a ‘quasi association’ with the EU after the dissolution of the former Soviet Union. The top objective of that process was the ‘four common spaces’. The idea emerged in 2003 and ‘road maps’ for its implementation were adopted by 2005. However, EU-Russia relations have seriously deteriorated since 2013 because of the conflict over Ukraine’s EU association, Russian intervention in the war of secession in eastern Ukraine, and finally the occupation of Crimea in 2014.

Seen from the EU angle, the common features in the Turkish and Russian cases have been a political distancing from Western Europe as a major economic and political partner and a parallel deviation from the European model as a modernisation objective. These trends represent serious security risks for Europe, too. Turkey used to be a strong believer in the European example of modernisation, but the ambiguous and increasingly reluctant attitude of the EU towards Turkish membership, influenced by several of its largest member states, helped President Erdoğan to achieve his anti-Western political turn in 2015. Russia and the EU did not find a common language, either. The EU side has not understood that for reasons of prestige Russia would never accept formally subordinated political status, even if the economic potentials of the two partners are tremendously different. Furthermore, increasing Russian revanchism, trying to restore as much as possible of the lost Soviet Union, has perceived the EU’s expansion – in the form of associations that float the uncertain promise of future membership – as a potential threat to its security interests.

As to the position of Brussels, the insistence on the classical requirements of EU conditionality and the neglect of grave security considerations has led to regrettable failures of EU diplomacy in its direct neighbourhood. Of course, not all the blame can be shifted onto the EU in this context, because internal developments in both countries – namely the anti-democratic power conceptions of Putin and Erdoğan – as well as changing external conditions have also played a decisive role. But the EU – as an international actor – was
not strong enough to preserve its attractiveness, which had previously guided relations with Turkey and Russia. With both big neighbours the spirit of mutual confidence was lost, and the real content of bilateral relations changed from rapprochement to growing conflict. One of the side-effects of this turn of events has been growing competition between the two countries and the EU in their common neighbourhood areas. Russia has achieved successful reversals in the foreign policy strategy of three Eastern Partnership countries, keeping them at a distance from closer EU relations in various ways.\(^1\) As a result, only three of the six ‘Eastern Partners’ – Ukraine, Moldavia and Georgia – intend to build closer relations with the EU (under their present governments) than with their real ‘eastern neighbour’, Russia. At the same time, Moscow has made efforts to revive its traditional political, economic and cultural ties within and beyond the borders of the former Soviet Union. Turkey maintains intensive relations in the Balkans, building on deep cultural roots from Ottoman times. Furthermore, in the South Caucasus region, it is connected to Azerbaijan by close linguistic proximity, as well as to all the Central Asian post-Soviet states by religious and cultural links, and to four of them linguistically, too.

The security importance of the two ‘big’ EU neighbours has been further increased by their direct involvement in the Syrian crisis. Despite some initial conflicts between Russia and Turkey in this region,\(^2\) they found common interests and embarked on a cooperation, with special regard to a new division of the zones of influence in Syria and Iraq (together with Iran and Saudi Arabia). Turkey has also demonstrated an interest in the consolidation of the Mediterranean region, where conditions have been altered by the ‘Arab Spring’ movements and several regime changes.

**Hard limits to EU’s ‘soft power’**

The above events and priority changes connected to classical EU normativity and conditionality shed new light on the concept of the EU as a ‘soft power’ operating mainly or exclusively with the use of non-military tools and methods. The ‘hard power’ arm of the EU has not progressed notably in the

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\(^1\) Belarus was a non-starter from the outset, opting for the closest relations with Russia. In the run-up to the planned signing of the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement, Vladimir Putin paid a visit to Azerbaijan (13 August 2013), which is balancing itself between Brussels and Moscow, based on its rich hydrocarbon resources and keeping in mind the future of Nagorno Karabakh. Putin also visited Armenia (3 September 2013) and diverted it from the idea of EU association, again playing the Nagorno Karabakh card.

\(^2\) The Turkish Air Force shot down a Sukhoi-24 Russian attack aircraft in Turkish airspace near to the Turkish-Syrian border on 24 November 2015.
past and its ‘common’ foreign policy only functions at the lowest inter-
governmental level of cooperation. The effects of the EU’s ‘soft power’ were
attributed to the attraction and influence of its economic strength, the vast
dimensions of the Single Market, its various aid programmes, the flow of
capital, technology and innovation from the European centre to the
peripheries, possibilities for a reverse flow of the workforce from the
peripheries to the centre, etc. However, there is firm evidence showing that
the Union’s ‘soft power’ does not exert general and world-wide influence
on all partners, and rather that its impact is limited in both space and time.
‘Soft power’ works mainly in the EU’s closer neighbourhood and has its
strongest effect in the pre-accession period. In particular, the perspective
and the promise of future EU membership, and all the benefits it includes,
motivated the European neighbours by ‘soft’ methods to accept and
implement the EU’s norms. But the reserves for further EU enlargement
have practically been exhausted, with the main obstacle no longer being the
insufficient technical preparedness of potential candidates, but rather their
lack of political will and/or the existence of hard security problems connected
with the criterion of ‘finished statehood’.

After the ‘big enlargement’ of 2004 and 2007, the external circumstances
of the EU’s use of conditionality based on ‘civilian’ methods have, as
demonstrated above, undergone important changes. Finished and recognised
statehood of candidate countries emerged as a fundamental component of
accession conditionality. From that particular aspect, EU enlargement has
reached its limits for the time being. On the basis of finished statehood, after
Serbia and Montenegro, only Albania could be accepted as a new EU member
in the Western Balkans. The other states need some more time to
consolidate their status. However, a joint rapprochement of Macedonia,
Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo to the EU, their inclusion into European
transport and energy networks, their regular invitation to some selected
Council bodies, etc., could contribute to the stabilisation of the security
situation in the Balkans. The states of the partly-failed Eastern Partnership
programme could also follow the Balkans along the same path, establishing
useful links not only with the EU, but also with Russia and other post-
Soviet countries. A guiding principle of all these relations should be the
strengthening of trust and security between the EU and its close neighbours.
In such agitated surroundings, mutual steps of this kind could lay the ground
for new initiatives that see the solution to a number of important ‘frozen
conflicts’ and ‘unfinished states’ as one to be gained through negotiation.
The final outcome on the distant horizon should be a new Helsinki-type
agreement – one that establishes the sovereign territories and border lines of
all post-Yugoslav and post-Soviet states on a permanent basis.

Hard security aspects have also come to the forefront in the EU’s neighbourhood. Two major conflict zones – Ukraine and Syria – are located near to the Union’s external borders, and their various consequences (e.g. migration) may directly affect the EU’s interests. The solution to Ukraine’s statehood problems needs the cooperation of Russia and the trans-Atlantic alliance that includes NATO and the EU. The complex and tangled conflict situation in Syria and Iraq cannot be solved without the active participation of both Russia and Turkey, either. In the above contexts the EU is no longer an influential player with its ‘soft power’: economic benefits and pure norms of human rights are no substitute for ‘hard’ tools. Beyond the limited zone of credible hopes for future EU membership, and the EU’s direct neighbourhood in general, its classical conditionality brings only suboptimal effects; the methods of permanent structured cooperation (PESCO) could, however, bring new perspectives (Fiott, Missirolli and Tardy, 2017).

Internal non-compliance as a new threat to the security of Europe

Not only has the external enlargement of the EU reached its temporary limits, but the internal deepening and widening of the integration system has stumbled on novel obstacles, too. The ‘deepening’ dimension is understood to be the strengthening of EU competences and the extension of their field of application. ‘Widening’ means the inclusion of new sectors into the integrated governance system. Member countries along the EU’s internal peripheries (e.g. the United Kingdom, Poland, Hungary) have been raising objections to both directions of the extension of the scope of EU governance, arguing that this is to the detriment of their ‘national sovereignty’. Anti-EU voices using such arguments have strengthened within several other member states, too, claiming the need for more independence and opposing particular aspects of integration (the euro, common border surveillance, etc.). Such forces can be loud in opposition but have no direct impact on a country’s governance. However, if anti-integrationist political parties are in government, they may exert influence on EU decisions, too. Evidence has been provided by the examples of the Greek Siriza, the Hungarian Fidesz or the Polish PiS parties. Other far-right political parties have recently appeared in government coalitions, e.g. the United Patriots in Bulgaria or the FPÖ in Austria. (Let us add that Bulgaria then Austria hold the EU Council Presidency in 2018.)

Brexit is another testimony to the EU’s loosening internal cohesion. It seems
unlikely that other EU member states will follow the British example: the negative consequences of leaving the EU have become more and more visible as EU-UK negotiations about their future relationship have unfolded. However, internal resistance to common action and hidden or open non-compliance with EU norms has appeared as a new phenomenon in EU practice. The EU, as a voluntary club of cooperating states, is not equipped to handle this kind of non-cooperative behaviour. Article 7 TEU has been invoked against Poland; the pre-Article 7 procedure was also suggested by the European Parliament in the case of Hungary. But there are several obstacles in the way of the application of real sanctions based on Article 7 TEU, beginning with the possibility of any member state using its veto in the Council when discussing a “serious breach of EU values”. Even if this procedure could achieve its original objective – which is not likely – it could easily become brutally counterproductive: a non-compliant member state’s government could point to EU sanctions as further proof justifying its anti-EU position. There is no way to break out of this vicious circle under the present bona fide legislation that is based on friendly negotiations and not on any intention of increasing the conflict level within the EU.

The above situation has serious security consequences, because internal conflicts expose the EU system to destructive external intervention. Anti-EU forces in opposition or in government in EU member states are easy targets for external powers which are interested in weakening the European system of joint governance and loosening its internal cohesion. The ‘decline of the West’ is a cornerstone of Russia’s current foreign policy doctrine (Nixey, 2015, 33-39). Extremist political forces in the EU maintain close and friendly contacts with Moscow and enjoy its support in various forms (Front National in France, AfD in Germany, the Siriza government in Greece, the Fidesz government in Hungary, etc.). Close relations between extremist political parties and governments and external anti-EU forces open a security door for the penetration of subversive actions into the EU’s field of action. Russia’s ‘hybrid war’ is one such danger (Galeotti, 2015, 156-164).

**Conclusions**

The EU’s successful expansion was for a long period possible without applying or referring to military power and by using ‘soft’, ‘civilian’ methods. However, after the end of the bipolar system, hard security considerations and risks emerged on all sides. In the current phase, not only has the expansion of the Western welfare and security zone come to a halt, but the
emerging positive process of cooperation, based on Western democratic norms, has turned into a dangerous spiral of confrontation. Internal resistance to common action by some member states – and the hidden or open non-compliance with EU norms – has appeared in EU practice as a new phenomenon that also brings serious security risks.

The rapid parallel growth and further enlargement plans of the EU and NATO have awakened Russia’s dormant security reflexes. Article 49 TEU stipulates that “any European state” may apply to become a member of the European Union. The interpretation and the concrete geographical scope of the adjective ‘European’ was once a serious topic for discussion, but in recent times the second part of the term – ‘state’ – has become the more controversial condition of EU accession.

In the post-Soviet and post-Yugoslav areas, finished statehood, including in some cases the territorial integrity of a state, represents a hard precondition for the development of international relations including EU association and membership. Disputed border lines, occupied or secession territories prevent the further Western rapprochement of several states and make the consolidation of their final status dependent on Russia. At the same time, incomplete statehood would be no obstacle to joining any ‘Eurasian’ initiative launched by Russia. In this fashion, in the post-Soviet area, states with an ‘unfinished’ status are locked into a one-way street leading back to the Russian sphere of interest, while any further rapprochement with the West is prevented by their incomplete statehood.

On the basis of the ‘finished state’ criterion, the circle of potential EU candidates has shrunk to a minimum. Apart from the three candidates currently conducting accession negotiations (Turkey, Serbia, Montenegro), only Albania could be considered as an immediate starter. A priority change in EU normativity and conditionality, elevating hard security considerations to a pre-eminent position and replacing classical technicalities, is shedding new light on the concept of the EU as a ‘soft power’. Putting into practice the methods of permanent structured cooperation, the EU could strengthen its hard security arm by ‘escaping forwards’.

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DEFINING AND ANALYZING ENERGY SECURITY IN CENTRAL EUROPE AND THE EU NEIGHBORHOOD

Andrej Nosko

Definitions and theoretical debates

In the absence of a universally accepted definition, energy security is usually defined in multiple ways, reflecting the different theoretical approaches to security. These varying definitions have profound implications on understanding the issues at hand, the political urgency that is conferred to securing energy systems and the resulting implications on policy choices. Analysis of energy security or policy advice on securing energy systems should always start with a clear definition of energy security that is relevant in the given context. Recognizing that understanding the different approaches to defining energy security is an important precondition for sound analysis of energy security and understanding differences in policy approaches observed, one needs to understand the choices, trade-offs and their implications in devising their definition of energy security.

Both throughout the history, as well as in different geographical locations, the understanding of what energy security is and what it includes has changed. A generic understanding of energy security as “low vulnerability of vital energy systems,” proposed by Cherp and Jewell (Cherp and Jewell 2011) explicitly leaves the choices of both (1) delineating what is included in the vital energy system(s) and how the (2) vulnerabilities of this/these system(s) are defined and identified open. These methodological choices have profound implications on the analytical conclusions and policy options available. As one can see from the historical developments, the differences between the understandings and approaches to energy security have consisted mainly in the level of specificity of the energy system, (i.e. whether it should include specific energy assets, a large part of, or even the whole economy), range and types of vulnerabilities considered - from unexpected disruptions (the answer to which is increasing resilience), naturally occurring events (the response to which requires increased robustness) or to more encompassing aspects such as implications of the vulnerabilities of the energy system on national sovereignty through the intentions of hostile actors, or on the welfare of citizens through the type and efficiency of regulation, and energy market
conditions and developments.

Once the definition of energy security is elaborated, it needs to be operationalized and indicators for measuring it need to be devised. One common problem that researchers need to be aware of is that understanding energy security often involves not only a material quality, but it also has social construct attributes as it consists of perceptions, and thus needs to be studied and measured as such.

**Historical developments of theoretical debates**

Similarly to the understanding of security, theoretical understanding of energy security has developed over time. The literature on energy security has followed non-academic interest in energy security and particularly in the transatlantic scholarly domain it has emerged in what one can discern as waves. The first wave followed the oil crisis in 1973-1974. The second wave followed the end of the Cold War, when many countries, mainly Central and East European, underwent transitions with the ensuing realignment of their foreign policy and economic transformation. Not only particularly central European countries went through the change of relations with post-Soviet Russia as their most important energy supplier, but they also implemented deep economic transformation and integration into Trans-Atlantic and west-European political and economic structures. These two waves also represent a move from traditional understanding of energy security. From restricted understanding of the energy system and the range of vulnerabilities against which to secure it, the understanding widened and became more inclusive and expansive, reflecting a much wider range of vulnerabilities including the changes in trade patterns.

The narrow understanding of energy systems and the understanding of security of energy resources stemming from it has traditionally been studied in relation to the ability of states to fuel their economies, in order to sustain their armies in case of military aggression. (Sen 1984; Schultze 1972, esp. pp. 522-529; Walt 1991, 221–39) While this aspect is relevant event today for at least one European country, Ukraine, that has it territory occupied by its neighbour and an important energy supplier, for a majority of countries in Europe this has been a far-fetched and an unlikely eventuality that only a few, if any, had specifically calculated and prepared for, thus opening the doors for a wider understanding of energy security.
Even the volume edited by the prominent American economist of the Cold War era, Raymond Vernon, in 1976, (Vernon 1976) as well as the report of Harvard’s energy and security research project edited by the two prominent political scientists, David Deese and Joseph Nye, five years later, (Deese and Nye 1981), see also (Lovins and Lovins 1982) were stimulated more by the developments on the international energy market rather than the Cold War itself.

While Vernon’s volume focused mainly on the interpretation and reflections of the oil crisis, given that oil at the time was seen as the most important fuel in terms of geostrategic considerations, the Deese and Nye report went deeper into the issue of energy security. The authors observed that “the relationships between energy, economic growth and national security are complex” (Deese and Nye 1981) and Nye explicitly framed “energy as a security problem.” (Nye 1981) It was already then that the authors noted the tensions between stating that energy is a security problem, and reflections of specific policies on this observation, as well as the complexity of “devising a strategy and thinking of energy as a security problem.” (Deese and Nye 1981, 6) The Deese and Nye volume focused mainly on the position of major economies (referred to as “key nations”), the precarious situation of Central and Eastern European countries vis-à-vis their main energy supplier - Soviet Union was referred to as “energy squeeze” (Goldman 1981, 113).

When it came to operationalizing energy security Deese provided five indicators for energy security: “degree of dependence on foreign sources of energy […] diversification of oil import sources […] distribution of primary energy sources […] distribution of final uses of energy.” The struggle with the role of government in securing energy is seen in Deese’s fifth indicator which he sees in “differences in government energy policies” operationalized as the “degree of government intervention in energy markets.” (Deese and Miller 1981) Given that government interventions in energy markets is one of the main tools for energy security policy, influencing the other four energy security indicators, this last indicator is self-referencing, and its inclusion conflates Deese’s otherwise helpful classification.

The understanding of energy security in the first wave of literature can be summarized using Deese and Nye’s words as a desire to have foreign policy “molded together [with energy policy] into an effective strategy of energy security” and responding to “three basic threats: the physical disruption of oil supplies, economic and political damage from rapid increases in oil prices, and the foreign policy consequences of […] energy vulnerability.” (Deese,
This view of energy security was a clear example of understanding the role of energy as an issue of “hard security.” Nonetheless even these authors recognized that hard energy security is more of a wish and appeal of students of international relations than observed reality. They recognized that the United States considered, and proclaimed energy as a security issue for three decades, “in reality, however American policies have tended to address price and economic effects more than energy security.” (Deese, Alm, and Nye 1981, 392)

This is in line with many other observations that governments in reality prioritize different policy aims rather than security. Even if studies analyzing changes in levels of security over time are rare, the few existing panel and timeline comparisons of energy security indices demonstrate that countries, regardless of their geopolitical importance, or economic power, over time rarely improve their energy security. (Sovacool and Brown 2010, 388) From the perspective of realism in international relations, which expects that protection of national sovereignty and increasing of national security would take on priority it is especially puzzling.

According to Sovacool and Brown’s study (Sovacool and Brown 2010, 388), between 1970 and 2007 out of almost three dozen OECD countries only Switzerland, Belgium, Japan and the United Kingdom improved their energy security. (Sovacool and Brown 2010, 388) It can be further argued whether this improvement is a result of conscious policy choice (as one could perhaps argue for Japan), or a coincidence of developments outside government policies (as it could be argued for Belgium and the United Kingdom).

As Sovacool and Brown point out in a larger panel study, (Sovacool and Brown 2010, 388) few countries act upon observed energy insecurity. This is also confirmed by my own observations in Central and Eastern Europe. (Nosko 2013) Hence the prioritization of energy security is not a function of insecurity, neither of effects of the international system and structure but rather a consequence of the interplay of domestic factors and internal politics. (Nosko 2013)

The tension between the expectations that governments ought to prioritize energy security and observed reality that other policy aims are prioritized calls for re-conceptualization of energy security to include the latter. This gradual “widening” of the concept can be seen in the second wave of the literature on
energy security.

The second wave of energy security literature followed the demise of the Soviet Union and the realignment after the end of the Cold War. In one way this has been history replayed, as CEE countries were shielded from the effects of the energy crisis in the seventies, as they received undisturbed amounts of energy at below world market prices. (Goldman 1981, 115) Similarly Ukraine and other countries of the former Soviet Union when they chose a more independent foreign policy from Russia, this policy choice triggered effectively a similar energy transition that CEE countries went through in the early nineties.

In the second wave we witness two streams of literature – one attempting to maintain the intellectual rigour of the energy security concept by maintaining the narrow understanding of energy as a hard security issue, and a second broader approach attempting to include all those aspects which in fact are prioritized by governments, under the label of energy security.

The Jan Kalicki and David Goldwyn volume (Kalicki and Goldwyn 2005) followed the path set by the first wave, confirming the dominance of oil, even if recognizing emerging alternative energy sources. The core question of their volume, following the wish for coordination between foreign policy and energy security, is how energy can be used to further foreign policy goals. They address two of the related aspects – “how best to conduct relations with established producers [...] to ensure oil market stability and security of supply. [...] the second is how to develop non-OPEC resources and to ensure that their production also reaches the international market place.” (Kalicki and Goldwyn 2005) This question is very relevant not only for CEE countries but especially for countries that used to be part of the Soviet Union and want to regain their sovereignty and emancipate their foreign and economic policies from Russia. Whether in the form of their dependence on imports of energy sources from Russia, such as Ukraine, Armenia and Georgia, or in form of independent access to energy markets for their own supplies such as Turkmenistan or Azerbaijan.

History seems to be repeating itself, 24 years after the Deese-Nye volume, Kalicki and Goldwin also observe that, “domestically, the United States has a persistently short attention span when it comes to energy security. It focuses on conservation and stability of supply when gasoline prices are high, in times of war, or when it suffers a disruption in supply from a major producer. Once a war ends, prices drop, electric power is restored, or production resumes,
attention fades.” (Kalicki and Goldwyn 2005, 6) In 2008, the Czech Ambassador for Energy Security, Václav Bartuška, provided this lapidary remark on the lack of interest in energy security without a state of emergency: “Europe needs a week-long energy blackout. Not five-hour, a week-long. So that the meat would walk out of the freezer. Because a week-long blackout starts to erase civilization.”

Kalicki and Goldwyn also observe the complexity that energy security trade-offs, especially domestically, present: “the trade-offs between energy security and national security, energy and the environment and energy and economic security are hard – and the politics of change is formidable.” (Kalicki and Goldwyn 2005, 6) The authors further analyze the structure of challenges to energy security policies in the US, including the division following regional rather than partisan lines or the “bipartisan failure to achieve basic changes” after this analysis the authors arrive at the rather surprising conclusion that “the challenge of achieving domestic reform is formidable and makes the need for a new foreign policy approach more urgent.” (Kalicki and Goldwyn 2005, 7)

The definition of energy security proposed in the Kalicki and Goldwyn volume is the “provision of affordable, reliable, diverse and ample supplies of oil and gas (and their future equivalents) – to the United States, its allies, and its partners – and adequate infrastructure to deliver these supplies to market.” (Kalicki and Goldwyn 2005, 9) Components of this definition recur in most energy security definitions. Similarly to other “comprehensive” definitions, for Kalicki and Goldwyn “affordable energy means the ability to buy supply at relatively stable, as well as reasonable prices”; they even quote a median range of $18-$22 per barrel of oil, but emphasize the importance of volatility of prices, rather than their level.

Kalicki and Goldwyn’s overall energy security definition nevertheless runs the same problem of complexity and context specificity: “A reliable energy supply means predictable supplies that are less and less vulnerable to disruption.” While they recognize that “energy security also means more than oil security – it means security of supplies for natural gas” they see this mainly in “the ability to insulate the global economy from the effects of extreme vulnerability.” Their conclusive definition notes that “energy security is an important goal in its own right, but it becomes critical when viewed against the broader canvas of foreign policy and economic development.” (Kalicki and Goldwyn 2005, 14) While trying to account for the observed divergences of priorities and attempting to maintain the
conceptual rigour Kalicki and Goldwyn remain trapped in between the hard security view of energy security as an aim in its own right and its broader implications for other policies, but they do not provide a compass to help navigate from this conundrum.

The widening approach to energy security divides the subject into different “dimensions,” and responses to the globalization of energy trade. As also Harris notes, interconnection in energy development, supply, and use, throughout the world “renders obsolete the traditional energy policy approaches directed towards national autonomy and control”. As another dimension of this explanation, she points out that national markets are increasingly integrating with global markets (Harris 2001, 272).

Alhajjii also joins the wider understanding when he refers to “economic, environmental, social, foreign policy, technical and security” dimensions of energy security. (Alhajji 2008) Von Hippel et al. identify “energy supply, economic, technological, environmental, social-cultural and military-security” dimensions for which they also provide a laundry-list of energy security policy issues, and complementary energy security strategies, measures/attributes and their interpretation of them (von Hippel et al. 2011, 6726). While energy security is let in through the conceptual open door into virtually any policy area, the conceptual questions of methodological rigour and analytical utility of the given definition remain.

Sovacool and Kruyt et al, both distinguished four dimensions of energy security that relate to the “availability, accessibility, affordability and acceptability of energy.” (Kruyt et al. 2009; Sovacool 2011, 6) Elsewhere Sovacool and Mukherjee offer five different dimensions of “availability, affordability, technology development and efficiency, environmental and social sustainability, and regulation and governance.” (Sovacool and Mukherjee 2011) Widening of the understanding of energy security provides also the challenge of sufficiently rigorous conceptualization which would enable quantification of energy security, or at least a proxy measurement. Kruyt et al. (Kruyt et al. 2009) provided a comprehensive review of the attempts to quantify these concepts, (Jansen, Van Arkel, and Boots 2004; Scheepers et al., n.d.; de Jong et al. 2006; Bollen 2008) but they only attest to the great diversity in approaches and understanding.

With the advent of wideners in energy security, energy security attracted also the attention of students of critical security. Chester points to the ‘polysemic nature’ of energy security, (Chester 2010) and the context-specificity of
energy security has been acknowledged also by Yergin (Yergin 2006) and Kruyt et al. (Kruyt et al. 2009) Ciută provides a critique of the academic practice of energy security pointing out the tension between the requirement of homogeneity of security and the observed multiplicity of energy policy priorities.

When the observed diverse objectives of energy policy are forced under the conceptual umbrella of security, they destabilize the security aspect of the definition: As Ciută points out

“no easy fit can be found between energy and existing security theories, precisely because the attempt to find such a fit destabilizes the conceptual scaffolding of these theories. […] the apparent fit between energy and the traditional approach to security undermines terminally the first principle of this approach, namely, the strict boundaries of the concept and practice of security. Energy security is formulated in patterns that contain jagged fragments and distorted residues of the elements thought essential to many different definitions of security – either survival and existential threats, or emancipation, exception, and distinctions between friend and foe. As a consequence, energy displaces, reshapes and remodulates the definitions of security embedded in these theoretical approaches. […] In other words, energy apparently confirms that ‘security’ may still have power but does not need to have an obvious meaning. Security is not present in ‘energy security’ in order to explicate what is security-ish about energy, but as a result of a reflex that only seems to confirm both its power and its meaninglessness. Even the absence of conceptual debate on energy security could confirm this inflationary tendency. We may simply not care anymore whether energy is really a security issue, or whether it is wise to put it on the security agenda. Theoretically speaking, the totality of energy may make security total, but not before it makes it banal, a redundant empty signifier.” (Ciută 2010)

This critique of a widening approach to energy security is important, as it uncovers the problematic approach to the study of energy security. Authors in the search for understanding the variation of importance given to energy security among various countries in their energy policies rather refitted the definitions, to fit the empirical observations. In the absence of observed behaviour of governments pursuing narrow energy security, authors, instead of finding reasons for this discrepancy and variation, pursued the road of changing and widening the definition of energy security to fit the empirical observations.
This has resulted in the case of almost every author, and sometimes in each of their publications, (Sovacool 2011, 3) proposing a new definition and redefinition of what energy security is and what it should be. Subsequently this has led to almost four dozen mainstream definitions available in the literature on energy security. (Sovacool 2011, 3ff) A literature review on definitions of energy security thus resembles compiling a phone book. Most of the four dozen definitions can be classified around logics, (Ciută 2010; Sovacool 2011, 6ff) policies, or perspectives (Cherp and Jewell 2011) around which they revolve, or underlying values they represent. (Sovacool and Mukherjee 2011) Different “logics” offered to date to explain energy security include “scientific”, “economic”, “ecological”, “social welfare”, and “political”, others include “logic of war, a logic of subsistence and a ‘total’ security logic,” (Ciută 2010) but these logics only represent different analytical perspectives, and further illustrate problems with the widening approach.

Updating or extending the list compiled by Sovacool, (Sovacool 2011, 3–6) is possible – as demonstrated by Tvaronavičienė, (Tvaronavičienė 2012) - but this might contribute little to our understanding of the matter. Tvaronavičienė also reached the same conclusion that “there is still no unanimous agreement how energy security can be defined and the discussion is ongoing.” She further added that the notion of “energy security” is indefinable universally, as it is in principle context-sensitive perception,” and concluded that the various energy policy targets contradict each other. (Tvaronavičienė 2012)

**Energy Security definition for the EU and its neighbourhood?**

As the review of the literature on energy security and commonly used definitions demonstrates, the literature on energy security focuses on various aspects of energy policy and security, but is of limited utility in understanding the reasons why prioritization of energy security in energy policies varies across countries and over time. I have argued that security is neither the main aim of energy policy, nor the single driving force of energy policy (re)prioritization. (Nosko 2013) Conflating energy policy with security has minimal analytical value. Energy policy consists of other policy goals, the bundling of which under the label of security is neither desirable nor analytically useful. Additionally, as empirically observed, other policy goals frequently take priority over security, and therefore the privileged position of energy security in the academic discourse does not reflect the policy need or attention that it receives with policymakers in reality.
This is not to say that security is absent from the policy prioritization, or that it is not among policy aims, or that it cannot somehow be claimed to be delivered through pursuing other policy aims. It is rather to say that security is one among several policy aims, and it is additionally used as a vehicle, signifier supporting and emphasizing argument, to further advance other policy priorities and interests. As Andrews points out, states are involved in the energy sector for various reasons with energy security, being the most voiced “policy driver, of great rhetorical and practical importance.” (Andrews 2005) Energy policy therefore is not only about security, it is about other policy aims such as welfare, competitiveness, efficiency, environment and general industrial policy as well. For analysts it important to understand both the position of energy security within the energy policy, but also the policy priorities afforded to both energy policy as well as energy security. Therefore, a more appropriate analytical approach is to analyze prioritization of specific security aspects in the complex energy policy system. This approach enables us to understand and explain different prioritizations of energy security throughout the studied period, as well as the inter-temporal and interspatial variation across the cases. This approach also enables us to understand whether and how countries in fact coped with their structural position and energy import dependence and what were the driving factors influencing different energy security policy choices that are used to tackle the problems stemming from this structural position. The contextual understanding also allows analysts to issue more actionable and feasible policy recommendations that would have greater likelihood to be successfully implemented.

REFERENCES


TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME (EU EXTERNALIZATION OF FREEDOM, SECURITY AND JUSTICE IN EASTERN NEIGHBOURHOOD COUNTRIES)

Yuliya Zabyelina

Introduction

The growing number of non-state actors in the international system has been one of the major features of international relations since the second half of the 20th century. The traditional actors in international affairs consisting purely of sovereign states have been expanded to accommodate non-state actors. In such a diverse international arena, states have become confronted with “sovereignty-free actors” (Rosenau 1990, 36), including not only those of the “upperworld” that largely preserve the causes of peace (e.g., international non-governmental organizations and multinational corporations) but also criminal actors, seeking enrichment through illicit means. Some of these criminal actors have managed to coordinate across national borders, often forming transnational organized crime (TOC) groups and establishing a presence in more than one country to plan and execute illegal business ventures.

The United Nations Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Branch first coined the term “transnational organized crime” in 1975 in an attempt to identify criminal acts that transcended national boundaries, transgressed national legislations and had an impact on another state. Since then, TOC has been widely used as an “umbrella term” (von Lampe 2004, 108), an “ambiguous catchphrase” (Paoli and Fijnaut 2004, 41) to refer to a super-set or grouping of related sub-categories of concepts representing various illicit cross-border activities, such as piracy, drug trafficking, trafficking in persons, smuggling of migrants, arms trafficking, and counterfeiting, among other relevant criminal cross-border activities. Because TOC refers to a multiplicity of criminal activities and may be applicable to a range of criminal groupings and organizations, definitions of the term typically tend to be general and all-inclusive.
Efforts to arrive at an internationally agreed definition of TOC were made under the auspices of the Naples Political Declaration and Global Plan of Action against Transnational Organized Crime at the World Ministerial Conference in 1994. At that meeting, 140 states committed themselves to joining forces against TOC. It took the international community five more years to reach an agreement over a common definition of TOC. The outcomes of the G8 meeting in September 2000 laid the foundations for the proceedings of the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (UNTOC) that adopted the first internationally recognized definition of the concept. As of today, the UNTOC definition of TOC has been accepted almost universally with 189 States Parties.

According to UNTOC, TOC refers to offences that are transnational in nature and involve an organized criminal group. An organized criminal group applies to “a structured group of three or more persons, existing for a period of time and acting in concert with the aim of committing one or more serious crimes or offences established in accordance with this Convention, in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit” (UNTOC, Art. 2a). A criminal activity is “transnational” when:

a) it is committed in more than one State;
b) it is committed in one State but a substantial part of its preparation, planning, direction or control takes place in another State;
c) it is committed in one State but involves an organized criminal group that engages in criminal activities in more than one State; or
d) it is committed in one State but has substantial effects in another State

(UNTOC, Art. 3, Par. 2).

This chapter reviews the existing anti-TOC legislation in the European Union (EU) and examines the externalization of the EU’s counter-organized crime approach to Eastern Neighbourhood countries. The sections that follow below include a legal analysis of the criminalization of TOC in EU legislation, description of the EU’s externalization models in the realm of justice and criminal matters to candidate countries and European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) countries, placing emphasis on Ukraine’s reforms in this sector following the “Orange Revolution” and “Euromaidan” movements (2014-2015).
Criminalization of Transnational Organized Crime in the EU

While previously playing a minor role compared with other policies of the EU, it has been since the mid-1990s that European criminal justices policies have become focused on developing a more efficient response to transnational organized crime. Since then, this problem has been dealt with on an EU-wide level and relied heavily on EU institutions. The EU strategies against organized crime were developed as part of the European Council programmes adopted at Tampere (1999-2004), The Hague (2005-2009), Stockholm (2010-2014), and Ypres/Brussels (2015-2020). The legal basis for the EU counter-organized crime policy also developed through several EU treaties.

At the meeting in Tampere in 1999, it was recognized that in order to create “a union of freedom, security and justice,” EU citizens had the right to expect the EU to protect them from serious crime. A joint police force (Europol) and integrated judicial resources (Eurojust) were discussed as priorities to achieve this goal. Europol was established in the Maastricht Treaty (formally the Treaty of the European Union (TEU)) of February 7, 1992, as a response to the growing problem of drug trafficking. Its first manifestation of joint work started in the form of the Europol Drugs Unit (EDU) in January 1994. Since then, Europol has occupied a central position in the European security architecture, offering a unique range of expertise, including support for law enforcement operations on the ground and collecting, analysing and disseminating information and intelligence, among other vital tasks. During approximately the same time period, Portugal, France, Sweden and Belgium took the initiative in creating a provisional judicial cooperation unit, Pro-Eurojust, which started from the Council building in Brussels in 2001. Since 2003, Eurojust—a permanent judicial agency responsible for supporting and strengthening coordination and cooperation between national investigating and prosecuting authorities in relation to serious crime—has grown tremendously by incorporating new EU members states in its permanent location in the Hague.

The Amsterdam Treaty (1997) provided a legal ground for alignment and further harmonization of criminal law in the EU member states, including legislations on organized crime. On the basis of the “third pillar,” Justice and Home Affairs (JHA), established by the Maastricht Treaty, further common

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1The reference is made to the older version of the document implemented by the Treaty of Maastricht (1992) which was replaced by the current version of the TEU entered into force in 2009, following the Treaty of Lisbon (2007).
action in the areas of terrorism, organized crime, counterfeiting, drug-related offences, money laundering, trafficking in persons, and similar offences of serious gravity, was developed. Importantly, the Framework Decision (FD) 2008/841/JHA of October 24, 2008, on the fight against organized crime was released, replacing the 1998 Joint Action. The highlight of this FD is that it builds on UNTOC, allowing for a “double model” of criminalising organized crime and accounting for various legal traditions. In light of this approach, EU member states are given the possibility of criminalizing participation in an organized criminal group either on the basis of an agreement/conspiracy conventional adopted by common law jurisdictions or as an offence based on criminal association preferred in civil law jurisdictions. This dual approach is reflected in UNTOC in Art. 5(1)(a)(i) (the agreement-type offence) and article 5(1)(a)(ii) (the criminal association offence), respectively—an international treaty signed and ratified by all EU members states.

### Article 5 of the Organized Crime Convention (Criminalization of participation in an organized criminal group)

1. Each State Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to establish as criminal offences, when committed intentionally:

(a) Either or both of the following as criminal offences distinct from those involving the attempt or completion of the criminal activity:

(i) Agreeing with one or more other persons to commit a serious crime for a purpose relating directly or indirectly to the obtaining of a financial or other material benefit and, where required by domestic law, involving an act undertaken by one of the participants in furtherance of the agreement or involving an organized criminal group;

(ii) Conduct by a person who, with knowledge of either the aim and general criminal activity of an organized criminal group or its intention to commit the crimes in question, takes an active part in: a. Criminal activities of the organized criminal group; b. Other activities of the organized criminal group in the knowledge that his or her participation will contribute to the achievement of the above-described criminal aim;

(b) Organizing, directing, aiding, abetting, facilitating or counselling the commission of serious crime involving an organized criminal group.

2. The knowledge, intent, aim, purpose or agreement referred to in paragraph 1 of this article may be inferred from objective factual circumstances.
The Hague Programme (2005-2009) further prioritized the exchange of information about criminal prosecutions among EU member states and mutual recognition of penal-judicial decisions across the EU. It focused on strengthening investigations relating to organized crime by encouraging the use of joint investigation teams (JITs) and speeding up the obtaining of evidence by means of the European Evidence Warrant, and creating a European witness protection programme. Among other priorities set in the Strategic Concept on Tackling Organised Crime (2005), the Council asked the EU institutions and bodies involved in the prevention of and fight against crime to enhance the legal framework for the freezing and confiscation of criminal proceeds by further developing financial investigation skills and developing adequate information exchange by financial intelligence units (FIUs).

The next milestone in the EU response to organized crime, the Treaty of Lisbon (2009), introduced a “new era” for cooperation in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ), reaffirmed by the Stockholm Programme (2010-2014). The Lisbon Treaty abolished the pillar structure but left serious and organized crime to be perceived as a severe threat to EU security. Organized crime and other AFSJ-related security threats (e.g., terrorism) were addressed in Title V of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), setting out the scope of the EU’s authority to legislate in this domain. Art. 83(1) of the TFEU provides the legal basis for establishing minimum rules for the definition of criminal offences and sanctions in the areas of organized crime with a cross-border dimension. More specifically, it lists offences that should be considered as “serious crime with a cross-border dimension,” such as “terrorism, trafficking in human beings and sexual exploitation of women and children, illicit drug trafficking, illicit arms trafficking, money laundering, corruption, counterfeiting of means of payment, computer crime and organised crime” (TFEU, Art. 83 (1)).

Importantly, following the Treaty of Lisbon, Europol’s mission was reinforced with the focus on collecting, sorting, processing, analysing and exchanging information and findings (intelligence) to support the responsible authority in the Member States (Hecker 2016). Although Europol has no independent executive or investigatory power set in Art. 88(III) TFEU that authorizes the organization to take operational measures only in connection and consultation of the authority of the affected Member State, the European Parliament and the Council in Regulation (2016/794) reinforced Europol’s response in efforts against terrorism, cybercrime, and other serious and organized forms of crime. More specifically, the Regulation (2016) calls for Europol to “evolve and become a hub for information exchange between the law enforcement
authorities of the Member States, a service provider and a platform for law enforcement services.”

Following the Treaty of Lisbon, the Stockholm Programme developments touched upon areas of homeland and public security, migration, and organized crime. They also brought some expansion of Europol and Eurojust, including the establishing of interoperability of police databases, advanced satellite surveillance, usage of the military against immigration, police intervention outside of EU territory, and intensified cooperation across borders, including non-EU countries. The programme, much more than its predecessors, illustrates a shift towards comprehensive approaches to security, such as by merging internal and external security strategies and cooperation. In particular, the Programme states:

Europol should work more closely with Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) police missions and help promote standards and good practice for European law enforcement cooperation in countries outside the Union. Cooperation with Interpol should be stepped up with a view to creating synergies and avoiding duplication. …Pilot projects in cross-border regional cooperation dealing with joint operational activities and/or cross-border risk assessments, such as Joint Police and Customs Centres, should be promoted by the Union, inter alia, through financing programmes.

The EU has contributed and drawn from collaboration with the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), Council of Europe, the G8 (reformed as G7 in 2014 due to Russia’s suspension) and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), which are some of the key organizations addressing transnational organized crime. The EU cooperates with other international organizations and takes coordinated action in the global efforts against organized crime: International Narcotics Control Board (INCB); World Health Organization (WHO); Council of Europe and World Customs Organization (WCO). Related to the EU’s work in the area of organized crime responses is the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Training (CEPOL), the European Police Chiefs Task Force (EPCTF) and Frontex, all of which have been created to address some of the existing and future security challenges.

Post-Stockholm approaches to European Security, including the EU anti-TOC policy, have maintained a strong externalization component. Importantly, the EU has sought to promote its norms and approaches in the
AFSJ area abroad. For instance, the EU has acted as an important player in providing legal advice and training expertise along with funding for counter-organized crime projects in the Western Balkans, Eastern Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) countries and the Mediterranean region. The success or failure of these externalization processes is hard to access. There exists a diverse body of literature on the topic (e.g., Knodt and Princen 2003; Kaunert 2009; Kaunert and Léonard 2011; Wolff, Wichmann and Mounier 2009; Monar 2014). Some scholars argue that the approach to and impact of externalization policies of the EU are shaped by the EU’s internal modes of governance (“institutionalist explanation”). They claim that the higher degree of Europeanization or the so-called “political cohesion” in a given policy area leads to a higher degree of the EU’s ability to externalize its policy preferences (Lavenex and Schimmelfennig 2009). Other scholars suggest that the degree of similarity between the EU and target countries has an impact on the success of the externalization process. The more the domestic structures and those of target countries resemble each other, the more likely a successful externalization is to be achieved. In contrast to these institutionalist approaches, an alternative explanation with the focus on power relations suggests that the resources that the EU holds vis-à-vis target countries and other “governance providers” (e.g., United States, United Nations, etc.) impact the success of the externalization process. In this view, the success of the EU’s externalization projects is contingent upon target countries’ dependence on the EU rather than alternative governance providers. Finally, the ability of the EU to ensure target country compliance with its own rules and policy preferences through a membership incentive has been viewed as another explanatory factor of the EU’s externalization success. This approach is often referred to as “governance by conditionality,” whereby the EU is argued to most successfully externalize its policies when they constitute a condition for countries to become EU Member States (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2004).

EU’s External Action in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ)

The EU’s external action in the AFSJ realm has been often merged with the EU’s foreign policy and developmental agendas. In responding to terrorist and organized crime threats, the EU has demonstrated cross-fertilization between the EU Justice and Home Affairs and its foreign policy tools, including military and civilian Common Security and Development Policy (CSDP) missions, capacity building in support of security sector reform
(SSR) and development, and technical assistance and training programmes (Pawlak 2009).

Despite the fact that all the EU’s external initiatives are built on EU-wide principles and standards, the format of the EU’s external action has been quite different across states. For instance, the EU’s externalization projects in the formal pre-accession format wield a somewhat coercive power to comply with the EU law towards candidate countries. This top-down (vertical) approach has received limited applicability outside of the EU’s official candidate countries. In the countries of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), the EU has traditionally adopted a capacity-building approach that incorporates legal advice, technical, and financial assistance. In other instances, such as the EU-Russia relations, the EU externalization model relies on consultation and consensus-building to promote non-binding agreements and technical cooperation (Börzel and Risse 2012). This model of externalization is horizontal and relies on non-hierarchical cooperation between formally equal partners (Lavenex and Wichmann 2009).

**Externalization of the EU’s Policy against TOC in the Pre-Accession Process**

The EU has common rules for border control, visas, external migration and asylum and strong cooperation in the fight against terrorist and organized crime. It aims to strengthen the rule of law and promote respect for human rights. In this regard, candidate countries for EU membership are expected to develop sufficient internal capacity in these areas and align with EU standards. In doing so, the candidate countries are expected to be willing to go through the approximation of their criminal laws and criminal procedures and demonstrate readiness to promote their adherence to the minimum EU standards in the definition of those criminal offences that are related to organized crime.

As part of the previous enlargement cycle, the Pre-accession Pact on organised crime was signed between the EU Member States and the applicant countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CEEC) and Cyprus.

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1 Official candidate countries are Albania, the former Yugoslav Republics of Macedonia, Montenegro, and Serbia. Potential candidate countries are Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo. With regards to Kosovo’s status, the EU designation is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with United Nations Security Council Resolution UNSCR 1244/1999 and the International Court of Justice (ICJ) Opinion on the Kosovo declaration of independence.
in 1998 (Longo 2003). It aimed to transfer cooperation mechanisms and standards from the EU to the applicant countries to target TOC, providing for the establishing of evaluation mechanisms and periodic controls of the CEECs’ progress. The Pact can be considered part of the approximation of the criminal law and criminal procedure pillar of the EU’s internal model, incorporating the ratification of the international conventions recommended by the action plan on organized crime, the application of the OLAF\(^1\) recommendations in matters regarding the fight against money laundering, the adoption of laws compatible with the anti-laundering legislation being developed by the EU, the development of an anti-organized crime legislation based on the basic principles stemming from the justice and home affairs legislation, witness protection programmes and for individuals who cooperate with the judicial authorities. It also provides for law enforcement and judicial collaboration based on the EU’s internal model, including setting up the platforms and instruments supported by Europol and Eurojust.

The existing instrument for enlargement in the Western Balkans regions is the Stabilization and Association Process (SAP) through which the EU supports reforms in the “enlargement countries.” Funds provided by the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA) are used to build up the capacities of the countries throughout the accession process. SAP activities aim to allow for stable and structured forms of cooperation with non-EU countries on AFSJ matters, including, border control, visas, external migration and asylum and strong cooperation in the fight against organized crime and terrorism, strengthening the rule of law and promoting the respect of human rights. Stabilization and Association Agreements (SAA) between the EU and enlargement countries conventionally cover the following six major areas: 1) reinforcement of institutions and rule of law; 2) protection of personal data; 3) citizens’ mobility (the entry and stay regime for citizens of the parties in their territories, as well as migration, asylum, border management); 4) preventing and fighting various crimes that affect the parties’ cooperation; 5) combating terrorism; 6) judicial cooperation in civil and criminal cases.

Another pathway for externalization is implementation through the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) which is part of the larger Common Foreign Security Policy (CFSP). The EU’s involvement in Security Sector Reform (SSR) also reveals several interlocking agendas that range from conflict prevention and crisis management to good governance and policing

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\(^1\) The European Anti-Fraud Office/Office européen de lutte antifraude (OLAF).
(see European Commission 2016). For instance, one of the EU’s long-running external programmes is ALTHEA/BiH (EUFOR), which, since 2004, contributed to capacity building of and provided training for the Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina, supporting them in their progression towards NATO standards. Despite a very strong military emphasis, this mission also encompassed criminal justice components, such as reforming the police against organized crime (which is believed to be linked to suspected war criminals) and provided for collaboration with the European Union Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUPM) and with the Bosnian Police.

It is important to mention the European Union Rule of Law Mission (EULEX) Kosovo, the largest external mission of the EU in the area of rule of law and criminal justice matters, which is mandated to provide support to Kosovo’s rule of law institutions with assistance on fighting political interference and monitoring of sensitive cases. It also aims to assist the building of Kosovo’s multi-ethnic police and custom service, ensuring that these institutions adhere to the European human rights standards and best policing practices. Although, since its launch in 2008, EULEX stated that it has successfully processed over 40,000 court judgments and the investigation of over 400 war crimes, the mission’s performance has been tainted with corruption and malfeasance investigations (Van Gerven Oei 2017). In 2012, the European Court of Auditors found that EULEX assistance has not been “sufficiently effective” (European Commission 2012).

**Building AFSJ-related Cooperation in the European Neighbourhood**

Another approach adopted in the EU externalization of anti-TOC policies and assistance targets regions in the neighbourhood, mainly countries of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). Along the lines of the ENP, the EU has worked with its Eastern Partnership (EaP) countries (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine) and Mediterranean partners (Algeria, Morocco, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Palestine, Syria, and Tunisia) in order to foster security and prosperity. Although neither of these partnerships presupposes membership in the EU, it does offer a “privileged relationship” with the EU. The EU has traditionally served as a major source of investment, legal adviser, and leading partner, thus always creating an asymmetrical power relationship between the EU and its ENP partner countries.
With partners in the Mediterranean, the EU has launched regional dialogues, including those with a considerable strategic impact on justice, security, migration, and integration (of immigrants). In the EU’s southern dimension longstanding conflicts such as those in the Western Sahara and the Israeli-Palestinian/Arab-Israeli situation remain on the EU’s CSDP and ENP agendas, alongside the more recent conflicts that emerged during and in the aftermath of the Arab Spring in North Africa (especially in Libya and Egypt), including the protracted Syrian civil war. In the Sahel region, the EU has run several programmes related to security and justice, such as EUCAP Sahel Niger and EUCAP Sahel Mali, which are mandated to target the root causes of extreme poverty and security threats. These programmes also focus on the strengthening of governance and stability through promotion of the rule of law, human rights and socio-economic development, as well as prevention of terrorist organizations, both regionally and in the EU, and the elimination of drug trafficking and other criminal activities.

Although Libya has no Association Agreement (AA) with the EU, the EU has provided assistance in justice and security matters to this country with the focus on post-conflict reconstruction and migration issues. Since 2013, the European Union Border Assistance Mission (EUBAM) to Libya has operated to support the Libyan authorities in developing border management and security at the country’s land, sea and air borders in order to foster Libya’s capacity to respond to trafficking in human beings and human smuggling. Equally important in the discussion of anti-TOC policies is the European Union Naval Force (EU NAVFOR) in Somalia, where the Union acted to respond to Somali-based piracy and armed robbery and provided Interpol with relevant information on the matter. This mission demonstrated not only the EU’s ability to act with “one voice” in international relations but also partner with international organizations, such as Interpol, thus actively exercising the so-called “actorness.” This EU-led mission also succeeded in collaborating with non-EU members, including the Krivak-class frigate Hetman Sahaydachny (U130) provided by Ukraine and the Patrullero Oceanico ARC 7 de Agosto (PZE-47) provided by Colombia.

With regards to Georgia and Ukraine, these countries’ internal drive for EU membership and deterioration of their relations with Russia have opened an opportunity for closer EU integration. Georgia’s anti-corruption drive and progressive police reform did not take place without the EU’s assistance. The EUJUST mission to Georgia operated from June 2004 to July 2005. The first of its kind, the EU aimed to contribute to alleviating political stability in Georgia in its post-coup phase by providing guidance to the Georgian...
government in implementing the new criminal justice reform strategy and supporting the overall coordinating role of the relevant Georgian authorities in the field of judicial reform and anti-corruption.

When it comes to Ukraine, it is worth mentioning the oldest and most productive assistance projects in the realm of border security and organized crime, the European Union Border Assistance Mission (EUBAM) to Moldova and Ukraine, which since 2005 has operated to promote border control, customs and trade norms, and rule of law practices aligned with EU standards. Based on a Memorandum of Understanding (2005) signed by the European Commission and the governments of Moldova and Ukraine, the mission is tasked to ensure the full implementation of Integrated Border Management (IBM) practices at the Moldova-Ukraine border, assist Moldovan and Ukrainian authorities in combatting cross-border crime more effectively, and contributing to the peaceful settlement of the Transnistrian conflict through confidence-building measures and a monitoring presence at the Transnistrian segment of the Moldova-Ukraine border.

### EUBAM’s Mandate

- be present and observe customs clearance and border guard checks;
- as part of its advisory role, to examine border control documents and records (including computerised data);
- provide assistance in preventing smuggling of persons and goods;
- request the re-examination and re-assessment of any consignment of goods already processed;
- make unannounced visits to any locations on the Moldovan-Ukrainian border, including border units, customs posts, offices of transit, inland police stations, revenue accounting offices and along transit routes;
- move freely within the territories of Moldova and Ukraine;
- cross the Moldovan-Ukrainian state border with only strictly necessary control and without any delay;
- use all roads and bridges without payment of taxes and dues;
- have access to appropriate telecommunications equipment;
- import and export goods which are for official use of the Mission.

Source: [http://eubam.org/who-we-are/](http://eubam.org/who-we-are/)
Following the conflicts in Georgia (2008) and Ukraine (2014), the EU launched two missions, the European Union Monitoring Mission in Georgia (EUUM Georgia) and the European Union Advisory Mission in Ukraine (EUAM Ukraine). Whereas the EUUM Georgia has worked since 2008 to ensure that there is no reappearance of hostilities and aims to facilitate the return to a safe and normal life for the local communities living on both sides of the Administrative Boundary Lines (ABL) with Abkhazia and South Ossetia and does not target organized crime and terrorism specifically, the EUAM Ukraine was launched in 2014 to assist the Ukrainian authorities achieve progress towards a sustainable reform of the civilian security sector comprised of agencies responsible for law enforcement and rule of law.

Ukraine and Georgia have secured a “privileged” relationship with the EU following the signing of Association Agreements (AA) (2016 for Georgia and 2017 for Ukraine). Both countries, however, are expected to accept precise commitments, such as strengthening the rule of law, promoting democracy and respect for human rights, facilitating economic reforms, and cooperating with the EU member states on key foreign policy objectives, (e.g., counter-terrorism, organized crime, and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction). These commitments are set out as detailed Action Plans (APs) that stipulate the most efficient ways towards the implementation of agreed objectives. Although the EU has tried to build equal partnerships in the neighbourhood, its relations with Ukraine and Georgia tend to be rather asymmetrical. The EU sets the tone and defines the extent to which neighbouring countries are to make progress towards building “common values” and responding to “common security threats”—both of which are defined and identified by the EU (Di Puppo 2009). This approach has often been criticized for producing a contradiction between the EU’s policies and local expectations, often leading to a difficult compromise between the EU’s core values and its efficiency.

European Union Association Agreement (AA) with Ukraine and its Impact on Ukraine’s Policies against TOC

At the end of the Soviet period Ukraine was left without the institutional capacity to address organized crime. During the perestroika era, economic resources were accumulated by criminal groups and political elites, not least due to high-level corruption and use of criminal violence. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, there were large stockpiles of arms left in Ukraine. The first globally prominent Ukrainian organized
crime groups\(^1\) capitalized on the availability of accessing the illicit international trafficking in these arms. Between 1992 and 1998, military equipment was continuously disappearing from military depots in Ukraine and ending up primarily in conflict zones in West Africa (Berry et al. 2003). From trafficking in arms in the 1990s, Ukrainian organized crime groups also managed to successfully enter into the international trade in illegal drugs, becoming some of the important players in heroin trafficking from Afghanistan to Central Europe. Some of the drug shipments used to traverse the Black Sea, flowing mainly through sea ports in Odesa (Shelley 1998).

The global outreach of Ukrainian criminal groups and their mobility has a proven record of presence and active operation in the United States and European countries (e.g., Latvia, the Czech Republic and Hungary), where they have been involved in human trafficking and prostitution. Since the 1990s, Ukraine has also been a source, transit, and destination country for the trafficking of men, women, and children for the purposes of commercial sexual exploitation and forced labour. In addition, the EU has repeatedly raised concerns about Ukraine’s involvement in the production and smuggling of counterfeit products, namely cigarettes (“cheap whites”) (OCTA 2011).

EU-Ukraine cooperation in the domain of justice and security is embodied in the Action Plan (AP) signed on 12 December 2001 and revised in 2005. The AP covers all of the main items of the EU’s AFSJ policy and comes with a scoreboard, which is monitored to ensure progress. Whereas some meaningful developments were achieved during the Yushchenko administration in the aftermath of the Orange Revolution (2005), it was not until after the nation-wide Euromaidan protests that rule of law reforms in Ukraine, including responses to organized crime, were relaunched. Following the Euromaidan demonstrations, the Ukrainian people expected impartial judiciary, effective policing, and zero-tolerance on corruption. It was also after the Euromaidan that the Ukrainian government signed the Association Agreement (AA) with the EU (2017), which provides further opportunity for formal EU-Ukraine collaboration on AFSJ-related matters.

Title II of this Association Agreement (2014) establishes an advanced form of political dialogue between the EU and Ukraine in all areas of mutual interest and facilitates the promotion of “gradual convergence of foreign and security matters with the aim of Ukraine’s ever-deeper involvement in the European

\(^1\)In the existing literature on the topic, Ukrainian organized crime is often referred to as “Russian organized crime” or “Russian-speaking organized crime.”
security area” (Art. 4), including the CSDP in particular issues of conflict prevention and crisis management, regional stability, disarmament, non-proliferation, and arms (Art. 7). Similarly to the EU’s approach in the Balkans region currently undergoing Stabilization and Accession Process (SAP), Title III of the EU-Ukraine AA promotes cooperation in the matters of justice and security that falls into the following six areas:

1. Protection of personal data (Art. 15);
2. Cooperation on migration, asylum and border management (legal and illegal, readmission, visas, asylum, protection of victims of human trafficking, etc.); (Art. 16; 18; 19);
3. The fight against money laundering and terrorism financing (Art. 20) (includes implementation of relevant international standards, in particular those of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) and standards equivalent to those adopted by the EU);
4. Cooperation in combating organized crime and corruption (cooperation against drug trafficking (Art. 21) and other forms of organized crime (Art. 22), including smuggling of, and trafficking in, human beings as well as firearms and illicit drugs, trafficking in goods, economic crimes including in the field of taxation; corruption, both in the private and public sector; forgery of documents; cybercrime. Art. 22 also requires parties to develop cooperation that involves Europol and requests commitment to implementing the UNTOC and its three accompanying Protocols effectively);
5. Cooperation in the fight against terrorism (Art. 23) (full implementation of Resolution No. 1373 of the UN Security Council of 2001, the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy of 2006 and other relevant UN instruments, and applicable international conventions and instruments);
6. Legal cooperation on criminal justice matters (Art. 24) (e.g., judicial cooperation in civil and criminal matters, mutual legal assistance and extradition; cooperation in the larger framework of the relevant international instruments of the United Nations and the Council of Europe, as well as the 1988 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) as referred to in Article 8 of this Agreement, and closer cooperation with Eurojust).

The Ukrainian side of the AA has made progress on the legislative front with constitutional amendments and a new law on the judiciary, new legislation creating the National Police and framing the role of public prosecution already in force and new anticorruption bodies established (e.g., NABU).
This progress constitutes a solid basis for comprehensive reform of the criminal justice sector. Significant challenges, however, remain in the implementation of post-Euromaidan reforms. This point notably concerns the far-reaching reorganisation of the courts and the renewal of the judicial body foreseen by the new legislation on the judiciary. In addition, the development of improved coordination of rule of law reforms, availability of appropriate budgetary allocations, and widespread corruption—all in the backdrop of an ongoing military conflict in Eastern Ukraine (Donbas)—need to be addressed as a matter of urgent priority before any meaningful progress in the criminal justice matters outlined in the EU-Ukraine AA can be achieved.

**Final Observations**

Since the middle of the 1990s, common tools have been developed in the EU to protect the European community from transnational organized crime. Yet, TOC continues to pose a significant threat to the security of the EU and can have a destabilizing effect on its economic development and citizens’ well-being. Part of the solution requires the EU to continuously adapt its response to this threat and coordinate anti-TOC responses within and outside its borders. Some progress towards these goals is reflected in the development and continued support of specialised EU agencies, such as Europol and Eurojust.

With regard to its external action, the EU has initiated cooperation in police matters, provided capacity building and technical assistance, and promoted border control and customs norms and practices aligned with EU standards. Quality of institutions in security and justice areas, such as rule of law, anti-corruption, law enforcement and judicial cooperation, assistance to victims and other relevant matters, has always been a priority in the EU’s negotiations with enlargement and integration countries.

Achieving a more secure Europe, however, will require more efforts to improve coherence between policies and their actual implementation. Not without good reason, the post-Lisbon discourse on EU leadership, including the AFSJ domain, has been characterized by a “less is more” leitmotif, suggesting that the evaluation and improvement of existing instruments should be prioritized instead of constantly introducing new measures and missions.
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THEORIZING “TERRORISM” AND “HYBRID WAR”

Ryszard M. Machnikowski

Introduction

Theorizing “terrorism” and “hybrid war” is extremely difficult. Both these notions of terrorism and hybrid warfare, while in use quite frequently, especially in mass media, politics and the academic world today, belong to the category of very vague and ambiguous concepts. As there is definitely no “general theory of terrorism” (rather many theoretical contributions towards understanding terrorism, stemming from divergent scientific disciplines, e.g. psychology, theory of organizations, political science), nor any “theory of hybrid warfare”, their theoretical background is not strong and obvious.

The main problem with terrorism is with its “ontological” status – whether we understand it as paramilitary “tactics” and even “strategy”, used in violent conflicts or is it understood as a distinct, separate phenomenon, unique and detached from other forms of political violence (such as wars, guerilla warfare, rebellion). This crucial issue is not settled yet, hence the never-ending presence of discussions on the definition(s) of terrorism and the (mis)usage of this concept. The main problem with “hybrid warfare” (or “hybrid threats”/“non-linear warfare”), as it seems, lies with its very existence – is it just a new, fashionable “buzzword” covering the ancient phenomenon of war with the use of military as well as non-military means, or is it actually something new, different from what we have already known about large-scale political violence? It is simply impossible to provide the reader with arbitrary answers to all these issues here, in the relatively short chapter of a handbook, so they are presented in a fairly “conventional” manner – dealing with the most commonly discussed issues. As the “history” of “terrorism studies” is much longer than the history of “hybrid warfare studies” I present a more “theoretical” approach dealing with the former and focus on a particular case (i.e. Russian aggression against Ukraine) to describe the (alleged) distinctive features of the latter. This is due to the fact that we have a large variety of terrorist groups, incidents etc. and yet only a handful of cases of “hybrid warfare” implementation.
Terrorism

Three major groups of theories employed in political and international studies – realism, liberalism and constructivism - have serious problems with coping with the concept of “terrorism”. While realism (and neo-realist approaches) is based on the presumption that states are still the main (if not the only) actors in international relations, and “terrorism” is a strategy used by sub-state, low-level groups (Baylis and Smith 1998, 109 – 124). The impact of terrorism on the international system was perceived, at least before the 9/11 terrorist attacks, as limited. Liberal theories admit the importance of terrorism: “At a theoretical level, advocates of liberalism take the challenge posed by international terrorism seriously. While their historic rivals, the realists, can invoke the domestic–international divide to argue that terrorism does not materially affect the international system, liberals see terrorism as an ideological challenge. While liberalism is about toleration, civility and progress, terrorism takes us down an altogether different path – one of violent intolerance where human life is lived in fear and dies in anger.” (Dunne 2009, 107)

Nevertheless, liberal theories tend to focus their attention on answering the crucial puzzle stemming from the so-called “liberal peace” thesis – that democracies do not engage in warfare, at least with other democracies: “This rational aversion to war becomes embedded in the political order of the liberal state such that democracies are ‘least prone’ to war. The puzzle with this rationalist account of the monadic democratic peace theory is that it does not account for why strong democracies do not go to war against weak democracies when the anticipated benefits are high and the costs very low. (…) In answering this question it is useful to engage with advocates of the democratic peace theory who believe that democracies are only peace-prone in relation to other democracies, the weaker version of the thesis (the so-called dyadic explanation). In relation to illiberal states, democracies are as war-prone as any other regime type. While war might have become unthinkable between democracies, the dyadic explanation allows for the fact that war remains an instrument of statecraft in relation to authoritarian regimes that are unpredictable, unjust and dangerous.” (Dunne 2009, 108)

Hence, liberalism has limited abilities to explain a group’s propensity to use extreme violence directed at non-combatants to achieve political goals, which is a “core” activity of terrorist entities.

The third theory most currently in use – constructivism – has noticed the importance of terrorism, but is still unable to produce fruitful explanations
because it is focused, which should not come as a huge surprise, on a “terrorist discourse” instead of terrorist organizations and their actions, motives, ideology or modus operandi. For constructivism: (…) terrorism is a social construction. The terrorist actor is a product of discourse, and hence discourse is the logical starting point for terrorism research. In particular, it is the discourse of the terrorists’ adversaries that constitutes terrorist motivations, strategies, organizational structures and goals. (…) This indicates that scholars and experts are predominantly interested in the terrorist actor, which may appear natural. Indeed, what should they investigate if not the terrorist (organization)? However, we argue that the focus on the terrorist actor in terrorism research is misleading. It is based on the assumption that knowledge about the terrorist means knowledge about terrorism. From a constructivist perspective, however, terrorism is a social construction, hence a social fact produced in discourse. Accordingly, research needs to focus on the discourse by which the terrorist actor and his or her actions are constituted. Terrorism can only be known through the terrorism discourse. This is why we suggest a shift in perspective in terrorism studies, from the terrorist to terrorism discourse. Instead of asking what terrorism is like (what structures, strategies and motivations it has), we need to ask how it is constituted in discourse.” (Hülsse and Spencer 2008, 571-572).

According to this kind of constructivist “narrative”: “Conventional scholars seek to establish features of terrorist organizations, such as their structure, finance, strategies or goals, but they rarely investigate the actual motives of terrorists. In the case of Islamic terrorism, for example, terrorist motivations are regarded as being at the same time incomprehensible and obvious: terrorists are nihilists loving death more than life.” (Hülsse and Spencer 2008, 574) But this constructivist “description” is certainly not true: even “conventional” scholars in studies on terrorism frequently discuss the motives of individual terrorists and do not limit them to apparent nihilism and death wish. In fact, while we may not have a “theory of terrorism” yet, we do have some “body of evidence” at our disposal, derived from different academic origins and disciplines, striving at an explanation of this apparently more and more common phenomenon.

“Studies on terrorism” emerged as a kind of academic subdiscipline in the late 1960s and early 1970s, a pretty obvious result of the deadly activity of, then mostly leftist, terrorist groups in Europe, and North and Latin America. The actions of Basque and Irish “separatist” groups and Palestinian terrorists in Europe and the Middle East only increased this public interest in these, supposedly “new”, phenomena of both domestic and international terrorism.
Anni di piombo, (or the “years of the lead”), were definitely not limited to Italy– many Western European and Latin American states, as well as the United States, were attacked by so-called “groupuscules”. Yet, this mass assault of a plethora of primarily left-wing violent groups on Western states was anything but new – the alleged “first wave” of terrorism in the late 19th century was also staged by the first generation of the modern left-wing organizations: radical socialists along with their syndicalist and anarchist compatriots attempted to subvert Western “oppressive” regimes and liberate “the people” just as their later followers. The Russian Socialist Revolutionary Party (SR) programme, released in 1879, openly proclaimed the need for “terroristic activity” in order to achieve their ideals (Venturi 1960, Woodcock 1962).

The phenomenon of terrorism in its modern (as well as post-modern) incarnation is at least a century and a half old. Initially, these 19th century “idealists” prone to use violence, attempted to select their targets carefully and preferably struck at high-ranking politicians (including heads of states) and agents of “repressive institutions” of the state. They attempted to prove that they were fighting in the name of the “innocent and oppressed majority”, hence striving at doing no harm to the “ordinary” public. Some attacks were even halted on the spot in order not to kill “innocent bystanders”. However, further ideological radicalization combined with the general inefficiency of their actions. Although they managed to kill some political leaders, still their victims were promptly replaced, proving that through violent actions of this kind they were unable to subvert their states. That ultimately made these first “terrorists” to attack random targets in order to raise fear among everyone, not only the ruling elite and state officials. Everyone who was not openly hostile towards the political regime had been ultimately considered a legitimate target, as a part of the “system’s silent supporters”.

This first “wave” of terrorist atrocities was dwarfed by the colossal scale of bloodshed delivered by states themselves, during the Great (First World) War. It proved, once again, that the state’s ability to spread mass damage could not be matched by the efforts of the “daring few” belonging to small groups. “Sub-state” violence was also bleak in comparison to the organized genocide which took place during the Second World War. But approximately a decade after this unspeakable bloodshed, another “wave” of political violence delivered by sub-state groups captured public imagination. This was due to the development of the post-WWII “anti-colonial” movements and the resurgence of the “separatist” moods, which resulted in the outbursts of “terrorist” actions delivered by Greece’s EOKA (Ethniki Organosis Kyprian
Agoniston - National Organisation of Cypriot Fighters) in Cyprus, FLN (Front de Libération Nationale – Front of National Liberation) in Algeria and the Zionist “Stern Gang” (Lehi – Lohamei Herut Israel - Fighters for the Freedom of Israel) in British-held Palestine. The combat success of these groups – as each and every one could have claimed that it contributed to the “liberation” of their nation- certainly must have fueled the later activities of the Palestinian Liberation Organization in Palestine and Israel, Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (Basque Homeland and Liberty) in Spain, Irish Republican Army in Great Britain and even Front de Libération du Québec (Front of the Liberation of Quebec) in Canada. The next generation of “political activists” could truly believe again that violence spread by sub-state groups might ultimately become an effective tool of national “liberation” (Crenshaw 1978).

It is frequently said that terrorism had been (and still is today) a peculiar act of political “communication”—a fairly effective way of spreading ideological messages and seeking followers who otherwise could miss a chance to become familiar with them. It should not come as a surprise that separatist groups were soon joined by the next generation of left-wing “activists”, who wanted to continue to carry the torch of “social revolution” through the acts of “propaganda by deeds”. Sadly, successful killing of the “innocents” resulted in an increased recruitment and popularity of these groups. Destabilization was achieved by Rote Armee Fraktion (Red Army Faction) and Bewegung 2. Juni (2 June Movement) in Germany, Brigate Rosse (Red Brigades) in Italy, Action Directe (Direct Action) in France, Cellules Communistes Combattantes (Communist Combatant Cells) in Belgium and Epanastatiki Organosidekaeta Noemvri (Revolutionary Organization 17 November, also known as 17N) “family” in Greece (della Porta 1995). The “Urban guerilla”, following the kind advice of Carlos Marighela’s Minimanual of the Urban Guerilla was also visible on the streets of many Latin American cities. Many Popular or National Liberation and Revolutionary Movements were supported by students and managed to move from small villages to the big cities of Latin America (Burton 1975). In the U.S. “revolutionaries” from the Black Panther Party and Weather Underground Movement were followed by, probably the most obscure and mysterious of all “left-wing” terrorist groups, the Symbionese Liberation Army.

As it should come with no surprise, this era of the terror of left faded away with the demise of the Soviet Union and Eastern Bloc in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Western states ultimately managed to limit the operational
abilities of terrorist groups through repressive police operations. European separatist groups survived left-wing terrorists by less than a decade – by the end of the 20th century their influence either demised (ETA) or they managed to enter into the legal political struggle (IRA), accepting the governments’ offer to achieve part of their goals through participation in the “regular” political process.

External assistance, provided by the Soviet Union and other communist states, previously supporting these terrorist organizations proves that they were treated as useful “proxies” in the war fought against the “capitalist world” – when communists were not interested in showing their hostility in an open way. This does not mean, of course, that these terrorist entities were wholly dependent and manipulated by communist states and their security services. Terrorists were, and still are, able to act independently; nevertheless this kind of support provided by external state sponsors may increase their abilities, efficiency and the duration of their actions.

The demise of left-wing and separatist violence in Europe certainly has not meant that “terrorism” has disappeared from our planet. The Palestinian *Hamas* in Israel and Shia *Hizballah* movement in Lebanon were born and active not only in the 1980s but also in the 1990s (Levitt 2006, Palmer Harik 2006). The next “wave” of terrorist actions commenced in the last decade of the 20th century was named “Islamic” due to the activities of the “Islamist international”, i.e. the alliance of jihadist organizations, thriving from the MENA region to Central Asia and beyond – towards the Far East. Conflicts in Algeria and Egypt, as well as perpetual war in Afghanistan gave birth to the next generation of terrorists. Though both the Egyptian Islamist groups, like their Algerian compatriots, lost their wars against the state by the end of the 1990s, nevertheless, their members managed to form the “Islamist international”, which ultimately found a “safe haven” in Afghanistan under the Taliban rule. Islamist “refugees” could have met there and exchange their experience and ideas, as this “failed state” attracted many veterans of the armed jihad against the “apostatic” Muslim regimes and their Western promoters, including the Saudi citizen, Osama bin Laden. He managed to persuade some of them to attack the head of the “hydra”, standing behind all “infidel” regimes around the world – the United States. The first round of attacks against American targets in South East Africa and Yemen was hardly noticed by the Western world, so Osama decided to organize “something big” – the so-called 9/11 attacks against the symbols of political and economic power of America (Wright 2006). Since September 11, 2001 the claim that “Islamic terrorism” is of a minor problem could
no longer be held. The *Al Qaeda* organization was promptly promoted by the “neo-con” U.S. administration as a primary threat to the national security of the United States, elevating the status of the Islamists well above their limits (Suskind 2006).

Hence, another violent minority sub-state group successfully captured the imagination of public opinion internationally, and the academic world no longer could be deaf to the widespread demands to provide proper expertise and explain their actions. Since then “studies in terrorism and political violence” departments, launched tentatively in the early 1970s, usually at the Faculties of Political Studies and/or International Relations, have rapidly grown, along with new scientific journals. Initially, the number of respected scholars in this field was counted in dozens rather than hundreds – they formed a kind of a “close order” of experts reviewing each other and producing the majority of published material. Since 9/11 this academic subdiscipline has been developing rapidly and has been joined by new generations of scientists, recruited from different scientific backgrounds.

Still, after more than 40 years of development, its theoretical output is not particularly impressive. Following the words of one of the “giants” in terrorism studies, Martha Crenshaw: “It is possible to think in terms of two basic explanations for how the conspiratorial organizations that practice terrorism behave. In turn, each analysis yields different policy recommendations. (…) However, both views may be necessary for understanding terrorism and its consequences. The first explanation is based on the assumption that the act of terrorism is a deliberate choice by a political actor. The organization, as a unit, acts to achieve collective values, which involve radical changes in political and social conditions. Terrorism is interpreted as a response to external stimuli, particularly government actions. An increase in the cost or a decrease in the reward for violence will make it less likely. However, the second explanation focuses on internal organizational processes within the group using terrorism or among organizations sharing similar objectives. Terrorism is explained as the result of an organization’s struggle for survival, usually in a competitive environment. Leaders ensure organizational maintenance by offering varied incentives to followers, not all of which involve the pursuit of the group’s stated political purposes. Leaders seek to prevent both defection and dissent by developing intense loyalties among group members. The organization responds to pressure from outside by changing the incentives offered to members or through innovation. Terrorist actions do not necessarily or directly reflect ideological values.”(Crenshaw 1987, 13)
These “conventional” approaches are based on the premise that we actually deal with such entities as “terrorist groups”, more or less coherent to be held and understood as a single phenomenon. However, it is not entirely clear why we should consider such different groups such as the German RAF, the Lebanese Hizballah, the Sri Lankan Tamil Tigers (LTTE - Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam) and the Japanese sect Aum Shinrikyo as similar? The answer is certainly not that simple. For instance, David Rapoport’s “four waves of terrorism theory” is a good example of this uncertainty. He claims (Rapoport 2006) that since the 19th century the world has suffered four “waves” of terrorism: “anarchist”, “anti-colonial”, “New Left” and, most recently, “religious”. Each wave supposedly lasts approximately 40 years, sometimes overlapping each other. But how can we assume that such divergent groups as the “New Left” and jihadists really belong to the same analytical category? (Proszin 2015) Their ideology differs as well as their cultural background, so we can guess about their motives and goals. So why should we analyze the activity of truly divergent groups (or even individuals) which have only one thing in common – the tactics used in a fight against the state?

Hence, one can adopt a different stance in an attempt to define “terrorism” – that this is a kind of a paramilitary activity based on a specific type of violence applied by groups or even individuals in a situation of a deep political conflict. In this approach, different groups in divergent circumstances may simply use apparently similar “tactics” or even “strategy” (when this is their primary way of affecting an “enemy”. Terrorism can be perceived as a strategy which is used in an asymmetrical conflict, to instill mass fear in a society by the use of tactics of pre-planned armed attacks on non-combatant targets, in order to force government(s) to meet political and/ or ideological demands of the “terrorists”, or even surrender. This “strategy” of terrorism is usually, though not always, used by the “weaker” side, i.e. non-state actors against much more powerful state(s), which is a much more potent organization. These non-state actors may form “groups”, “networks” or even “movements”, which aim at attacking non-combatant targets to show that this apparently powerful state is ultimately defenceless facing this kind of action and cannot fulfil its primary function – to provide security to its inhabitants. Through acts of “terrorism” they try to deprive the modern state of its monopoly to use violence. They attempt to evoke fear within society, which can be further utilized as a tool of “social engineering” to achieve political and ideological transformation. Sometimes these non-state terrorist entities are backed by other states to subvert their enemies under condition of “plausible denial”, particularly when states do not want to or simply cannot wage open, fully-fledged war against other states.
Moreover, some of these political groups do not resort only to “terrorist” activity – they are involved in a “guerilla” fight, psychological warfare, sometimes even commit atrocities close to acts of homicide, such as the crimes against humanity perpetrated most recently by the Islamic State. Why should alleged “terrorism” be the primary distinctive feature of their activity while they are involved in different types of political violence? So, if terrorism is both a paramilitary strategy as well as a tactic, used by many different entities in different times and circumstances, shouldn’t we treat it as a phenomenon similar to an “air battle” or “tank battle” and study it in detail at military schools? In this case, we should rather not ask questions about the “causes” of terrorism (as nobody dares to ask about the “causes” of a “land battle” with the use of infantry). Terrorism just happens when various groups or even individuals want to further their political agenda through attacking defenceless targets. When we ask about ideological motives standing behind this kind of hostile action towards the state and its society, we deal with problems already well-recognized by many scientific disciplines.

Considering the case of Ukraine, where many different types of military activity were used against the Ukrainian state by its neighbour – the Russian Federation – from subversion, cyberwarfare and information warfare (see the chapter on this issue in this book and Darczewska 2014, Snegovaya 2015, Darczewska 2016) to direct military assault and invasion –is the concept of “terrorism” applicable to these types of violence which were used in Russian aggression towards Ukraine?

Let us consider the most widely-known case of “international terrorism” there – the shooting of the Malaysian Airlines Boeing 777 flight MH17 from Amsterdam to Kuala Lumpur on 17 July 2014. As is known today, this passenger plane with 298 passengers and crew was shot by a Buk 9M38-series surface-to-air missile with a 9N314M warhead launched from pro-Russian separatist-controlled territory in Ukraine. This missile launcher belonged to the Russian 53rd Anti-Aircraft Rocket Brigade originally based in the Russian city of Kursk. This Buk missile system had been transported from Russia to Ukraine on the day of the crash, and then was sent back to Russia after the crash, with one missile less than with which it arrived. This missile had been fired from a rebel-controlled field near Pervomaisky, a town 6 km south of Snizhne.

After this plane crash the Joint Investigation Team was set up by the Netherlands Public Prosecutor’s Office and the Dutch National Police, together with police and judicial authorities of Australia, Belgium, Malaysia.
and Ukraine. The JIT inquiry finally said that more than 100 people, witnesses as well as suspects, who were involved in the movement of the Buk launcher, had been finally identified, though they had not yet identified a clear chain of command to assess culpability. (JIT info 2016)

Though some important information is still missing we can easily draw an overall picture of this severe atrocity and ask whether it was an act of “terrorism” or may be rather a “war crime” Though it was committed from the territory captured by the sub-national group of “separatists” and the direct perpetrators are not clearly identified yet, nevertheless they were provided with the proper military equipment and expertise by the neighbouring state – Russia. Was Russia just “sponsoring” a sub-state group of “separatists” who committed an act of terrorism or was Russia itself perhaps involved in a war crime against Ukraine and the passengers of the Malaysian plane, using the “separatists” as its proxies? Maybe this is a good example of, widely discussed in the media today, “hybrid warfare”? If we consider that spreading disinformation is an essential part of a hybrid (or non-linear) campaign, this might be exactly the case. As Peter Pomerantsev and Michael Weiss claim: “After the downing of Malaysian Airlines flight MH17, RT spread conspiracy theories regarding the cause: ranging from the flight being shot down by Ukrainian forces aiming at Putin’s personal plane through to Ukrainian deployment of Buk SAMs in the area. RT also quoted a supposed air traffic controller named Carlos, who had written on his Twitter feed that Ukrainian fighter jets had followed the Malaysian plane. The Carlos Twitter disinformation story was also pushed on the website of RT contributor Pepe Escobar—one of the stars of the RT chat show complaining about how western media manipulate the truth.” (Pomerantsev and Weiss 2014, 85)

Regardless of how we call it, terrorism or hybrid warfare, Ukrainian authorities decided to file a case against Russia for “acts of terrorism and unlawful aggression” at the United Nations’ highest court. The Ukrainian foreign ministry launched the action at the International Court of Justice, claiming that Russia was supplying weapons and other assistance to rebel groups operating in eastern Ukraine. (Oliphant 2016)

**Hybrid warfare. Ukraine – Russia conflict as a case**

The concept of “hybrid” warfare seems even more ambiguous, and fiercely discussed nowadays than the issue of terrorism. “Hybrid” warfare is usually described as a military strategy which is a complex combination of
conventional warfare mixed with an irregular one, supported by cyberwarfare and psychological operations which are aimed at avoiding retribution. According to Brian P. Fleming (2011): “In a 2008 article, the Army Chief of Staff [George C. Casey] characterized a hybrid threat as an adversary that incorporates ‘diverse and dynamic combinations of conventional, irregular, terrorist and criminal capabilities.’” The United States Joint Forces Command defines a hybrid threat as “any adversary that simultaneously and adaptively employs a tailored mix of conventional, irregular, terrorism and criminal means or activities in the operational battle space. Rather than a single entity, a hybrid threat or challenger may be a combination of state and non-state actors.” Most recently, the U.S. Army codified the term in its 2011 operations doctrine as, “The diverse and dynamic combination of regular forces, irregular forces, criminal elements, or a combination of these forces and elements all unified to achieve mutually benefitting effects.” Certainly, all these aforementioned elements exist in almost each type of military conflict or even war, including intensive propaganda and the use of criminals (Allied invasion of Sicily in 1943, codenamed “Operation Husky”) but it seems that the primary goal of “hybrid operations” is to persuade both the enemy and the external world that actually they are not dealing with regular war so there is no need to be engaged with the use of the military means. According to the Russian concept of “non-linear war”: “The open use of forces — often under the guise of peacekeeping and crisis regulation — is resorted to only at a certain stage, primarily for the achievement of final success in the conflict.” (Gerasimov in: Galeotti 2014)

So if we accept this brief description, it is hard to find a better example of “hybrid warfare” than the Russian aggression against Ukraine since 2014, at least in its initial phase. According to Mark Galeotti, who reviewed carefully the Russian Chief of the General Staff and first deputy Defence Minister, Gen. Valery Gerasimov’s article entitled “The Value of Science in Prediction” which appeared in the Military-Industrial Courier newspaper, and has become the basis for the so-called “Gerasimov doctrine”: “Call it non-linear war (…), or hybrid war, or special war, Russia’s operations first in Crimea and then eastern Ukraine have demonstrated that Moscow is increasingly focusing on new forms of politically-focused operations in the future. In many ways this is an extension of what elsewhere I’ve called Russia’s ‘guerrilla geopolitics,’ an appreciation of the fact that in a world shaped by an international order the Kremlin finds increasingly irksome and facing powers and alliances with greater raw military, political and economic power, new tactics are needed which focus on the enemy’s weaknesses and avoid
Russia was well-prepared for the next round of the “Ukrainian crisis” since its very beginning: already in summer 2013 Russian authorities undertook increasingly brutal economic and psychological pressure directed at President Yanukovych and the then Ukrainian government, in order to change Ukraine’s pro-European political course. The much-awaited deal on the co-operation of Ukraine with the EU had been long perceived by the Kremlin power elites as a daring Western incursion into an exclusive Russian “sphere of interest” and, consequently, as an existential threat for Russia. Russian officials used to issue stark warnings against “crossing the red lines” addressed to the West many times in the past (Kaczmarski 2009). As a result, Ukraine was threatened first with a trade war – the first shots of which were fired on 14 August 2013, when the Russian Customs Service stopped all imports coming from Ukraine. President Yanukovych’s ultimate refusal to sign the agreement on co-operation with the EU was met with huge popular resistance, which led to many bloody clashes with the police force, resulting in the deaths of many pro-Western Ukrainians, ready to fight for their “European” dreams. President Yanukovych finally refused to crush his nation’s resistance with brute force and fled the country on 22 February 2014, followed by key members of the Ukrainian government. One of the most effective Russian propaganda tools – RT television (known formerly as “Russia Today”): “(p)laying to an international audience, (...) initially focused on giving space to experts blaming the troubles in Ukraine on the EU and its plans for expansion, trying to exploit right-wing, anti-EU sentiment in Western Europe, while also slurring the post-Yanukovych Kiev government as a right-wing junta and spreading stories of Jews being frightened of the upsurge in Ukrainian nationalism.” (Pomerantsev and Weiss 2014, 82) This slogan of the “rising fascism” in Ukraine (and elsewhere) will be frequently used in a propaganda warfare by the pro-Russian side.

After this somewhat unexpected twist of fate, the power was literally lying in the streets of Kyiv and pro-Russian forces in Ukraine abruptly lost their alleged leaders. The Kremlin must have perceived this situation as a severe and imminent threat for Russia’s raison d’état and decided to seek a kind of military “solution” to this rapidly growing “crisis”, as the former pro-Russian government had simply vanished. On 23 February 2014, pro-Russian demonstrations were held in the Crimean city of Sevastopol. On 27 February 2014, masked Russian troops without military insignia (called later “little green men”) took over the Supreme Council (parliament) of Crimea and captured strategic sites across Crimea (Shevchenko 2014). This led to the
installation of the pro-Russian Aksyonov government in Crimea, conducting the Crimean status referendum and the declaration of Crimea’s independence on 16 March 2014. Russia claimed Crimea on 18 March 2014, when a treaty between the Russian Federation and the self-proclaimed independent “Republic of Crimea” was signed to initiate Crimea’s accession to the Russian Federation. On 19 March 2014, Ukrainian Armed Forces were evicted from their bases. Regular Russian military units, though still deprived of their distinctions, were involved in capturing public offices and “assisted” civilians and “separatist militias” during the process, which was finally acknowledged by Russian president Vladimir Putin on 17 April 2014: “But military maskirovka, the war of deception and concealment, has only been one small part of the Kremlin’s campaign. Inside Russia, and in areas of Eastern Ukraine where Russian television is popular, the Kremlin’s political technologists have managed to create a parallel reality where “fascists” have taken power in Kiev, ethnic Russians in East Ukraine are in mortal danger and the CIA is waging a war against Moscow.” (Pomerantsev and Weiss 2014, 80)

This Russian “hybrid action” was also possible due to the support of the Russian and pro-Russian population in Crimea, as well as the passive behaviour of the Ukrainian military command. As is known now, some high-ranking officers in the Ukrainian army had already been recruited by the Russian side and were either disobeying resistance orders sent by their government or doing nothing to organize some armed defence against Russian soldiers (Polityuk and Zverev, 2017). As Galeotti notes: “If we take Ukraine as an example, the GRU (military intelligence) took point over Crimea, supported by regular military units. In eastern Ukraine, the Federal Security Service (FSB), which had thoroughly penetrated the Ukrainian security apparatus, has encouraged defections and monitored Kyiv’s plans, the Interior Ministry (MVD) has used its contacts with its Ukrainian counterparts to identify potential agents and sources, the military has been used to rattle sabres loudly on the border—and may be used more aggressively yet—while the GRU not only handled the flow of volunteers and materiel into the east but probably marshalled the Vostok Battalion, arguably the toughest unit in the Donbas. Meanwhile, Russian media and diplomatic sources have kept up an incessant campaign to characterize the ‘Banderite’ government in Kyiv as illegitimate and brutal, while even cyberspace is not immune, as ‘patriotic hackers’ attack Ukrainian banks and government websites. The essence of this non-linear war is, as Gerasimov says, that the war is everywhere.” (Galeotti 2014)
Russian annexation of Crimea was very soon followed by the military “destabilization” of the Donbas region. Protests of the anti-government and pro-Russian groups were organized in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions of Eastern Ukraine since the beginning of this conflict in March 2014. From 12 April 2014, unmarked militants started to seize governmental buildings in many cities and towns in Eastern Ukraine and managed to secure control within a couple of days without resistance or overpowering forces loyal to the government in Kyiv. President Turchynov declared the launch of an “anti-terrorist” operation by the government armed forces already on 9 April 2014. After refusal by the separatist side to lay down their arms the government military operation was declared on 15 April 2014. On 11 May 2014, status referendums were held in Donetsk and Luhansk, where separatist leaders claimed that a vast majority of participants voted in support of the establishment of the “People’s Republics”. On 16 May 2014, the DPR as a whole was designated as a terrorist organization by the Ukrainian Government. The Ministry of Temporarily Occupied Territories and IDPs of Ukraine was established to manage this part of the country. On 24 May 2014, these two separatist republics signed an agreement confirming their merger into a confederation called “Novorossiya”: “(…) the name Vladimir Putin has given to the large wedge of southeastern Ukraine he might, or might not, consider annexing. The term is plucked from tsarist history, when it represented a different geographical space. Nobody who lives in that part of the world today has ever thought of themselves as living in Novorossiya and bearing allegiance to it. Now, Novorossiya is being imagined into being: Russian media are showing maps of its “geography,” Kremlin-backed politicians are writing its “history” in school textbooks. There’s a flag and even a news agency. There are several Twitter feeds. The fantasy of Novorossiya is then used as a very real political bargaining chip. In the final days of August 2014, an apparent Russian military incursion into Ukraine—and a relatively small one at that—was made to feel momentously threatening when Putin invoked the term “Novorossiya” and the need for talks on the statehood of southeastern Ukraine, leaving NATO stunned and Kiev intimidated enough to agree to a ceasefire.” (Pomerantsev and Weiss 2014, 80-81)

From late May to July 2014, the Ukrainian government’s armed forces, supported by volunteers, managed to retake a vast area in the country’s East, after heavy fighting with “separatist” forces. These “separatist” units were supplied with heavy weaponry, including tanks and anti-aircraft systems (like Buk) by the Russian side. To stop the Ukrainian government offensive in August 2014, significant military forces of the Russian Federation entered
the Donbas conflict zone, including Russian armoured units and artillery
(Bidder, Gathmann, Neef and Schepp 2014; Kramer and Gordon 2014). Ultimately, after heavy clashes in which the Russian side prevailed, the ceasefire accord called Minsk I was agreed on 5 September 2014 (OSCE 2014). This agreement has been violated many times, the most serious case started on New Year’s Day 1 January 2015 and led to another round of heavy fighting in Debaltseve, Mariupol and Donetsk international airport areas of Donbas. As a result, the so-called Minsk II ceasefire agreement was signed on 11 February 2015 (OSCE 2015). This ceasefire agreement has been violated until today and Ukraine is still unable to take control of a large part of its country. Nevertheless, the idea of “Novorossiya” and its annexation, following the pattern of Crimea, was ultimately abandoned by the Russian Federation.

Russia in its “kinetic” actions against Ukraine has used irregular forces like the so-called People’s militias, the Russian Orthodox Army, the Vostok Battalion, Cossacks, Chechen, Ossetian and Abkhazian paramilitary units, as well as “foreign fighters” coming from all over the world and Russian military personnel “on leave”. Still, during the “counteroffensive” in the summer of 2014 regular military units belonging to the Russian armed forces were also used (Sutyagin 2015). This diversity is an important mark of the alleged “hybrid” nature of warfare in Ukraine since 2014. Another is Russia’s deep involvement in the “information operations” reaching much further than Ukraine itself: “The Internet and social media are seen by Russian theorists as key gamechangers in the weaponization of information (…). Internationally social media has allowed the Kremlin’s traditional media to make its way into the mainstream. (…) The Russian Foreign Ministry and missions abroad now use Twitter and Facebook actively, adopting a laconic tone. The Internet is also a boon for 21st-century active measures: if in Soviet times the KGB would have to work hard at getting its “reports” in the western press, the Internet now gives an opportunity for spreading limitless fake photos and reports, and then reporting them as “fact” on traditional media (see below breakdown of Ukrainian crisis).” (Pomerantsev and Weiss 2014, 43)

As Maria Snegovaya interestingly notes, key elements of Russian information warfare in Ukraine include:

• Denial and deception operations to conceal or obfuscate the presence of Russian forces in Ukraine, including sending in “little green men” in uniforms without insignia;
• Concealing Moscow’s goals and objectives in the conflict, which sows fear in some and allows others to persuade themselves that the Kremlin’s aims are limited and ultimately acceptable;
• Retaining superficially plausible legality for Russia’s actions by denying Moscow’s involvement in the conflict, (…);
• Simultaneously threatening the West with military power in the form of overflights of NATO and non-NATO countries’ airspace, threats of using Russia’s nuclear weapons, and exaggerated claims of Russia’s military prowess and success;
• The deployment of a vast and complex global effort to shape the narrative about the Ukraine conflict through formal and social media.” (Snegovaya 2015, 7)

Conclusions

Despite the fact that theoretical output of studies on terrorism (and hybrid warfare) is not very impressive as descriptions of particular “cases” prevail over “theories of”, we may say that we possess some knowledge in these fields. We know a lot about different terrorist entities and their history, leaders, ideologies and modus operandi. The number of academic workers interested in researching issues connected to terrorism is increasing and we should expect that a fresh look at these subjects may bring new, fruitful contributions. Terrorism is a strategy used by sub-national groups (or even individuals) who want to achieve political ends through the application of (limited) violence directed at ordinary people in order to evoke fear and in this way to influence governments. Acts of terrorism are also used to increase their abilities, propagate their message, win public support and recruit new followers. Hybrid warfare is a strategy of complex activity used by states to achieve political goals without the need to resort to fully-fledged war. Both these activities intend to utilize the psychological impact of exploiting mass fear and contemporary information environment to mislead and deceive enemies. Still, there is a lot of room for an innovative approach to both of these concepts as the demand for appropriate expertise in these fields is constantly growing.

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CHALLENGES OF THEORETICAL APPROACHES TO CYBER SECURITY

Feledy Botond

The cyber operations in Ukraine are among those that have effectively raised awareness concerning cyber security by Euro-Atlantic political decision-makers. While the very first known state-sponsored cyberattack in contemporary history was Stuxnet, directed against the Iranian uranium centrifuges in 2007, in the Central and Eastern European (CEE) region one could also call recall the Denial of Service (DDoS) attack on Estonian networks the same year. (Choucri & Goldsmith 2012). The conflict between Ukraine and Russia keeps producing more and more instances of active cyber operations as well as active measures in the information space.

Central Europe has not been spared at all of cyber threats. Not only have Ukraine and the Baltic states discovered that their enemies are online, but the Visegrad countries as well. 2017 brought lots of threats to the attention of the general public: the WannaCry attack in May, NotPetya in June and Bad Rabbit in the autumn, not to mention BlackEnergy – used against K but also engineered for different attacks. (Middleton 2017, 207) It is not without reason that Kyiv approved a new cyber security strategy, mostly in accordance with the EU’s requirements and NATO standards. The Finnish Security Committee’s cyber security programme for 2017-2020 talks about cyber self-sufficiency, “sufficient autonomous capability for maintaining the critical infrastructures alone, i.e. without need of third-party support.” (Adamowski 2017). APT28 – just to name one of the most notorious hacker groups – has been active regarding Central and Eastern European targets as well, conducting cyber espionage campaigns. Most alarmingly, the spectre of cyber operations demonstrates all the possible options in the CEE: from information operations, online and offline maskirovka, influence campaigns to potential physical damage to critical infrastructure and data loss. (Świątkowska 2017) Even the most advanced nations - such as the United Kingdom - struggle to keep their cyber security strategy updated in the face of the extremely quick developments in the domain, especially regarding the acquisition of previously state-held capabilities by private actors. (Lonsdale 2016; OECD 2012).
The Cyber-challenge: policymakers and the academia

The NATO member states at the Warsaw Summit in 2016 declared that cyberspace constituted a new domain of operations besides land, air, space and sea operations. Measures following the summit are to be implemented by 2019. The decision was long overdue, as some member states by that time already possessed important experience in defensive and offensive cyber operations. The NATO infrastructure itself has been target of hostile cyber operations continuously, hence NATO has resorted to push cyberspace further up on the transatlantic agenda (Jordan 2017). Meanwhile, cyber defence related decisions of President Trump remain among those non-contested, also that regarding the elevation of US Cyber Command to a full combatant command as recently as August 2017 (Trump 2017), which counts as a deed during these years of exponential bipolarization of federal legislative and executive bodies. However, no serious actor can deny anymore the relevance of cyber security in public debates.

Nevertheless, national legislations and administration level regulations are lagging behind. It is enough to think of drones and their troubled regulation: where, what size and at what speed may something fly above our heads, who bears responsibility and how registration (of flights or the equipment or both) may be enforced. Legislation concerning the civilian side of cyberspace is certainly less developed than the integration of cyber operations into military doctrines. The US has already been issuing relevant documents since the mid-nineties all through the Bush and Obama administrations, while, in contrast, the European Union adopted its General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) and the directive on security of network and information systems, the NIS Directive, recently (Joint Publication 2013; Joint Publication 2014; Feledy 2017).

Cyber security, despite rising public budgets in the domain, remains a joint effort of private and public actors. Furthermore, it seems that their cooperation is very much a vital variable of the effectiveness of cyber policies. The development of the Government Computer Emergency Response Teams (govCERTs) is but one example of this cooperation, as govCERTs usually offer a platform for information sharing regarding incidents, data breaches and other violations of cyber security between private and public actors. Pay gaps between public administration and private corporations are causing concern among public officials in charge of cyber security, which in turn forces cooperation further. However, complete privatisation of cyber security is impossible in the current
structure of the international system and state actors are pushing hard to create and maintain their Internet sovereignty, possibly limiting the competences of private actors in the long run.

Despite the blossoming policy discussions and growing effects of cyber (in)security on interstate relations, International Relations (IR) academia has not made any special effort to try to include cyberspace into its theoretical arsenal. While several policy papers, operative instructions and even software itself were leaked in the infamous Snowden documents years ago, it raised academic attention very slowly. As Kello explained, an earlier survey of literature illustrated the scholarship gap: the examined 18 IR journals in a ten-year period between 2001 and 2010 found all in all 49 articles on cyber politics in six publications (Kello 2012).

It is still difficult to make cyberspace enter the everyday thinking of acting politicians, even CEOs and other decision-makers, who otherwise have to confront the consequences of cyber operations on a regular basis. Now imagine the community of IR scholars who were preoccupied in the nineties by the explanation of why all theories had failed to predict the end of the Cold War, after 9/11 they had to explain why they had missed the rising role of religion and terrorism in international relations. (Battistella 2012, 619) In understanding the relevance of cyberspace, one also confronts a generational gap, as the speed of the technological evolution has easily left diverse social groups behind.

The autonomy of international relations as a domain of social sciences comes from the fact that it has its own object of research (international politics) and its own methodology, already cluttered into different paradigms over the second half of the 20th century. After the horror of the world war, the first university departments dedicated to IR and the first representatives of early idealism in the discipline concentrated on the normative objective of how to let peace reign among states, later analyses wanted to understand the causes of war. (Smouts, Battistella, Vennesson 2003, 434.)

However, war itself has transformed dramatically. The First World War was probably the last case where civilian loss was inferior to military loss on both sides. The transformation of war actually brought down more and more civilian targets and civilian victims, not necessarily as collateral damage, but as major targets. The nuclear threat of the Cold War was a clear civilian nightmare. The threat over cyberspace fits perfectly into the continuation of this logic where military operations might target solely
civilian and private infrastructures, implying damage on a national or regional scale.

It is clear that IR theory should embrace cyberspace in its full scope, but the lack of data, the overwhelming government secrecy, the mind-set barrier between technical knowledge of computer networks and policy-making/IR theory, these all account for the lacuna of cyber-relevant IR research.

Cyber operations are most probably even more secretive than traditional intelligence operations, especially after the very sensitive leaks by C. Manning and E. Snowden recently. This level of secrecy is of a different level than compared to the nuclear set up during the Cold War: scientists in the 1950s might have known - at least *grosso modo* - the possible impact, delivery and options of a nuclear strike. (Shulsky and Schmitt 2002, 160.) Today, one may well guess what kind of pre-deployed cyber arms exist and how effective they are, what the side effects are and which nation is in possession of what kind of capabilities. In other words, it is pretty difficult to develop theories among so many unknown variables.

The first challenge would be to define the actors, as cyberspace is challenging IR theories on their very classical frontlines. (Battistella 2012, 645.) Cyber space is jam-packed with non-state actors, from multinationals to terrorist groups to empowered (or just lucky) individuals. In other words, the barrier to entering cyberspace is historically very low. Anyone with access to the electric grid or to the Internet might carry out actions affecting possibly large groups of a given population. States might use these private actors as cyber-proxies and might abuse infrastructures of other states as a clout to hide their own activity. It would have been unimaginable during the Cold War to launch a strike – nuclear or conventional – from the territory of a given other country with a private army – without the serious risk of attribution. Partisans, proxies and terrorists were all being labelled and rather easily attributed. Cyber operations carry the risk of non-attribution where certainty is almost impossible or at least unadvised (Catch 22: an open act of attribution by a victim state would uncover possibly a whole range of its own cyber capabilities, as they would be needed for a high certitude attribution - otherwise the international community would not accept it). (Tsagourias, 2012)

Private actors have long passed the edge since the dawn of information technology revolution to spend and invest more in research than any state itself. Even in the United States, the Defense Advanced Research Projects
Agency (DARPA) might spend technically less with its own 3.2 billion dollar (FY2018 request) than Silicon Valley’s companies all together. This is driving us to take a closer look at the resource side of cyberspace through the lens of IR theory.

Even the largest states themselves are relying on private services when it comes to cyber security and infrastructure: communication networks have been largely privatised, government communications of middle powers are running through (partly) third state-owned countries. Hungarian government communications run through the Deutsche Telekom local company’s grid, in which the German Federal stake is currently 31.9%. Private Internet service providers are sometimes in a situation where they have to buy access to the Internet through third-country Internet Exchange Points (IXP). To be more precise, 40% of the countries do not have their own IXPs so they are forced to import broadband Internet access (Klimburg 2017).

Visibly, while the Internet (interconnected networks) is only a subset of cyberspace, it already presents a peculiar physical resource. Such a form of resource that might fit within the theory of Kenneth N. Waltz on structuralism (neorealism), where resources are a form of variable in explaining the changes of the international system. Non-physical domains of cyberspace – with at least the same capacities to influence state behaviour – also need more attention of constructivist and other identity-relevant approaches, for example when one talks about the information layer of cyberspace, and disinformation or strategic deception campaigns.

Taken from another central notion of IR theories, one may assess cyber security through the interpretation of war. Even practical level discussion on what constitutes an act of war in cyberspace is far from reaching a rest. Strict US-led interpretations lean rather to a more restrictive definition where casualties must be serious and lethal, while international humanitarian law would allow for a broader definition where a large-scale attack on civilian infrastructure in itself could constitute an act of war. (Klimburg 2017, 125 and SGDSN, 2018, 35.)

The US doctrine of equivalence highlights again the connection between conventional and cyber warfare: Washington reserves the right to retaliate in a conventional way to any cyberattack endured. This is one more argument to involve the complete cyber issue into the core of IR. However, there is a developing incremental approach, where it is understood that the theatre of war (cyber or not) falls under existing international norms – this
is the classical understanding of state-to-state conflict. The growing problematic is presented to us by the soft underbelly of hard conflicts, all the preliminary phases, until an act reaches the threshold of war. Up to that level, however, the international community is short of norms and regulations for the time being, which does not help academia and systematic research. (Farrell and Glaser 2016)

The structure of cyberspace

Before going further in the analysis of IR theory and cyberspace, it is worth stopping and deciphering how one might dissect it into a meaningful structure. The Joint Publication on Information Operations of the U.S. Army identifies three layers of cyberspace: the physical network, the logical network and the cyber-persona:

“The physical network layer of cyberspace comprises the geographic component and the physical network components. It is the medium where the data travel. The logical network layer consists of those elements of the network that are related to one another in a way that is abstracted from the physical network, i.e., the form or relationships are not tied to an individual, specific path, or node. A simple example is any website that is hosted on servers in multiple physical locations where all content can be accessed through a single uniform resource locator. The cyber-persona layer represents yet a higher level of abstraction of the logical network in cyberspace; it uses the rules that apply in the logical network layer to develop a digital representation of an individual or entity identity in cyberspace. The cyber-persona layer consists of the people actually on the network” (Joint Publication 2013, V)

The logical layer in the above description is better separated into two different sets by Klimburg (2017, 28), who identifies four layers. The physical or hardware level is the first layer, which is operated by the coding level, the second layer. Software or scripts, practically anything that is designed to operate the infrastructure falls into the “coding level”. The third level is the data level basically, where any type of information might be concerned that is intelligible to a human being. Finally, Klimburg christened the fourth layer the “social level”, as humans interpret the transmitted data in a given context, not the least according to given cultural norms and social constructions. The dissection of cyberspace has become an academic exercise. (Choucri and Clark 2012). The identity-related IR theories hence can find
their domain of applicability as much as the resource-related realist approaches in the above structure.

Another twofold differentiation is also evident, as cyber operations are either kinetic or informational. (Joint Publication 2013, SGDSN 2018, Klimburg 2017) That means that the operation has either a kinetic goal – where physical damage is intended – or it wants to compromise information in any given way (extract, manipulate or create) which might range from psychological operations to single interceptions. It is important to see that cyber defence and offence are only different in their objective but not in their means: a cyber defence measure might well involve active deterrence, put simply, an attack.

**Applying theories**

I will offer two venues for the systematic academic interpretation of cyberspace by IR theories. The first might concentrate on actors – forced to choose among them anyway – and derive conclusions from their interactions. The second option is to dissect cyberspace into layers, already done by several researchers, and apply existing theories according to the chosen layer and its internal logic.

1. **Actor-centred approaches**

A cyber threat might emerge on behalf of different actors, as stated in the previous sub-chapter. This is inviting actually different IR theories again. While mainstream IR theory would first concentrate on the very classical threat by a nation state against another nation state, one may take into account unorthodox ways such as local criminals threatening multinational corporate actors (by ransomware) or private profit-seeking actors (by generating advertisement revenue through fake news) influencing democratic processes of third states or state encouraged hacker groups disabling national critical infrastructure elements (such as the power plant cyberattack in Kyiv).

Theoretically speaking, all kind of actors might be targeted by any kind of actors.
1. State against state

2. State against private actors

3. State against private actors

4. Private actors against private actors

When IR theory steps in, for ease of explanation, I will retain only the first three options and leave out the cyber scenarios between clearly private (non-state) actors, as that may well fall under the large umbrella of cybercrime. We cannot however leave aside those private actors who wittingly or unwittingly act on behalf of a state or national interest.

The dilemma stems from the same ground as during the famous IR-paradigmatic debate: which actors are crucial and how to make a model simple enough for scientific use? State-centred neorealist and traditional realist theories may be able to take care of state-to-state cyber conflicts especially when the physical layer or kinetic attacks are envisaged, so to say when interstate conflict is concerned. This might translate as a classical conflict, though it is actually degrading cyber to a tool or weapon, and not an autonomous domain per se worthy of research.

Once the cyberspace layers are detangled, it is possible to interpret the first two layers– hardware and coding - as pure resources over which states might go to war or at least bear conflict.

This conflict is taking place in the UN Group of Government Experts on Information Security, at the Conference of the International Telecommunications Union, or at the level of bilateral non-espionage agreements, typically between China, the US and other players. Private actors are also very much represented and active through the different organizations responsible for running the infrastructure of the Internet. It must be noted that these private multi-stakeholder groups are very much consensus oriented and prefer to distance themselves from politics. Thirdly, the large multinational corporations are also strongly articulating their interests in the debate, as they fear that a state-on-state conflict escalation might have peculiar consequences on the ICT market globally, especially
when it comes to the regulation of large IT domains.

This is the reason why liberal institutionalists certainly have a strong say: what one is witnessing today is similar to the early days of regime building and to the search for confidence building measures (CBM). (Choucri, Madnick and Ferwerda 2013) This is far from the realist approach, as private actors are weighing in and in parallel, many believe that it is possible to have a win-win set at international level (or to evolve from anarchy into some form of cooperation).

But what about large-scale information operations and deception campaigns? These might be accommodated by liberal theories accepting in their paradigms the existence of competing groups internal to nation states. Only this methodology would render the information operations intelligible for abstraction and scientific analysis: a hostile state can exploit internal cleavage of a given society or alliance of nation states by weaponizing information for domestic consumption.

Finally, the role of international organised crime (IOC) should not be underestimated. According to new data sets, IOC drug trafficking is currently harvesting less revenue than cyber criminals. The quick adaptation that we have witnessed during the refugee crisis in 2015 on the trafficking routes, how illegal trafficking routes grew up in a couple of weeks, is an excellent offline example of the short reaction time of IOC. Cyber criminality has undergone the same transformation; it is just that it is less visible. IR theories related to interdependency might have better explanations in this regard.

Officially recognized private actors are also crucial. The Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) is a non-profit public benefit organization founded in 1998 in charge of crucial domain name procedures and related databases. Initially it was under US government oversight, only as recently as in October 2016 was ICANN released from government tutelage and became an autonomous actor run by an international multistakeholder group. ICANN and its history is an excellent example how technical governance of the Internet has been run by developers and engineers. Policy governance has always been trying to keep up with the pace, but policy actors are deprived of the global consensus that so much characterizes the informal scientific community running the basic Internet functions. (Klimburg 2017, 94)

Probably ICANN is the very first international organization that has a truly global reach and impact while officially no nation state dominates it.
Institutionalists have an excellent case of comparison with the actors of climate change who are under the UN Climate Change Conference series (COP) umbrella, but private actors have never grown as powerful as in the cyberspace domain. How can one ensure the long-term transparency and independence of ICANN? Is an intervention of last resort by the US government always possible, especially that core elements of the physical infrastructure are very much in North America? Perhaps in 2016 the world witnessed the first truly private actor taking its place at interstate level? Or are realists right and ICANN is just a better run cover-up for government interests after all?

As for regime building, the first – unsuccessful – United Nations Group of Government Experts in information security was launched as far back as in 2004. The third report in June 2015 represented a breakthrough, on the norms and responsible state behaviour in cyberspace. It is taken as one of the most important CBMs, despite the severe disaccord between the Internet Sovereignty block and the Free Internet block. The report underlined the non-intervention and state sovereignty principle at the same time as confirming the validity of international law and its applicability to the use of ICTs by states. (UN 2015)

In the above interpretation, this represents an excellent regime-building exercise for managing the conflict of state actors before reaching the threshold of war. The major dilemma here is the following. The Internet Sovereignty block wants to refrain from lowering the threshold of act of war, in other words, they do not want to face a situation where a mass cyber espionage operation might lead to conventional countermeasures such as sanctions or war. On the other hand, the Free Internet block wants to maintain a margin of manoeuvre over the definition and restrain itself from exactly laying down (in any kind of international norm) what constitutes non-war cyber operations and what is the threshold. If a tangible threshold was accepted, all hostile states would just pass under it and reclaim it as a non-act of war, so it would be largely abused. This is not a recipe for a mutually accepted convention for the time being.

In this perspective Mearsheimer’s offensive realism offers a good understanding. State actors thrive to maximise their security and are not satisfied with optimizing it. This seems to be exactly what is happening in the state-run part of cyberspace. (Mearsheimer 2001; Thomas 2016)
2. Layer-centred approaches

The fight of the great powers and their allies is actually ongoing for the physical layer of cyberspace, namely the Internet infrastructure. At state level, one of the first loud conflicts erupted at the International Telecommunications Union’s (ITU) World Conference on International Telecommunications in December 2012 in Dubai, where the American delegation and another 54 states did not sign the resolution mainly lobbied for by Russia, China and Iran. It would have indirectly permitted content filtering through the excuse of spam blocking (but to block a specific email, first it has to be analysed content-wise).

As Robertson observed in his article, the ITU Secretary General Hamadoun Touré’s declaration, the new leader “insisted that ‘I wouldn’t want to see the ITU trying to take over Internet governance,’ but he said that it still had a “mandate” to protect it and foster growth.” (Robertson 2012)

But this was only the surface. By that time the world has been separated into two blocks. First the “Free Internet” group with US leadership, satisfied with the international status quo of the Internet. This means that DNS servers and IXPs are still overwhelmingly in the transatlantic space, though not at all under direct government control. The more or less maintained “net neutrality” principle has helped so far to keep content-filtering at bay. The other “Internet Sovereignty” group understands cyberspace in its entirety: not only the first two layers, but very strong emphasis on the social aspect, in other words, sovereignty over the information space. Hence this group wants to enable internationally and legitimize the domestic interventions over the Internet, shall that mean national firewalls, IP blockings, social scoring or any other measures. (Klimburg 2017)

This fight of the two blocks simply resembles too much the Cold War settings, but only at the first sight. However, it is not impossible to give realist explanations on the state-level to these interactions where international organizations are just tools for bandwagoning and not vehicles for true confidence-building measures. Nonetheless, such a realist interpretation would render a large part of reality unreadable for the analyst as it is omitting important and weightful actors. What might one do with all the private interests— NGOs, freedom fighters, anonymous-like groups, hacking communities and IT multinationals – which are having their impact on this debate, representing interests substantially decoupled from state interests.
On the other hand, Wallerstein’s world system theory and the classical Marxist approach can have its entry points to the analysis of cyberspace. It would take the focus of the research more to global multinationals and their role in creating wealth, managing populations (or at least offering tools of oppression by social media/social scoring for example) and defining the new borders of centrum and periphery: who is connected and who is disconnected? According to realistic estimates, at least 2/3 of the countries in the world are still in the phase of connecting themselves to the digital world, in the process of digitalization. Might digitalization be the new gap between powerful centres and peripheries?

The upper layers – information, cyber-persona or social – are just as important as the technical layers of the cyberspace. Human agency is playing out with its full load in this layer and active measures have been conducted in the last decade and a half with global impact. Nevertheless, information warfare as such entered the military vocabulary more than two decades ago concerning the physical level: jamming communications, obscuring radar signals and the like. It did not take too long though to come to today’s understanding: by the end of the 1990s, information warfare was accepted more as an umbrella for influence operations, psychological operations, also involving behaviour-focused operations and all this being carried out over the information space. In the latter, the role of cyberspace grew exponentially from the early 2000s.

Information operations (IO) are not a new phenomenon, it is just that cyberspace has exponentially rendered them more effective against large populations and much less expensive than previously. By definition, such an operation can simply target (a group of) individuals by intelligence services (e.g. for interception), but more interestingly from a theoretical perspective, they might target larger groups or entire populations as well. This latter deserves theoretical adaptation from IR academics.

To follow our description from the previous sub-chapter, the interpretation of information space by the Internet Sovereignty block and the Free Internet block differs again. For the sovereigntist states, typically with authoritarian regimes, it is usual to take cyber information space as a weaponized space, where information can always be a weapon. They have been pursuing information operations against their own population for some period most probably. For the Free Internet block, this is legally a barrier, as the basically democratic countries are disabled to use information domestically as a weapon, though they have been using it abroad. But the place of information
operations is different in the two blocks’ military doctrines. For the democratic states, it is most often forced to the operational level, concerning theatre of war situations, intelligence and targeted cyber operations. It means that decision-makers are usually afraid to present to their domestic public that they are about to weaponize information on a large scale abroad, as fears of using it the same way at home would immediately arise. This does not mean that intelligence services and lately cyber commands of Western states are not using information operations, quite the contrary; the public has been discussing it due to the Snowden revelations. (Greenwald 2014) However, that public debate exactly showed how easy it is to lose trust in a democratic environment for government agencies. Tumkevic built an entire essay on the interpretation of national cyber security strategies according to the different threat perceptions, based on the earlier works of Buzan et al. (Tumkevic 2016)

From a theoretical perspective it may be assessed that domestic policy is influencing foreign policy actions for the above reasons. This is excluding most structuralist approaches and others where intra-state decision-making is a black box. Furthermore, hostile information operations, once again, are targeting groups of populations for the very reason to influence their own political leaders. In other words, it is a weapon to change and shift public perceptions and public opinion. If successfully implemented, it may decrease trust in the government, in allies or international organizations, as we see with country-tailored Russian hostile strategic deception campaigns. (Pynnöniemi and Rácz, 2016)

IOs represent a special tool in identity politics. Of course the axioms of the chosen paradigm must accept identity perceptions. It seems to be good terrain for constructivist explanation, especially with IOs waged against NATO as an alliance and the perception of the allies by the populations. The sole existence of IOs is corroborating constructivism and liberal approaches in IR where groups inside the nation-state can define and redefine national interest (Battistella 2012).

Major questions for the early 21st century are whether state collapses can be provoked by IOs? How can IR theory insert social trust in governments among its variables? Clearly, mistrusted public institutions in democracies are driving to extremely volatile elections or referendums which might be in turn hijacked by hostile IO campaigns. Finally, the foreign policy of a given state actor might be reduced in its ambition due to the domestic chaos. How may Ukraine beat the Russian IOs in the international information space
where the Russians are trying to hammer the message of how corrupt and radical (fascist) the Kyiv regime is, while Ukraine needs to convince investors and international partners of its trustworthiness at the same time? Surely the classical networks of embassies are unable to pursue such a large scale endeavour; hence this exercise is becoming one of the biggest for public diplomacy. How to raise awareness and how to involve groups of the given nation to be involved in the campaign? (Just like Russians in Germany during the “Lisa case” or Ukrainians in Transatlantic countries trying to counterbalance Russian narratives).

The growing disengagement between the media space (traditional journalism) and social media offers new venues for disinformation on a global level. Language barriers are also important; take the example of Russian minorities in post-Soviet states dependent on Russian-speaking media. Plenty of identity questions arise that may be replied by the constructivist approach.

Conclusions

Cyberspace is one of the greatest intellectual challenges for us in the 21st century. No one knows today who will be in charge, what kind of electronic and information flows will remain unhampered and which ones will become stuck on the teeth of firewalls. The battle between global IT multinational interests and national interest is also counting down, especially if Chinese-US relations become severed. Ukraine has become an exercise ground for cyber operations in all aspects. The Transatlantic allies must learn from and reach out to Kyiv in order to maintain distance from Moscow. Theories of IR are not able to grasp the entirety of cyberspace but as previously during history, each paradigm has its own added-value to the dilemmas of the future of cyberspace.

1Lisa case: a German girl allegedly raped by an immigrant during the run-up to the German federal elections in 2015. Later it turned out that no violence had taken place and experts agreed it had been a Russian disinformation operation. Details: NATO Review Magazine 2016.
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